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THE MILITARY REFORM IN THE VICEROYALTY OF PERU, 

1762-1800 



By 

LEON GEORGE CAMPBELL, JR. 



A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 

1970 




8 1-6^ 99980 Z9ZI S 

Vaid01ddOAilSU3AINn 



TO J.E.A., S.P.A., AND A.A.C. 
V/HO PUSHED, PAID, AND PULLED, RESPECTIVELY 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Although a dissertation hears the name of a single author^ 
it is the product of ideas and inspiration received during the 
student's graduate career. To Professors David Bushnell^ Neil] 
Macaulay^ John Mahon, and Andres Su6reZj v;ho have provided both^ 
I owe a sincere debt of gratitude. 

I should also like to thank the persons who aided in the 
preparation of this dissertation. In Lima the staffs of the 
Archivo Nacional and the Biblioteca Nacional extended me every 
courtesy. Dr. Felix Denegri Luna placed his extraordinary library 
at my disposal and helped my research in many ways. i owe a 
financial debt of gratitude to the Division of Foreign Studies 
of the Department of Healthy Education^ and V/elfare for the 
generous assistance v/hich supported my research. Miss Mary Lou 
Nelson of the Institute of International Studies kindly assisted 
me in numerous ways. in Seville^, I was Indebted to thf' Staff 
of the Archivo General de las Indias for tlieir cooperation. 
Mrs. Celia Lcscano ably typec' the n.fnuscr'pt. 

To Professor Lyle N. McAlister^ my committee chairman^ I owe 
the largest measure of gratitude. Not only has he provided me with 
financial support c^nd sound advice throughout graduate school^ but 
also with much that has contributed to my development as a scholar. 
Moreover^ he has been a close and valued friend. Finally^ I hereby 



release my v;ife and children from their vows of perpetual silence 
whi le I am typing. 

While praise may be distributed widely, blame cannot. I 
assume all responsibility for errors of fact and interpretation 
contained in the manuscript. 



TABLE OF CONTEfiTS 

Page 

ACKNOV/LEDGMLNTS ii 

LIST OF TABLES v 

LIST OF FIGURE vi 

A NOTE ON CITATIONS vii 

ABSTRACT xi 

INTRODUCTION 1 

I. THE DEFENSES OF PERU AT MIDCENTURY 9 

II. THE MILITARY RESPONSES OF PERU TO THE SEVEN YEARS 

WAR 30 

III. THE ARECHE VISITATION AMD THE V.'^'.RS OF THE AMERICAN 

REVOLUTION 95 

IV. TESTING OF THE MILITARY REFORM: THE INDIAN 

REVOLTS OF I78O-I7S3 1^5 

V. THE CULMINATION OF THE MILITARY RF.FORM 207 

Vi. THE CUNSEOUENCES OF EXPANDED MILITARY PRIVILEGE . 266 

CONCLUSION 312 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 322 



LIST OF TABLES 

Table Page 

1. THE ARMY OF PERU, 1760 15 

2. COMPANIES OF MILITIA RAISED DURING THE 

SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1762-17&3 ^k 

3. THE ARMY OF PERU IN 1776 77 

k. UNIT ORGANIZATION UNDER THE REGLAMENTO 
FOR THE DISCIPLINED MILITIA OF CUBA, 
1769 105 

5. EXPEDITION SENT FROM CUZCO AGAINST TUPAC 

AMARU, MARCH, 1781 183 

6. THE REFORM OF THE F I JO COMPONENT OF THE 

ARMY OF PERU, 178'i 225 

7. ORGANIZATION OF A VETERAN INFANTRY 

REGIMENT 228 

8. THE MILITIA OF PERU, I787-I8I6 238 

9. THE ARM.Y OF PERU, 181 6 251 



LIST OF FIGURE 



Figure 

1. Map of Peru 



Page 
xi 



A NOTE ON CITATIONS 

The research for this dissertation was done In four principal 

archives: the Archivo Genera] de las Indias in Seville, Spain 

(hereinafter cited as AG I ) , the Archivo Nacional, Lima (hereinafter 

cited as ANL), the Bancroft Library of the University of California 

at Berkeley (hereinafter cited as BL) and the Biblioteca Nacional, 

Lima (hereinafter cited as BNL) . In order to facilitate citing 

these sources, abbreviations will be used. The name of the archive 

will be immediately followed by a colon and the name of the ramo 

(section) of the archive where the particular document is to be 

found. The abbreviations for these are as follows: 

AC - Audiencia de Cuzco 

AL - Audiencia de Lima 

IG - Indiferente General 

RA - Real Audiencia 

RH - Real Hacienda 

RTC - Real Tribunal del Consul ado 

TM - Tribunal Mi 1 itar 

The ramo is followed by the number of the volume in which 
the document was found. Wherever possible, this number is fol- 
lowed by the number of the expediente (item or document) itself, 
although in many instances these were unnumbered, in this case, 
the docunient is identified by the names of the correspondents, 
the location, the date and the page numbers. 

For example, a letter from Viceroy Kanuel de Amat to Jose de 
G5lve2, Lima, January 12, 1775; wliich v/as located in the Archivo Gene' 
ral de las Indias in Section Audiencia de Limia, volume 1^90^ would 



be cited as AGI :AL 1^9Q Amat to G^lvez, Linia_, January 12, 1775, 
Particular titles are enclosed in quotation marks and cited 
exactly as they appeared. 



Source: Jchn Preston Moore^ The Cabildo in Peru 
under the Bourbons (Durham, N.C,, I966), 
facing p. 252. 




r3 






AUDIENCIA DE LIMA 

ADAPTED FROM ANDREAS BATEATO, 

Piano del Vtrrepnato del Peru, 1792 



Boundaries of the Intendcncics of Lima 
Boundary of the Cuico Audiencia 



Figure 1 . --Map of Peru 



XI 



Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the 

Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment 

of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 



THE MILITARY REFORM IN THE VICEROYALTY 
OF PERU, 1762-1800 



By 

Leon George Campbell, Jr, 
June, 1970 



Chairman: Dr. Lyle N. KcAlister 
Major Department: History 



During tlie seventeenth century the defense of the Spanish empire 
in America vias in the hands of regular army troops sent from Spain and 
stationed in the pre s id ios or garrisons located along the frontiers of 
the several viceroyal l ies , The decisive defeat of Spain at the hands 
of Great Britain during the Seven Years V/ar (1756-1763) demonstrated the 
inadequacy of these presidial troops to defend such a vast region and 
led to a major reorganization of the New V/orld armies. This reorganiza- 
tion of th.e military comprised one of a series of measures knov/n col- 
lectively as the Bourbon Reforms in honor of their creator, the Bourbon 
monarch Charles III. 

The intention of the Spanish crov.'n v/as to replace these garrison 
troops with battalions raised In the colonies themselves in an effort 
to better defend against future attacks. In addition, a militia was to 



be created on a regional basis and disciplined by veteran comnand and 
staff groups vyhich were to provide them with periodic training. While 
this approach v;as successful in New Spain, the immense size of the 
Viceroyalty of Peru prevented its effective implementation there. The 
distance between towns and cities and the rural nature of the kingdom 
meant that the militia in Peru v;ere too widely dispersed to operate as 
tactical units during v/artin";e. Moreover, the lack of whites in these 
highland regions made the Spanish authorities reluctant to grant com- 
missions as officers to mixed bloods, whose loyalty to the crov;n was 
frequently suspect. The discipline of the militia broke down because 
militia commissions were instead granted to the Creole nobility in 
Lima who rarely, if ever, travelled to the provinces to inspect their 
companies , 

A decade of Indian rebellion, bf^ginn'ng with the Tupac Amaru 
revolt in I7B0, forced the eventual disbanding of the interior militia 
except in certain large cities such as Cuzco where bodies of urban 
militia remained as a form of civil guard. Thereafter a disciplined 
militia in Peru viss retained only along the coast. This reduction in 
the size of the militia and of the f i jo battalions that had been raised 
in the colonies, combined v;itli the arrival of two veteran regiments 
from Spain in I786, signified a return to the traditional form of 
defense, and was a tacit admission that the military reform had failed. 

Further limitations v/ere placed upon the military reform by the 
disruptive visitation of Jos6 Antonio de Arecfie and the creation of the 
Viceroyalty of the La Plata in 1776 which removed the silver mines of 

xi i i 



Charcas from Peru's jurisdiction. To replace this source of revenue, 
tax levels were increased in Peru which provoked further disturbances. 
Efforts to collect a "military contribution" to pay the salaries of 
veteran training cadres were defeated by militia resistance. Embroiled 
in a long series of European wars, Peru was forced to restrict its 
army to the defense of Lima and certain other large cities along the 
coast . 

The failure of the Army of Peru to achieve the power and prestige 
which a successful reform might have brought about caused it also to 
be unable to assert its f uer o mi li t ar , or privileged military juris- 
diction, at the expense of civil authority as the Army of New Spain 
was able to do. Although Creoles by 1800 monopolij'ed both the regular 
and militia components of the Army of Peru, they v/ere a conservative 
and internally divided group. In addition, the military v;as split 
over the issue of pard o or Negro military privileges, and opposed by 
a powerful civil jurisdiction which was exercised by men of wealth 
and prestige in the community. In Lima, courts were unwilling to grant 
the military special privileges since they v^ere not considered to be 
the defenders of the kingdom. The viceroy himself enforced a strict 
code of military justice. In Peru the military reforni was largely 
abortive and the army never succeeded in becoming a corporate Interest 
group. Not until the v;ars for independence did anything resembling a 
praetorian tradition take hold in Peru. 



INTRODUCTION 

This dissertation is a study of the reform of the Army of Peru 
which took place during the period 1762-1796 under the auspices of 
the Bourbon Kings Charles III and his son Charles iV and which consti- 
tuted one of the group of measures collectively known as the Bourbon 
Reforms . 

This study specifically is intended to help fill three Important 
historical needs. Firsts It offers additional information regarding 
the Viceroyalty of Peru during a critical epoch in its history. Peru 
was the oldest and wealthiest of Spain's possessions in South America^ 
but unfortunately It has never received the historical attention com- 
mensurate with its importance to the empire. Moreover^ studies of 
colonial Peru bear the marks of passion and bias, Jorge Basadre,, per- 
haps Peru's greatest living historian^ has explained this phenomenon 
in terms of the "civil war" v/hich he feels has raged in his country 
between those scholars who defend Spain's actions and those who down- 
grade them in favor of the Indian cultures which the Spanish displaced. 
Such a polemic, he maintains, has made the writing of objective colonial 
history practically Impossible. The eighteenth century--sandwiched 
between the dramatic events of conquest and independence which flank it 
on either side--has been seriously neglected in this regard. This 
period deserves a better fate. Not only does it embrace the precursors 
of independence such as Jose Gabriel Tupac Amaru, the Indian rebel v/hose 

1 



revolt in I78O v/as the most significant challenge to royal authority of 
the century, but also other important events such as the Bourbon Reforms, 

v/hich historians only recently have come to regard as crucial to a full 

2 

understanding of the independence period v/hich follows. 

The second purpose of this work is to shed additional light on 
these reforms which have not been studied as a whole at this writing. 
The military reorganization is especially pertinent in this regard, 
since it touched upon and was affected by several other Bourbon reform 
measures, including the expulsion of the Jesuits, the creation of the 
La Plata Viceroynity, the fntendant system, and many cf the fiscal 
actions intended to produce additional revenue. 

Finally, the study will examine the growth of the military corpora- 
tion in Peru. The author is interested in determining if the stated 
purposes of reforming the institution \Jere achieved or not, and the 

consequences of such a reform. Few other studies of the military during 

3 

this period exist. Without them the assumption that all royal laws v;ere 

applied and executed uniformly throughout the empire tends to be perpet- 
uated by default. This study attempts to demonstrate that in fact such 
v;as not the case. Often the historical realities of each region Imposed 
changes v;hich led to the creation of military institutions which varied 
greatly in terms of size, composition, and function. These differences 
often assume an important role In understanding the subsequent histories 
of the area? in question, and should be recognized for this reason. 
The significance of the Bourbon Reforms lies in the fact that 
tiiey sought to effect a complete fiscal and administrative renovation 



of the Spanish empire in America. To help achieve these purposes^ 
jurisdictional boundaries within the empire were redrawn to increase 
efficiency, and administrators known as Intendants were dispatched from 
Spain to apply precedents which had been successful earlier in France. 
Capable administrators knovyn as vl s I tors -general were sent out to 
investigate current conditions and to implement the reform program. 
Measures were also taken to insure internal security including the 
expulsion In 176? of the powerful Society of Jesus, which the crown 
regarded as subversive. 

In 1778 a "free trade" regulation was passed v/hich v;as designed 
to increase economic grov/th by permitting expanded trade within the 
colonies themselves and with the Peninsula. Efforts were made to 
slimulate colonial Industries such as tobacco and brandy manufactures 
by converting them Into royal monopolies. Measures designed to Increase 
royal revenues were central to the Bourbon program because of Spain's 
constant involvement in European v/ars. Duties were placed upon rriany 
colonial products formerly excluded from payment, and levels of sales 
taxes and tributes were increased. Scientific missions from Europe 
were dispatched to factories and mines to apply technological advances 
and thereby increase productivity. 

The underlying reason behind all of these measures v/as to 
strengthen the empire In order that It might defend Itself from ex- 
ternal aggression and bear its fair share of the expenses of such 
defense. As historian R. A. Humpiireys has stated 

The reasons for these striking innovations were, in the 
broadest sense of the word, strategic. Efficiency in administra- 
tion, the rehabilitation of colonial trade, were not so much ends 



in themselves as means to an end; and the end was colonial defense, 
the protection of the empire against foreign aggression, particularly 
English aggression.^ 

Such a purpose dictated that the size and quality of the small colonial 

armies be improved. 

The proposed military reform consisted of four major parts. First, 
a series of new fortifications were to be built and older ones improved 
in order to protect the shipping and populations of the coastal port 
cities. Secondly, the quality of the Spanish regular forces serving 
in the garrisons throughout America was to be upgraded. Third, additional 
regular troops, known as f 11 o (fixed), or permanent battalions viere to 
be raised within the colonies themselves. Finally, a militia was to be 
raised and disciplined in order that it could bear the major share of 
colonial defense. The relative Importance of this militia increased 
after the Spanish defeat In the Seven Years V/ar (1756"1763)^ since money 
was less available to construct fortifications or to raise additional 
regular troops. Instead of garrisoning the colonies with veteran troops 
as it had formerly done throughout the seventeenth century, Spain sent 
out veteran command and staff groups from the Peninsula to train and 
discipline these militia. Taken together, these four measures were 
intended to create the first modern armies in Spanish America. 

The several chapters of the dissertation are designed to il- 
lustrate the stages through which the reform program passed and the 
changes v/hich circumstances Imposed upon It. The emphasis throughout 
is upon the effect which these changes had upon the functionality of 
the reform itself, or to v/hat degree the stated objectives of the 



reform were achieved. Chapter I offers an overview of the defenses of 
the VIceroyalty of Peru immediately prior to the reform in order that 
the reader can better evaluate the changes which occurred thereafter. 
Chapter II describes the impact of the Seven Years War upon Spanish 
military policy. The war itself provoked two measures, one of which 
was an initial riiobi 1 izat ion of forces at the time of Spain's entrance 
Into the war in 1762. The end of the war the follov/ing year caused 
this mobilization to be tentative and provisional in nature but the 
stinging defeat which Spain had suffered at the fiands of Great Britain 
created the preconditions for a thoroughgoing reform of the army 
instituted in 1766 by the Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Junient and designed 
to avert continued British intrusion into the empire. One of the lead- 
ing historians of this period has claimed that this reform "militarized" 
Peru, enabling it to withstand the serious challenges of Indian revolt 
during the follGv;ing decades, and to hold back the movement for 
independence after the turn of the century. Archival research 
indicates, however, that this interpretation Is dangerously misleading 
and thai certain features of the reform itself might have actually 
helped to provoke these later events. 

Chapter III treats the third stage of the reform which coincided 
with the arrival in Peru of the Vis i tor -General Jose Antonio de Arecfie 
in 1777. His counterpart in New Spain, Jose de G^lvez, had initiated 
a series of measures in that region v;hich materially aided the success 
of the Bourbon reform program. The different experience of Areche in 
Peru demonstrates that personality conPlIcts and economic circumstances 



v/ere to affect the outcome of the visitation, the military reform 
program, and even the future of the viceroyalty Itself. Moreover, 
it also points up the fact that often the reform programs did not 
constitute a harmonious whole. Both the creation of the La Plata 
Viceroyalty and the emergency fiscal measures initiated by Areche 
actually v/orked at cross purposes with the military reform, prevent- 
ing its full implementation and altering its course. This factor has 
not previously been considered in assessments of the success and 
significance of the Bourbon Reforms. This chapter Introduces several 
documents which illustrate that the reformed militia played an 
important part in defeating these fiscal reforms and in at least one 
instance provided a model of successful resistance to royal authority 
which was utilized by the leaders of the indigenous rebellions shortly 
thereafter. This constitutes a rel nterpretat Ion of the events of the 
period, and of their significance within the context of reform. 

Chapter IV describes the Indian rebellions vjhich provided the 
first true test of the effectiveness of the military reform, and 
which led to an important reorientation of the program after 178^. 

Chapter V describes the culmination of the military reform 
v;hich took place between 178't and 1796. Here it will be shown that 
changes resulted from the Indian wars which caused the composition, 
location and mission of the Army of Peru to be altered. Such changes 
raise the questions of whether the purposes stated at the time of its 
formation had in fact been achieved, or whether a quite different 
institution had been created by the end of the century. And if it 
had, what the consequences of this were. 



Chapter Vl deals with the expanded military privileges which 
accompanied the reform program. These privileges, or f ueros . included 
the right of soldiers to be tried by their military tribunals rather 
than the ordinary, or royal jurisdiction. Historian Lyle N. McAIIster, 
in a book on the subject, holds that such privileges were abused in 
Nev.' Spain and that members of the army, notably the militia, utilized 
them to undermine the prestige and authority of the representatives 
of the king. He offers this as one explanation for the disintegration 
of Spanish government in New Spain after I8O8, and for the creation of 
a praetorian tradition in that country. This chapter will present 
several cases which Illustrate the extent to which tlie Army oF Peru 
was also able to become an effective corporate interest group, and 
offer some hypotheses regarding Its ability to operate In this fashion. 
Finally a conclusion will summarize the findings of these chapters and 
offer some hypotheses regarding their significance. 



Notes 



Jorge Basadre^ Me ditaciones sobre el destino hist6r?co del 
Per u (Lima, 19^7), P. ^8. 

2 

R. A. Humphreys and John Lynch (eds.), The Origins of the 
Latin American Revolutions, 1308-1826 (New York, 1965). 

•J 

■'Allan James Kuethe, "The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty 

of New Granada, 1773"1796/' doctoral dissertation, University of 

Florida (Gainesville, 1967); Colonel Juan Beverina (ret,). El 

vi rre i nat o de las prpvincias d el Rio de la Plata, su organiza - 

cion mi 1 iter (Buenos Aires, 1935), 

R. A. Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt in Lat in America 
(London, 1969); p, 78, 

Manuel de Amat y Junient, Memoria de Gobierno . Edici6n y 
estudio preliminar de Vicente Rodr'guez Casado y Florentine 
P^rez Embid (Seville, 19'+9), p. lii. 

6 
Lyle N. McAiister, The "Fu er o Mil iter" in New Spain. 176^- 

1800 (Gainesville, 1957), PP. 15; 89. 



I. THE DEFENSES OF PERU AT MIDCENTURY 

The defense of the Viceroyalty of Peru had alv.'ays been severely 
restricted by factors of geography and demography. In addition, Peru's 
isolation, maintained by the treacherous Cape Horn passage, prevented 
the need for a large standing army. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century this situation was rapidly changing. Navigational improvements 
reduced the hazards of the passage and English seaborne expeditions 
began to appear with increasing frequency, while Indian uprisings also 
prol i ferated. 

The Viceroyalty of Peru in the eighteenth century embraced a huge 
area of approximately 2,300,000 square miles, more than ten times the 
size of Spain itself. The viceroy in Limn held ultimate control over 
the districts of Tucum^n, Paraguay, and Buenos Aires, also, but due 
to the great distance from Lima they were practically autonomous and 
will not be considered as part of the viceroyalty for the purposes of 
this study. Peru v;as divided into the judicial districts of Charcas, 
Chile, and Lima. The Audiencia of Charcas, or Upper Peru, exercised 
practical jurisdiction over the districts of Buenos Aires, Paraguay, 
and Tucum^n to the east. The control of the viceroy over Chile to 
the south was limited to "grave and important matters" such as defense, 
and as such it will be included in this study, although in fact the 
president of that audiencia was relatively autonomous due to the 
formidable geographic barriers separating it from Lima. The Audiencia 



10 



of Lima, stretching along the coast from Piura to the Atacama desert 
to the south and eastward across the Andes to the Brazilian frontier 
(roughly the configuration of present-day Peru), was the immediate 

concern of the viceroy, although he bore ultimate responsibility for 

2 

practically the entire subcontinent. 

Although the viceroy in Lima was the most powerful Spanish 
authority in South America, the geographical barriers which afflict 
this region severely limited the exercise of this power. The coast- 
line of Peru stretches out some 1^00 miles. For the most part it is 
barren desert, save for a few rivers which traverse it at certain 
points. Behind this desert is located the s ierra and the formidable 
Andes mountain range which rises to heights of twenty thousand feet. 
Past the eastern peaks of the Andes 1 ie the montana and the sel va 
(jungle) regions which extend to the Brazilian frontier. Such 
geographic diversity has prevented tlie development of internal com- 
munications. Due to the seaborne nature of the Spanish American 
empire, most of the cities of colonial Peru were located among the 
coastal desert near the rivers which emptied into the sea and allowed 
agriculture to be established. The largest of these was the capital 
of Lima, "The City of the Kings/' v/hich by 1755 had an estlm.ated pop- 
ulation of 5^+^000, excluding Negro slaves and Indians. The other 
cities of Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa were located along the v/cstern 
sierra, at fielghts up to thirteen thousand feet. Northern and 
eastern Peru was practically uninhabited except by Indians. 

By midccntury the viceroyalty had an estimated population of 
3.5 million people, the majority of whom were Indians inhabiting 



11 



the montana and sierra regions. A midcentury estimate of the Indian 
population of Peru sets their number at approximately 2.5 million. 
While there are no accurate figures for Peru as a vjhole, the popula- 
tion estimates of Lima tell us something about the ethnic composition 
of the viceroyalty in general. Generally speaking^ the coast was a 
Negroid area. The Spanish naval lieutenants Jorge Juan and Antonio 
de Ulloa felt that Negroes and mulattos constituted the largest single 
group in Lima^ working mostly as muleteers and agricultural laborers. 

They estimated that the mestizos (a mixture of Indian and white) formed 

8 
the second largest group. These people tended to populate the sierra 

region, often employed as small tradesmen. The number of whites in 

Lima and elsewliere was particularly small in relation to the other 

races. The number of Peni nsulares , or Spaniards born in Spain who 

owned property in Lima, has been estimated at 1,811. The total number 

of whites in Lima, including Creoles or Spaniards born In Peru, has 

9 
been estimated at between 15^000 and 18,000. Although many of these 

had been ruined as the direct result of a violent earthquake which 
struck the city on October 28, 17^6, a v/ealthy upper class, rich in 
real property and slaves, managed to maintain itself throughout the 
century. These Isolated cities, ruled by a provincial elite, and 
the geographic barriers which separated them prevented any central- 
ized administration of the viceroyalty and produced a regionalism 
v/hich is still prevalent in Peru today. 

The Pacific coast location of the Viceroyalty of Peru had 
granted tliat kingdom an isolation which had not been afforded to 



12 



Spain's ci rcum-Car Ibbean colonies. The rigors of the Cape Horn passage 

tended to deter large expeditions which might assault its shores. By 

midcentury, however, navigational improvements such as the quadrant and 

the astrolabe had reduced the hazards of such a crossing and had ended 

two centuries of splendid isolation. Proof of this was to come v;ith 

the invasion of Admiral George Anson in 17^1. 

English and French corsairs had frequently sailed off of the coast 

of Peru during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries but had done 

little actual damage due to their small number. But historian Jorge 

Basadre feels that 

Only the absence of a common plan among all the freebooters, 
the distance of Peru from their bases, the contrary winds, and 
the internal dissension, saved Peru from worse depredat ions . ' 2 

This assertion is buttressed by the secret testimony of Juan and Ulloa, 

who reported to the king that the expedition commanded by the English 

Admiral George Anson which had captured the port of Paita in northern 

Peru would undoubtedly have been able to capture Lima also except for 

the fact that losses suffered in rounding the Horn had reduced his 

force to two ships and only 500 men. Even so, Anson had captured 

Paita and forced its ransom by the viceroy. Juan and Ulloa stressed 

to the crown that, as a result of the expedition. Great Britain had 

gathered sufficient geographical information about the Peruvian coast 

13 

to mount an effective invasion of the viceroyalty in the future. 

In addition, the earthquake of 17^6 had affected the fertility of the 

soil in Peru whiich forced it to import wheat and other foodstuffs 

1^+ 
from Chile. This made it very vulnerable to a blockade by sea which 

could possibly have forced the surrender of Lima through starvation. 



13 



By midcentury only the Andes provided the coastal cities of Peru 
with any sort of internal barrier against the depredations of the 
hostile Indians who inhabited the montapia and selva regions. This 
defense had its limitations, however, since there were numerous 
passes throughout the western cordi 1 lera v;here these Indians could 
penetrate and raid the small settlements of Tarma and Jauja to the 
east of Lima. In 17^2 an Indian cacique (chief) of Cuzco, Juan Santos 
Atahualpa, rose in rebellion against the crown and proclaimed himself 
King of the Andes. Local militia were raised in the Cuzco region 

to put down the uprising but their efforts were unsuccessful due to 

1 6 

a lack of discipline, organization, and training. In 17^+5 Viceroy 

Jose Antonio Manso de Velasco dispatched a force of 100 regular troops 
from Lima under the command of General JosI de Llamas to subdue the 
rebels. A combination of bad weather, epidemics, difficult terrain, 
and ineptitude defeated the efforts of this expedition. Juan Santos 
and his folloivers used guerrilla tactics to perfection, keeping to 
the high ground, and never allowing themselves to be drawn into a 
pitched battle v;ith the Spanish forces. For thirteen years Juan 
Santos raided the small towns in the Tarma-Jauja area and was never 
captured. His success v/as dramatic proof of the Inability of the 
Army of Peru by midcentury to maintain the internal security of the 
viceroyal ty. 

The composition of the Spanish colonial armies can be divided 
into two groups, regulars and militia. The first of these v/ere regular 
Spanish army troops which were sent out to man the frontier garrisons 



14 



yhich clotted the coasts and borders of the various viceroyal t les . By 
nidcentury this component numbered only 1^553 men (see Table 1). The 
lecond, or militia^ component was separated into two classes, provin- 
:ial and urban, modelled after the militia of Spain. The first of 
:hese was organized after the thirty-three infantry regiments which 
lad been formed in the thirty-three provinces of Castile. It was 
'requently referred to as "disciplined" militia due to the fact it 
possessed a standard table of organization, a veteran training cadre, 
5nd regular instruction in tactics and the handling of arms. Urban 
lilitia, on the other hand, possessed none of these attributes. They 
;ere merely ad hoc bodies which were sponsored by guilds or corpora- 
lions within the larger towns and cities. In general they were raised 
luring periods of immediate emergency to defend the city from attack. 

The omnipresent danger of corsairs required that garrisons be 
naintained along the coast of Chile and Peru. The southern port of 
/aldivia was garrisoned with an infantry battalion numbering 315 men 
)nd a cavalry battalion of 185. The islandsof Chiloe and Juan Fernan- 
Jez off of the Chilean coast v/ere also garrisoned due to the safe 
larbor they offered to expeditions v/hich had rounded the Cape. Chiloe 
lad infantry and dragoon companies numbering ninety-four men, while 
Juan Fernandez had an infantry company with forty-five. The capital 
)f Santiago and its port of Valparaiso were guarded by a forty-four 
nan dragoon company and a fifty-three man artillery company respec- 
: I vely. 

The interior of the viceroyalty had no formal garrisons until 
:he Juan Santos rebellion of 17^2. The failure of General Llamas to 



15 

TABLE 1 
THE ARMY OF PERU, I76O 



Regulars 

Lima 

Cavalry 

Company of the Viceregal Guard I60 

Halberdier Guard of the Viceroy 62 

Companies of the Callao Garrison 100 

Cal lao 

Royal Regiment of Lima 272 

Tar ma 

Companies of Infantry and Cavalry I56 

Jauj a 

Company of Infantry 67 

Valdivia 

Battalion of Infantry 315 

Battalion of Cavalry 185 

Chi loe 

Company of Infantry ^7 

Company of Dragoons ^7 

Juan Fernandez 

Company of Infantry ^5 

Sant i ago-Valparaiso 

Company of Dragoons ^^ 

Company of Artillery - 53 

Total Regulars 1,553 



Urban Mi 1 il; j a" 
Lima 

I nf antry 



16 



TABLE 1 (cont.) 



Regiment of Commerce 299 

Twelve Companies of Spaniards 1 113 

Eighteen Companies of Indians 9OO 

Six Companies of pardos 300 

Eight Companies of morenos 392 

Total Infantry Militia 3 00^ 

Caval ry 

Eight Companies of Spaniards k^-^ 

Three Companies of Indians I50 

Eight Companies of pardos 1*53 

Seven Companies of morenos 100 

Total Cavalry Militia ] ]^^ 



Source: AGI:AL 1^+90, "Extracto de la revista que el Marques de 
Torretagle^ Comlsario de Guerra . . . dirige en el 1 de 
Diciembre de I758 a la tropa de Ynfanter'a . . . que 
sirve en el Presidio del Callao . . ./' Cal 1 ao/oecember 
h 1758_, p. 1; Amat^ Memoria de Gobierno. pp. ^97-^98^ 
500-501, 661-662, 668-669; Hcmoria de l v irrey Manso de 
ye]asco, p. 10^; Juan and Ulloa, Voyage, p. I83. 

"Viceroy Manso de Velasco does not cite figures for urban 
militia in the other towns of the viceroyalty besides Lima. The 
fact that he does not indicates that their strength was subject 
to considerable variation. The strengths given should be regarded 
as estimates at best since there was no way of accurately determin- 
ing them. Memoria del virrey Manso de Velasco. p. 28^. 



17 



capture the Indian rebel convinced the viceroy that expeditions 
sent from Lima could not expect to defeat wel 1 -organized guerrilla 

bands and that permanent fortifications v/ould have to be erected 

20 
to protect Spanish settlers in the area. In 17^6 a presidio vjas 

built in Jauj a and another in Tarma. An infantry company of 

sixty-seven men was sent to the former, while the latter was provided 

companies of cavalry and infantry totalling 156 men. A cavalry 

detachment was established in the town of Santa Cruz de la Sierra 

to traverse the frontier to warn of impending attacks. The 

majority of these troops were local recruits supplemented by regular 

21 
forces from the Callao garrison. The viceroy was pessimistic 

about the future of these garrisons however. To his mind only the 

22 

Church could ever effectively pacify the Indians. 

The fortress of Callao, the port city of Lima, was in a total 
state of disrepair at midcentury, mirroring the general inattention 
to defense v^hich characterized the period. During the ]7^G 

earthquake a tidal wave had engulfed the city, destroying the fort 

23 

and killing practically all of the inhabitants of the garrison. 

Viceroy Manso de Velasco dedicated himself to the task of rebuild- 
ing the fortress but was unsuccessful due to a lack of men, money, 
and materiel. Although the nev; fortress, christened "Real 
Felipe" in honor of King Phillip V, was begun in January of 17^7^ 
it was still unfinished v;hen Viceroy Manuel de Amat arrived to 
replace Velasco. He wtyly noted that the "fortress" consisted of 



18 



nothing more than a simple outer wall which was unsuitable for 

mounting cannon, and that it seemed to serve the purpose of con- 

25 
fining the soldiers better than of protecting the kingdom. 

Actually, the mounting of cannon would have done little to Improve 
the situation, since the mouth of the Callao harbor was wide and 
placed invading ships out of the range of the cannons. The judg- 
ment of Juan and Ulloa that the fortress was Inadequate to deter 

26 
an enemy attack still was valid a decade after midcentury. 

The prescribed strength of the veteran garrison at Callao 

was seven infantry companies of 100 men each and a seventy-man 

27 
artillery company. It is doubtful If this strength had ever been 

maintained, even prior to the ]ykG earthquake. The French voyager 

Amadee Frezler, writing earlier in the century, noted that the 

garrison was never at full strength, and that there v;ere scarcely 

28 
enough soldiers there to mount the guard. This view was 

confirmed by the Incoming Viceroy Manso de Velasco In 17^5^ who 

described the battalion as "nine companies without fixed number, 

and with many useless members, and other (places) given secretly 

29 

to those v;ho ought not to hold them." 

The fraud and corruption In the sale of military ranks was 
but one manifestation of a general malaise which pervaded Peru 
by midcentury. Service in the garrisons of America was not 
popular v/Ith Spanish regular troops since promotion was often 
slov/er in areas farthest removed from the crown. Most odious of 
all was service In the presidio of Valdivia due to the presence 



19 



of the fierce Araucanian Indians. Each year a veteran company was 
dispatched from the Callao garrison, but because of the high rate 
of desertion, it became necessary for military officials to enlist 
local recruits to fill the ranks, Juan and Ulloa had estimated 

that no more than one-quarter of the soldiers in the Callao 

31 

garrison were Spanish, the rest presumably being local conscripts. 

The situation became increasingly worse each year since the govern- 
ors of underpopulated areas such as Valdivia often granted these 
soldiers military discharges In an effort to retain them as per- 
manent residents. This forced further local recruitment to fill 

32 

the ranks to strength. 

Often service in the infantry battalion at Callao was per- 
formed for the benefits v;hich accrued from it. Consequently, 
positions in the battalion were purchased at high prices. Juan 
and Ulloa remarked to the King that 

It is very common [for] all those officers and even 
[field] marshals, v;ho work In the mechanical trades of [Lima], 
such as silversmiths, painters, shoemakers, tailors, and 
similar positions, to come from Lima to enroll, be it in the 
artillery, or in the Infantry, not with the purpose of serving, 
but only to enjoy the privileged military jurisdiction, and by 
this means to free themselves from the persecutions of the 
constables^ or from some small fines of other justices; thus, 
they find It convenient to turn over all the pay from the 
position to the principal officer to whom the rank corresponds, 
retaining only the privileged title of soldier or artillery- 
men. When the situation of holding a review arises, they are 
always advised In time, and are all completely present so that 
never a man is lacking. So it Is that not over twenty-five 
or thirty [soldiers] are actually in service, and all the 
rest are those who commit the fraud, ^3 

The normal procedure was for the aspirant to the position to give 

a present to the company commander, after which the two would 

bargain as to the percentage of the monthly pay which the former 



20 



would turn over to the latter in exchange for the privilege of 
holding rank. This amount varied depending upon the rank to be 
filled and the number of applicants. Since pay in the artillery 
company was higher than in that of the infantry companies, pos i - 
tions in it were the most highly prized. 

Viceroy Manso de Velasco recognized the shortcomings of the 
Callao battalion and made some effort to improve its organization. 
These efforts, hov.ever, were insufficient to overcome a century 
of inertia. At the request of Velasco, the crown issued its ap- 
proval of a plan to draw up a new regulation covering the Callao 
garrison. On July 1, 1753, the Reglamento para la Guarnicion 
del Cal 1 ao was published in Lima. The regulation renamed the 
unit as the Regiment of Royal Infantry of Lima, and reduced its 

size to a battalion of seven infantry companies and an artillery 

35 
squadron v/ith a total strength of ^21 men. Nonetheless, it 

seems that the regiment vias frequently underst rength.-^ 

One hundred soldiers from the Callao garrison were quartered 
in the viceregal palace in Lima for the protection of the viceroy. 
In addition to guarding the palace these troops provided guards 
for the royal treasury, the mint, and the tobacco monopoly ware- 
house. Detachments also patrolled the city at night to suppress 

37 
civil disturbances. Furthermore nothing seems to have been done 

about the more serious lack of training which prevailed at Callao. 

Upon his arrival, Viceroy Amat remarked that "The few soldiers 

that v^ere regulars lacked the training in the military exercises 

that they ought to have had." 



21 



As a royal personage the viceroy enjoyed the services of a 
viceregal guard comprised of a company of cavalry and one of 
halberdiers. These companies were composed of Spaniards who were 
personally selected by the viceroy himself and great prestige was 
attached to such service. The cavalry company consisted of 160 
soldiers, a lieutenant, and a captain. Fifty-three supernumeraries 

were available for ceremonial occasions. The company of halberdiers 

39 

numbered sixty-two soldiers, a lieutenant and a captain. The 

viceroy also retained the services of an honorary company known as 
the Spanish Guard v^hlch accompanied him on public excursions to 
lend dignity to his office. The functions of the Viceroy's 
Guard, besides the protection of the viceroy himself, were to aid 
royal officials in tlie collection of taxes and in the enforcement 
of the decisions of the royal courts. Viceroy Manso de Velasco 
attached a higher significance to this guard than to any other 

unit within the viceroyalty because of these duties calling It 

k] 

"the principal respect of the government." 

The second component of the colonial armies was the militia, 
which has been defined as "citizen soldiers" who are organized 
into units and trained In times of national emergency to reinforce 
the regular units. In Peru, as in the other Spanish possessions 
in America, no provincial or disciplined militia in the formal 
sense of the word existed by midcentury. What militia companies 
did exist had been raised in the larger interior towns such as 
Tarma, Jauja, Cuzco, and Arequipa in response to specific 



22 



emergencies such as the Juan Santos rebellion. These^ however, were 
merely aj hpg bodies which dispersed when the danger had passed. In 
a sense they constituted private armies which came into being in 
response to the inability of the crown to protect the settlers of 
these rural areas. 

Along the coast the formation of urban militia units was 
somewhat more organized since the cities were larger and some con- 
tinuity was provided by the frequent threat of seaborne invasion. 
In general these urban companies were sponsored by one of the local 
trade guilds or municipal corporations and were designed to act as 
a sort of civil guard. In Callao, for example, there were seven 
companies: one of seamen, one of residents and tradesmen, a third 
of master carpenters, caulkers, and shipfitters, including the 
free Negroes who vrorked in the naval yards. In addition, there 
were four companies of Indians drawn from the suburbs of Magdalena, 
Miraflores, and Chorrillos, whose job it was to transport provisions 
and ammunition to the presidio at Callao in the event of an at- 
tack by a foreign power. 

The infantry militia of Lima was organized according to race 
or trade in accordance with established tradition. The Regiment of 
Commerce was sponsored by the consulado or merchants' guild. The 
regiment was composed of six companies, totalling 299 men, each 
composed of members of a particular guild, including tailors, 
shoemakers, silversmiths, and artisans. The Spaniards in Lima 
formed their own regiment tctalling 1,113 men, raised in the 



23 



several districts of the city. In addition, there were eighteen 
companies of Indians numbering 900 men, six companies of pardos 
(anyone containing Negro blood) with 300, and eight companies of 
morenos (pure-blooded Negroes) with 392 men. In addition, Lima 
had a cavalry regiment including eight companies of Spaniards 
totalling ^^3 men, three companies of Indians with 150, eight 
companies of pardos with ^53 men, and seven companies of morenos 
numbering 100 men total. Viceroy Manso de Velasco claimed that 
seventy-six companies of militia totalling 4,150 men existed in 
Lima by midcentury (see Table 1). 

In conclusion, it would seem that the Army of Peru was in- 
capable of defending the kingdom from attack midway through 
the eighteenth century. In part the immense geography and small 
population acted to defeat any attempt at maintaining internal 
security as the unsuccessful expedition against Juan Santos had 
conclusively proven. Secondly, the small veteran contingents, 
located on the coast, were too scattered and underst rength to have 
formed an effective tactical unit capable of taking the field to 
repel an enemy invasion. As the Frenchman Frezier, referring to 
the garrisons in Chile, said 

What may be said in general of the strength of the 
Spaniards in that Country Is that their Military power is 
composed of Men who are much scatter 'd about, not disciplin'd, 
and ill arm'd . . . the Spaniards have no Fortifications in 
their Lands vihere they.may secure themselves, unless they fly 
to the Mountains . . . 

Much of v/hat has been said about the Spanish regular forces in Peru 

can be repeated about the militia. The sacking and ransom of Paita 



2^ 



by Admiral Anson was proof, not only of their ineffectiveness to 
repel a foreign invader, but also that any attempt to call them 
onto active duty for any length of time would bankrupt the royal 
treasury. By midcentury, European travellers had reported this 
weakness to their heads of state. Frezier dispelled the rumor 
that the Viceroy of Peru could raise 100,000 foot soldiers and 
20,000 cavalry troops. In reality, the Frenchman asserted, he 
could arm no more than one-fifth this number. Even this v/as a 
generous estimate, as v/as demonstrated during the effort by Vice- 
roy Amat to mobilize the Army of Peru during the Seven Years War. 
The Army of Peru had been sufficient to protect the major cities 
from being raided by hostile Indian bands and had generally 
driven off corsairs. The Anson expedition and the Juan Santos 
rebellion were preludes to change. With the fall of Havana and 
Manila to the English Navy during the Seven Years War it became 
patently evident that a strong, v;sl 1 -organized expeditionary force 
could possess itself of the Viceroyalty of Peru if the defenses of 
that region were not drastically improved. Shortly thereafter the 
Tupac Amaru rebellion demonstrated the further need for a force 
capable of maintaining peace v/ithin the confines of the kingdom 
itself. 



25 



Notes 

Jean Descola^ Daily Life in Colonial Peru, 1710-1820. trans. 
Michael Heron (London, 1968), p. kh. 

Hemoria del virrey Jos^ Antonio Manso d e Velasco, In Memor ias 
de los vireyes que han gobernado el Peru durante el tiempo del colo - 
niaje espanol , ill (Lima, 1859), 78, 17^-175; Primera parte de la 
Rclacion del virey Manuel de Amat y Junient , ibid., IV, 153~15'+. 

3 

Frederick B. Pike, The Modern H istory of Peru (London, 19^7), 

PP. 2-3. 

Carlos Daniel Valcarcel, Geograffa del Peru Virreinal (Lima, 
1951), p. 20. This is an annotated republication of the "Descrip- 
clon geogr^fica de las provlncias que componen los reynos del Peru, 
Buenos Ayres y Chile, por Dn. Cosme Bueno, catedrStico de matemSt i - 
cas, y cosmografo mayor del Peru" (Lima, 1763-1778). Bueno directed 
a census of Lima for Viceroy Manso de Velasco in 1755. 

-'William S. Robertson, The History of America , in The V/orks of 
Wilham Robertson, D,D ., 10 vols. (London, 1821), III, 370. Robertson's 
estimate was extrapolated from tribute records and from sales figures 
of copies of a papal bull throughout Peru. Later estimates indicate 
he was too high. A 1796 census set the total population at 1,076,122, 
while one taken in 1812 estimated 1,509,551 inhabitants. 

The Indian population of Peru at any time is still the subject 
of great debate. Viceroy Manso de Velasco estimated the total Indian 
population outside of Lima at 1,060,186. Memor i a de Manso de Velasc o, 
p. 79. Robertson utilized the figure of 612,780 tributaries cited by 
Velasco and multiplied it by four to include women and minor children, 
arriving at a figure of 2,^49,120. History of America , III, 370. 
Viceroy Manuel de Amat cited 761,696 tributaries in 1776. Memor I a 
de Amat , pp. 235-238. Later census figures indicate that all these 
figures v/ere too high. Note the racial composition of Peru in 1796 
and 1812: 

1796 

Spaniards (including Creoles) 135,755 

Indians 608,89'+ 

Mestizos 2^4,436 

Free Negroes and mulattos ^1,256 

Slaves ^0,336 

Total 1,076,122 



181? 



Spaniards 178,025 

Indians 95^1,799 

Mestizos 287, if 86 

Negro slaves 89,2^1 

Total 1,509,551 



26 



Pike, Modern History of Peru , p, 14. 

Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America , 
The John Adams translation, abridged, ^th ed. (Nev; York, 196U), p. 
195. Juan and Ulloa were two young Spanish naval lieutenants sent 
out to America on a scientific expedition sponsored by the French 
Academy of Sciences. They first arrived in Lima in October, 17^0, 
in response to a plea from the viceroy to help devise defenses 
against the Anson expedition. Their observations during a three- 
year residence in Lima are among the most informative records of 
that viceroyalty, first beina published in 17^8. Perhaps more 
important were the Noticias secretas de America , intended to inform 
the king on the social, economic, and political conditions of the 
"Peruvian Realms." These provided the first documented proof of 
the conditions which the Bourbon Reforms were intended to upgrade. 
Published by an Englishman in 1826, they remain the most damning 
indictment of Spanish rule In the Nev^/ World. 

o 
Juan and Ulloa, Voyage, p. 195. Cosme Bueno estimated there 
were about 2,000 Indians in Lima in 1755. Valcarcel, Geograf f a , 
p. 20. 

9 

Memoria de Manso de Velasco , p. 99. Juan and Ulloa estimated 

Lima held between 16,000 and 18,000 whites. Voyage , p. 193. Cosme 
Bueno estimated 18,000 somewhat later. Valcarcel, Geograf fa , p. ?0. 

Compare the observations about the upper class of Lima made 
by Juan and Ulloa, Voyage , pp. 193-195^ with those in AGIrIG 1528, 
"Descripcion dialogada de todos los pueblos del Virreinato del Peru," 
written between I76I and 1776, and cited in Guillermo Cespedes del 
Cast i 1 1 o, Lir"3 y B'jenos Aires: repercus iones econ6mIcas y polftlcas 
de la creaci6n del Virreinato del Plata (Seville, 19'+7)> P. 6. 

Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structure and Polit - 
ical Institutions (Berkeley and Los Angeles, I967), p. 130, 

1 2 

Jorge Basadre, La Multitud, la Ciudad y el Campo en la 

Historia del Peru, 2nd ed, (Lima, ]3h'/TJ'p, II3. 

13 

Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, N oticias sec reta s de 

America sobre el es tado naval , mllitar, y polftico de los reynos 
del Peru y provincles d e Quito, cos tas de Nuev a Granada y Chile, 
2 vols, in one (London, 1826), I, 27. 

Oscar Febres Villarroel, "La crisis agrfcola del Peru en 
el ultimo tercio del siglo XVIII," Re vista Hist6rica , XXVII 
(Lima, 1964), 102-199, passim . 

Francisco loayza, Juan Santos ; El Invenclble (Lima, 19^2) 
offers the best overview of this important rebellion. 



27 



The corregidor of Jauja^ the Marques de Casatorres put the 
blame upon the authorities in Lima. In a letter to the viceroy he 
noted that it was an axiom of warfare that "a soldier will not 
fight, finding himself without uniform, unshod, and unfed." Loayza, 
Juan Santos, p. 19^. 



17 



II 



Ibid ., pp. 75-76, 113-116. 



A detailed description of Spanish military organization 
can be found in L. N. McAlister, "The Reorganization of the Army 
of New Spain, 1763-1767," Hispanic American Historical Review , 
XXXIII (February, 1953), 1-32. 

^^Amat, Hemoria de Gobierno, pp. ^97-^98, 500-501, 661-662, 
668-669. Since these are standard tables of organization it can 
be assumed that none of the garrisons were actually at full 
strength. 

^"^Loayza, Juan Santos, pp. 113-11^. 

21 

Ibid ., pp. 120-121; Memoria de Manso de Velasco. p. lO't. 

See AGI:AL 1^90, Reqlamento para la quarnicion de ]a plaza del 
Real Phel i pe . . . , Lima, July 1, 1758, p. 1, for the classes of 
troops involved. 



22 



Hemoria de Manso de Velasco . pp. 65, 197. 

23 

AGItAL 983, Alfonso de Ortega to Juan de Jecta Santa, Tarma, 

May 30, 17^7, p. 2, cited in Loayza, Juan Santo s, p. 117. Other 
descriptions of the catastrophe which, according to the viceroy, 
left Lima "materially and formally ruined," and killed some 12,000 
persons are to be found in the Memoria de Manso de Velasco, pp. 110- 
112; Manuel de Mend i bur u, Di ccionario h i stor i co-bi ogr^f i co del Peru, 
11 vols., 2nd ed. (Lima, 1931-193^), Vli, 169; A True and Particular 
Relation of the Dreadful Earthquake v/hich Happen'd at Lima, the 
Capital of Peru, and the Neighborinq Port of Callao. on the 28th of 
October. 17^6. 2nd ed. (London, 17^8). 

2^ 

Mendiburu, VI I, 175. 



25 

26 



Amat, H emoria de Gobierno, p. xlviii. 

Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas. I, 23 "27. 



27j 
28 



PP. 8-9. 



bid., pp. UtO-lJ^l. 
Amad^e Frezier, cited in A True and Particular R elation, 



28 



29 

Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 262. 

For a critical report on the viceroyalty illustrative of 
this situation, see the anonymous "Estado pol'tico del Reyno del 
Peru: Gobierno sin leyes, ministros relaxados, Tesoros con po- 
breza, fertilidad sin cultivo, sabidurfa desest imada, milicias sin 
honor, ciudades sin amor patricio, la justicia sin templo, hurtos 
por comercios, integridad tenida por locura, Rey, el mayor de ricos 
dominios, pobre de tesoros ..." (Madrid, 1751?) which has been 
partially republished in Revista Peruana (Lima, 1 880) , IV, 1^7-190, 
351 "369. Scholars believe its author was Victorino Montero de 
Aguila, a Captain of the Halberdier Guard of the Viceroy and a former 
corregidor of Piura. As an alcalde, or civil magistrate of Lima, 
Montero reflects the hatred of the creole aristocracy for the 
Spanish merchant class which was aspiring to positions of importance. 

•^'juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, lAO. 

32 

Ibid ., p. 1^2; Boleslao Lewin, Descripciori del Virreinato 

del Peru, Cr6nica in^dita de comienzos del Siglo XVII ( Ros a r i o, 

1958), p. 70. 



33 



Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, 1^1 



^^ Ibid .. p. ]k2. 

AGI:AL 10^0, Reglamento para la Guarnici6n del Callao , Lima, 
July 1, 1753; Memoria de Manso de Velasco. pp. 271-272. 

AGI:AL 1^90, "Extracto de la revista que el Marques de Torre- 
tagle, Comisario de Guerra . . . dirige en el 1 de Diciembre de 1758 
a la tropa de Ynfanterfa . . . que s i rve en el Presidio del Callao 
. . . ," Callao, December 1, 1758. This review reflects the number 
of troops detached in Lima, Tarma, and Jauja, whose inclusion v;ould 
bring the regiment more nearly to strength, 

^''agI:AL 1490, "Extracto de la revista . . .," Callao, December 
1, 1758; Memoria de Manso de Velasco. p. 283. 

•3 o 

Amat, Memoria de Gobierno . p. xlviii. 

39 

Juan and Ulloa, Voyage, p. 1 83 . 

For the history of this honor guard, see Guillermo Lohmann 

Villena, "Las Comparffas de Gent i leshombres Lanzas y Arcabuces de la 

Guardia del Virreinato del Peru," A nuario do Estudios Americanos. 

XII I (Seville, 1956), 151, 213. 

Memoria de Manso de Velasco , p . 283 . 

k2 

McAl ister, "Reorganizat ioti, " p. U, 



29 



Zf3 

Liisa North^ Ci vi 1 -Mi 1 i tary Relations in Argentina. Chile . 

and Peru (Berl<eley^ 1966)^ p. k. 

1,1. 

A True and Particular Relation, p . 11. 

'' Memoria de Manso de Velasco, p. 284. 

Amad^e Frezier, A Voyage to the South-Sea and along the 
Coasts of Chili and Peru, in the years 1712.. 1713. and 1714 
(London, 1717), P. 103. 

'Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas. I, 121. 

48 

A True and Particular Relation, pp. 57 "58. 



II. THE MILITARY RESPONSES OF PERU TO THE 
SEVEN YEARS WAR 



Spain's entrance into the Seven Years War on January 22^ 
1762, provoked the first mobilization of the Army of Peru since 
17^0. Perhaps more importantly^ it forced the creation of a 
large body of urban militia in Lima^ and, to a lesser extent, in 
the outlying regions of the viceroyalty. While the defeat suf- 
fered by Spain at the hands of Great Britain the following year 
diminished the need for a large military buildup, it also created 
the preconditions for the first thoroughgoing reform of the 
Spanish colonial armies. 

The central purpose of the French Bourbons v;as to strengthen 
their ally Spain and its colonies, in order that they might aid 
in the development of the French economy and in the French struggle 
against Great Britain. In this regard, they were fortunate to 
have Charles Ml on the throne of Spain. His reign (1759"1788) 

has been characterized by one historian as constituting "the apogee 

2 

of three centuries of Spanish colonialism in America." One man- 
ifestation of this was to be seen in the capable administrators 
which he sent to the New V/orld. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century it had become royal policy to substitute career military 
men for the clerics who had formerly monopolized the higher posts 
in the colonial bureaucracy under the Hapsburgs, Two reasons for 
this were that these men could presumably be counted upon to deter 



30 



31 



English attacks upon colonial ports, and their strict code of 

military honor was felt to be a deterrent to their involvement 

3 

in the contraband trade. 

The appointment of the former President of the Audiencia 

of Chile, Colonel Manuel de Amat y Junient, to the position of 

Viceroy of Peru, was particularly fortuitous for the latter 

kingdom. Amat had compiled a brilliant service record as the 

Commandant of the Regiment of Dragoons of Sagunto during the 

campaigns in Africa and Italy before being named to the Chilean 

post in 1755. His arrival in Peru on October 12, 1761, to assume 

the responsibilities of that kingdom came at a critical juncture 

in the history of the viceroyalty. Historian Guillermo Cespedes 

del Castillo has observed that 

The Peruvian viceroyalty was in the middle of a critical 
epoch; the war with England, inevitable and near at hand, put 
[Peru's] external security in danger; its political and 
administrative structure had proven to be antiquated and in- 
efficient; deep social problems were about to explode violently 
in a great uprising . . . Fortunately, an intelligent, 
energetic, diligent, and efficient man ruled over the destinies 
of the viceroyalty, who warned of this crisis and confronted 
it v/ith all his energies and means: he tried to secure the 
country militarily ... he clamored for political reforms 
v/hich years later would be implanted, and demonstrated an in- 
domitable, at times ferocious, energy in the face of indls- 
cipl ine. 5 

Amat considered himself as a man with a royal mandate to rule, 

a characteristic which increased his efficiency at the expense of 

his popularity. In his Memor ia he stated that as the alter ego of 

the King himself he enjoyed the highest confidence of the crown. 

Popularity, he felt, was inconsistent with his task of rebuilding 

the strength of the viceroyalty, and he consciously refused to curry 



32 



favor with the 1 imeno el ite. His choice of the beautiful mestiza 
actress Micaela Villegas ("La Perracholi") was regarded as an insult 
by the cl ass -conscious aristocracy of Lima whose company he shunned. 
At the end of his term of office, the incoming visitor general held 
that "[Amat] . . . had been hated in the kingdom and in the capital 

Q 

for the harsh way in which he treated all people." 

Attention to military affairs was a task that the new viceroy 
was fond of. in his Memoria he confessed that he felt it was "the 
most interesting of the activities of the viceroy" and that he felt 
honored to have been selected for the task of defending and preserv- 
ing the viceroyalty. He had demonstrated this attention to 
military affairs during his tenure in Chile. There, Amat had 
noticed the "excessive number" of unemployed Creoles (American- 
born whites) in the Santiago area, and determined to utilize them 
both to enhance the prestige of his position and to help maintain 
internal order which had been noticeably lacking to that time. 
He therefore selected fifty "uncultivated persons of the country" 
who v/ere able to prove their purity of blood and formed them into 
a fijo company of mounted dragoons, A v;eekly program of drill 
and instruction in the handling of v/eapons v/as instituted by Amat 
himself to increase their skills in the military arts. Such a 
scheme constituted a departure from the established tradition of 
leadership set by his predecessors, especially insofar as he 
treated these Creoles. In place of the strict obedience which 



33 



former Spanish administrators in Chile demanded from the subjects, 
Amat granted to them both "respect and presents of employment" in 
return for which he received their unquestioned loyalty. This 
company of gentlemen, "versed in politics and manners," was the 
pride of the Creoles of Chile. The fierce pride in their own 
abilities which the company exhibited caused an observer to wryly 

note that the Creoles were finally made aware of the deeds of their 

11 

forefathers "which perhaps their executors had not read to them." 

This sense of incipient nationalism was to fully manifest itself 
by the end of the century, and nowhere was it to become more evident 
than in the ranks of the reorganized Army of Peru, v.'hose ranks vjere 
also to be filled by Creoles. 

The declaration of war against Great Britain, announced by 
Spain on January 22, 17^2, allowed Amat to exercise his skills as 
a military leader. On May 2 he received by way of Panama a secret 
royal order from the Minister of the Indies Julian de Arriaga, 
notifying him that both countries had recalled their respective 
ambassadors, and that a formal declaration of v/ar was imminent. 
Amat was ordered to "put Peru in a state of defense" and to 

perform this task "in terms of a manifest war." A second order, 

12 

arriving on May 10, confirmed that war had been declared. 

In response to the first decree, Amat had issued a circular 
order to all the corregidors authorizing them to enlist militia 
within their coastal jurisdictions, and had included a series of 
instructions intended to place these regions in a state of readiness, 
To prevent abuses from occurring during the levies by which the 



3^ 



militia was to be raised, guidelines were provided covering this 

1 "i 

procedure. -^ All herds of livestock were ordered driven to the 

Interior to prevent their capture. A coast guard was to be posted 
and Indian runners were to be employed to relay news of a landing 
to the authorities in Lima. Perhaps most importantly, Amat directed 
the officials of the Royal Treasuries in these areas to underv/rite 
all reasonable defense expenditures recommended by the corregidors, 

rather than placing the burden of such an expense upon the local 

1^ 
citizenry as v/as customary. Defense v;as thereby taken out of 

private hands and assumed by the state. 

The declaration of war also nullified the 1750 Treaty of Madrid 

which had established the border between Peru and Brazil, requiring 

increased vigilance along this frontier as well as along the coast. 

In March, 17^2, Amat was ordered to expel the Portuguese from the 

Jesuit missions in the Mojos region but the expedition failed when 

Its membership was decimated by tropical fever. Although other 

expeditions were sent out later, they failed for the same reasons, 

and no further attempts were made to oust the Portuguese from these 

1 6 

regions . 

The strategy of Viceroy Amat for defending the Viceroyalty of 
Peru took into consideration the financial limitations of trying to 
garrison such an extensive territory, and attempted to utilize the 
harsh terrain as a deterrent in lieu of fortifications. Amat hoped 
to avoid the experience of his predecessor, the Marques de Villa- 
garcia, v/hose actions in calling out the militia and raising a 
naval expedition to defend against the Anson expedition in 17^1 



35 



had bankrupted the viceroyalty, forcing him to suspend the payment 

of salaries to the garrison troops and to the members of the Royal 

Audiencia. ' Not only did such a situation provoke ill will among 

both civil and military officials, whose loyalty was important to 

the crown, the expenditures had done nothing to deter the invasion, 

and had left Peru financially unable to prepare for subsequent 

mobi 1 izat ions. 

Viceroy Amat was well aware that British naval expeditions to 

Peru would be forthcoming, especially now that Spain and Great 

Britain v;ere at viar. He told the king that 

Until novi distance has been our bulwark and security, but 
today the difficulties have been conquered . . , Foreign na- 
tions do not fear the Cape Horn or the Straits of Magellan. 
They think of creating ports of call where they can set up .q 
residences, regroup their forces, and strengthen their plans. 

Nonetheless, he felt it was impossible to attempt to defend the 

entire coast from attack with troops such as Villagarcia had tried 

19 

to do. -"^ Moreover, he considered it to be unnecessary. Amat 

believed that the constantly changing v;inds made the offshore 
shoals and reefs treacherous for anyone not having a perfect idea 
of their location. He also felt that even if an enemy expedition 
v;as able to make a safe landing, it could gain no appreciable 
amount of wealth in most of the small towns, and its presence would 
serve only to create ill feelings among the townspeople."^ His 
strategy was simply to fortify a few presidial areas v/hich guarded 
the major coastal towns. At this point, however, he does not seem 
to have determined v;hether the smaller tov;ns should have been 
evacuated or defended in the event of an invasion. 



36 



Of immediate concern to the viceroy was the defense of the 
metropolitan Lima-Callao area. One of his first actions follow- 
ing the outbreak of the war was to lead a mounted expedition 
along the coast betv;een Ancon and Lurin, a distance of about 
fifteen miles^ to familiarize himself with the terrain and to chart 
the areas which would be most suitable for launching a counter- 
attack if an invasion should occur. A diligent student of military 
tactics^ Amat felt that success in warfare often depended upon the 
ability of a commander to modify his plan of battle in order to 
take advantage of the physical geography of an area. It was this 

ability to adapt to circumstances, he noted in a dictum, vjhich 

21 

often accounted for victory rather than superiority of numbers. 

From the expedition arose an elaborate plan of shore batteries which 

were arranged in a series of concentric rings around the city, to 

22 

be manned by specific militia companies upon a given signal. 

Foremost in his plan of defense was to complete the fortress 
"Real Felipe" of Callao which had never been completely rebuilt 
after the 17^6 earthquake. The military situation of Callao and 
Lima In general was deplorable. A high-ranking officer of the 
Lima customshouse, Juan de Echevarrfa, characterized Peru as being 
"without presidios, without troops, without cannonballs, without 
gunpov/der and totally defenseless . . . Callao was reduced to a 

simple outer wall." V/hat militia existed v;ithin the city, he 

23 

noted, v/ere completely lacking in military training. 

On June 8, 1762, Amat led a mounted procession from the vice- 
regal palace to the fortress for his first tour of Inspection. As 



37 



a symbolic gesture he ordered that 106 cannon be mounted upon the 
walls to protect the harbor. Amat also ordered that a foundry be 
constructed to repair the weaponry which was in disrepair. The 
following year the crown approved his request for a veteran com- 
mandant of artillery, sending out Colonel Antonio Zini and a cadre 
of instructors to command the brigade of artillery at Callao and 

to direct work at the foundry. The results of such a commitment 

2k 
to ordnance were impressive. 

The commitment to reform of the Callao fortress led to other 

improvements, notably that of the study of mathematics v/hich had 

previously been neglected in the viceroyalty. During his tour of 

the fortress Amat learned that its pentagonal design had been the 

idea of a Frenchman, Louis God in, a former member of the French 

scientific expedition sent out to measure the curvature of the 

earth in 173^, who had remained in Peru as a professor of mathematics 

at the Royal and Pontifical University of San Marcos in Lima. While 

the Spanish officials held that Godin was the only mathematician 

deserving of the name within the viceroyalty, the Creoles bitterly 

asserted that several of their number at San Marcos were qualified 

for the commission of designing the fortress, but had been passed 

over in favor of an "incomprehensible Frenchman" for the job. All 

of them admitted, however, that no formal engineers existed at the 

25 
university. Such information incensed Amat and drove him to 

introduce a program designed to produce qualified mathematicians. 

He explained in his Memori a that this branch of learning was so 



38 



important to defense and "guidance of the Military Art" that it 

26 

must be developed. The results of such a program will be 

discussed in the succeeding chapters, 

A second consideration of the viceroy v;as to stem the 

corruption that flourished among the officials of the port of 

27 
Callao and the command of the garrison. His efforts to end 

the practice of these positions being hereditary provoked the first 
serious crisis of authority of his brief career in Peru. In a let- 
ter to the Ministry of the Indies he stated firmly his belief that 
offices should be granted on the basis of merit and individual 
capacity^ rather than by heredity, because such a practice excluded 
the qualified aspirant unless he happened to be v/ealthy. Amat 
cited specifically the positions of Commissar of War and Navy and 
Paymaster of the Troops of the Presidio of Callao, in an oblique 
reference to Pedro Tagle y Bustamante, the Marques de Torretagle, 
a member of the creole aristocracy of Lima who had purchased the 
posts and was exercising them in his own interest. During the 
war Amat discovered that Torretagle had been charging the soldiers 
of the garrison for their uniforms and for time off in Lima. Due 
to the exigencies of v/ar, Amat was unable to remove Tagle until 

after the end of the war, at which time he relieved the entire 

29 
Guard i a Mayor, or High Command, at the port and sent them to Spain, 

By deviating from a long-standing tradit ion of permissiveness, 

Amat incurred the wrath of these displaced officials, v;ho took their 

grievances to the king. The governor of the presidio of Callao, 



39 



Francisco del Moral^ had also been removed by Amat from his post 
for his refusal to lead the expedition being readied to oust the 
Portuguese from the Franciscan missions in Mato GrossQ. Instead^ 
Del Moral went into hiding^ feigning illness. When news of the 
peace reached Peru he petitioned Amat for the return of his posi- 
tion but was refused. In his correspondence with the crown^ Amat 
noted that in countries like Peru which a state of war had reduced 
to a complete ruin^ if rulers continued to yield to the schemes 
of individuals such as Del Moral, it would have'Very fatal 

consequences," since these men were completely lacking in sub- 

! . 30 

oroination and honor. He stated his intention to place the 

post of Governor of Callao in the hands of inspectors general of 

31 

the army who were sent out from Spain in the future. 

Many of these displaced officials took their cases to the 
court in Spain, defending their conduct, and accusing the viceroy 
of numerous wrongdoings. Jose Morales de Aramburu referred to 
these men as papagayos (parrots), who not only slandered Amat but 
at the same time scorned Peru and the vigor and ability of its 
people, for which he felt they should be hanged for treason. He 

noted that frequently those who attacked the viceroy in public had 

32 
privately expressed admiration for the man. Although none of 

these allegations were sufficient to secure the ouster of Amat, 

v;ho enjoyed great popularity among the ministers of Charles IN, 

there is some indication that these dissident voices were heard 

in high places. Follov/ing the close of the war, tiie viceroy 

wrote to the crown that he had pacified Peru satisfactorily and 



^0 



33 

that his only remaining enemies were in the Council of the indies. 

The most notable aspect of the initial mobilization of the 
army in response to the Seven Years War was the creation of a body 

of militia^ since it v/as from these companies that a disciplined 

3^ 

militia would later be created. Following the publication of the 

declaration of war, Amat requested a report from the captain for 
the Royal Armory citing the total number of firearms which were in 
working condition. The report v^as not encouraging: gunpowder and 
munitions were in short supply, and there were insufficient arms 
to supply the soldiers. The conditions v.'ere so bad that the vice- 
roy was forced to purchase sabers and broadswords from among the 
residents of the city to equip the militia of cavalry. By the 
end of Amat's term of office this situation had been markedly 
improved.-^-' 

On May 10 Viceroy Amat reviewed the unit rosters which he had 
requested from the commanders of the various urban companies that 
had been in existence in Lima prior to this time, and found them 
to be "small, undisciplined, and without the least order." For 
this reason he ordered an edict published requiring all subjects 
of the king betv/een the ages of fourteen and sixty to present 
themselves at a review on the following day in the region of the 
city knovyn as "Los Peines" to be enlisted in their proper militia 
companies. The members of the nobility v;ere requested to present 
themselves to the secretary of the viceroy to record their names, 
along v/ith the number of slaves and v/eapons which each possessed. 
Since Amat was desirous of having the nobility create and finance 



k] 



additional companies of militia, efforts were made not to alienate 
this group. No penalties for falling to appear at the review were 
established, other than to say that persons whose absence was un- 
authorized v;ould be identified by the authorities. The coopera- 
tion of the large hacendado class was essential to securing the at- 
tendance at the review of their numerous slaves and retainers. 

The following day Viceroy Amat appeared at the review and 

37 
asked his military commanders to form their companies. The review 

confirmed his worse suspicions: the companies ranged in size from 

twenty-five to two hundred men, all of them without uniforms, and 

completely lacking any knowledge of their duties. Although such 

a situation v;as no doubt discouraging, the number of persons who 

had turned out to enlist offered som.e encouragem.ent . Amat's 

secretary observed that the edict elicited the desired response 

among all groups in Lima 

Gentlemen, titled persons, and the most wealthy quickly 
offered themselves and their sons ... [it] caused no less 
commotion among the masses and common people, principally 
among the Indians, Pardos, and Morenos who emulated them in 
a most worthy manner. 39 

The request made subsequently to the nobility of Lima that 
they raise and outfit additional companies of militia struck an 
apparently responsive chord among Creoles who hungrily sought the 
honor and prestige which emanated from a ranking military commis- 
sion. The Commandant of Infantry, Colonel Felix Morales de Aram- 
buru set an example by raising and outfitting a company of infantry. 
The Conde de 1 os Torres followed by outfitting a company of cavalry, 
Felix de Encalada uniformed an infantry company designated as "La 



U2 



Reina Madre," Juan Francisco Micheu, a prominent merchant of Lima 
formed a company of merchants, Pedro Josef de Zarate raised a 
company of mounted dragoons "Batavia," and Francisco Marino de 
Lobera founded a grenadier company "Principe de Asturias." 
The nobility of Lima formed into a regiment of twelve companies. 
Amat himself accepted the post of Colonel and Commandant, and under- 
wrote the cost of raising four grenadier companies to be attached 
to the unit. In addition, the Audlencia of Lima dressed an 
infantry company of 10^ men, while the cebl Ido. or municipal 
council sponsored 800, and the consulado an additional 1,000. 
Some of the urban companies of Indians, pardos, and morenos, which 
had existed prior to the mobilization, were reorganized. For 
example, the eighteen companies of pardos llbres v/ere consolidated 
into a battalion of nine companies as were the thirty-three 
companies of Indians. A battalion of morenos libres with ten 
companies was also created. Veteran troops from the garrison 
at Callao were assigned to these latter three battalions to give 
them Instruction in the handling and firing of weapons. In ad- 
dition, each militia company v;hich was newly formed received a 
charter from the viceroy defining the limits of its duties and 
obligations. Since no general regulation covered their organ- 
ization, the viceroy specifically granted each the rights and 
privileges of militia service, including the fuero militar, 
exemption from the payment of certain taxes, and limitations on the 
distance from Lima that each company would have to travel If called 
onto act I ve duty. 



^3 



Although the size of the militia created by Amat remains a 
matter of speculation, it is not unduly important since no invasion 
by a foreign pov/er was made to test it. As a result the companies 
were deactivated shortly after news of the Peace of Paris reached 
Peru, and not reorganized again until the reform of 1766. Of more 
interest is the degree to which this initial mobilization was 
carried out by the c orreq idores throughout the viceroyalty. A 
table compiled by Amat 's recording secretary sets the total number 
of militia created during the year I763 at 5^,580 men, which he 
observed had been "dressed, armed and very skillfully instructed 
in the use of arms . . . without including in this figure the 

regular troops . . . and nearly ten thousand slaves that can be 

Z+2 
equipped in an emergency." Such an estimate (see Table 2) is a 

gross distortion if this militia is regarded as a tactical weapon 
possessing the requisite sl<.ills and training to protect the vice- 
royalty from an attack by sea. As the following chapter will il- 
lustrate, these troops did not deserve to be regarded as a disciplined 
militia in the formal sense of the word. 

Viceroy Amat was determined, however, to retain the capital 
in a mobilized state for as long as possible. Although the news 
of the peace reached Lima on March 30, 17^3, Amat chose not to 
publicize it until November 5. As late as May, 1764, he was still 
requiring the militia to drill on a weekly basis. Similarly, the 
production of gunpov;der and mortars was continued. This training 
produced a certain pride among the citizens of Lima in the military 



kh 



TABLE 2 



COMPANIES OF MILITIA RAISED DURING THE 
SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1762-1763 



Urban Militia 

Lima 

Infantry Militia 

Regiment of the Nobility 
Company of Lawyers 
Company of Students 
Regiment of Spanish Infantry 
Battalion of Merchants 
Regiment of Indians 
Battal ion of pardos 
Battalion of morenos 

Caval ry Militia 

Regiment of Cavalry "De Los Reyes" 
Brigade of Royal Fusi leers 
Company of Indians 
Company of morenos 
Company of pardos 

Coastal Provinces 
Caval ry Mi 1 i t ia 

Regiment of Lurigancho 
Regiment of Bellavista 
Regiment of the Villa de Arnedo 
Regiment of Mala 
Regiment of Huarura 
Regiment of Canete 
Regiment of Chincha 
Regiment of Lambayeque 
Regiment of Quilihuay 

Dragoons 

Regiment of Carabaillo 

Regiment of La Muerte de Canta 

Regiment of Huarochiri 

Regiment of Pisco 

Regiment of lea 

Regiment of CamanS 

Regiment of Cangallo 



^5 



TABLE 2 (cont.) 



I nf antry Militia 

Regiment of Piura 2,025 

Regiment of Trujillo 1,^98 

Regiment of Santa 8if2 

Regiment of Pisco 176 

Regiment of Nazca 292 

Regiment of Atacama ^66 

Regiment of Moqueoua 904 

Regiment of Arequlpa 2,359 

Regiment of Tarma ^,3^+8 

Regiment of Jauja 1,722 

Regiment of Huaylas 2,6^7 

Regiment of Conchucos 986 

Regiment of Chachapoyas 536 

Regiment of Cajatambo 1,077 

Regiment of Urubamba 200 

Regiment of Huancavelica 1,^00 

Regiment of Huamachuco 3,922 

Regiment of Huamalles 261 



Source: AGi:AL 1^90 Compendio de las prevenciones que e1 Exce - 
len tfsimo Senor Don Manuel de Amat hizo para la defensa 
de la Guerra cont ra Portugal, e Inglaterra, Lima, November 
10, 1763, pp. 10-21. 

The author, Antonio de Elexpuru, cites a total of 18,900 
infantry militia and 35,680 cavalry militia in Lima and the 
proximate coastal provinces. The figures for infantry militia 
are appended, and presumably are not included in the totals above. 
They are probably based on estimates of some sort. Since all of 
the figures are inflated, the value of the table is to show the 
locations in which a mobilization of the militia was emphasized. 



^6 



capabilities of their militia by this time. The Gaceta de Lima 

crowed that in the future Peru would be able not only to wage a 

defensive war against an enemy but an offensive one as well. 

When news of the peace was published^ Amat 's secretary voiced 

the disappointment v^hich it provoked among the militia 

I do not know if these faithful vassals are content with 
such happy news; with regard to the common good and resigna- 
tion of the will of their King ... or saddened at having 
the occasion to give the most authentic proof of their love 
and loyalty escape from their hands. 

If a professional military had not come into being by this time, 

there were indications at least that the psychological conditions 

for creating one were at hand. These, combined with the crushing 

defeat of the Seven Years War, v;ere to force the creation of a 

modern professional army in Peru to defend it against future attack. 

The termination of the Seven Years War had a profound effect 
on Spain as v;ell as its colonies. Historians are in general agree- 
ment that the humiliating defeat which Great Britain inflicted upon 
Spain and France convinced the vanquished allies of the need for a 
radical reorientation of Bourbon administrative policies. There 
v;ere tv/o reasons to support such a decision. First, they had to 
be able to protect themselves should a second war against Britain 
break out, and secondly, Spain's empire in America had to be 
preserved from future attack If such should occur. The series of 
programs v;hich stemmed from this decision are collectively knov/n 
as the Bourbon Reforms. 

Spain had long realized the need for change within the com- 
mercial and administrative spheres of Its colonial empire, but the 



^7 



fall of Havana and Manila to the English in August, 1762, convinced 
it of the need for a colonial military reform as well. Havana had 
long been the sentinel protecting the outbound silver fleets on 
which Spain depended so heavily for revenue. Its fall demonstrated 
the fallibility of overdependence upon fixed fortifications which 
had, until this time, formed the basis of Spanish military strategy 
in the New World. The ease with which Havana had been captured 
also made an open secret of Spain's military weaknesses in the New 
V/orld and heightened the chances of future attacks, since from 
Havana Great Britain would have a staging area from which to at- 
tack Veracruz and Mexico City. Another fact not lost upon the 
Spanish authorities was that over 700 merchant ships loaded with 
English manufactures had called at Havana during Its eleven months 
of capture, whereas prior to this time not more than fifteen had 
called during any given year. Not only would England be desirous 
of recapturing these markets once again but It would be increasingly 

difficult to placate the Spaniards themselves unless their 

^7 
antiquated commercial system were altered. Production and 

protection were the keys to Bourbon policies In the New World. 

The colonies had to increase production in order to finance Spain's 

return to greatness. They were also counted upon to bear their 

fair share of defense expenditures. 

To effect these changes, a Secret Committee for Imperial 

Defense was formed. The Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 

the Indies and Finance, the Marques de Grimaldi, Julian de Arriaga, 



k8 



and the Marquis de Esquillache respectively^ met in Madrid with 
their French counterparts to outline a general plan for the defense 
of the Spanish colonies. Although they agreed on the need for 
improved fortifications^ the fall of Havana taught them that larger 
numbers of troops were needed to support the small numbers of 
presidial soldiers throughout the empire^ since the deteriorated 
state of the Spanish treasury made it impossible to supplement 
these veteran units to the point that they might constitute an 
adequate standing army. Moreover^ the Spanish and French policy- 
makers^ for various reasons^ were questioning the value of regular 
troops in the Indes. As Arriaga noted 

The presidios of America do not have and cannot have the 
troops necessary for their defense. There is no money for 
the payment of such troops . , . and all the Infantry in 
Spain would not be enough to provide what is needed there 
. . . there is another highly important obstacle, which is 
that the troops who go to the Indie^ desert and become cor- 
rupted ... as a result in a short while they are worth 
little more than the militia . , . Although it would please 
everyone for the King to recruit soldiers in CSdiz for the 
Indies, it would cost the Crov;n a voyage for the hundreds of 
parasites v^ho furtively seek to go to America, and it is 
abundantly clear that these recruits would not remain in 
the corps longer than necessary to make good their escape. 
The result of all that I have expressed is that one cannot 
count on maintaining the presidios of America with a suf- 
ficient number of regular troops for their defense. 50 

The alternative to regular troops was to base colonial defenses 

upon small numbers of Spanish regular units who would be frequently 

rotated, supplemented by larger numbers of fijo (fixed) battalions 

of soldiers raised within the colonies themselves. Yet since both 

of these measures required substantial amounts of money to pay the 

salaries of these soldiers, it was necessary that these units be 



^9 



supplemented by a militia, greatly increased in size and trained 
and organized on a standard basis like the provincial militia of 
Spai n. 

In order to test the efficiency of this revised defense system, 
the Spanish crov;n dispatched Field Marshal Alejandro O'Reilly to 
Havana in April, I763. O'Reilly v/as to determine the causes for 
the fall of the fortress, and to reform the fijo and regular bat- 
talions. In addition, he was to reorganize the militia of the 
island upon a disciplined basis. In July, 176'4, O'Reilly completed 
his mission to Cuba and returned to Spain. The fruit of his labor 
was the Reglamento para las milicias de infanterfa y caballerfa de 
la Isia de Cuba, first printed in Havana on June 15, 1764.-''^ ft 
was from these provisional tables of organization, as v;ell as 
from tables which had been drawn up earlier in 1734 for the use 
of the Spanish provincial militia that a basis for the creation of 

bodies of disciplined militia in New Spain, the Phillipines, New 

53 

Granada, Peru, and the La Plata vi ceroyal t ies was established. 

The concept of a supplementary militia V7as not a nev; one in 

Peru. Juan and Ulloa had recommended that one be established to 

aid in the maintenance of coastal defense: 

We are of the feeling that the principal defense of those 
populations which cannot be comprised within the enclosure of 
a provided fortification, consists in the inhabitants taking 
arms to defend themselves, or to oppose any attempted enemy 
landing, by forming bodies of militia in all the ports. ^^ 

This, however, was only an extension of the concept of an urban 
militia, in whicii no thought was given to periodic training or 
formal organization. In the new program, the emphasis would neces- 
sarily be upon training and discipline. 



50 



The first guidelines for the formation of such a militia in 
Peru were dispatched on May 11, I763 in the form of a royal order 
entrusted to Colonel Juan Manuel Campero, a regular officer who had 
been sent out as the new military governor of Tucum^n. Accompany- 
ing the order was a document entitled Plan de Milicias: su esta - 

55 
blecimiento y necesidad . The plan convinced Viceroy Amat that 

a disciplined militia "was not only useful but necessary . . . 

56 
successive experiences confirm this fact every day." In December 

Amat v/rote the Ministry of the Indies giving his analysis of prior 
defense strategy and its failures. In the letter he restated his 
belief that the navigational perils of the Cape Horn passage v;ere 
no longer sufficient to deter an enemy Invasion, and his awareness 
that no help could be sent from Spain in time should such an event 
occur. Efforts by his predecessors to raise standing armies to 
combat such invasions had failed from a military standpoint, he 
thought, since the number of troops which could be raised v/ere in- 
sufficient to cover the extensive coastline. It also was unwise 
from an economic viev;poInt, he felt, since such a measure forced 
small towns to donate far beyond their resources and bankrupted 
the royal treasuries. Once this happened, Amat noted that "all 
v/as reduced to discontent and confusion," the army drifted apart, 
and the towns were as defenseless as before. For the above 
reasons, Amat reiterated his preference for a militia which sought 
no pay for its services, and v«;hlch was ready at a moment's notice. 
Those he had raised in Lima, he affirmed, "were not inferior to 
the most veteran soldiers from Europe." Already, he boasted, he 



51 



had raised and trained a larger number of these than Campero had 
est imated.-*' 

On August 2^, 1765, the crov;n issued a second guideline for 

the organization of a disciplined militia, which was republished in 

58 
Peru as the Reqlamento sobre las milicias del Virreynato del Peru . 

Since the former plan had presumably only been intended to convince 
the viceroy of the efficacy of raising a militia, his enthusiastic 
support of the plan opened the way for a more detailed regulation 
designed to place this militia on a footing consistent with the 
Spanish provincials. Yet nowhere in the regulation is there any 
indication that Viceroy Amat was bound to adhere to these guide- 
lines. The fact that the ministers of the crown considered Amat 
to have no peer as an administrator and military expert accounts 

for the flexibility given him to reorganize the militia along the 

59 
lines he felt most suitable. 

The 1766 R eql ament o contained a series of steps governing 
the raising and organization of units of disciplined militia in 
Peru. First, the governor or corregidor of a particular district 
v/as to take a census of the population within his jurisdiction in 
order to determine the number of persons available for duty. Each 
regiment was to be raised within a ten-league radius of a pro- 
vincial capital, the regiment taking the name of that town. Although 
no mention was made of the number of companies which v;ere to be 
raised, in most cases only one battalion could be formed. Often 
companies were raised in small towns distant from the capital which 
infrequently would train with the battalion but which were attached 



52 



60 
to it for administrative purposes. The regulation went on to state 

that each infantry battalion was to contain nine companies of seventy- 
five men each, cavalry or dragoon regiments were to be composed of 
nine companies of fifty men each^ which were to be grouped into 
squadrons of three companies for tactical purposes. 

Enlistment procedures were not spelled out In the regulation, 
although a rather elaborate process for enlistment was in use in 
New Spain. The regulation did mention, however, that rank was to 
be granted in line v/Ith social status. All officers and sergeants 
were to be granted the active military privileged jurisdiction as 

long as they held their rank, while enlisted personnel enjoyed 

62 

these privileges only when called onto active duty. The regula- 
tion v;arned that militia officers or provincial officials were not 
authorized to employ soldiers in any capacity which interfered with 
harvesting their crops or other trades. The sole master of the 
militia, it noted, was the King of Spain. The regulation also 
stated that the militia were to be provided with veteran training 
cadres to instruct them in military exercises and the handling of 
weapons. Although it was clearly intended to provide veteran 
troops wherever possible, the other members of the command and 
staff groups were allowed to be drawn from "the most decorated 
persons in the provinces. 

The capture of the "cold and sterile" Malvinas (Falkland) 
Islands off the coast of Buenos Aires by the English In I766 created 
a climate of urgency in Peru which gave en added imipetus to the 



53 



formation of these militia companies^ since from them Great Britain 
could launch a full-scale attack on the West Coast without the 

danger of their movements being detected and relayed to Lima before- 

65 
hand. Such news provoked Amat to pledge all his efforts towards 

66 
securing Peru against a seaborne invasion. In an effort to do 

this, the viceroy made numerous overtures to enlist the support 

of the Creole elites of Lima, in the hope that the lower classes 

would emulate their example and enter the militia voluntarily. 

Formerly, he had organized the Regiment of the Nobility, which 

became a creole unit encompassing the members of the best families 

67 
of the city. In granting military f ueros (privileges) to this 

unit, Amat made it clear that membership would not abrogate any of 

68 
the privileges which they already enjoyed. A creole observer 

has observed that "the joy was universal" when this regiment was 

created, and that the Creoles doubled their attention to the military 

69 
exercises, quickly making "incredible progress." 

The other urban unit of Lima, the Battalion of Merchants, was 

also reorganized into ten companies of fifty men each, and thirty- 

70 
nine officers, commanded by the Conde de Tor revel arde , It was in 

this way that the numerous Spanish merchants of Lima were brought 
into the militia program. 

Militia service was less popular among the negroes and mixed 
bloods who filled the enlisted ranks of these companies. To begin 
with the inhabitants of the city were unused to the demands of war- 
time and consequently afraid of them. Amat noted that "all the 



5^ 



people suffered from cowardice, and upset" and that in tiie past 
they had abandoned the city when news of an invasion had reached 
them. Although training of the militia had been attempted in 
the past, the distance of a European enemy from Peruvian shores 

caused an air of unreality about such exercises and they were 

72 
never taken seriously. Especially problematical was the in- 
corporation of the Negroes of Lima, an audacious group which was 

73 
alv/ays at odds v/ith the viceroy. Although his resources v;ere 

short, Amat had gold medals made featuring a bust of Charles ill 

and granted them to the commanders of the companies of pardos, 

morenos, and Indians in an effort to raise morale among these 

7^ 
groups. The scheme apparently worked, and no reported cases of 

violence have been located surrounding the enlistment of these 

groups into the militia. This brought expressions of amazement 

from certain observers, who noted that the viceroy "accomplishes 

more by being agreeable than by force" and compared him v;ith 

Alexander the Great who utilized similar methods to incorporate 

the defeated Macedonians into his army. The moral seemed clear: 

sagacity produced better results than the sword. 

Am.at's deep interest in the militia persisted long after the 

initial reorganization. His presence at the weekly reviews in the 

plaza mayor (main square) of Lima provided these exercises with a 

dignity v;hich they had never before possessed. Moreover, his 

passionate respect for a career at arms gave this vocation a new 

luster. According to one observer, the advent of Viceroy Amat 



55 



caused the proficient handling and firing of weapons to be looked 
upon as a badge of honor which distinguished "accomplished and 
gallant men." These Creoles professed disdain for "excessive braid 
and trimming" vvhich had distinguished the Spanish soldier and 
which to them seemed a mark of vanity rather than of service to the 
king. The regulation specified that reviews were to be held a 
minimum of twice a year but made no mention of weekly drills. Vice' 
roy Amat had definite ideas on the subject though, and called an 
untrained soldier "a body that serves only to embarrass." During 



wo 



the war, the merchant's guild had sponsored the construction of t 
barracks in Lima for the training of the militia companies. Each 
week a company of Infantry and one of cavalry would occupy the 
barracks to receive dally training sessions under the auspices of 
veteran officers from Callao. The artillery detachment practiced 

outside of the city by firing at a wall built especially for the 

78 ,, 

purpose. This practice was discontinued by the King in 1764 

over the objections of the viceroy, who feared the consequences 

if the militia lost its wartime readiness. With the introduction 

of the 1766 militia regulation into Peru this weekly training was 

79 
again resumed In Lima. 

Periodically, Amat would stage exercises in the plaza mayor 

to demonstrate the proficiency of the militia which he had created. 

these reviews were festive and glamorous affairs attended by the 

best people of Lima. The plaza was decorated for such an occasion 

and tapestries were hung from the balconies fronting the square. 



56 



Frequently fights broke out among the lower classes for the spaces 
not occupied by the nobility. One such demonstration was held on 
November k, 1772 in honor of the birthday of Charles III. A wide 
trench was dug across the middle of the square to simulate a river, 
and a bridge was built across it. The militia of Lima was divided 
into two opposing armies and set up campsites at each end of the 
square. One side was to hold the bridge while the other attacked 
it in a series of stages v;hich v;ere explained to the assembled 

citizens in order that they might gain a better appreciation of 

... . 80 _ . , , , . , , 

military tactics. Reviews generally began with each company pass' 

i ng before the royal balcony on which the viceroy and his military 
advisors were seated. At 3:30 the review terminated and the vice- 
roy and his party entered carriages for the procession to the 
church of Our Lady of Monserrat, the patron saint of the militia 
of Lima, where a high mass was celebrated. The streets were jammed 
for the occasion. Follovjing the mass, the militia companies took 
seats along the Rimac River where the brigade of artillery put on 
a demonstration of fireworks. Grenades were lobbed into the river, 
exploding and sending up plumes of spray. At the conclusion of the 

fireworks the procession returned to the plaza mayor where dinners 

81 
and festivities lasted long into the night. 

Viceroy Amat took a similar interest In the veteran component 

of the Army of Peru, and consistently upheld their demands for 

higher pay and more generous benefits. He had been in Chile when 

a regular battalion revolted because the government had fallen 



57 



-aw 



into arrears on their pay. Thus^ when the crown asked him to dr; 

up a revised pay schedule in I768 to help offset rising costs, 

Amat tabled the order on the basis that such a measure v;as injurious 

tu public safety due to the effect it would provoke on the veteran 

8? 
forces. In a letter to the crown, Amat argued that while he was 

fully aware of the expense which this component caused, and the 

poverty of the royal treasury, veteran pay scales v;ere already so 

low that they could barely sustain a common soldier, much less an 

officer. He observed that in Peru "the poor fjegro journeyman" was 

better off than the soldier. He expressed fear that if pay was 

slashed further soldiers would begin leaving the army for civil oc- 

cupations, and the king would be without an army to defend his possessions. 

As it stood, he felt the regular and fijo troops in Peru viere only 

capable of defending seventy of the seventy-six provinces in Peru. 

This excluded the highland areas filled with "barbarous Indians 

and innumerable castes." Amat went on to cite the great respect 

which veteran troops enjoyed within the viceroyalty and their value 

to it. As an example, he pointed to the cavalry company of the 

Guard of the Viceroy, without whose presence, he noted, "the Royal 

Treasury would not collect a real ." He warned that if the presidial 

troops ever joined with the Indians to oppose the royal authority, 

8k 

no one "would be able to put out the fire that they could light." 

In addition to supporting their pleas for better pay and 
increased benefits, Amat applied the first comprehensive regulation 
to these regular and fijo units in 1770, intended to better their 



58 



organization and discipline. -^ He stressed the development of 
technical expertise among these units as well. As mentioned earlier, 
the viceroy was particularly interested in developing the field of 
mathematics which he considered essential to national defense, since 
mastery of this science helped the artillery brigade hit its targets 
more accurately, and because of the various applications it might 
have in erecting new fortifications. He therefore arranged that 
a hall at San Marcos be set aside for the teaching of this subject, 
which was to be taught by Cosme Bueno, the senior cosmographer of 
the viceroyalty. On February 21, 17^6 Amat published an edict 
notifying all cadets, second lieutenants, and lieutenants in the 
regular or fijo companies that they might come to Lima and enroll 

as fulltime students of mathematics at San Marcos while drav>/ing 

86 
their full military salaries. Of the "many" officers who took 

advantage of this offer, three were graduated in a special public 

examination on June 11, 1768. With the viceroy sitting as honored 

guest, the three engaged in an oral examination, after which they 

87 
were granted diplomas and given promotions. In a similar ef- 
fort to maintain the morale of the regular forces at a high level, 
Amat voiced strong opposition to the Crown's plan to ship deserters 
from the Spanish army to Peru to serve in the fijo units there. He 
explained that they would merely desert again if given the op- 
portunity and go off to live with the Indians, forming outlaw bands 
to terrorize merchants and travellers. In light of the small number 
of regular troops in Peru, Amat ventured that such occurrences could 
combine to overthrov/ the government if allowed to proceed unchecked. 



59 



The order was subsequently withdrawn. 

The viceroy felt that the capital cities of Peru and Chile 
were close enough to the coast to permit aid to be dispatched 
rapidly to other areas in the event of an invasion by sea, since 
a wel 1 -equipped field army could cover at least twenty leagues in 
a day's march. The small size of the majority of the Chilean 
coastal villages led him to joke that it would be easier to move 
them by tying the rude shacks to a horse's tail than to waste any 
additional money upon fortifications. For this reason Amat 
recommended that Valparaiso and Concepcion not be given additional 

regular garrison troops, but instead that their defense be left 

90 
to the regulars of Santiago located thirty leagues away. He 

similarly wrote off Valdivia as unworthy of further fortification, 

blaming its present condition upon the Company of Jesus who, he 

maintained, had always used their influence to defeat proposals 

91 

to increase military construction amongst the Araucanian Indians. 

The one exception to the general rule of not increasing 
fortifications was the island of Chiloe, located off of the Chilean 
coast, which Amat sought to make the bulv;ark of his southern 
defensive perimeter. Chiloe was a logical stopoff for any marauder 
rounding the Cape Horn because of the available fresh water and 
plentiful wild animals V'jhich abounded on the island and had harbored 
the Anson expedition earlier. As such, it could increase the range 
of an enemy expedition, freeing it from the necessity of putting 
into a mainland port for repairs or supplies. Enveloped in fog for 



60 



nearly all the year, from Chiloe an expedition might directly at- 
tack Santiago or Lima without fear of being spotted. These were 
some of the considerations which led Viceroy Amat to refer to the 

island as "one of the principal keys to the security of the king- 

92 

dom, " and v;hich caused him to increase the size of its garrison. 

Although the island came under the jurisdiction of Chile, 
the willingness of the president of that audiencia to abandon Chiloe 
to an enemy prompted Amat to request that it be transferred to the 
Viceroyalty of Peru. Since the voyage by sea from Chiloe to Callao 
v^as faster than from Chiloe to Valdivia, due to more favorable tides, 
this request made sense on strategic grounds, and it vias approved 
by the king on August 20, 176?. In addition, the viceroy was 
granted permission to fortify the island and to name a military 

governor there. On March 28, I768, Amat named Captain of Dragoons 

93 
Carlos Berang3r to the post. By 1776 the island was garrisoned 

by 1^6 regular troops, the majority of them situated in the capital 

9^ 
city of San Carlos. 

The news that Great Britain had possessed itself of the 

Malvinas (Falkland) Islands off of the coast of Buenos Aires 

heightened Spanish fears that a second vjar against that nation vias 

forthcoming. In order to assure itself that the Viceroyalty of 

Peru could surmount such an invasion, the Ministry of the Indies 

requested Viceroy Amat to make a full report on the defenses of 

the viceroyalty in order that the king might decide what measures, 

if any, v;ere necessary to secure the kingdom from attack. Amat's 



61 



reply, dispatched on November 1, 1768, was a remarkably candid 
document, detailing the weaknesses in the Peruvian army as well 
as its strengths. It also signalled a departure from the original 
strategy of defense which Amat had expressed during the early part 
of the Seven Years War. 

By 1767 the viceroy seems to have conceded to Great Britain 
control over the high seas and the folly of attempting to garrison 
Peru against any seaborne invasion which that nation might seek to 
carry out. "There is no naval force that is able to oppose them; 

there are not enough troops nor enough money in the world to gar- 

95 
rison and fortify such vast territories." Instead, Amat chose 

to concentrate almost exclusively upon the defense and fortifica- 
tion of Lima alone. The fortress "Real Felipe" (to be completed in 

177^); the artillery foundry, and gunpowder factory were all symbols 

96 
of this emphasis. In his report, however, Amat voiced deep concern 

about the security of the city, which had "never seen the theater 
of Mars" and whose fabulous v^ealth made it the logical point of any 
English attack. He lamented the fact that women and priests out- 
numbered able-bodied men in Lima, and cited the presence of numerous 
troublesome castes whose conduct he feared during wartime. Although 

the people had a tendency to flee in the face of danger, Amat hoped 

97 
that his presence would put an end to such practices. By sur- 
rounding the city with militia to hold off an approaching enemy, the 
viceroy at least felt he would be able to transport the better part 
of the silver and other wealth into the mountains before the city 
fell 93 



62 



On the subject of the militia^ Amat is more circumspect than 
in his earlier statements. While he categorized the militia of 
Lima as "numerous," Amat conceded that companies from the outly- 
ing provinces would be unable to assist in the defense of the 
city unless they had ample forewarning, due to the distances involved 
Likewise, he noted that while the battalion at Callao and the Vice- 
roy's Guard were both trained and ready to act in an emergency, some 
of these troops were always serving on the Indian frontier and there- 
fore unavailable. Moreover, he estimated that 3,000 troops v/ould 
be needed to garrison the fortress in the event of a siege. He 
therefore considered it "indispensable" that Peru receive more 
regular troops, especially to help in the training of the militia 
v/hich he felt had deteriorated to their prewar condition. Since 
none of them had had combat experience, Amat urged that weekly 
training be resumed throughout the viceroyalty to improve their 

sel f -d isci pi i ne . and strengthen their character which, he noted, 

99 

"is so \veak that a bad night is capable of making them surrender." 

He had little good to say about the regulars either, referring to 
them as men of low reputation v^ho joined the army only to avoid 
jail in Spain. He closed by emphasizing the need for driving the 
English out of the Malvinas, since not only did these islands provide 
them a base from which to invade Peru, but also would allow ther 



;m 



to carry horses to transport their cannon once a beachhead had 

■ , . , ,100 
been establ i shed. 



63 



Following the British occupation of the Malvinas in I768, 
Charles III had requested his Minister of Foreign Affairs^ the 
Marques de Grimaldi, to prepare a memorandum outlining the measures 
which he felt should be taken to defend Peru against the pos- 
sibility of foreign attack. On February 25 of the following year, 
Grimaldi submitted his report, entitled "Estado del Peru/' to the 
Ministry of the Indies. In it he remarked that the numerous rumors 
of British schemes to establish themselves upon the mainland of 
Spanish America demanded that a program of military reform be 
undertaken In that kingdom to prevent its loss through invasion. 
Grimaldi stated that his understanding that practically the entire 
coastline v^as undefended and that Callao was garrisoned by a force 
of less than 500 men had caused him great worry about the security 
of the viceroyalty. He therefore recommended that the crown send 

n initial shipment of regular troops to Peru at once, and that 
each year this be supplemented v;ith other shipments of soldiers, 
arms, and munitions, to "provide hope for the coming year" to the 
citizens of Peru in their efforts to defend themselves against 
attack.l°^ 

In response to the reports of Amat and Grimaldi, the crown took 
a series of measures intended to better the organization and effi- 
ciency of the Army of Peru. While much of the program was either 
not fully implemented or allowed to lapse after the English were 
ousted from the Malvinas by Spain In 1770, Amat worked exceedingly 
hard to retain the army in the state of readiness which it had 



a 



6k 



enjoyed in I763. However, although the King, in an order dated 
October 21, 1768, ordered the Reqiamento para las milicias de in - 
fanterfa y caballerfa de la Isia de Cuba applied in Peru, Amat did 

not order the regulation published and seems to have left the 

102 
militia on the same footing as it was since its inception. The 

crown also created the post of inspector general of the veteran 
and provincial troops of Peru, and appointed a proven soldier and 
administrator, Brigadier General Francisco Javier de Morales to 
fill it, but this measure was also abortive due to a series of un- 
fortunate circumstances. Early in 1769 Morales and his second in 
command Colonel Baltasar Semanat left for Peru with a battalion of 
the infantry Regiment of Portugal, composed of six fusileer companies, 
an artillery company, and thirty cavalry soldiers. These troops 
v;ere to serve as reinforcements for the garrisons and also as train- 
ing cadres for the militia. Bad weather prevented the flotilla 
from rounding the Cape Horn, and in April they were forced to 
return to Montevideo. From there Morales and Semanat struck out 

overland on their ov^n, reaching Santiago in February, 1770. Morales 

103 
never did reach Peru due to an unforeseen set of circumstances. 

This loss of vigorous leadership was to hinder attempts to reorganize 

the militia especially in the provinces where the subi nspectors 

disliked and feared to go. 

In an attempt to arrest the declining level of moral ity among 

the soldiers, Amat placed Peru under something quite like martial 

law during this period. Discipline ./as to Amat the cornerstone of 

any program of reform within tfie military institution. In his 



65 



Hemor i a he wrote "It Is clear that obedience to the rigid Military 
Religion is the basic foundation upon which rests the glory and 
success of Arms, and the most minimal deceit and condescendence 
ought not be allowed to transcend it." In order to reduce these 
vices to their minimum, Amat frequently called out the Callao 
garrison in the dead of night to determine if the tables of strength 
reported to him by the commanders was accurate. Units found un- 
accountably understrength v^ere severely disciplined. The number 
of officers present at all reviews was doubled also to prevent 
future abuses from occurring. To check graft in purchasing and 
supply, the viceroy appointed a comptroller to audit the accounts 
of the commissar of war. In a letter to the king defending such 
strenuous measures, Amat stated that without constant vigilance. 
His Majesty would have "no troops, arms, treasury, or derense." -^ 

During the Seven Years War the viceroy had jailed suspected 
wrongdoers through a series of legal subterfuges because of the 
delays involved in receiving rapid judgments from the crown. 
Even v;hen dealing with military cases Amat was liable to take mat- 
ters into his own hands rather than turn the case over to a military 
court. In 1772, for example, when a ring of soldiers from Callao 
v;hich had been terrorizing people on the streets of Lima was broken 
up, Amat ordered them to be marched into the plaza mayor where they 
were to be read the passages of the military ordinances pertaining 
to theft. He then decreed that they should be beheaded and their 



66 



107 

heads placed on pikes as a warning to others. In another case 

involving a pay dispute between the officers and crew of the 
Spanish v/arships Astuto and Septent r ion harbored at Callao^ Amat 
marched to the harbor at the head of his guard and boarded the 
ships. Bypassing the jurisdiction of the captain, the viceroy had 
forty-three suspects jailed and declared himself a court of military 
justice to hear the case. In a cruel travesty of justice, he 
declared all of the defendants to be guilty of mutiny, but permitted 
them to hold a lottery among themselves to see v;ho would lose their 
lives. As a result, nine v/ere hanged and thirty-four were given 
whippings and lengthy jail sentences. In his Memor I a, Amat 
expressed some discomfort in having been forced to proceed in such 
a fashion, but defended his actions by noting that leniency on the 
part of military commanders had been the cause of repeated mis- 
behavior among the soldiers. 

Although the Peruvian militia had no foreign war to fight 
during the viceregency of Manuel de Amat, their services were 
utilized numerous times to preserve the internal security of the 
kingdom. Two of the most significant instances of this were the 
Quito tax rebellion of I765 and the expulsion of the Jesuits in 
1767. The conduct of the militia in each of these circumstances 
helped to determ.ine the limits of effectiveness of this component 
of the Army of Peru. 

In Quito a rebellion broke out following the attempt by the 
governor of thai city to inr.pose a sales tax upon cane brandy. In 
retaliation, a roving band of tov;nspeople on the evening of June 



67 



22 destroyed the Quito customhouse which had been built to hold the 
revenues from this tax. After a few tentative attempts by the 
audiencia and the local militia failed^ the rebels grew stronger 
and possessed themselves of the entire city. When the negotia- 
tions between the government and the rebels broke down completely, 
the Viceroy of New Granada petitioned Amat on July 28 to send an 
expedition to liberate Quito. Amat quickly ordered two companies 
from the infantry Regiment of pardos and two from the "Prince of 
Asturias Battalion" of the Regiment of Spanish Infantry, along 
v/Ith an artillery detachment and 50,000 pesos to be sent to Gua- 
yaquil where they were to unite with soldiers arriving from Panama 
for the overland march to Quito. When the expedition arrived in 

Quito, however, the revolt had already been ended by negotiations, 

109 
and the audiencia was in proper control of the city. 

The Quito expedition again pointed up the fact that the 
militia of Lima v;as of little use as a peacekeeping force In the 
more distant parts of the interior, due to the time vyhich It took 
them to reach their destination. In view of this distance between 
Lima and Quito It Is somewhat difficult to see v;hy the Viceroy of 
New Granada requested troops from the former city, but more dif- 
ficult to explain v/hy Viceroy Amat should have acceded to this 
request and outfitted a fruitless expedition which cost the 
viceroyalty some 112^000 pesos. One student of the situation has 
speculated that Amat v/as trying to demonstrate to the crown that 
he v/as able to militarily defend Quito, which had once formed a 
part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, in an effort to have it and Guaya- 



68 



quil rejoined once again. The incorporation of Guayaquil especially, 

with its fine harbor and ship chandlery, made reincorporation a 

110 

favorite idea in Lima for a century thereafter. 

The expulsion of the Company of Jesus from America in 17^7 
offers one striking instance in which the reorganized militia v;ere 
able to aid in the execution of another importanL Bourbon Reform, 
and demonstrated how such a militia could be mobilized rapidly to 
suit the purposes of the crovjn. The wealth and independent policies 
pursued by the Company made it a real threat to the absolutist 
Charles III and had caused him to expel the order from Spain some 
years before. In Peru the Jesuits were among the strongest of 
the various religious orders, possessing large landholdings and 
exercising, especially in Lima, enormous political power. Vice- 
roy Amat characterized their expulsion from Peru as one of the 

112 

most difficult tasks ever undertaken by his government. 

On March 2, 17^7; instructions for expulsion v;ere sent by 
the Conde de Aranda, the president of the Royal Council of ministers, 
to the various governors of the American kingdoms. On August 20 
this order arrived in Lima, delivered by an official of the Buenos 
Aires government, whose mere presence provoked rumors that some- 
thing was afoot. The order had been sent out to the interior cities 
of Peru froi.i Buenos Aires somevjhat earlier and Jesuit houses in 
Chuquisaca (August 1 7) ^ Cuzco (September l) , Moquequa (September 
7), and Mojos (October 5~8) had all been closed without incident and 
their members marched towards Lima for eventual departure. The 



69 



situation in Lima^ hov/ever, promised to be considerably more dif- 
ficult since the capital contained five of the largest and wealthiest 
houses of the twenty-five in all Peru. In addition^ the network of 
family and property ties which its membership maintained with the 
upper classes of the capital meant that a riot might break out once 
the expulsion order became known. Therefore, although the order 
made no specific mention of soldiers being used, Amat determined 
to use the militia to insure the success of the venture. 

The order received by Amat gave no specific date for ousting 
the Company other than to say that it should take place promptly 
after the receipt of the order. Therefore, Amat chose September 
8, the birthday of Our Lady of Monserrat, the patron saint of the 

ilitia of Lima, vjhen a review of the militia and parade were 
scheduled in the plaza mayor. Since the militia would already be 
assembled, no suspicion would be attached to their presence when 
the order was carried out. Amat also ordered the warship San Jose 
( El Peruano) outfitted for taking the Jesuits to Italy, simul- 
taneously letting it be known that he was planning to send it to 
Acapulco on a trade mission. Although the viceroy v;ould have 
preferred to utilize only the members of the Regiment of the 
Nobility, which was composed of members of the upper class, for 
the task of expelling the Company, he felt he needed more men 
than this. Unfortunately, the records do not indicate which ones 
re utilized. All that is known is that ten grenadier companies 
re invited to attend a formal dinner in the Royal Palace following 



m 



we 



we 



70 



the mass which ended the review. After the dinner there was dancing 
and entertainment, including plays and readings. At two a.m. the 
highest officials in the city appeared at the rear entrance of the 
palace and requested admission, showing the message which Amat had 
sent them earlier in order to gain it. At this time the viceroy 
read to them the expulsion order. Not long thereafter a fijo 
infantry company from the Callao garrison arrived at the palace to 
relieve the company on duty there. This company, the members of 
the Viceroy's Guard, and the militia, gave the authorities a force 
of 700 soldiers. These were divided into four equal groups and 
dispatched to the four main houses of the city. By 5 a.m. the 
houses of the Jesuits were all occupied and their members in pro- 
tective custody. In addition, troops had been sent out to seize 
the extensive Jesuit landholdings outside of the city. Within a 
few weeks the Peruvian Jesuits were at sea on their way to Italy 
and exile. In a letter to the crown. Viceroy Amat boasted that 

"The Jesuits have been throv;n out, and I threw them out like a 

1 li; 
herd of 1 ivestock." 

Although the crown considered the expulsion of the Jesuits to 
have been necessary to preserve the colonies, some subsequent develop- 
ments tend to raise the question that perhaps its overall effect was 

1 15 

detrimental to this end. On the other hand, the skill and ef- 
ficiency which the militia and fijo troops of Lima manifested in 
the affair indicated that in lieu of foreign wars to fight, their 
talents could be utilized in domiestic affairs without concern 



71 



about their loyalty to the King. 

This situation demonstrated as well as any the improvement 

which Viceroy Amat had effected in the Army of Peru, which^ at the 

time of his arrival had been underst rength and in a demoralized 

condition. The veteran^ or regular component, which composed the 

backbone of the army at midcentury_, had never been held in high 

regard by the inhabitants of Peru, due to the fact that as 

Spaniards they could be counted upon to treat both the lov/er classes 

and the Creoles condescendingly and also because they were members 

of the lower class in Spain. in effect, the Callao garrison was, 

because of its notorious lack of discipline, a laughing stock. 

There is no doubt that before the coming of this Viceroy 
[Amat] the critics joked with some apparent factual basis 
since there was no other [military] organization to be found 
except the good judgment of a retreat because the garrison, 
the armory, the militia, the cannon, only demonstrated that 
defenses v/ere attributable to miracles. The advantages were 
always with the enemies, but through the Mercy of God vie lived 
without fear, conceited in both spirit and necessities. Since 
[former viceroys] lacked the audacity to place the blame, no 
concern developed for the necessity of their arms, which became 
rusty from lack of use . . ,''° 

By the end of Amat's term of office this situation seems to 

have changed. Certainly discipline was much improved due to the 

iron rule of the viceroy who served as a court of first instance 

whenever it pleased him. With the arrival of the battalion from 

the Regiment of Portugal in 1770 the size of the veteran component 

v/as substantially increased from what it had been at mid-century. 

By 1777 the Regiment of Royal Infantry of Limci had reached a strength 

of 690 men, 320 of which v/ere regulars. The size of the total 

veteran contingent in Peru and Upper Peru (Bolivia) numbered 1,362. 



72 



An additional 1,89^ troops were located in the presidios of Chile. 

In all, the Viceroyalty of Peru and its dependency Chile could count 

lift 

3,256 regular troops within their borders. 

Amat's accomplishments with the militia were equally impressive. 
The urban Battalion of Merchants and Regiment of the Nobility had 
been reorganized and numbered ^95 and 38^ men respectively. The 
remaining militia companies in Lima v;ere classified as disciplined 
and were provided with veteran training cadres composed of twenty 
of the officers of the Regiment of Portugal and an additional twenty- 
six officers and sergeants from the militia Regiment of Spanish 
Infantry (Reqimien to del Numerol who were dispersed among them."^ 
The several companies of disciplined militia were reorganized as 

foil OVJS . 

The Regiment of Spanish Infantry v;hich in I762 had totalled 
twenty-seven companies had been reduced in size to two battalions 
with nineteen companies, numbering 1,3^7 men, including its com- 
mand and staff group. In its officer corps were the members of the 

Lima nobility, with lower-born whites of the capital serving in 

1 20 
Its enlisted ranks. In addition to the "free companies" of 

scribes, students, and artisans which had been raised in I763, two 

more companies of mestizo tailors, officered by Spanish members of 

the tailors' guild, had been formed in 1769^ each with a total 

strength of seventy-five men. The "free companies" all had their 

own training cadres and totalled k'/k men in all.'^^ The Regiment 

of pardos stood at two battalions of nine companies each totalling 

9^2 men, v/hile the Battalion of morenos numbered nine companies 



73 



with ^7^. The Regiment of Indians stood at three battalions v^ith 
a total strength of 1,^58. In all, the infantry militia of Lima 
numbered 5^251 soldiers by 1776. The artillery brigade had been 
increased in size to five companies totalling 3^^ men by the same 



date. 



The cavalry militia showed a similar increase in size. In 
addition to the tv/o urban units already mentioned, there was a 
"free" company of lawyers with seventy-five men, four companies 
known as "Royal Fusileers," who were Spanish nobles with hunting 
experience. These companias de cazadores (companies of hunters) 
as they often referred to themselves numbered 157 men. In addition, 
there were three companies of pardos numbering 10^ men, three of 
morenos with seventy-seven, and a company of ninety-nine Indians. 
These seven companies of castes formed a Regiment of Nations 
numbering 280 troops in total. 

The Regiment of Dragoons had been formed by Viceroy Amat in 
1773 by combining into it the companies of dragoons which had been 
formed in 17^2. By 1776 it was composed of three squadrons with 
three companies each, with a total strength of 362 men. In addi- 
tion dragoon regiments had been raised in the outlying areas of 
Lima by large landowners possessing both horses and retainers. In 
the Luriganclio valley, for example, a regiment of dragoons existed 
formed into ten companies with a total strength of ^^+5 men, all 
under the command of the Marquis de Hoscoso. Another existed in 
the Carabaillo valley consisting of five companies totalling 3lA 
men under the command of Colonel JosI Antonio Borda, a wealthy 



7^ 



Creole. An additional regiment numbering 180 men existed in the 
suburb of Bellavista. By 177^ the cavalry and dragoon militia of 
Lima and its immediate suburbs stood at just over 2,000 troops. 
Viceroy Amat personally considered these cavalry soldiers to be 

the most useful arm of the service since they could rapidly traverse 

123 

the coast to meet an enemy invasion near Lima. 

The size and condition of the militia outside of Lima during 
any given time is more difficult to estimate since the practice of 
sending copies of the reviev;s to Lima does not seem to have been 
followed. The distinguished historian Mendiburu states that prior 
to 1762 there were regiments of militia only in Cuzco, Arequipa, 

Guamanga, Trujillo, Tarma and three or four more provinces which 

1 2h 

he does not Identify. By the end of that year, an estimated 

125 

25,000 militia has been raised in response to the Seven Years War. 

By the end of the viceregency of Manuel de Amat the total number 
of militia in Peru v/as estimated to be four times this number, or 
nearly 100,000, composed of seventy-five battalions and seventy- 
five "free companies" of infantry v;hich totalled 60,775 men, 125 
squadrons and fifty "free companies" of cavalry numbering 22,273, 

and eighty squadrons and thirteen "free companies" of dragoons 

.^126 
with 13,3^8. 

The size of these figures v/ould be suspect even if further 

proof of their existence v/ere available. Since it is not they are 

even less reputable and consequently unworthy of much attention. 

In cases v;here evidence is available, it can be seen that the 

companies in these battalions frequently existed at some distance 



75 



from each other, reducing the tactical utility of the regiment im- 
measurably. This was clearly evident in a letter written in 1770 
to Amat by the governor of the province of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 
Luis Alvarez de Nava. In it he noted that since most of the militia 
worked on large landholdings located well outside of the town, they 
could not be freed for a sufficient amount of time for them to 
travel to town to drill with their companies. Therefore, he 
proposed that the viceroy provide him with sufficient funds to cover 
the cost of maintaining these soldiers in town for a one-month 
training period v/hich he felt would be sufficient to turn them into 
effective soldiers. There is no indication that Amat honored this 
request, however. The governor also complained that the efforts of 
interior governors to train their militia were frustrated by the 
authorities in Lima, who paid far more attention to the companies 
located on the coast. He warned that the numerous Indians and 
Portuguese required as much attention as that being given to the 

possibility of an English invasion, since this region was "the 

127 

key and doorv;ay to Peru." 

Such a telling comment indicates something about the militia 
buildup in Peru: namely that the emphasis by 1776 was almost 
completely upon the creation of coastal units designed to protect 
against an English invasion. A proper disciplined militia did not 
exist in the interior by 1776. The only exception to this general 
rule were the new companies raised in the larger mining towns and 
cities of the highlands against the threat of Indian attack. More- 
over, along the coast, the emphasis seems to have been on the 



76 



creation of mounted "flying squads" which could rapidly cover the 
area in case of an invasion. For example, in the provinces of 
Chancay, Canta, Huarochiri, Jaujos, Canetej and lea v/hlch ringed 
Lima_, of the 6,609 militia which had been raised;, all but 900 were 
mounted cavalry or dragoon units. Numerically, recruitment had 
been heaviest along the northern coast from Paita to Chimbote, where 
16,062 militia had been raised. To the south along the Atacama 
desert, less than half of this number of militia had been raised, 
most of them close to the city of Arequipa. 

In the interior, most of the militia units centered in and 
about the larger towns and cities such as Jauja (13^250), Huanca- 
velica (5,093), Cuzco (11,773), and La Paz (^,97^), which reflected 
more than anything the Spanish desire to avert raids by hostile 
Indians. It is practically certain according to later testimony, 
that all of the militia raised outside of the immediate Lima area 
v/ere of an urban classification, lacking standard strengths and 

training cadres, due to the reduced danger of attack in these 

1 9R 
areas and the scarcity of veteran troops. (See Table 3.) 

In conclusion. Viceroy Manuel de Amat presided over several 

of the early Bourbon Reforms, and instituted others of his own, 

such as the teaching of mathematics and Nev;tonian physics at San 

Marcos. In addition, Amat reoriented military strategy to utilize 

the harsh topography of Peru to deter enemy invasions, retaining 

selected fortifications only for the purpose of protecting certain 

1 29 

populated areas from capture and ransom. He also succeeded in 



77 

TABLE 3 
THE ARMY OF PERU IN 1776 



1 . Regul ar Troops 

Lima 328 

Callao 785 

Santiago 21^ 

Valdivia 357 

Chiloe 1^6 

Juan Fernandez 56 

Tarma I56 

Jauj a 67 

Santa Cruz de la Sierra 26 

Chilean Frontier 1,1^1 

Total 3,256 

2. Militia 

Lima - Companies of Infantry 

Regiment of Spanish Infantry 1,3^+7 

Battalion of Merchants ^95 

Regiment of Indians 1>^>58 

Regiment of pardos SkZ 

Battalion of morenos 535 
"Free companies of scribes, 

students, tailors, etc. hlh 

Total 5,251 

Lima - Companies of Cavalry and Dragoons 

RegIiT>ent of the Nobility 384 

Company of Lavyyers 75 

Companies of Spaniards 157 

Companies of Nations 280 

Regiment of Dragoons 362 

Dragoons of Lurlgancho 4^5 

Dragoons of Cariballlo 31^ 

Dragoons of Bellavlsta I80 

Total 2,197 



78 



TABLE 3 (cont.) 



Provinces surrounding Lima 5 809 

Coastal Provinces North of Lima 16^062 

Coastal Provinces South of Lima 7^752 

Interior Cities : 

Tarma and Jauja jo r2Q 

Huancavel ica ' 



Cuzco 

Lake Tit icaca Basin 

La Paz 

Cochabamba 

Oruro 

Potosf 



5,093 
11,773 
^.017 
^.97^ 
8,595 
750 
5,912 



Total Infantry Militia 50 775 

Total Cavalry Mil itia 22 273 

Total Dragoon Militia 13^48 

GRAND TOTAL ^^ 



Source: Guillermo Cispedes del Castillo, Lima v Buenos Alrf>^. pp 

85-86j AGI:AL 653 "Estado general que manifiesta las tropas 
milrcianas . , , que en este virreynato del Peru se han 
alistado . . . n.d.; Amat, Memoria de G obiemn. nn 371- 
373, llZ-llh. — ' ^^' 



79 



completing the fortress "Real Felipe" at Callao despite financial 
limitations which hindered his efforts, Third^ he reoriented 

Peru av;ay from its former dependence upon a large and expensive 

130 

navy which consumed much of its revenues. In its place Amat 

created an improved standing army^ increasing the size of the 
regular contingent considerably. Finally^ he created the first 
disciplined militia in Lima and ordered the creation of many other 
urban units throughout Peru. In so doing, Amat encountered the 
opposition of the Church which created a psychology of distrust . 
to these innovations. This was no doubt due to its fear of having 
its ovyn privileged status diminished by the rise of a competitive 
institution to pov'ver in the form of a professional military. Some 
persons, for example, questioned Vvhether the preponderance of 

clerics in Lima was necessary for its security now that soldiers 

131 

v;ere there. 

One of Viceroy Amat 's prime accomplishments was to restore 
the dignity of militia service as an honorable form of employment. 
One observer called this the viceroy's "greatest triumph" and 
noted that militia posts which had formerly been fit only for 
Negroes were novi "hungrily sought" by sons of the best families 

of Lima, v/hose fathers encouraged them to pursue a career of arms 

132 

rather than letters. The fact that many of them were Creoles 

would become increasingly significant as the period wore on. 
These contributions have led Spanish historian Vicente 
Rodrtguez Casado to conclude that by the end of Amat's term 



80 



the militarization of the country was achieved, and when, -^km^^ <•. 
years later, the Tupac Amaru revolt occurs and in the epoch JQjJijf,, 
of [Viceroy] Abascal, the civil war for independence begins, L+. iw f 
the viceroyalty of Peru will always be the principal center 
of resistance to the death. In the final analysis, such 
facts have been accomplished, thanks perhaps to the organiza- 
tional efforts of don Manuel de Amat.'33 

Since this interpretation of the period is dangerously misleading, 

it is necessary, from an historical viewpoint, to clarify the 

s i tuat ion. 

To begin with, the militia buildup in the interior cannot be 
proven, and in fact subsequent developments after 1776 indicate 
that a disciplined militia never came into existence there before 
or after that date. This, combined with the failure of the various 
expeditions sent during the two preceding decades to subdue Indian 
rebels indicates that one cannot properly speak of the interior 
being "militarized" in any sense of the v;ord. Only in Lima could 
a proper army be said to have existed by this date. 

Secondly, the rivalry between whites In the Army of Peru 
caused a cleavage v;ithin that institution v/hich militated against 
the unity requisite to an effective militarization. It is an axiom 
of Latin American history that Peninsular Spaniards held the top 

positions in society in most of Spanish America and in addition, 

13^ 

commanded the best political offices and highest salaries. 

This statement is generally true in Peru, although due to their 
loyalty Creoles seem to have been relatively vie]] off In that 
kingdom. Still, there were not enough positions of responsibility 
to be given to all those desiring them. Excluded from positions 
of honor and responsibility, the Creoles entered the militia after 



81 



17^2 as both a means of reaffirming their loyalty to the king and 
to improve their ov/n positions. Creoles monopolized the senior 

officerships in the militia companies created in Lima during the 

135 
Seven Years War. The pride which emanated from belonging to 

this militia was an interesting byproduct of the mobilization^ 

since it heightened the tension existing between Creoles and 

Spaniards. One creole observer^ whose brother was the infantry 

commandant^ boldly asserted that 

We do not have to fear England, any other nation, or 
Hell Itself, due our discipline, instruction, artillery, 
[and] arms. ! doubt tliat other better prepared, and 
disciplined [militia] can be found on the day and hour that 
a drummer sounds. '-^^ 

The bitterness of the creole nobility towards the Spaniards 

137 
in Peru v;as deep and definite. Much of It can be seen in the 

contempt held by the creole militia for the Spanish regular troops, 
whom they felt were avaricious, dissolute, and expensive to main- 
tain. They felt that these soldiers forgot their training in the 
Indies, and maintained that if only the Creoles were given the 
proper instruction, they would exceed them in the handling of 
arms which was considered to be a European virtue, Creoles 
cited as proof of this the example of the Captain of the Vice- 
roy's Guard Victorlno Gonzales Montero, a creole who had been 
appointed to train the companies being readied in Lima to pursue 

the rebel Juan Santos, a spectacle which drew great crowds of 

139 

admiring Creoles. 

Although Amat privately referred to the members of the 
Creole nobility as "evil and daring" men, to whom corruption 



82 



wa 



s an attribute of their birth, he actively sought their participa- 
tion in the militia since this group could best afford to bear the 

l^iO 

expense of raising and outfitting new companies. in so doing, 

he sought to help heal the breach between Creoles and Peninsulars 
which threatened the unity of the kingdom. That he and his successors 
were unsuccessful in this v/i 1 1 be shown throughout the following 
chapters . 

Finally^ it is wrong to give to the militia created by Amat 
credit for the defeat of the rebel Jos^ Gabriel Tupac Amaru or for 
prolonging the later wars for independence. In the first place, 
as Chapter IV v/ill shov/, it was not the provincial militia, but 
rather local irregulars, officered by Spanish regulars, v/ho finally 
subjugated the Indian forces. Although it is without the scope of 
this paper, there is good evidence that this combination also 
formed the basis of the Army of Peru during the viars for independence. 

Viceroy Amat left Peru with the warning that internal rebel- 
lion posed a far greater threat to the security of the viceroyalty 
than did the threat of an external attack, although he urged that 
defenses against both dangers be maintained. In a broader vein, 

he called for a thoroughgoing reform of the administrative system 

lAl 

to end corruption and injustice. Although his military reform 

program v;as not without its detractors, it provided a solid base 
for the later reforms provoked by the Wars of the American Revolution. 



83 



Notes 



Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein^ The Colonial Heritage of 
Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Pe r spective (New 
York, 1970), p. 89. 

^ Ibid .. p. 99. 

3 

Ibid ., p. 103; Woodrow Borah, "Colonial Institutions and 

Contemporary Latin America," Hispanic American Historical Review, 
XLIII, No. 3 (August, 1963), PP. 375-376. 

L 
Mendiburu, I, k]0-kk]. 

C^s pedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 72-73. 

Ama t , M emoria de Gobierno, p . 153. 

'JosI Cruces Pozo, "Cualidades militares de Amat," Anuar i o 
de Estudios Americanos . IX (Seville, 1952), 338, 

g 
Micaela Villegas v;as a thirteen-year-old courtesan living 
in the Cal le del Huevo. in Lima's bordello v/hen Amat arrived as 
the viceroy in I76I. In 1 766 the two were introduced and the vice- 
roy fell madly in love with the young girl. When he took her as 
his mistress, the scandal rocked the viceroyalty. He built her a 
house, the Quinta del Rinc6n, and had the Rimac river diverted 
through it to simulate the famous Alhambra of Spain. Amat took 
no efforts to hide his love, and often paraded openly with Micaela 
through the streets of Lima. He also preferred to spend time with 
her friends in the theatre rather than with members of the Lima 
aristocracy. Her nickname, "La Perricholi," apparently stemmed 
from an argument in v^hich Amat referred to her as a perra chola 
(half-bred bitch) in reference to her low birth. He built the 
famed Paseo de Aquas and the bullfight arena Acho to please her, 
much to the dismay of his critics, who accused him of misusing 
public funds. V/hen Amat left Peru in 1776, he left Micaela pregnant, 
She subsequently bore him a son, Manuel de Amat y Villegas, later 
to become a signer of Peru's Act of Independence. See Descola, 
pp. 2^6-260. 

"Antonio de Areche to Fernando Marqu6s de La Plata, Viceroy 

of La Plata, Lima, February 1, I783, P. 1, cited in Eunice Joiner 

Gates, "Don Jos^ Antonio de Areche: His Own Defense," Hi spanic 

American Historical Review. VIM, No. 1 (February, 1928), 23. 



10 



Amat, Me moria de Gobiern o. p. 701. 



8^ 



Jos^ Morales de Aramburu^ "Not Idas del verdadero ventajoso 
estado politico, de el Peru vajo [sj_c] la governacion de el Excellen 
teinio Senor Don Manuel de Amat y Junient/' Fenlx. V (Lima, 19^7), 
335"336. Aramburu was a wealthy Creole who was in Chile during 
Amat's presidency, and then later returned to Lima where he became 
a lawyer for the Audiencia and a prosecutor for the inquisition. 
He later was made rector of San Marcos. See Mendiburu, 11, 99. 
Amat also raised an urban militia in Santiago and enforced strict 
rules at the presidio of Concepcion and Valdivia in an effort to 
end the corruption which prevailed there. Before his arrival, 
Aramburu notes. Royal laws were nothing more than "painted images 
to which reverence is lent." 

'^Amat, Memoria de Gobierno. p. 706; AGI:Al. 1^90, Compendio 
de las Prevenciones que e] Exce lent i s imo Senor Don Manuel de Amat 
hizo p ar a la defens a de la Guerra contra Portugal, e Inglaterra. 
Lima, November 10, 1763, p. 1. 

13 

£.ori.ip.endJ^ pp. 1-2. For a succint analysis of the steps 

whereby a militia company was raised, see McAl ister, "Reorganiza- 
tion," pp. 22-2^. 

Compendio. p. 21. The author of the Compendio was Antonio 
de Elexpuru, Viceroy Amat's secretary. He notes that Amat "supplied 
money in hand, the obstacle to obtaining sutlers and vehicles which 
are not customary in these areas; as a result, many are found there 
today." Prior to this, troops were left to feed themselves off the 
land as best they could and often stole to do so. 

15 

Amat, Memoria de Gobierno . pp. lxxix-1 xxxi v. 

'Amat, Memoria de Gobierno , p. 579;, AGI:Al 653, Report from 
Viceroy Manuel de Amat to the King, Lima, December 10, I763, pp. 2-4. 

18„ 

Amat, Memoria de Gobierno. pp. 328-331. 

'^iMd.., P. 703. 

?0 

Ibid ., pp. 7^6-7^7. Amat enumerates the ports and their 

suitability for an invasion on pp. 777-778. 
21 




85 



2U 

AGI:AL 1^91, Royal order from King Charles I I I to Viceroy 

Amat, Madrid, November 22, 176^; Aramburu, p. 317. By 1777 weapons 
shipments brought the total number of rifles in the Lima armory to 
12,000. The coast bristled with 400 cannon, of which "Real Felipe" 
mounted 186 of all calibers. C6spedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos 
Aires, p. 88, notes 101-102. 

^^Aramburu, p. 299. 

?6 

Amat, Hemoria de Gobierno, p. 12^. 

27 
'AGI:AL 639, "Resumen por menor de las grabes [sic] dolen- 

cias en que ha enfermado esta basta gobernaci&n del Peru," Lima, 

March 12, 1762, cited in C^spedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos 

Aires , pp. 79-80; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 353 "35^; P020, 

pp. 11-12. 

AGI:AL n.c. Letter from Viceroy Amat to Minister of the 
Indies Julian de Arriaga, Lima, November 18. I769, cited in Pozo, 
PP. 12-13. 

^^AGIrAL 639,. Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 7, 1768, p. 1; 
Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 58O. 

•in 

-^ AGI:AL \h3\ , Report of Viceroy Amat to King Charles Mi, 

Lima, January 5, 1764, cited in Pozo, p, 14. 

3 1 

Del Moral was temporarily replaced by Pablo Saenz de Busta- 

mante who had been educated in Spain and was an officer in the 
Royal Army. Mendiburu, X, 7-8. 

32 

Aramburu, p. 315. 

^^AGI:AL 639, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, January 6, I768, p. 2. 

34 

A list of the units and their officer corps is set out in 

Elexpuru, Compend io , pp. 10-19, passim, 

3 5 

■^-^Amat, Memori a de Gobierno , p. 734; Elexpuru, Compend io. p. 3. 

36 

Elexpuru, Compend io, p. 3. 

37 Ibid. . pp. 3-4. 

Amat, Memoria de Gob ierno, p. 713. 

39 

Elexpuru, Compend i o, p. 3. 



86 



Amat, Memoria de Gobierno , pp. 713 "71^. The overwhelming 
majority of the men who sponsored militia companies were prominent 
Creoles. See AGIrAL 1^91 "Lista de los oficiales que se dedicaron 
al arreglo egercicio y ensenanza de los soldados de su cargo," 
Lima, February 23, 1765, pp. 1 "3 . 

^1 

Amat, flemoria de G obie rno, p. 713; Mendiburu, I, Ul 1 . For 

a sample of one of these charters, see "Decreto de Amat sobre la 
creacion de una companfa de Fusileros," Revista Historica, VI 
(Lima, 1918), 290-293. 

k2 

Elexpuru, Compendi o. pp. 20-21. 

^Ella Dunbar Temple (ed.), La Gaceta de Lima del Siglo XV I I I 
(Lima, 1965), p. 75. 

Elexpuru, Compendio, p, 23. 

^^Arthur S. Alton, "Spanish Colonial Reorganization under the 
Family Compact," Hjs panic American Historical Review, XII, No. 3 
(August, 1932), 269-28O; L. N. McAl ister, "Reorganization," pp. 1-2. 

Aiton; Allan Christelow, "Great Britain and the Trades from 
Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil, 1759-1783," Hi span ic 
American Historica] Review, XXVII, No. 1 (February, 19^7), 9-10, 2h- 
27. 

^Stein, pp. 95-97. At the end of the war Great Britain 
returned Havana and Manila to Spain. In exchange, Spain gave up 
all its possessions east of the Mississippi River, including 
Florida and granted important trading concessions also. 

^8 

Ibid ., pp. 90-91. 

^Aiton, pp. 273-27^; McAl ister, "Reorganization," p. 8. 

Letter from Julian de Arriaga to Richard Wall, Madrid, 
April 2, 1760, cited in Vicente Rodrfguez Casado, La PoHtica 
y los Po lt ticos en el Reinado de Carlos ill (Madrid, I962), pp. 
105-108. 



51 



McA 1 ister, Fuero Mil itar, p . 3 , 



-''^Bibiano Torres Ramtrez, "Alejandro O'Reilly en Cuba," 
Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XXIV (Seville, 1967), PP. 1357" 
1388. 



87 



53 

The 173^ Ordenanza de milicias provinciales de Espsna v;as 

supplemented and amended and finally culminated in 17^7 in the 
Real declaracion sobre puntos esenciales de la Ordenanza de mili - 
cias provinciales de Espana . In New Spain^ for example, both of 
these plus the Cuban Regulation were supplied the inspector- 
general in charge of reorganization of the militia, yet he was 
free to set up the strength and organization of the regiments as 
he sawflt. McAlIster, "Reorganization," p. 12. 

5^ 

Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, I, p. 56. 

Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, p. 313. I have been unable to 
locate this document. Presumably it was only a rationale for the 
establishment of a militia and not a table of organization, since 
it is not referred to during the subsequent reorganization. 

-* AGIrAL 651, Report from Viceroy Amat to the King, Lima, 
December 1.0, I763., p. 1. 

^^ Ibid .. pp. 2-^. 

r O 

AGI:AL 65^^ Reglamento sobre las milicias del Virreyn ato 
del Peru, Lima, August 31., 1766. 

^^AGI:AL 6^^, letter from the Marques de Grimaldi to Julian 
de Arriaga, San ildefonso, September 10, 1769^ P. 1. Grimaldi 
states that 

With respect to Peru, that viceroy [Amat] displays such 
military expertise, and moderation [regarding] what he 
considers necessary in order to defend that domain, that 
it seems to me that one ought to supply all that he asks. 

McAlister, "Reorganizat ion, " pp. 20-21. 

Reglamento sobre las milicias del Peru, p. 2. While the 
Peruvian militia regulation coincided to some degree with the 
Cuban regulation, there is enough difference between the two to 
assume that the former was based on earlier regulations instead. 
For example, an infantry battalion under the Peruvian regulation 
was based upon nine companies of seventy-five men apiece, v;hile 
the Cuban regulation specified ninety. Thus the battalion 
strength for the Peruvian regulation was 675 men, while the 
Cuban regulation specified 8OO. Furthermore, the Peruvian regula- 
tion made no distinction between cavalry and dragoon battalions, 
whereas the Cuban regulation specified a cavalry battalion to 
contain 65O men and a dragoon battalion to contain ^50. (See 
Table 4, Chapter 111.) 

The officer corps and the command and staff groups of the 
Peruvian regulation also varied from the Cuban ordinance in that 
the former did not specify which ranks were to be held by veterans, 
whereas the Cuban regulation was more definite on the subject. In 
practice, however, the key posts of sergeant major and adjutant 
were reserved for regulars, while militia officers frequently held 



the other ranks^ due to the shortage of regular troops in the vice- 
royal ty . 

The usual practice was for the colonel of a regiment to be 
appointed by the king from a list of candidates submitted by the 
viceroy. The remaining officers were then selected by the vice- 
roy from a list submitted by the colonel. Noncommissioned of- 
ficers were chosen by the captains of each company. Due to the 
difficulty of communicating with the crown during the Seven Years 
War, Viceroy Amat appointed all militia officers subject to royal 
confirmation. After the war the crown ordered an end to this 
practice and also decreed that vacancies in the fijo regiments 
should be filled by the Minister of War. AGI:AL 1^91 Royal Order 
from the King to Viceroy Amat, San lldefonso, September 1^+, 1764; 
ibid. . September 8, 1766; AGI:AL I885 Royal Order from the King 
to Viceroy Amat, San Lorenzo, November 21, 1770. 

6? 

Ibid ., p, 3. For a detailed explanation of the history of 

the fuero militar, see McAlister, F uero Mil i tar . pp. 6-10. 

McAlister, Fuero Militar, p. 5. 

Ibid . , p . 3 . 

-'Amat, Memoria de Gobierno , pp. 701-702. 

^^AGI:AL 664, Amat toArriaga, Lima, August 6, 1771, cited 
in Pozo, p. 9. 

'Elexpuru, Compend i o, p. 10. 

Amat, Memoria de Gobie rno, p. li. 

69 

Elexpuru, Compend i o, p. 9. 

Ara.mburu, p. 316. 
^'agI:AL 1491, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1 768, 



P. 5. 



72 

' Aramburu, p. 316. 



'^^AGIiAL 1491, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, I768, p. 5; 
Amat, Memoria de Gobiern o, p. 104; Aramburu, p. 343. For an 
example of their diatribes against Amat, see the "Drama de 1 os 
Palanganas Veterano y Bisorfo," Revista Chilena de Historia y Geo - 
qraf la, LXXXVI (Santiago, 1939), Pp. 280-329. 

'^AGIrAL 652, Amat toArriaga, Lima, February 10, 1776; 
Amat, Memoria de Gobierno , p. 765. 



89 



Aramburu, p. 317. 

^^ Ibid .. p. 333. 

Reqlamento sobre las milicias del Peru, p. 3; Amat, 
Hemoria de Gobierno, p. 7'^. 

78 

Amat, Memoria de Gobierno . pp. 715~716. 

'°AGI:AL 651, Amat to the King, Lima, December 10, I763, pp. 5" 
6; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno . pp. 716-717. 

80 

See Plate Two following page xlviii in Amat, Memoria de 

Gobierno . showing a diagram of this demonstration in the plaza 

mayor. 

81 

Aramburu, pp. 327-329. 

Oo 

AGI:AL 653^ Amat to Arriaga, January 26, 1775;, P. 1. Vice- 
roys were allowed to reject orders which they considered to be 
inflammatory and contrary to public safety. 

83 

Ibid ., pp. 2-3. 

. Ibid .; AGI:AL 653, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, March 18, 1775^ 
pp. 1-3. Amat boasted that he trusted the members of his Guard so 
completely that he had entrusted a shipment of 200,000 pesos to a 
soldier to carry a distance of 500 leagues and not a peso had been 
lost. 

^AGI :AL 652, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, May 31, 1770, p. 1; Or,- 
denanzas de S.M. para el regimen, dis ci pi i na, sub o rd i naci 6n y ser - 
vicio de sus exir c itos ... 2 vols. (Madrid, I768). 

86 

AG! :AL 65 1, Por quanto 0I Estudio d e las Matem^ticas, que 

hoy tan empenosamente se cultiva en todo el Orbe Literario . . . 
Lima, February 21, 1766. 

87 

AGI:AL 1^91, Certamen o Conclusiones Matem^ticas defen - 

didas en este Real Universidad de San Marcos . . . bai o la Instru c- 
cion V Direccion del Doctor D. Cosme Bueno, Lima, June 11, I768, 
pp. 1~9. Amat 's secretary enthused that "These young men . . . 
capable of shining in any court, will free from ignorance a new 
World that ougfit to have flowered from the time of its conquest." 
(Aramburu, p. 299.) 

88 

Amat, Me moria de Gobier no, p. 730, 

AGJrAL l'i91, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 1, I768, p. h. 



90 



90 
91 
92 

93 



Lbid., p. 3. 
Ibid ., p. 2. 

Amatj Memoria de Gobierno . p. 659. 



Ibid ., p. 660. This became necessary since^ by Amat's estimate 
only about 2,500 of the 1^,000 Indians on the island were capable of 
bearing arms in an emergency (pp. 657"658) . 

9^ 

In addition, Beranger reported that he had raised 1607 

infantry militia and a 20-man artillery company. AGI:AL 1^92. 

Report from Colonel Carlos Beranger to Julian de Arriaga, San Carlos 

de Chiloe, April 3, 1770, p. 1; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno , pp. 660- 

662. 



95 
96, 



AGIrAL 1^92, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, February 23, 1767, p. 2, 



Amat, Memoria de Gobierno , pp. Ixvi-lxvii. For the best 
study of Amat's program of fortification, see Vicente Rodrfguez 
Casado and Florentine Pirez Embid, Const rucciones Militares del 
Virrey Amat (Seville, 19^7). 



PP. 



97 

1-5. 

98 



AG1:AL 1^91, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1768, 



Ibid ., p. 5. For a diagram of the shore batteries, see 
Figure 11 v/hich follov/s p. 7^8 in Amat, Memoria de Gobiern o. 



99 



AGI:AL 1^91, Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 1768, pp. 10-12. 



100 



101 



Ibid. 



PP. 5-9. 



'AGI:AL 6i+^,"E5tado del Peru. Ai^o de I769," San lldefonso, 
September 10, 1769. This is a copy of the report sent by Grimaldi 
to Arriaga on February 25, 1768, pp. I-5. 

102 

Mendiburu, VI, 169. See the observations of Viceroy Guirior 

(AGI:AL 655 Manuel de Guirior to Jose de G^lvez, Lima, February 20, 

1777, p. 1) v/ho denied the regulation had ever been put into effect. 

103 

AGI :AL 1^91, Arriaga to Amat, San lldefonso, n.d. The 

President of Chile died while Morales was in Santiago, and Amat 
appointed him to fill this position v/hich he did until 1773 when he 
was replaced by Augustfn de Jauregui. Morales died shortly there- 
after. Another Inspector General was not sent out to Peru until 
1776. Diego Barros Arana, Historia General de Chile, 16 v,, 2nd 
ed. (Santiago, 1932), Vi, 3^+2, 363; Mendiburu, VIM, 7. 



91 



104 

Amat, Fiemoria de Gobierno . p. 800, 

105 

Pozo, pp. 11-12. 

Ibid. 



'^^Mendiburu, I, 4^5 -^'+6, hSy . 

I flR 

Amat, Hemoria de Gobierno . pp. 800-802; Pozo^ pp. 11-12. 

109 

Amat, Hemoria de Gobierno . pp. 288-291. The rebellion was 

led by three Spaniards who had heavy investments in the business of 

distilling brandy. Mendiburu^ I, k]k, 

John Edwin Fagg, Latin America, a General History (New 
York^ 19iS3); p. 3^9; Amat, Hemoria de Gobierno . pp. 703-704. In 
1803 Guayaquil was reincorporated into the Viceroyalty of Peru. 

'''agI:AL 1491^ Report of Amat to the King, Lima, November 1, 
1768, p. 5. A project currently undertal<en by Professor Pablo 
Macera of San Harcos University is compiling data on the extent of 
their landholdi ngs . 

I I 2 

Amat, Hemoria de Gobierno , p. xlv. 

113 

Descriptions of the expulsion of the Company from Lima may 

be found in Amat, Hemoria de Gobierno, pp. 130-132; Aramburu, pp. 
310-311 ; Reuben Vargas Ugarte, Jesuitas Peruanos desterrados a 
Ital ia (Lima, 1934), pp. 4-11, and the last chapter of Luis Hartin, 
The Intellectual Conques t of Peru: the Jesui t College of San Pablo , 
1S68-1767 (New York, 1 968) . 

^' AGI:AL 639, Amat toArriaga, Lima, April 12, I768, p. 2. 

The classic condemnation of the Spanish colonial system 
was the Lettre aux Espagnol s -Amer i cains . written by the Peruvian 
Creole Juan Pablo Viscardo. It was later published by Francisco 
de Miranda and taken by him to Spanish America in 1799 for propa- 
ganda purposes. Humphreys and Lynch, pp. 7-8. 

Aramburu, p. 315. 

AGIrAL 655, "Estado que manifiesta la Tropa, que el Batallon 
Fixo de Ynfanteria del Rl. Phelipe del Callao . . . Lima, March 8, 
1777. 

1 1 R 

''°Cespedcs del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Ai res , pp. 85-86. 

In royal orders dated January 12, I767, and October 20, I768, the 

crown had requested Field Marshal August'n de Jauregui in Chile to 



92 



draw up a table of organization for the fijo component of the Army 
of Chile and to forward it to Viceroy Amat for his approval. See 
AG I :AL 655* Reglamento que . . . propone el mariscal de campo Dn . 
August in de Jauregui . . . al Exmo. Serior Virrey del Peru Manuel 
de Amat , Santiago de Chile, April 25, 1776. The plan, which was 
forwarded by Amat on November 11, 17^8, called for the creation of 
twenty-three fijo companies of fifty men each, or a total of 1,150 
soldiers. Of these companies, six infantry and twelve dragoon 
companies were to form the Army of the Frontier to be permanently 
deployed in the south against the Araucanian Indians. The remain- 
ing companies v^ere to be spread among the coastal presidios. 

'^^AGiiAL 651, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, December k, M^S, p. 1 ; 
Barros Arana, VI, 3^1; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno , pp. 371-373. 

1 90 

AGI:AL 658, "Proyecto proponer los medios que considera mSs 

utiles y proporcionados a la actual constitucion de este Reyno para 

mejorar el pie y adelantar la instrucci6n de sus tropas de Milicias 

. . .," Lima, July 31, 1778, pp. 1-2; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, 

pp. lll-llh. 

1 21 

Ibid ., pp. 3-^; Amat, Memoria de Gobierno. p. 722. 

^22Arnot, Memoria de Gobierno, pp. 371-373, 722-723. 



123 



Ibid ., p. 728. 



^^'Viendiburu, I, 411-M2. 

1 25 

Elexpuru, Compend i o, p, 10. 

^ AGI:AL 653, "Estado general que Manifiesta las Tropas Mili- 
cianas . . . que en este Virreynato del Peru se han Alistado de 
Orden del Ex"^° S*^"^ Virrey . . .," n.d. (cerca 1775). 

'^''agI:AL 6'+5b, Luis Alvarez de Nava to Viceroy Amat, San 
Lorenzo de Barranca, October b, 1770, pp. 1-3. The comments of the 
subi nspectors general sent out by Viceroy Guirior in the following 
chapter demonstrate conclusively that these militia were largely 
non-existent , 

^^^AGI:AL 653, "Estado general . . . "; C^spedes del Castillo, 
Lima y Buenos Ai res , p. 89. Descriptions of the militia forces in 
the provinces at this time are quite rare. One such description by 
Miguel Feijoo, the corregidor of Trujillo, entitled Relacion descrip - 
tiva de la Ciudad y Provincia de Trujillo . . . December 6, 1771, 
indicates that this town of 9,000, located north of Lima on the coast, 
had a command and staff group consisting of a governor at arms, field 
marshal, commissar general, and a sergeant major. The militia numbered 



93 



seven infantry companies with 350 men^ a 30-nian artillery company, 
and three cavalry companies with a total of 330 men, plus a "free 
company" of Indians. The remaining town in the province had an 
additional thirteen companies of cavalry numbering 630 men. Feijoo 
notes that all the militia of Trujillo were formed on "the old plan 
of war" indicating that the Cuban militia regulation had not been 
applied there. Apparently local nobles paid well for the privilege 
of becoming members of the command and staff groups, pp. 18-19. 

1 29 

Gregorlo de Cangas, "Descripcion en di^logo de la Ciudad 

de Lima: entre un Peruano prSctico y un visono Chapeton," La Causa 
de la Emancipacion del Peru (Lima, I960), p. 30^. Cangas was a 
veteran officer serving on the training cadre for the militia of 
Lima. Cangas mal<es it clear that the militia was counted upon to 
come to the aid of the presidios if besieged. 

130 

AGI:AL 6^^, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, October 26, 1770, p. 1. 

131 

Aramburu, p. 329. 

'^^Cangas, "Descripcion en di5logo . . .," pp. 301-302. 

133 

Vicente Rodr'guez Casado, cited in Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, 

p. 1 i i . 

134 

Hubert Herring, A History of Latin A merica, 3rd ed. rev. 

(New York, 1968), p. l8i^. 

135 

See note kO; Bailey Diffie, Latin American Civilization; 

Colonial Period (Harrisburg, Pa., 19^5), notes that out of 170 vice- 
roys ruling in Americ^ 1535-1813^ only four were born in America; 
of 602 captal ns -general and presidents, fourteen; of the 706 bishops, 
105, but these men were given the less important dioceses (p. ^88). 
In Peru the situation seems to have been better than this: 136 
persons born in Peru held positions in the councils and audienclas 
during the same period; 98 served as archbishops or bishops; 63 as 
generals or brigadiers, Hendiburu, VI, 439-^5^. In addition to 
holding many militia posts, Creoles in Lima dominated the audiencia. 
They were to become one of the prime issues in the dispute between 
the viceroy and the vis i tor -general (see the following chapter). 

^Aramburu, p. 297. 

'^''ibld., pp. 329, 338. 

1 "5 Q 

Ibid ., p. 317. Aramburu noted that the Europeans, who were 
"so presumptuous In the handling of arms, became depressed" v;hen 
they viewed the proficient militia exercises held in the rnain square. 

^^^ikid.., P. 331. 



3^ 



AGIrAL 639^ Amat to Arriaga^ Lima, November 7, 1768, p. 1; 
ibid.. April 30, I769, P. 3. 

AGIrAL 639, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, April 30, I769, P. 5; 
Amat, Memoria de Gobierno. pp. 820-822. 

1^2 

Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre, Plan del Pe r u, defect os del 

gobierno espanol antique, necesarias reforma s, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 

1823), p. 16, felt that Amat sought to arm the lovver classes by 

creating a militia and to utilize it to overthrow the crown and make 

himself King of Peru but that he never had time to realize this plan. 

Vidaurre was an erratic Creole judge of the Audiencia of Cuzco v/ho 

fled Peru prior to independence because of his liberal ideas. See 

Pike, pp. k]-h3; Mendiburu, XI, 305-306. 



III. THE ARECHE VISITATION AND THE WARS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 



Spain's entrance into the Wars of the American Revolution 
against Great Britain caused the first major reorganization of the 
militia created earlier by Viceroy Amat. This reform was to be 
complicated^ however, by the presence of the Visitor General Jose 
Antonio de Areche and the repercussions of several other Bourbon 
reform measures taken after 1776. 

By the year 1776 the Spanish Crown was ready to put into 
execution a number of administrative changes which it was hoped 
would prepare the colonies for the war against Great Britain 
anticipated by the Secret Committee for Imperial Defense. On 
December k, Manuel de Amat sailed for Spain and retirement.^ His 
replacement, Lieutenant General of the Royal Navy Manuel de 
Guirior, the former Viceroy of New Granada, arrived in Paita on 
July 17, 1776, and began an overland trek to Lima to better 
acquaint himself with the country he was to rule. This appoint- 
ment v^as for him the capstone of a distinguished career. On 
December 3 he made his public entrance into Lima and on December 
13 was formally invested by the rector of San Marcos. In 
addition, the capable Jose de Galvez had replaced Julian de 
Arriaga as Minister of the Indies the previous year. One of 
his first acts was to dispatch Brigadier General Jose del Valle 

95 



96 



as Inspector General of the Army and Governor of Callao to replace 

L 
Morales . 

The social and economic situation which Guirior inherited 
was discouraging. Agricultural production had failed, to keep pace 
with local demands, and the viceroyalty was dependent upon imports 
of wheat from Chile to feed itself.^ Trade would continue to 
decline after the "free trade" regulation of 1778. V/hereas under 
the laws formerly in effect Callao was the only v;est coast port 
open to the register ships proceeding south from Panama, making 
it the entrepot for the entire subcontinent, after this date 
Santiago and Guayaquil were permitted to trade freely with Spain, 
and the competition of Buenos Aires and Montevideo would cause a 
reorientation of trade patterns towards the Atlantic coast. Never- 
theless, Callao remained the leading commercial port on the Pacific 
coast throughout the century. 

The social situation in Peru was explosive as well. The 
extortionate repart imiento system, whereby Indians v/ere forced 
to buy worthless goods at inflated prices, had caused revolts to 
break out in the provinces of Chumbi vi 1 cas, Huamalies, Caylloma, 
Conchucos, Jauja, and Lambayeque, among others. In several of 
these revolts, the Indians had killed the corregidors and their 
families. In most cases, local militia or irregulars could put 
down the uprisings, which v;ere generally small in size. However, 
pasquines . or lampoons disrespectful of royal authority kept 
appearing in public places long after the rebels had been put down. 



97 



The viceroy feared that not even military force could endthis dis- 
respect. In Cuzco, the scene of "disturbances too numerous to count," 
the militia had to be called out to garrison the city in an effort 
to restore peace. 

A combination of economic and military factors weighed in the 
decision of the crov/n to create the Viceroyalty of La Plata in 1776. 
The failure of the two military expeditions sent out from Lima to 
expel the Portuguese from the Sacramento Colony located west of the 
Spanish port of Montevideo and opposite Buenos Aires, vjas an adm.is" 
sion that Peru could not administer this region with any degree of 
effectiveness. Moreover, the viceroyalty in Lima could not assist 
the silver cities of Potos' and Oruro quickly if the situation 

should require it. While Potest was ^00 mountainous leagues from 

8 
Lima, it was only 19^ leagues from Buenos Aires. V/hile Viceroy 

Amat had recognized these problems, he had recommended that Buenos 

9 
Aires be placed under the control of Chile as a compromise. By 

June, 1777 the expedition dispatched by the King under the command 

of Pedro de Cevallos had expelled the Portuguese from Sacramento 

and had established the Viceroyalty of the La Plata. The most 

damaging aspect of this creation to Peru v/as the subsequent decision 

of the crown to transfer jurisdiction of the rich Audiencia of 

Charcas, v/hich contained the silver mines of PotosT and Oruro, to 

the new viceroyalty. In so doing, it removed from Peru two of its 

richest treasuries at the time when military and civil expenditures 

had reached all-time highs. The end result of the creation of the 



98 



new viceroyalty was to reorient commercial patterns and impoverish 
the Lima merchants, provoking a bitter cocripet i t ion for hegemony 
between Lima and Buenos Aires that was to endure throughout the 
century. It was also to place serious financial limitations 
on future military reform, 

A brief look at the finances of the viceroyalty of Peru at 
this tine will indicate the condition. Total revenues, which in 



177't had been 3,986,908 pesos, by 1777 had dropped to 1,^+73,018. 



Expenditures, v;hich had been 3,566,612 pesos in 177^, in 1777 
stood at 2,070,053, causing a yearly deficit of nearly 600,000. 
Military expenditures had increased yearly since the mobilization 



of 1762. By 1771 military expenditures reached an all-time high 

12 

of 2,23^,921 pesos. One of the most damaging expenses v/as that 

of sending annual military subsidies ( s ituados) to the outlying 



areas of the subcontinent for their defense. These were sent to 
the various presidial areas such as Valdivia, Chiloe, and Juan 
Fernandez. In addition, money was sent to Quito, Panama, and 
Buenos Aires. By 1779 the annual subsidy to Pana.ra was nearly 
300,000 pesos. This was exceeded in size, however, by that 
sent to Buenos Aires which during the period of Guirior's vice- 
regency reached the sum of four and one-half million pesos. 
Although the Peruvian officials continually petitioned to be freed 
from the paym.ent of these subsidies in order to apply the money 
within their own kingdom, there is no evidence that such requests 
were granted. 



99 



It was this deteriorating economic situation which led the 
crown to institute the visitation of Jos^ Antonio de Areche to 
Peru in 1777. The use of the visitation had been highly success- 
ful in New Spain in 17^5 where it was executed by Jose de G^lvez, 
who now sat as Minister of the Indies. To carry out the mission 
the crown accepted G^lvez's recommendation of his old associate 
Areche, whom he knew to have been dogged and loyal defender of the 
royal interest during his successful career as an administrator. 
Since the financial health of Peru, notably its silver and crown 
monopolies, was a strategic link in the chain of events which were 
calculated to restore Spain to fiscal solvency, the king and his 
advisors considered the visitation to be a most important under- 
taking, ^ 

Jos^ Antonio de Areche, Intendant of the Army, Councillor of 

the Army, and gentleman of the Order of Charles ill, was appointed 

to his post on March 11, 1776. On March 21, 1777 he sailed from 

Acapulco with a group of functionaries who comprised his staff. 

On June ]h he arrived in Lima and found his instructions awaiting 

1 o 
him. The personalities of the viceroy and the visitor general 

were opposite in nature, and they would have likely clashed even 

under more favorable conditions than those which existed in Peru 

at the time. Manuel de Guirior v;as affable and conoi 1 iatory, a 

lover of v/i ne and an epicure, vjho surrounded himself with the 

Creole nobility which his predecessor Amat had shunned. Areche 

was harsh and uncompromising, tvio traits v;hich made him one of the 

19 

most hated men in Peru. U'ith the grant of the super i ntendency 



100 



of the royal tobacco monopoly and the royal treasury to Areche in 
June, 1780, the seeds of further discontent v;ere planted between 
the two men. Loss of this power constituted a serious blow to the 
power and prestige of the viceroy since through control of the 
junta superior of the treasury he could gain valuable support in 

the interpretation of vague decrees, and escape sole responsibility 

20 
for their evasion. By dividing the supreme authority in Peru 

between two men who were unalterably opposed to eacli other the 
crown had also weakened the viceroyalty at a critical period in 
its history. 

Areche first focused upon Guirior's close friendship with 
the Creole elite of Lima in his campaign to discredit the vice- 
roy at court. In a secret report to Jose de G^lvez, Areche 
comipared Guirior unfavorably to Viceroy Amat, a strong authoritarian 
personality like Areche himself. Since Guirior's arrival, Areche 
accused him of having "handed over [the government] to the v;orst 
Creoles of this America, who have debased it," an obvious reference 

to the group of wealthy landowners who controlled the audiencia 

21 

and heavily influenced the viceroy on matters of policy. These 

accusations by themselves had little effect. However, in light 

of the later Tupac Amaru rebellion, they were to provide the 

22 
crown with a rationale for deposing the viceroy. 

One of the first projects to occupy the attention of the new 

viceroy was a verification of the size of the militia as it had 

been reported by Viceroy Amat. A royal order of November 18, 1775 



101 



informed Guirior that, according to its figures, the viceroyalty 
had a total of 96,396 militia, not including the nine transmontane 
provinces which were practically uninhabited. It also noted that 
the area forming a radius of fifty-three leagues around the capital 
reportedly had 7^239 infantry militia and 8,^^0 cavalry militia. 
The crown informed the viceroy that if this figure was correct, it 
was sufficient to defend Lima, but that in order to increase the 
effectiveness of these troops they were to be provided with train- 
ing cadres to furnish them instruction in the handling and firing 

23 

of weapons and military discipline. 

To this end. Viceroy Guirior ordered Inspector General Jose 
del Valle to inspect the number and quality of militia within the 
Audiencia of Lima and to send subi nspectors to the m.ore distant 
regions of the viceroyalty for the same purpose. Del Valle was 
told to apply the provisions of the Cuban regulation for the 
reorganization of the militia wherever it seemed advisable. He was 
also ordered to estimate the number of veteran officers needed to 
instruct thee militia, and to estimate the cost of providing them. 
All of this was to be drawn up into a report v;hich was to be for- 
warded to the King. 

In a preliminary report to the crown, Guirior noted that the 
number of militia estimated by Viceroy Amat was certainly sufficient 
to defend the kingdom against attack if the figure was accurate. 
But he went on to add that it was likely the subi nspectors would 
find a "great reduction" in this number upon their inspection tours, 



102 



since Amat 's figures had not been revised dov/nwards since the out- 
break of the Seven Years War. He went on to bemoan the fact that 
with only one fijo battalion in the viceroyalty he was unable to 
provide the militia v,/ith enough capable officers to direct their 
training. Moreover^ Guirior stated that due to the presence of 
various castes within its ranks the fijo battalion itself v/as 
internally divided^ but noted that he encouraged these rivalries 
since they acted to prevent the battalion from becoming a threat 
to the royal authority. As for the militia^ Guirior said that he 

possessed no information to indicate that they had any aptitude for 

25 
military service. This problem^ he said^ was compounded by the 

fact that the "gowned Ministers and legists" in the kingdom refused 
to obey the military ordinances. He closed by asking the Council 
of the Indies to issue a declaration which would order that they 
be observed. 

The status of the fijo battalion at Callao had later been 
confirmed in a report of the Inspector General del Valle. The 
viceroy himself had toured the fortress somewhat earlier and had 
been appraised of the serious shortage of weapons in the coastal 
port cities. He ordered del Valle and Zini, along with the com- 
missar of v;ar and a military engineer Mariano Pusterta to form a 
commission to evaluate the needs of the storehouse and armory at 

"Royal Phillip" in order that steps might be taken to provide these 

27 
necessities. Subsequently, del Valle told Viceroy Guirior that 

the rate of attrition in the fijo battalion v;as reaching a crisis 



103 



situation. Growing numbers of soldiers were soliciting permission 
to retire from tine royal service once their terms of enlistment 
v;ere up^ he noted, and all efforts to provide replacements for 
them had failed. He recounted one recruiting mission had turned 
up 165 men, but that these v;ere "full of vices and evil habits" 
and not much good for service as a result. He felt that honorable 
men, be they Spaniards or Peruvians, had little inclination to 
serve in the army since they felt they could be financially more 
successful in other fields. He warned the viceroy that the bat- 
talion v;as 252 men understrength, and held that in light of the 
fact that it was the only body of troops v/hich could be counted 
upon to support the crown in any and all circumstances, an addi- 
tional AOO veteran troops viere needed to bring it to strength. 
In view of this petition, Guirior wrote the crov/n asking for an 
additional 272 soldiers from the fijo battalion, maintaining that 

he had sufficient officers to train them. By December the bat - 

29 
talion was at a strength of ^88 men. 



As the subi nspectors of militia returned to Lima with their 
reports on the provincial militia it became clear to Viceroy 
Guirior that his suspicions had been correct. In a letter to the 
Minister of the Indies he informed Galvez that the Cuban Militia 
Regulation had never been applied to Peru although this had been 
ordered by the King earlier. As a result, he felt they could not 
be compared either in appearance or skill to the militia of 
Cartagena or Panama, both of v^hich he had observed in training and 
admired. He went on to warn the ministry that any officers of the 



10^ 



Peruvian militia v/ho presented themselves at court should be regarded 
as members of the urban militia, and should not be considered to have 
the same degree of training and utility as members of the regular or 

disciplined militia, since in many cases the units they claimed 

30 
membership in v;sre imaginary. 

By July Inspector del Valle had completed his project concerning 
the status of the militia of Peru. It constituted the first search- 
ing examination of this component of the Army of Peru since their 
creation a decade earlier. Coming just prior to the entrance of 
Spain into the Wars of the American Revolution, it constituted a 
particularly appropriate guideline for the royal authorities to 
evaluate the success of the reorganization. The report divided into 
two parts, the first containing the measures recommended for improv- 
ing the militia of Lima, and the second setting forth proposals for 
bettering the provincial militia in selected areas vyhich del Valle 
felt ivere of the greatest strategic significance to the viceroyalty. 

in Lima, del Valle recommended that the infantry militia be 
reorganized into five battalions and two free companies, and that 
the cavalry and dragoons be reorganized into three regiments. He 
also proposed that selected units along the coast be reorganized 
due to their strategic location. Basically, the inspector general 
proposed that each unit be increased in strength in conformity 
with the Cuban Regulation. (See Table k.) This would mean that 
each fusileer company v;ould be increased from seventy-five to 
ninety men apiece as prescribed by the regulation. The tv/o 
grenadier companies in each regiment would be raised in strength 



105 



TABLE k 



UNIT ORGANIZATION UNDER THE REGLAMENTO FOR THE 
DISCIPLINED MILITIA OF CUBA, 1769 



White Infantry Battalion 



Sergeants 



First 
Corporal s 



f— i_ 



Compani es 



Grenadiers 
Fus i leers 
Fus i leers 
Fus i leers 
Fus i leers 
Fus i leers 
Fus i leers 
Fus i leers 
Fus i leers 



k 


6 


6^ 


80 


k 


6 


7^ 


90 


k 


6 


7^ 


90 


k 


6 


7^ 


90 


k 


6 


7^ 


90 


h 


6 


7^ 


90 


h 


6 


7k 


90 


k 


6 


Ih 


90 


k 


6 


Ih 


90 



Totals 9 



36 5^ 9 656 800 



Command and Staff Group 



1 Colonel 

1 Sargento Mayor (Veteran) 

1 Ayudante (Veteran) 

2 Standard-bearers 
1 Chaplain 



1 Surgeon 

1 Drum Major (Veteran) 
1 Corporal, Gastador 
6 Gastadores 



106 
TABLE k (cont.) 



Pardo Infantry Battalion 



Compan ies 



Grenadiers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


6i+ 


80 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


7'4 


90 


Fusi leers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


7^ 


90 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


7^ 


90 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


7^+ 


90 


Fus i leers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


7^ 


90 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


7^f 


90 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


7k 


90 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


6 


6 


Ih 


90 



Totals 9 



bh Sh 



656 



800 



White 



Command and Staff Group 



1 Ayudante Mayor, Suinspector 
h Ayudantes 
5 Garzones 



Pardo 

1 Commandant 

2 Standard-bearers 
1 Drum Major 

1 Corporal, Gastador 

6 Gastadores 

3 Fifers 



107 



TABLE if (cont.) 



Cavalry Regiment 



cr 


TO — Q) C — 


0) 


(1) 


o 


o 


^ Companies 


«_) _l 00 UU L- I/O Ll 


C/O 


1/1 


h- 


Carabi neers 




1 1 2 


2 


if^ 


50 


First 




1 2 


2 


kk 


50 


— Second 




1 2 


2 


kk 


50 


Third 




1 2 


2 


Uk 


50 


Fourth 




1 2 


2 


kk 


50 


'^ Fifth 




1 2 


2 


hk 


50 


Sixth 




1 2 


2 


kk 


50 


Seventh 




1 2 


2 


kh 


50 


f^ Eighth 




1 2 


2 


kh 


50 


Ninth 




1 2 


2 


kk 


50 


Tenth 




1 2 


2 


kk 


50 


-=*■ Eleventh 




1 2 


2 


kk 


50 


Twelfth 




1 2 


2 


hk 


50 



Totals 



13 13 13 13 13 13 13 26 26 



572 



650 



Command and Staff Group 



1 Colonel 

1 Lieutenant Colonel 

1 Sargento Mayor (Veteran) 

1 Ayudante Mayor (Veteran) 



1 Chaplain 
1 Surgeon 
k Buglers (Veteran 
or Militia) 



108 



TABLE k (cont.) 



Dragoon Regiment 



First 
Sergeants Corporals 



■i-JDOi/i o V — OE-D ra 

0-(UOi- O +-> — OD»- 4-> 

t) — 0) — Q) O .— 0) I_ O O 

Companies o_j(jou- t/^ > 2:^/^Qoo i- 



1 1111 2 2 4 6 1 8^ 100 

1 1111 2 2 4 6 1 8i+ 100 

1 1111 2 2 4 6 1 8^ 100 



1111 
1111 
1111 

1110 


1110 


1110 



1 1110 2 3 3 /42 50 

1 1110 2 3 3 i+2 50 

2 3 3 ^2 50 



Totals 6 6 6 6 3 12 6 21 27 3 378 A50 



Command and Staff Group 

1 Colonel 1 Chaplain 

1 Ayudante Mayor (Veteran) 1 Surgeon 

2 Standard Bearers 



Source: Adapted from Ordenanzas de S.M. para el regimen, discipli 
na, subordi naci6n, y servicio de sus ex^rcitos. 2 vols. 
(Madrid, I768). 



109 



from seventy-five to eighty men apiece. Such changes would raise 
the size of the infantry regiments from 1,350 to 1,600 men. 

Del Valle also recommended that each oT these regiments be 
provided with a training cadre. This was to consist of veteran 
officers who were to hold the key posts of sergeant major and 
adjutant. In addition, each regiment was to have eighteen lieutenants, 
eighteen first sergeants, thirty-six corporals, a drum major, eighteen 
drummers and four fifers. He recommended that these groups be put 
on pay status in order to assure their dedication to the task. He 
also included a list of three candidates for the posts of adjutant 
and sergeant major for the viceroy's consideration. 

The training cadre proposed for the regiments of pardos and 
morenos was somewhat different than that proposed for the Regiment 
of Spanish Infantry above. For these regiments of castes, del 
Valle recomniended the same increase in strength, and asked that 
the position of subinspector general be given to a veteran officer 
with the rank of adjutant major. To assist him, del Valle recom- 
mended that there be eight adjutants with the rank of lieutenants, 
and ten acting sergeants. The Battalion of morenos v/as to be 
increased in size from 675 to 800 men, and provided with an ad- 
jutant major, four lieutenants, and five sergeants for their train- 
ing. The "free companies" v^/ere to be furnished with an adjutant 
and a lieutenant to oversee their training. Del Valle remarked 
that the Battalion of Merchants should remain on its present 
footing as an urban unit as well as the Regiment of Indians, but 



no 



recommended that the officer corps of this latter unit be retained 
on pay status in recognition of their efforts to stimulate these 
Indians in the pursuit of the glorious career of arms. 

The report recommended that the Regiment of Dragoons be in- 
creased in size from three to four squadrons^ and that each of the 
three companies in each squadron be raised in size from forty to 
fifty men apiece. in all^ the regiment was to be increased from 
360 to 620 men. These troops, which vvere drawn primarily from 
among the employees of the wealthy landowners of the Carabaillo, 
Lurigancho^ and Magdalena valleys surrounding Lima, who possessed 
the finest horses in the capital, were a valued part of the 
inspector general's plan, due to their mobility In defending Lima 
against a seaborne attack. For this reason, the plan also specified 
that additional dragoons were to be added to the Regiment of Canete, 
drawing up the employees of the white landowners of the Mala, 
Chincha, and Pisco valleys, and provided with training cadres 
similar to those specified for the Regiment of Lima. The Regiment 
of Dragoons of Chancay was also to be increased in size to 620 
men, by drawing on the landowners of the Huarura, Barranca, and 
Pachivilca valleys. The report retained the Regiment of the 
Nobility and the "free companies" of lawyers and other groups as 
urban militia and made no proposals to alter their present 
formation. In total, the inspector general estimated that these 
eight regiments would reach a realistic total of nearly 6,200 
soldiers available during peacetime to defend the capital. 



Ill 



To supplement this force^ del Valle recommended that the size 
of the Callao garrison be increased. He felt that a veteran infantry 
regiment and a regiment of dragoons should be sent out from the 
Peninsula since^ if an internal emergency arose, the absence of the 
battalion v/ould leave Lima virtually defenseless against an attack 
by sea. The inspector general seemed to have anticipated the 
futility of such a request due to financial limitations. He submitted 
an alternative proposal suggesting that each disciplined battalion 
of infantry and cavalry militia be called to serve in the Callao 
garrison for a year, during which time they would be trained and 
paid as a f i jo unit . 

The second part of the plan identified areas of the coast and 
the Indian frontier where militia units were to be reorganized and 
placed on a disciplined basis. Del Valle specified the cities of 
Tarma, Jauja, and Cuzco since these v;ere all centers of large 
Indian population v/here violence had broken out in the past. To 
the south, the report singled out the Ar i ca-Arequipa region 
located forty-five leagues south of Lima, which embraced three 
seaports and which constituted the first inhabited area in the 
viceroyalty which an invader rounding the Cape Horn would encounter. 
According to this information, del Valle estimated that this region 
of approximately 216 leagues in circumference contained three 
infantry battalions, eight squadrons of cavalry, and five squadrons 
of dragoons. While he made no suggestions for changing the size of 
these units, del Valle did urge that training cadres be provided 
for them immediately, and that an additional training group be sent 
to the island of Chiloe. 



112 



The northern coast^ including the city of Trujillo and the 
port of Paita^ reportedly contained three infantry battalions and 
eleven cavalry squadrons which also vjere to be provided training. 
The province of Tarma located forty leagues east of Lima contained 
three squadrons of cavalry militia and three of dragoons, plus some 
"free companies" of infantry, none of vyhich had received any train- 
ing. Del Valle recommended that they be provided training groups 
since these militia were frequently required to serve against the 
Indians of the region. The advised the same consideration be given 
to the three battalions of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry 
and three of dragoons in the province of Jauja slightly to the east. 
Cuzco, located approximately 186 leagues southv-yest of Lima^ held a 
reported three infantry battalions, and four cavalry squadrons within 
a circumference of forty leagues. The inspector general proposed 

that a large training cadre be stationed in Cuzco to provide train- 

31 

ing for all of the militia located along the Indian frontier,-^ 

In his summation, del Valle spoke to the problem of neglect 
of the militia in Peru. The practice of leaving them untrained in 
their present state of ignorance, he v/arned, could have "pernicious 
results" if it was allowed to persist. He cited the fact that they 
had been created without the benefit of ordinances or military laws, 
and that consequently they shov/ed no subordination, punctuality, 
or respect for their superiors. To end this state of "Ignorance, 
confusion, and disorder" In v;hich they found themselves, del Valle 
recommended that the viceroy solicit from the king an order requir- 
ing obedience to the Cuban Regulation which should be printed and 



113 



32 

distributed throughout the viceroyalty. 

When the viceroy received the estimated cost of providing 
command and staff groups for these militia he called it "absolutely 
exorbitant" and complained that the condition of the Royal Treasury 
prevented its payment. The inspector general had estimated that 
390 instructors would be required for the job^ costing 258^694 
pesos annually. Since only 5^,^68 pesos had been budgeted for 
instruction of the militia^ the remaining 204^226 pesos would have 
had to be financed out of the royal treasury^ which Guirior noted 
was in such a depleted state that it could not pay fixed expenses 
such as military pensions^ which that year had risen to 3^5^918 
pesos. Such a situation placed the viceroy on the horns of a dilemma, 
While he was forced to concede to the Minister of the Indies that 
the regiments of militia set out in the Estado General which was 
submitted annually to the crov-vn were imaginary, he warned that 
the disturbances within the Audiencia of Lima itself had not been 
put dov;nj and were "only in the early stages of formation at the 
present time." Nevertheless, faced with a treasury Vv/hich could 
not bear any additional expense, Guirior notified G^lvez that he 
was forced to suspend execution of the Inspector General's plan 
pending royal approval. 33 

The reply which the viceroy received from the Ministry of 
the Indies regarding the plan warned of the great expense which 
the command and staff groups proposed by the inspector general 
would entail, and ordered the viceroy and his advisors to make 



]]k 



the final decision on the matter. To do so the viceroy formed a 
junta composed of the visitor general^ the inspector general^ and 
the military commandants to decide the issue. All of the various 
issues concerning the defense of the kingdom were to be discussed, 
and ways to reduce the cost of such a plan viere to be proposed. To 
this end, Viceroy Guirior ordered del Valle to submit to him rosters 
of the regiment of infantry and cavalry in the provinces along with 
recommendations as to which should be retained and which should be 
abolished. The inspector was also asked to draw up rosters giving 
the rank, location, and pay status of all members of the command 
and staff groups presently serving on active duty in the viceroyalty, 

On May S, 1779> this state of the militia of Peru was sub- 
mitted by the inspector general to the viceroy. The total strength 
of the militia was set at 66,716 men. The annual cost of providing 
their training was estimated to be 68,700 pesos. This report V7as 
discussed by the junta which met on June 28, and all of those 
assembled agreed that this total strength was imaginary. In the 
debate which follov/ed over the issue of increasing the size of 
the training cadres for the disciplined militia as proposed by 
del Valle, the members of the junta felt that, although it en- 
tailed a significant expense, training cadres should be provided 
in Peru as they had been in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Cartagena, and 
Panama. All of the members of the Junta agreed v;ith the assessment 
of the inspector that the militia lacked training and obedience, 
and all felt that training cadres v/ere necessary to provide these 



115 



virtues. The junta passed a resolution authorizing del Valle to 
review the militia of Lima and to reform them into battalions of 
nine companies each as specified by the Cuban Regulation. The 
inspector was further authorized to reorganize the officer corps, 
discharging those officers he felt to be incompetent and submitting 
three candidates for vacancies based only upon consideration of 
their capacity to lead. Since the Royal Treasury could not afford 
the cost of the salaries of the proposed training cadres, it was 
decided that the inspector should select members of the fijo bat- 
talion at Callao and place them in the regiments as he saw fit. 
It was also decided that subi nspectors were to carry out periodic 
reviews of the provincial militia v;hich had not previously been 
done and v;ere to form additional companies where there was a suf- 
ficient number of persons to merit it. 

Earlier, the viceroy had created the Commandancy General of 
Artillery to bolster the defense of Lima. In recognition of its 
utility to the crown, the corps of artillery v;as granted a 
separate jurisdictional status from the other fijo companies, and 
placed under the command of Colonel Antonio Zini. Its size was 
set at four companies of 100 men each, and provided with a 
technical training cadre. A school and training ground was set 
up outside of Lima to teach the rudiments of physics and provide 
practice in the firing of v;eapons. Tfie size of the companies 
remained at fifty men throughout most of the period, however, due 
to expense.-'-^ 



116 



On September 26^ 1779, the declaration of war against Great 
Britain and on the side of the American colonies was published in 
Peru by Viceroy Guirior. On the same day the viceroy published 
an edict ordering all citizens capable of bearing arms to present 
themselves in a general review before the inspector general unless 
they v;er e excluded from service under the provisions of the Cuban 
Militia Regulation. The review was ordered for September 27. 
The lack of attendance at the review left the viceroy shocked. In 
a letter to his executive secretary Pedro de Ureta^ Viceroy Guirior 
held that the units were far below their listed strengths. He 
singled out the regiments of pardos and morenos as being especially 
deficient. This absence the viceroy interpreted as an abhorrence 
of military service on the part of these castes^ which he termed 
"criminal and prejudicial" to the interests of the crown. Guirior 
ordered that a review be held the following day in v^hich these 

castes were to be forcibly enlisted in their units or suffer the 

38 
penalties prescribed for such unauthorized absence. The vice- 
roy presented the inspector general v;ith several royal standards 
v;hich he ordered placed at the head of these regiments to symbol- 
ize that it v/as the king's will that this enlistment take place. 
He simultaneously published an edict ordering all free castes to 
enlist in their respective units^ and v/arning that those failing 
to do so would be considered as slaves of the crown and be forced 
to work perpetually on the public works of the king. The edict 
vwrned that any free caste who attempted to present himself as a 



117 



slave, or any master or scribe who abetted such an attempt to defraud 
the royal authorities would be sentenced to ten years in the presidio 
of Valdivia.^^ 

The financial limitations placed upon the viceroy reduced 
preparations for the war to modest levels. Merchant ships were 
armed to patrol the coasts and warn of enemy ships approaching, and 
property owners were again asked to register their slaves, mules, 
and firearms v;hich might be utilized in the event of an attack. 
Circular orders were also sent to the coastal corregidors, order- 
ing them to review the militia v/ithin their districts frequently, 
but not authorizing them to bring these units to strength. Due to 
the penury of the RoyaTi Treasury, considerable reliance v^as again 
placed upon the generosity of individual citizens to furnish tfie 
means to provide an adequate defense. In a letter to the Ministry 
of the Indies, Guirior expressed the effects v;hich the loss of the 
treasuries of Potosf and Oruro had had on the viceroyalty and that 
as a result of the constant requests for military subsidies Peru 
was "completely exhausted of wealth." 

As tiie war wore on. Viceroy Guirior became convinced that 
measures must be taken to improve the militia. He confided to 
G^lvez that "the gentle resolutions taken up to the present" to 
induce enlistment had not produced the desired results, and that 
he had been forced to use strict penalties to fill the battalions. 
He chided the ministry for not processing his requests for the 
promotion of promising militia officers with greater speed, and 



118 



remarked that only by rewarding these subjects and setting them off 
from their peers would any permanent change in morale be effected. 
He reminded G^lvez that the kingdom of Peru was wholly dependent 
upon this militia in the event of an emergency because "This vice- 
royalty establishes its defense on no other bulwarks than those of 
their courage^ since as Your Excellency knows^ there is only one 
battalion of veteran Troops^ incapable of protecting their present 
barracks . " 

Within his final limitations^ the viceroy began to implement 
the reforms proposed by the inspector general and to place Peru on 
a v;artime footing. On October 5, he ordered that the Cuban Militia 
Regulation be republished and distributed throughout the vice- 
royalty to provide a model for the reorganization of the militia 
of Lima. The Regiment of Spanish Infantry v;as the first to be re- 
organized along these lines and to be provided with a veteran 
command and staff group. The Regiment of Dragoons v/as also re- 
established upon a provincial basis, v/hile veteran training cadres 
were provided for the Regiment of Cavalry of the Villa of Arnedo 
in the province of Chancay_, and for the Regiments of Dragoons of 
Carabaillo and Guacir^n outside of Lima. Corregidors were also 
authorized to publish edicts ordering the enlistment of all 
residents of a certain age in order to bring their units to the 
strengths prescribed in the Cuban Regulation. 

Appeals were also made to persons of wealth to help outfit 
and equip the militia of Lima. Especially gratifying vyas the 



119 



response of the Real Tribunal del ConsulaJo (merchants' guild) 
which offered to help as it had done previously in I763. In 
January the Tribunal met and agreed to provide the cost of 1^000 
uniforms and to pay the expenses of billeting two militia companies^ 
one of infantry and one of cavalry^ which were to rotate period- 
ically in two barracks which were being built in the Plaza Santa 
Catalina at the expense of the cabi Ido (municipal council) of Lima. 
Besides agreeing to pay the salaries of these tv;o companies^ the 
consulado promised to pay the costs of outfitting and supporting 
IjOOO men if an expedition was sent into the field. By 1779 the 
consulado of Lima v/as spending an annual 600^000 pesos to support 
the militia of Lima and Buenos Aires, due to the default of the 
royal government in providing such expenses. 

By October, 1778 Viceroy Guirior again wrote to G^lvez and 
informed him about the progress of the militia reform. He 
stated that the receipt of a secret order dated January 2k, I778 
v;hich restricted him from incurring any extraordinary expenses 
had prevented him from providing training cadres for the militia 
companies outside of Lima as proposed by the inspector general, 
and that as a result the militia of Lima were "the only ones 
which merit this name of all those of the vi ceroyal ty. " He 
described the battalions of free castes as demonstrating the 
greatest amount of professionalism in this regard, and the artil- 
lery companies as exhibiting the least, although he expressed hope 

that the training by the fijo artillery company at Callao might 

k7 
soon improve this situation. 



120 



Notwithstanding this limitation^ by November, 1779^ the vice- 
roy showed general satisfaction v/ith the way in which regular train- 
ing had improved the militia of Lima. in a letter to the Ministry 
of the Indies in v;hich he described a review held to honor the 
birthday of Charles 111, Guirior spoke of the 5^39^ militia v;hich 
he reviev\'ed as being motivated by a deep love for their sovereign 
and v;illing to sacrifice their lives for him. He concluded that 
these soldiers "are real and not imaginary" and that if they received 
regular training, the king could count on them to defend his dominions 
and to carry out his will vyhenever he requested it. He noted that in 
Lima this militia drilled on Sunday afternoons practicing maneuvers 
and handling v/eapons, and that they did it with "ardor and pleasure." 
He relayed to the crov;n the assurance of the inspector general that 
Lima could count on 3,989 infantry militia and 1,870 cavalry and 
dragoon militia "upon the slightest novelty" and that there were 
1,400 cavalry militia available to reinforce them within four days 

r . . .. ^8 

of receiving notice. 

The viceroy also paid attention to increasing the number of 
presidial troops during this period, and especially to the strategic 
island of Chiloe v;hich had been incorporated by Viceroy Amat. The 
fijo battalion at Callao was increased by 100 men to a strength 
of nearly 700 to replace a detachment of soldiers which had been 
sent to garrison the city of Arequipa during a period of internal 
disturbance. In addition, 200 troops vjere recruited for the 
garrison at Valdivia, v/hile Valparaiso, Concepcion, and Juan 
Fernandez each received detachments of fifty men and munitions from 



121 



a naval squadron outfitted in Callao and sent down the coast. 
Soldiers and munitions were also sent to Guayaquil at the request 
of the governor there. 

The example of preparations made on the island of Chiloe is 
illustrative of the importance attached to that island as a bul- 
wark of defense in the South Pacific. In I778 the crown sent 
Manuel Zorrilla^ an Engineer Extraordinary of the Royal Armies, to 
survey the defenses of the island. In his report;, dated October 
26, 1778, Zorrilla noted the presence of I30 fijo troops on the 
island and recommended that this number be supplemented by three 
additional companies of 100 men each. He emphasized that the 
terrain and the numerous inlets on the island made further fortifica' 
tions unnecessary, and recommended that it instead be defended by a 
mobile standing army. In response to this report. Viceroy Gui- 
rlor named Tom^s She6, a former captain in the Regiment of Ireland 
as Commandant of Arms of the Province of Chiloe and Lieutenant 
Jacinto Iriarte of the Regiment of the Queen Mother as his second 
in command. The appointment of military men as military governors 
in frontier areas was an established tradition in Peru and most 
of the colonies. On December k, 1779, She^ arrived in Chiloe 
where he discovered the fijo companies to be "badly disciplined 
and bored." In his report to the king, he cited the number of 
militia in San Carlos, the capital, at 2, 67^, but added that they 

could not be counted upon in an emiergency unless additional 

52 

regular troops were provided to train and officer them. He 



122 



proposed that four companies of fijo troops totalling 210 men be 

53 

raised to supplement this militia and provide them v/ith instruction. 

The declaration of war against Great Britain also prompted 
the initial reorganization of the militia in Chile. The militia 
of that captaincy general totalled 15^856^ all of v;hich v/ere urban 
except those of Santiago and Concepcion which had been provided 
with training cadres from the presidial troops in these areas and 
were classified as provincials. The declaration of war v/as received 
in Santiago from Peru on October 5 and republished on November 8^ 
1777. Augustm de Jauregui^ the president of the audiencla^ im- 
mediately ordered that veteran training cadres begin training the 
militia of Santiago^ La Serena^ and Coplapo^ and that the Valpa- 
rafso garrison be reinforced vjith an additional fijo company. The 
Cuban Militia Regulation was dispatched to Cuba and v/as follov/ed 
in reorganizing the militia there. In Santiago the 200-man Bat- 
talion of Merchants and the Battalion of pardos which totalled 
150 men, v.'ere both brought up to strength but were retained on an 
urban classification. Three new provincial reglm.ents v^ere created 
by Jauregul: the Regiment of infantry "del Rey" numbering 8OO 
soldiers, and two cavalry regiments, the Regiment "El Prfncipe" 
and "La Princesa" both v/ith 6OO men apiece. The militia of 
southern Chile, while found to exist on an irregular basis, vias 
at least battle-tested due to constant skirmishing with the 
Araucanlan Indians of the area south of the Bio-Bfo River. This 
component was backed by the Army of the Frontier stationed at 



123 



Concepcion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ambrosio O'HIggins, 
This detachment had been reinforced with a veteran infantry bat- 
talion and a cavalry detachment during the British occupation of 
the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and by I78O the total strength of 
the regular component in Chile stood at 1^900 men. 

Since Peru never became a theater of the conflict betv;een 
Spain and Great Britain^ it v^as the increased demands for revenue 
which constituted the most significant aspect of the v^ar upon the 
viceroyalty. While the v/ar had led to tfie first major reorganiza- 
tion of the militia, the economic limitations produced by the need 
to send military subsidies to other parts of the empire in America 
reduced the scope of this reorganization to Lima and a few other 
selected areas v/ithin the audiencia. in addition, the war v/as to 
have other repercussions in Peru. In an effort to finance the 
military expansion program, the visitor general instituted a 
series of new taxes v/hich were to provoke serious outbreaks of 
violence. These in turn v;ere to provide the issue which would 
split the viceroy and the visitor general still further apart, 
resulting in the ouster of the former at the hands of his rival. 
Such events split the royal government of Peru at a most critical 
period in its history immediately prior to the rebellion of I78O 
which constituted the most serious threat the Spanish crown had 
experienced until that time. Insofar as the visitation acted 
to limit the military reform, it raises the issue of whether the 
Bourbon Reforms are to be viewed as part of a unit, each working 
to produce a certain end, or if at times they actually worked at 



12^ 



cross -purposes to one another. 

One of the prime missions of Jos^ Antonio de Areche as the 
king's emissary to Peru was the reorganization of the Peruvian 
treasury which was felt to be producing far below its capabilities. 
The visitor sought every means to increase revenues, including the 
extension of royal monopolies to products v;hich had previously 
been untaxed. In 1779 he devised a new tax which he called a 
"military contribution" and levied it upon free persons of color 
in an effort to finance the cost of the v;ar. The fact that these 
free castes had never before in Peru been included as tributaries, 
which they argued the tax made them, offended their dignity and 
prompted them to revolt against royal authority. The additional 
fact that the leaders of these tax revolts were also officers in 
the newly reorganized militia made them formidable opponents. The 
defeat of the new tax measures in turn set financial limitations 
on future efforts to reform the militia, since the tax v;as to pay 
for increased training cadres. It pointed up the fact that the 
Bourbon program vias not a harmonious v/hole but that often Bourbon 
fiscal and military measures worked at cross purposes with each 
other, such as the creation of the La Plata viceroyalty had 
demonstrated. Perhaps most significant v;as the fact that the cost 
of the reforms fell upon those least prepared to pay and benefitted 
only a small minority. This provoked a small rebellion in Lamba- 
yeque v/hich v/as only a prelude to more serious rebellions. It v;as 
these later rebellions v;hich v;ere to end the career of the Vice- 
roy Manuel de Guirior. 



125 



In 1779 Visitor General Areche appointed a series of f iscales . 
or attorneys to traverse the viceroyalty in an effort to obtain a 
complete census of tributaries. Not only did such a census provide 
the crov./n with a list of potential conscripts for the militia^ but 
it also gave the government an Idea of what level of revenues might 
be expected in a particular area and helped it to regulate its 
expenses accordingly. For this reason the census was a fearsome 
and hated event. For the registration of the tributaries in 
Lambayeque on Peru's northern coast^ Areche commissioned Juan de 
O'Kelly, the corregldor of the province of Sana v;ho also held the 
rank of gentleman in the Order of Charles III and a captaincy in 
the artillery militia of Lima. O'Kelly was given the title of 
Lieutenant to the Captain General and^ along with his aide, Juan 
Munoz de Villegas, arrived in Lambayeque In November, 1779. 

In his first meeting with the free persons of color in 
Lambayeque, O'Kelly explained that although they had not 
previously been called upon to pay such a tax, they must now be 
registered and meet their quotas or suffer the consequences, 
O'Kelly also met with the representatives of these castes, the 
captain of the Company of pardos libres Celedonio Ollva, and 
his lieutenant Manuel Bejarano. He attempted to impress upon 
them the fact that the "military contribution" did not constitute 
a tax, but only a donation "to m.alntain the troops vihich [Lamba- 
yeque] has, and should have . . . [to protect] against the enemies 
envious of America and its land, and useful productions," O'Kelly 
went on to explain hov; financially v/eak the kingdom was and the 



126 



benefit which this contribution would make to the crown. Before 
leaving^ Oliva and Bejarano were informed that it v;as their 
responsibility to assemble the castes for registration the follow- 
ing day and that payment of the "contribution" was due and ov.'ing 
immedi ately. 

Apparently Bejarano and Oliva were not impressed with this 
line of reasoning and instead returned to their people to formulate 
a plan of action to resist payment of this new tax. Although 
exactions had been coming at an increasing rate^ in most cases 
the castes paid their share vi'ith little comnient. This tax was 
particularly hateful^ however. In the first place the money was 
to be used to pay the salaries of veteran training cadres vvho often 
treated the local militia with contempt and disrespect. More 
importantly, the tax v/as felt to be a disguised form of tribute. 
In a letter drafted to O'Kelly, the tv;o militia officers argued 
that the contribution constituted merely another form of tribute, 
and that free castes in Peru had never been included as tributaries 
before. To consider them as such, the petition went on, was to 
imply that they held a lov;er standard of loyalty to the crov/n than 
did other groups and that they had been conquered by force of arms 
like the Indians. Both of these assertions were true, it v;ent on, 
and constituted an affront to their honor as loyal vassals of the 
king. The letter added that the castes of Lambayeque had been 
given no proof by 'Kelly that the tax was being collected from 
the castes in Lima. The autliors went on lo profess the great 
loyalty which the castes held for the crown, proof of v."hich they 



127 



maintained could be demonstrated by the fact that many of them 
continued to serve in the militia even though no salaries 
attached to these positions. The letter implied that if 'Kelly 
could prove that the castes of Lima were paying such a tax^ that 
those in Lambayeque would follow suit. But they demanded proof 
in the form of a letter from the viceroy himself requesting this 
contribution^ and noted they would accept this evidence from no 
one else. 

On December h Areche received a report from 'Kelly in which 
he included the letter from the free castes of Lambayeque. 'Kelly 
asked the visitor to reduce the quota to four pesos in Lambayeque 
and asked that proof that the tax was being collected in Lima be 
forwarded to him immediately. In his reply Areche again stressed 
the voluntary nature of the "military contribution^" the purpose 
of which was to defray the expenses of the "distinguished Army 
Corps of this America." He noted that it was not necessary to 
adhere to a fixed quota if this would facilitate collection^ but 
he admitted that he was losing patience v/ith the action of these 
insolent Negroes. He threatened to send "500 disciplined and paid 
troops" to Lambayeque "for a few months" in order to "tear out 
this unjustified demonstration of insolence and disloyalty," All 
of this vias bluster^ however. The viceroyalty simply did not 
have the money or manpov/er to dispatch such an expedition. Areche 
admitted as much in his closing admonition to O'Kelly^ notifying 
him to v;ithhold further effort? to collect the revenue until the 



128 



viceroy had been appraised of the situation and could comment on 
it. 

In a letter to the viceroy, Areche defended the "contribu- 
tion" on the basis of precedent in the Recopilacion de leyes de , 
los reinos de las Indias which permitted the taxation of free 
castes, although he admitted that it had not been applied to Peru 
for centuries. Areche maintained that it had been peacefully 
collected in other areas of the viceroyalty, but neglected to 
mention the disruptions vih'tch it had provoked as well. He 
described the Negroes as "disrupters of the public peace and enemies 
of the rights of the King." He cited the insulting manner in which 
they had allegedly presented the letter to O'Kelly "entering the 
house of the commissioner with an air of independence, their hats 
on their heads, throwing the letter on the table, and taking seats 
without being asked," in an effort to enlist the sympathy of the 
viceroy. The visitor admitted, however, that the sending of troops 
to put down this rebellion was impossible and did not request 
permission to do so. In his reply Guirior agreed that a legal 
basis did seem to exist for imposing the tax, but cautioned that 
in light of the fact that it had not been invoked for years that 
it v;ould be v;ise to proceed with caution on the matter. No further 
instruction vjas given. 

In a second letter to the viceroy Areche defended his conduct 
and described the scrupulous means by which he was proceeding in 
order to assure equity in the collection of the tax. He expressed 



129 



hope that the situation in Lambayeque would stabilize itself since 

he had ordered O'Kelly to establish a monopoly on the sale of 

brandy instead of attempting to collect the contribution. Areche 

warned the viceroy that by changing the method of collecting these 

revenues nothing had really been solved though. He noted that the 

crown's failure to make an example of the incident in Lambayeque 

might provoke other incidents in other parts of the viceroyalty. 

He suggested that the viceroy might therefore want to give the 

leaders of the Lambayeque uprising "some signal ... at least 

. . . some visible sign of your displeasure/' but there is no 

evidence that Viceroy Guirior complied with this request. Although 

he ordered the corregidor of Lambayeque and O'Kelly to denounce 

and reprimand the leaders of the i nsur rect ion^ he stopped short of 

removing them from their militia posts^ probably due to the furor 

which such a move would have provoked. His advice that these 

leaders atone for their actions by making voluntary contributions 

bears a ring of total unfami 1 iar i ty with the realities of the 

situation. In a subsequent letter to O'Kelly ordering him again 

to cease efforts to collect the tax^ Areche explained that 

. . . present circumstances do not permit the separation of 
the garrison troops from [Lima]^ which, to my understanding, 
would be the only means of bringing that miserable people to 
their senses, seduced by the ignorance and malice of those 
who confuse advice with coercion.-'" 

The significance of the Lambayeque rebellion lies in the fact 

that it provided a model for other revolutionaries who sought, often 

successfully, to limit the government's power to tax. In Cuzco, 

for example, Lorenzo F5rfan de los Godos, the son of a former 



130 



reqidor (alderman) of that city and a member of the nobility, was 

inspired by the Lambayeque example. An employee of the hated 

customshouse which was to collect the revenues from these nev; 

taxes, F^rfan recruited a group of silversmiths and Indians who 

also harbored resentment against the government's economic policies 

and mining regulations. In one of the meetings, F^rfan recounted 

the ways in which the citizens of Lambayeque had resisted the 

implantation of the customshouse by O'Kelly and had finally forced 

the officials to return to Lima. According to his information, 

the people of Lambayeque, as soon as they received the dispatch 

regarding the customshouse 

. . . they read it and tore it up, and did not admit [it] 
. . . they were good men because v;ithout forming an alliance 

they resisted the establishment of the customshouse, they 

did not give the customs officials anything to eat, neither 

did they sell them the necessities of life v;ith their silver 

until they became annoyed and left . . . one man had feigned 

insanity . . . and went from house to house with his small 
drum encouraging people to resist. 

Farf^n noted that in Quito three persons had persuaded the 

rest of the persons in the city to sign an appeal to prevent the 

establishment of a customshouse there. He was also aware that 

similar pressure carried on in Arequipa against the customshouse 

there had forced its closing as a mob estimated at 1,000 poured 

into the streets and captured control of the tov/n for a brief time. 

Although veteran troops were sent from Callao to end this riot, 

it was notable that the leaders were given general pardons in 

order to pacify the situation. 



131 



These examples led Farf^n to plan a similar resistance in 
Cuzco but the scheme failed when an Augustinian priest Informed 
the authorities of the plan which had been told to him in the 
confessional. Subsequently the leaders were hanged, but efforts 
were made to interrogate one of them^ Bernardo Pumayalli Tambo- 
huasco^ a young cacique of Pisac, to find out if any connection 
existed between him and Jos^ Gabriel Tupac Amaru, who in 

November, I78O, had captured and executed the corregidoi" of Tinta, 

60 
Antonio de Arriaga. Although no connection was ever proven, it 

is probable that the Indian leader had knowledge of both the Cuzco 
and Lambayeque rebellions, which constitute significant antecedents 
to the Indian rebellions which followed. 

These tax rebellions had one of their most dramatic mani- 
festations in Arequlpa where a group of renegades had entered 
the city under the cover of night and had set fire to the new 
customshouse, seriously wounding an official in charge and making 
off v;Ith an estimated 3^000 pesos. At the same time the band 
ransacked the house of the corregidor and sent him Into hiding. 
A plan to attack the Royal Treasury was postponed due to impend- 
ing daybreak. The following day, in response to the rumor that 
the rebels were joining 2,000 sympathizers in the town of Santa 
Marta for a second assault upon Arequlpa, the corregidor ordered 
two companies of infantry militia and one of cavalry to march 
out to meet them. After the battle^ in which the rebels were 



132 



defeated, Guirior granted promotions to the senior militia officers 
for their bravery. Nevertheless, this victory had little effect 
on the rebels in Arequipa, and lampoons consistently appeared 
urging the citizens to riot. The Spanish corregidor, Baltasar de 
Semanat, notified the viceroy that he was incapable of handling 
the situation with the militia at his disposal. Although the viceroy 
favored sending a detachment of fijo troops from Callao to quiet 
the city, he vacillated since there was strong opposition to such 

a move by authorities within the city of Arequlpa who hoped to 

62 

end the rebellion through negotiations. As a result the viceroy 

did nothing. 

Such inaction in a situation where it was required to maintain 

respect for the crown vyas to Areche inexcusable. In a report to 

Jose de G^lvez he complained that 

If this Chief [Guirior] was more disposed to make his 
justice feared, this measure of sending troops could pos- 
sibly be put off until a later time, but since he does not, 
I request that it be done as quickly as possible. V/ithout 
this show of strength or without another leader taking this 
command It will no longer be possible to reestablish [royal 
authority] . 

He also compared Guirior to his predecessor Viceroy Manuel de Amat 

to the detriment of the former 

Viceroy Manuel de Am.at, predecessor of the present vice- 
roy, made himself feared throughout the entire kingdom because 
when he considered It opportune he would give distinct, rapid, 
arid frank warnings of the consequences of an action. That 
leader was alv;ays observing of the actions, words, or inclina- 
tions of these inhabitants and . . . they were given sentences 
which made them, live in perpetual fear ... A completely 
distinct type of government succeeded him. Handed over to the 
worst Creoles In the America, who debased it: liberty raised 



133 



its head; the inclination to boldness was recognizable . . . 
and from this was born all the present disorder and state of 
depression which threatens the territory of the Viceroyalty 
of Peru. 

Areche urged the Minister of the indies to use the resources at 

his disposal to put an end to these revolts, including the sending 

of veteran troops. "Similar examples cannot be left unpunished," 

he continued. Instead, "it would be fitting to magnify them by 

establishing here a contingent of regular troops at least equal to 

that of Hevi Spain. Established and put at the orders of an expert 

go 

leader everything Is simple." 

Although the Arequlpa revolt was subsequently put down by 
veteran troops sent from Callao, the larger Issue of the utility 
of the militia remained to divide the viceroy and the visitor 
general. V/hlle the viceroy had defended this component of the 
army since many of his closest associates were in the officer 
corps, the visitor ridiculed it In his messages to the Ministry 
of the Indies as being useless and a positive harm to the well- 
being of the kingdom due to the arrogance which membership 
provoked among the influential men of affairs of Lima. 

Here all or almost all of the dress of the men is the 
militia uniform, with epaulets, and braid, and these manifest 
without a doubt that they serve no purpose: in the companies 
are the landowners, the merchants and the leading Men of 
Affairs of the Kingdom, Moreover, they are the contributors, 
since there are no royal revenues, and therefore the maintenance 
of an interior and external defense is contrary to this 
practice ... We have done nothing more in establishing such 
bodies of militia than to create daring arrogance and pride; 
it is true that the companies never contain more soldiers than 
the officers which I have indicated, but these are enough to 



13^ 



provoke hatred towards an inactive government, and since this 
is surely and easily proven I have no doubt that Your Excel- 
lency . . . [will] establish in Peru that force which can 
competently regulate the militia in order to establish the 
respect of your command. -^ 

In another secret report sent to the king, Areche elaborated on 
this theme of corruption which he felt was a threat to the vice- 
royalty. 

There are more colonels, lieutenant colonels, and sergeants 
major [in Peru] than there are in the army of Spain since many 
regiments which have never been reorganized on the footing of 
the Cuban Regulation find themselves with two, three, and even 
four senior officers . . . There is a lieutenant colonel of 
the Battalion of Merchants who is at the same time a common 
soldier of the Regiment of the Nobility, and wears his uniforms 
alternatively. The civil occupations in the government are all 
full of Officers of higher and lower rank down to the lowest 
subaltern, and there is hardly a Country in the world where the 
soldiery is so disrespected due to this lack of values where 
persons of the lov/est birth are so rewarded. 

All these officers, using the term of the country, carry 
a baton signifying command and It makes one sick to see such 
persons with this insignia which before was respectable and 
one that was reserved for those who hopefully served man. The 
chief clerk of the notarial office of the Government is a lieu- 
tenant colonel and the senior notary is a sergeant major, al- 
though of a different regiment. Finally, for those who are 
not Militiamen, there is a general enlistment where the in- 
habitants of all ages, trades, and ranks of the country are 
given uniforms, excepting the boys, women, priests, and friars. 
And it makes one laugh to see in the morning a lawyer dressed 
as a judge and a little later in the uniform of a colonel or 
other military distinction. 

One cannot count upon these militia for anything if It is 
necessary to call persons such as this to duty. This has been 
manifested by this Captaincy General at the repeated urgings 
of its inspector don Joseph del Valle about the regulation of 
the militia, and about a regiment of infantry and one of 
Dragoons coming from the Peninsula. 

The result of such a situation, Areche maintained, was that there 

was a general loss of pride in the uniform which would not be 

revived until the officers of the militia v;ere chosen on the 

basis of merit and bravery rather than influence. Only then, he 



135 



declared would the militiaman be obeyed and respected as he was in 

other parts of the world. 

In his report to the king Areche also criticized Guirior for 

failing to punish the leaders of the insurrections which had 

engulfed "all the jurisdictions near and far from this capital." 

He mentioned the weapons that were distributed throughout the 

kingdom as constituting a potential danger^ and cited several 

cases in which punishment had not been meted out as it should due 

to the inaction of the viceroy. He summarized by stating that 

although the crown spent 200,000 pesos annually on military 

expenses 

. . . for all the purpose this expenditure has achieved it is 
as if it were never spent and the army hardly offends as much 
as this cost. Here a person diligently pretends to be a soldier 
because it is a great advantage to enter the Palace Guard, 
whether it be the Cavalry of Halberdiers, because in addition 
to having an extremely high salary it Is a license to defraud, 
rob, and amuse oneself with the uniform in the basest endeavors. 
The Company of Cavalry act as mail runners for particular 
persons, they pursue fugitive Negroes at the order of their 
masters, they are constables, notaries, receivers, and in a 
word they do everything except what they are supposed to do. 

By suppressing this useless expense and cutting back on the militia 
Areche estimated that the two or three regiments of veteran troops 
which he and del Valle had requested could be maintained "very 
comfortably" and he predicted that the land and its inhabitants 
would once more become the property of the res publ ica (common- 
weal) which he regretted to say was not presently the case. So 
emotional did the visitor become over the issue that he stated 



136 



"I began to write Your Excellency yesterday . . . [but] I am going 
to conclude since I am yielding to that lack of moderation which I 
knew by my pulse . . , " 

The above diatribe was but one of a series of reports in which 
the visitor sought to reduce the power and prestige of the viceroy 
and secure his downfall in the hope that his successor v/ould be 
more tractable. In other letters he accused Guirior of disobeying 
royal orderS;, opposing the ministers of the Royal Council, inter- 
fering with the mission of the visitation, and numerous other 
actions against the crov/n. Faced with Areche's refusal to cooperate 
with the viceroy, whom G^lvez believed had tried to sabotage the 
visitation, and a deteriorating economic and social situation in 
Peru, the Minister of the Indies informed the king that he felt 
the viceroy should be removed and replaced with someone who could 
v;ork more closely with the visitor. The king quickly agreed to 
the wisdom of such a move, and appointed Augusf in de Jauregui, the 
President of Chile, to replace him. It was clearly noted in his 
appointment that Areche was to retain his control over the Royal 
Treasury in order that he continue without impediment the task of 
its reorganization. On July 21, I78O, Guirior handed control of 
the viceroyalty over to his successor and sailed on October 7 to 



Spain to defend himself against the visitor's charges of mal 

68 
feasance. His departure preceded by one month the outbreal 

the Tupac Amaru rebellion in v/hich the crises that had been 



137 



developing since midcentury were to culminate. 

In conclusion, the viceregency of Manuel de Guirior had not 
materially furthered the initial military reform begun by Viceroy 
Manuel de Amat . The financial drain of Spain's entrance into the 
Wars of the American Revolution in the form of military subsidies 
which Peru was required to send to other areas of the New V/orld, 
plus the removal of the silver mines of Potosf and Oruro to the 
La Plata Viceroyalty, placed financial limitations on future 
military reform. For this reason, training cadres were never pro- 
vided to the majority of the Peruvian militia units. 

Other limitations plagued the reform also. The fact that 
Inspector General Morales had been diverted to Chile meant that 
Peru never received a true military commander until the arrival 
of Jos^ del Valle in 1776. As a result subi nspectors -general were 
never dispatched to reform the interior militia until that time. 
The reform was also limited by the presence of Visitor General 
JosI Antonio de Areche and his successor Jorge de Escobedo who 
urged frugality continually and regarded the militia as an un- 
necessary expense. Escobedo charged that in some areas the 

militia rolls were larger than the census rolls even if twelve 

69 
year-old boys were included. Reports such as these give 

credence to the assertion that the strength of the militia was 

overstated and that a true reform of the army had not extended 

into the provinces. Moreover, the harsh taxes imposed by Areche 

to finance the reform had provoked outright resistance among 

certain of these provincial units. 



138 



By 1780 the Tupac Amaru rebellion was to test the true extent 
of the reform and prove the above assertions. The result was to 
further discredit the militia and to force a radical reorientation 
of the reform program during the last quarter of the century, in 
an effort to provide a more secure basis for both internal and 
external defense from attack. To a large degree this reorienta- 
tion constituted a repudiation of all that had preceded it. 



139 

Notes 

Mendlburu^ I, ^^7. Although Amat apparently left Peru a rich 
man, the residencia^ or judicial review of his viceregency found him 
guilty of no wrongdoing. Amat^ Memoria de Gobierno. pp. cvii-cxii. 

^Mendiburu, VI, 152. 

^Aiton, p. 271. 

L 
AGI:AL 65^;, Amat to Arriaga, Lima, May 2, 1776, p. 1. 



^Villarroel, pp. 102-189, pass im . 



^Diffie, pp. klS-h'il. By 1 805 trade at Callao had a value of 
four million five hundred thousand pesos. 

Relaciones de 1 os virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el 
Peru (Madrid, I867-I872). III. Relacion que hace el Excmo. Sr. D . 
Manuel de Guirior . . ., Lima, August 23, 1 78O, pp. 39-^0, k'i-kk; 
Mendiburu, VI, I6O-I6I. 



C^spedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 120-121. 

9 

John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administrati on, 1782-1810: 

The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata 
(London, 1958), pp. 37-^0. This plan was rejected since Chile 
did not have an adequate economic base upon which to support 
Buenos Aires. 

The best treatment of this rivalry is C^spedes del Castillo, 
Lima y Buenos Aires . 

^^ Ibid ., pp. 81, 1^5-1^6. 

'^ 1 bid . . pp. 86-87. This broke dov;n as follows: 

military subsidies 1,17^,811 pesos 
military salaries 288,338 pesos 

extraordinary expenses 77 1 , 111 pesos 

total expenses 2,23^^921 pesos 

Relacion de Guirior. p. 9^. One contemporary source referred 
to the military subsidy as "an open money bag into which everybody 
dug with both hands, except those for whose benefit the subsidy had 
originally been established." Eugene H. Korth, S.J., Spanish Pol i cy 
in Colonial Chile: the Struggle for Social Justice. 1535-1700 
(Stanford, Calif., I968), p. 2lU. 



\ko 



The subsidy to Buenos Aires, for example, held at about 
125,000-130,000 pesos annually until I76I, and about 200,000 
during the rule of Amat. In 177^ it was set at 600,000 to cover 
the expenses of the creation of the viceroyalty by order of the 
crown. After that it often reached 850,000 pesos annually. The 
main reason for these defense expenditures was the size of the 
army in Brazil, \-/h i ch by 1776 stood at eleven regiments. C^spedes 
del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 101, 103; Mendiburu, IV, 
163, 169. 

^^ Relaci6n de Guirior, p. 9^; Mendiburu, VI, 169. 

Vicente Palacio Atard, Areche y Guirior: observaciones 
sobre el fracaso de una visita al Peru (Seville, 19^6), p. 8. 

l^The best study of Areche 's efforts to put the royal 
treasury of Peru on a sound basis is Guillermo C^spedes del 
Castillo, Reorqanizacion de la Hacienda Virreinal Peruana en 
el S i g 1 o XV II I (Seville, 1953). 

AGI:AL 1082, "Instruccion que debe observar don Jos^ 
Antonio de Areche en la Visita y arreglo de los Tribunales de^ 
Cuentas, Cajas y Ramos de Real Hacienda en los Reinos del Peru, 
Chile y Provinclas de la Plata"; AGI:AL 1082, "Instrucci&n re- 
servada para interior gobierno del Visitador General del Peru." 
Areche delegated the duties of the visitation in Chile and the 
La Plata regions. 

^^Palacio Atard, pp. 31-32, 3'+-36. For an article which 
emphasizes the positive aspects of Areche's personality, see 
Gates, pp. l^-^2. 

^°C^spedes del Castillo, Reorqani zacion, p. 11. The super - 
intendency over the Royal Treasury, formerly held by the viceroy, 
gave its holder virtual fiscal autonomy over the viceroyalty by 
virtue of allowing him to decide where these monies should be 
spent . 

^^AGIrAL 108^^, Secret report from Antonio de Areche to Jos^ 
de G^lvez, Lima, April 12, I78O, pp. 23-2^+. Areche referred to 
Lima as a "Babylon" controlled by the Creoles whom he alleged ruled 
Viceroy Guirior. He cited their control over the audiencia, the 
post of majordomo in the palace, that of sergeant major of the 
Regiment of the Nobility, a creole militia unit which Areche 
characterized as "extremely useless," and other posts. He also 
criticized Guirior for practicing nepotism. Areche maintained 
that these Creoles blocked his proposals for reform since they 
found the disorder in the viceroyalty more to their advantage. 
AGI:AL Sh^b, Report from Areche to the King, n.d., pp. 1-3. 



]h] 



22 

AGIrAL 6^0, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix, instrru- 

iendole de los principales acaecimientos en el Reyno del Peru con el 
fin de que le sirvan de govierno estas noticias," El Pardo, March 28, 
1783, pp. 1-15. In it the crown blamed the Creoles of Lima for plan- 
ning the rebellion as early as 1776, and held that Guirior either 
overtly aided them or did so through his refusal to take any action. 

■^ Relacion de Guirior. p. 92. 

2Sbid. 



^^AGhAL 65^, Guirior to Gilvez, Lima, August 20, I776, pp. 1-2. 
An anonymous description of Lima, written around 177^ corroborated 
Guirior's suspicion. The author stated that Amat had failed to 
discipline the militia of Lima and concluded that due to the great 
distance involved, militia from the surrounding provinces could 
not be counted upon to help a province under attack. Aurelio Mird 
Quesada, "Una descripcion inedita de Lima en e] siglo XV I I I , " 
Revista Historica . XXVI (Lima, 1962-1963), 181-182. 

■^ AGI:AL 65^, Guirior to G^lvez, Lima, October 20, I776, p. 1. 

27 

Relacion de Guirior, pp. 56, 91 . 

?8 

AGIrAL 65^, Report of Joseph del Valle to Manuel de 

Guirior, Lima, October 1, 1776, pp. 1-2; ibid . , November 3, 1776, p. 1 

29 
-^The actual strength of the battalion v/as hSk men, but twelve 

of these were cadets, 137 listed themselves as Spaniards, 320 as 

Peruvians and 37 foreign-born. Of the officers, thirty-one were 

Spaniards and eighteen v;ere Creoles. AGIrAL 655, "Libro de Serbi- 

cios F s ic 1 de los Oficiales, Primeros Sargentos y Cadetes del 

Batallon Fixo del Callao de Lima," Lima, December 30, 1776. In 

1776 the Creoles at court had sent the king a "Representaci on hecha 

por los Americanos al Rey Carlos III," Madrid, August 12, 1776, in 

which they had requested being allowed to enlist more widely in 

these fijo battalions. On November 15 the crown sent the Viceroy 

of Peru a circular order instructing him to end any discrimination 

in these battalions between Spaniards and Creoles. AGIrAL 656, 

Guirior to GSlvez, Lima, June 20, 1777, PP. 1 ~2. 

^"^AGIrAL 655, Guirior to G^lvez, Lima, February 20, 1777, p. 1. 

31 

AGIrAL 658, "Relacion del proyecto formado por el Inspector 

General de las tropas veteranas y de mil Idas del distrito de este 
Virreynato del Peru," Lima, July 31, 1778, pp. I-I6. 

32 

Ibid., pp. 15-16. Del Valle asked that the Reqlamento p ara 

las mllicias de i nfanterfa y caballerfa de l a isia d e Cuba of 176^+ 
and the Real declaraclon sobre puntos esenclales de la Ordenanza de 



]k2 



milicias provinciales de Espana of 1 767 be published in Peru. 
This was finally ordered by Guirior on October 5, 1779. 

^^AGIrAL 658, Guirior to G^lvez, Lima, September 5, 1778, 
PP. 1-3. 

^ \elaci6n de Guirior, pp. 92-93. 

3^ |bid . , p. 105; AGI:AL 659, Guirior to GSlvez, October 5, 
1779, P. ^. 

Ibid . , pp. 9^-95; AGI :AL 659, Declaration of War against 
Great Britain, Lima, September 26, 1779. ■ 

37 |bid .. pp. 95-96. 

^ AGI:AL 659, Guirior to Pedro de Ureta, Lima, September 28, 
1779:, p. 1; AGi:AL 1483, Guirior to Ureta, Lima, October 5>) 1779, 
PP. 1-2. 

^° Relaci6n de Guirior , pp. 95-96. 
^° lbid .. pp. 96-97. 

AGI :AL 1^83, "Orden circular a todos 1 os corregidores del 
Manuel de Guirior," Lima, October 5, 1779. 

^^AGi:AL 658, Guirior to G^lvez, Lima, September 5, 1778, p. 1 

"^AGIrAL IU83, Guirior to G^lvez, Lima, October 5, 1779, P. 2. 

^^ Relacion de Guirior. p. 97. Those soldiers who held the 

rank of adjutant in the Regiment of Spanish Infantry prior to its 

reorganization viere commissioned as lieutenant to meet the critical 
need for officers. 

'' ibid. , pp. 97-98. The only persons excepted from militia 
service were those serving as lookouts and those working in the 
gunpowder factory. 

ikLd.. , p. 100; Cdspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires , 
p. 1^9. By 1784 the expenses of the Tupac Amaru rebellion had 
raised this sum to an estimated 1,702,23^ pesos (p. 137). The 
cabildos of Peru were less generous in appropriating funds for 
defense. Koore cites the example of the cabildo of Lima voting 
to appropriate such funds only to have an open session reverse 
this decision. Similar examples occurred in Piura and Trujillo, 
pp. 127-128. 



1^3 



k3 



AGIrAL 659;, Guirior to G5lvez_, Lima, October 5, 1779, pp. 3"^. 

q 

AGIrAL 1483, Guirior to G^lvez, Lima, November S, 1799, pp. 
1 -2 ; Relaci6n de Guirior. p . 1 03 . 

Relaci6n de Guirior. pp. 105-109. 

50 

AGI:AL 1^93, "Relacion . . . que manifiesta la situacion geo- 

grSfica, Producciones, y Estado Actual de defensa de la Provincia de 

Chiloe . , . por orden de 26 de Octubre de 1778," pp. 1-8. 

In 1753 the crown had sent out the first group of veteran of- 
ficers to serve as military governors of provinces located along the 
Indian frontier. Others were sent to the mining towns of Huancavel ica, 
Chuicuito, and Potosf. During the reign of Viceroy Amat, military 
governors v;ere established In the coastal provinces of Canete, lea, 
and Arica, as v;ell as in Tarma, Jauja, and Cajatambo which were felt 
to be critical to national security. AGIrlG Zkk, "Nota de los go- 
viernos militares del Peru," cited in C^spedes del Castillo, Lima 
y Buenos Aires, p. 91. Amat felt military governors could lead 
expeditions to assist Lima if the capital v;as threatened by attack. 
AGIrAL 653, Amat toArriaga, Lima, September 10, 177^, p. 3. Generally 
civil governors were preferred by the cro'.vn since they were more 
economi cal , 

-•^AGIrAL 1493, Report from Inspector General Tom^s Sheg to 
Viceroy Manuel de Guirior, San Carlos, Chiloe, December 20, 1779, 
pp. 1-2. 

^^ANLrRA, Legajo 1 (I78O), "Plan del costo que tendrSn las 
quatro compan'as de milicias que se projecta emplear en actual 
servicio, durante la guerra ..." San Carlos de Chiloe, December 
26, 1779, P. 1. 

^ Barros Arana, VI, 316-317, 361 -367, 389-393. 

^^ANLrRA, Legajo 1 (I78O), pp. 1-19, lists the pay requests 
for all of the veteran training cadres in the viceroyalty. Their 
location and numbers are as followsr Juan Fernandez (56), Tru- 
jillo (4), Canete (5), lea (10), Huarura (6), Arnedo (7), Cara- 
baillo (22), Piura (10), Arica (3), Arequipa (103), Chota (10), 
Chiloe (8), Cuzco (63). The figures in Cuzco and Arequipa reflect 
veteran detachments there. 

5°Palacio Atard, pp. 39"44. 

57 

AGIrAL 1086, "Relacion de la negativa de los Pardos de 

Lambayeque hacer la contribucion militar," n.d., pp. 1-17. 



58 

For example in Par inacochas, near Cuzco^ Areche was forced 
to suspend an order calling up the local militia for fear that 
they would turn their weapons against the corregidor who had tried 
to collect the "military contribution." AGI:AL IO85, Antonio de 
Areche to Augustin de Jauregui_, Cuzco, March 16, I78I, p, 3. 

59aGI:AL 1086, "Relacion de la negativa , . ," p. I7. 

Lu's Antonio Eguiguren Escudero, Guerra Separatista del 
Peru. 1777-1780 (Lima, 19^2), pp. 19-29. 

Mendiburu, Vi, I6I; Relacion de Guirior. p. kS. 

Boles lao Lewin, La Rebel ion de Tupac Amaru y 1 os Orfgen es 
de la Independenci a de Hi spanoamgr i ca . 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires, I967), 
pp. 153-162; Palacio Atard, p. ^1. 

AGI:AL 108^, Areche to Gllvez, Lima, April 12, I78O, pp 
23-2it, 28. ^ . ^^ . / . KH. 

64 

The expedition which arrived in Arequipa on May 5 was 
described by the viceroy as a "liberating army" which was wildly 
acclaimed (R elacion de Guirior. p. ky) although an historian of 
the subject has compared it to a column of prisoners (Palacio 
Atard, p. 4l). The appearance of the troops apparently touched 
off new waves of violence, although Guirior insisted this was due 
to fear rather than any misbehavior on the part of the soldiers, 
Relacion de Guirior. p. ky , 

65 

AGI:AL 1084, Areche to GSlvez, Lima, April 12, I78O, p. 22. 

AGI:AL 645b, Report from Areche to the King, n.d., pp. 1-4. 

67 . 

JLkid..^ pp. 3-4. In an annotation in the margin of this 
report. Royal officials at court state that they considered Areche 
to have proven his charges that Guirior tried to sabotage the 
visitation in an effort to further his own despotic authority, 
and note that his replacement Augustin de Jauregui should improve 
the situation. 

68^ . . 

Guirior was successful in clearing himself of the charges 
levelled by Areche. See Palacio Atard, pp. 63-65. 

69 

AGI:AL 1100, Report of Escobedo to the Crown. Lima, 
January 16, 1784, in Richard Konetzke, Sud-und Mi ttelamer i ka ! ; 
Die I ndianerkul turen Altamerikas und die Spani sc h -Portug ies ische 
Kolonialherrschaft (Frankfurt -on-Ma i n, I965), p. I63. 



IV. TESTING OF THE MILITARY REFORM: THE 
INDIAN REVOLTS OF I78O-I783 



The Indian revolts which raged throughout Peru during the 
period v;ere the culmination of a century of abuse of the natives 
at the hands of their Spanish conquerors. The early successes 
enjoyed by the rebels exploded the myth of Infallibility which 
surrounded Spanish arms and brought into question the success and 
functionality of the military reform program. The rebellions also 
raised the question of militia loyalty and in certain cases found 
it lackirig. Although the revolts were eventually put down^ the 
campaigns brought to light serious deficiencies in the Army of Peru, 
Such shortcomings provoked a reorientation in the reform program 
after 178^ av/ay from its former reliance on the militia. 

On July 27., I78O Viceroy Guirior was replaced by Lieutenant 
General Augustfn de Jauregui, a career officer who had served in 
the Regiment of Dragoons of Almansa vi\th distinction in Africa and 
the Caribbean before being appointed Captain General of Chile in 
1773^ where he had reorganized the militia and had energetically 
dealt v;ith the problem of the Araucanian Indians. 

Jauregui v/as reminded that the Indian was to be his central 
problem by Jose Baqu'jano y Carrillo_, a leading Creole intellectual^ 
who, in a welcoming speech^ upbraided the Spanish government for its 
abuses and injustices to this sector of society. Moreover^ Baqufjano 



1^5 



]kS 



was speaking out against the entire concept of Spanish absolutism. 
As the spokesman for a nev; generation of Peruvian liberals^ Baqui- 
jano was symbolic of the influence of the Enlightenment which would 
become increasingly more apparent in the thought of Creole intel- 
lectuals as the century wore on. There can be no doubt of the 
truth in Baqufjano's statements. Indian tribute levels were being 
raised at the rate of one million pesos per year^ in an effort to 
meet military expenditures, which, one observer stated, seemed 
impossible to reduce. The efforts of Jose Antonio de Areche to 
raise revenue levels through the imposition of new taxes also 
seems to have been successful. By 1779 Peru had a budgetary surplus 
of l,69it,209 pesos. All of this vyas purchased at a heavy price, 
however. In the wake of the Indian rebellions the viceroyalty 
suffered a budgetary deficit of tvyelve million pesos which v^as 
increasing at about one million pesos per year. 

The effect of imposing the "military contribution" and in- 
creasing the number of crown n-'onopol ies had a demonstrable effect 
upon many persons throughout the viceroyalty. According to an 
anonymous resident of Cuzco, it was these taxes v;hich precipitated 
the violent rebellions which v;ere to engulf Peru, New Granada, and 
part of the La Plata. 

A project of this nature, although its role appears to be 
very useful and advantageous to the Crown, has produced fatal 
consequences since then . . . because there is no monster so 
fearsome as a People, which, suppressed or deprived of its old 
liberty, hands itself over to despair and desperation. Then., 
what shall become of a Kingdom, and one so libertine and vice- 
ridden as that of Peru?' 



\^1 



Although it seems unlikely that the visitor general would not have 
foreseen the results of his tax policies, he was apparently unwill- 
ing to reduce his quest for additional revenue in order to avert 
them. Also he made no effort to end the hated repart imiento system. 
Instead, circular orders v;ere sent to all corregidors instructing 
them on what steps to take should the Indians of their district 
revolt. These orders provoked a reply from the corregidor of 
Pasco v.'ho informed the visitor that many corregidors had been 
killed already, and that he was filled with "fear, perplexity, and 

a lack of confidence" at having to enforce these tax collections, 

9 
He was told by the visitor to follow orders. 

The visitor in turn blamed the revolts on Viceroy Guirior. 

In a later defense of his conduct, Areche asserted that he had 

warned Guirior as early as 1775 of the possibility of Indian revolts, 

based on reports sent to him from territorial justices, but that 

the viceroy had refused to take any preventive action. According to 

Areche, there was also considerable talk of a major revolt to have 

been launched in 1777 ("the year of the three sevens"), which was 

supposedly to confirm the prophecies of Saint Francis and Saint 

Rose of Lima. Areche termed Guirior's refusal to take action at 

10 
this time as "a crime of culpable omission." It is true that 

the viceroy turned down proposals to secure the sierra region. 

One of these, proposed by Colonel Demetrio Egan, would have been 

composed of a body of militia stationed in Cuzco and the creation 

of several new presidios garrisoned with fijo troops v/as turned 



litS 



down by the viceroy due to the expense Involved. But it is wrong 
that the viceroy alone shoulder the blame for such a decision. As 
superintendent of the Royal Treasury the visitor general was per- 
haps in a better position to support the plan, but apparently did 
not do so. It seems that such plans were not supported by the 
crown either. Another measure proposed by the Viceroy of Buenos 
Aires, the Marques de La Plata to create thirteen battalions of 
militia in Upper Peru, one-third of which were always to be on 

active duty, was turned dov/n by the Ministry of the indies for 

11 

economy reasons. 

The man who was finally able to capitalize upon the discontent 
harbored by the Indian masses towards the Spanish colonial system 
was the young mestizo cacique or chief of Tungasuca in the province 
of Tinta near Cuzco, Jos^ Gabriel Condorcanqui . Condorcanqui often 
used the name Tupac Amaru since it was from an ancestor Felipe 
Tupac Amaru that they inherited their title of nobility. The 
concern of Tupac Amaru for the problems of the oppressed Indians 
stems from the year 1770 when he v/ent to Lima in order to have 
the Spanish authorities there confirm his right to the title of 
Marques de Oropesa, and there is some speculation that he came 

into contact v/ith influential Creoles in Lima who were also 

12 

assertedly plotting the overthrow of the government. At any 

rate, his occupation as a muleteer, transporting goods from Lima 
to Buenos Aires, exposed him to poverty and discontent, and also 
granted him an opportunity to test the popularity of his ideas. 



149 



When these began to fall on fertile ground he decided to initiate 
his rebel 1 ion. 

Tupac Amaru singled out as his target the powerful corregldor 
of Tinta Antonio de Arriaga who was vie]] hated for his cruelty. 
Arriaga had recently run afoul of the powerful Bishop Moscoso of 
Cu^^co whom he had accused of participation in the revolt of F^rfan 

de los Godos^ and in so doing "practically signed his own death 

]h 

warrant." On November k, 1780^ Tupac and a dozen accomplices 

seized the corregldor and forced him to write an order requisition- 
ing all the funds in the treasury of Tinta and stating that all the 
inhabitants v;ere to assemble in Tungasuca for a projected expedition 
to defend the port of Aranta from an attack by the English. The 
plan worked to perfection^ and the assembled militia even garrisoned 
the plaza mayor as the Indian chief executed their corregldor on 

November 10. Such acquiescence implied a high degree of sympathy 

15 

for the rebel and his program. Proclamations calling for support 

were sent out to the Indians of neighboring villages and Creoles 
and mestizos v/ere also encouraged to join him. 

On November 12 the news of the revolt was delivered in Cuzco 
by Fernando Cabrera_, the corregldor of Quisplcanchi . A junta de 
guerra (council of v/ar) was immediately summoned by the corregldor 
of Cuzco Fernando Incl5n Valdez^ and it moved to place two regiments 
of militia In barracks to defend the city against an attack. Because 
of his military experience, the junta appointed the sergeant major 



150 



of the veteran detachment Joaqufn de Valcarcel as military commandant, 
The former Jesuit college was converted into a military headquarters 
and all weapons and royal funds vyere gathered there for protection. 

At 3:^5 a.m. in the morning of November 13 the meeting concluded 

16 

and a runner v;as dispatched to Lima with the nev/s . 

What follov/ed in Cuzco was sheer confusion. The bishop stated 
that by November 16 many companies of mestizo militia had been 
formed but that few of them possessed firearms or any rudiments of 
military discipline. He felt that they sympathized with the Indians 
and actually posed a threat to the city. Moscoso noted that the 
citizenry v;as afraid and even turned dov/n offers of commissions 
and fueros of the militia. He v/ent on to say that even the of- 
ficers viho composed the command and staff group of the militia of 
Cuzco had not participated in the junta but had actually fled in 

panic from the city v;hich made discipline among the militia an 

17 

Imposs i bi 1 i ty. 

The junta sent circular orders to all of the corregidors of 
the outlying provinces asking them to come to Cuzco with all the 
troops at their disposal. Cabrera in the meantime gathered a 
makeshift group of "Indians, mestizos, and Spaniards" and was 
joined outside of tov;n by Tiburcio Landa, the corregidor of 
Paucartambo. Although the junta had requested that the pair wait 
until four hundred soldiers and a company of nobles was gathered 
in the city, recruitment was slow and Cabrera and Landa took off 
alone in pursuit of the rebels. On November 17 at about sunset 



151 



the Royalist force, which totalled 604 soldiers and about 700 Indian 
auxiliaries, reached Sangarara and decided to spend the night in the 
plaza mayor. Although they did not see any evidence of the Indians 
they apparently had been watching them the entire time. At h a.m. 
the Indians launched an attack v;hich caught the Spanish forces un- 
prepared. They retreated to the safety of the church v;here they 
took refuge. Tupac Amaru ordered the Spaniards to allow all Creoles 
and women to leave safely but the Spaniards refused to comply with 
this ultimatum. When the Spaniards refused to surrender, the 
Indians set fire to the church and massacred the soldiers as they 
tried to escape the flames. All of the Spanish troops were killed 
except for tv;enty-eight Creoles who v/ere left wounded. ^^ 

The defeat of Sangarara exploded the myth of Infallibility 
v/hich had surroLinded Spanish arms in Peru and encouraged the 
Indians to carry on the resistance. News of the massacre caused 
panic to break out in Cuzco which feared the Indians would now 
turn the attack against the city. This fear was checked somewhat 
by the arrival of 250 "very superior" militia from Abancay under 
the command of their corregidor Manuel Villalta on November 22. 
The junta met and named Villalta as commandant of the militia 
of the city, defeating a strong proposal by Bishop Moscoso to 
surrender the city to the Indians. ° Subsequently, militia 
appeared from Andahuaylas, Paucartambo, Galea, and Urubamba. The 
clergy not only donated money, but men as well. A battalion of 
clerics was raised from among the priests, friars, and seminary 



152 



students of the city, and placed under the command of the dean 
of the cathedral chapter Manuel de Mendieta. The battalion received 
training from a fijo training cadre and was utilized as sentinels 
in the church tov/ers during the night to prevent a surprise attack. 
in order to obtain new recruits and secure the loyalty of the 
Indians, the cabildo abolished payment of both the repart imiento 
and the sales tax, and excluded faithful Indians from service in 
the textile mills. In addition, work vvas begun under the auspices 
of the cabildo to collect and repair firearms and to dig trenches 
around the city. By the end of November Cuzco was defended by a 

force of about 3,000 men who had received some rudimentary military 

20 
training in the handling and firing of v;eapons. 

The size of the rebel army commanded by Tupac Amaru was less 

important than the lack of military leadership possessed by its 

officers. In a letter v^rltten by a friend ibr the Indian leader 

the size of the army v;as estimated at 14,000 men, although this 

21 

number fluctuated considerably. Rumors were also spread that 

whites formed a part of the army, and It was believed that these 
might have been Englishmen, who planned to use the Indian rebellions 

to topple the Spanish colonies from v.'Ithln. Such assertions were 

22 

never proven, however. The real weakness of the rebel army 

lay in the fact that practically none of its members had any 

experience In handling weapons or the tactics of warfare neces" 

23 
sary to defeat an opponent. For example, after the Sangarara 

victory, Tupac Amaru chose not to invade Cuzco, but Instead marched 

south Into the Lake Tltlcaca basin thirty leagues south of the city. 



153 



It was not until he had reached the town of Ayaviri that he received 
word from his vjife, Micaela Bastidas^ that the Royalists were taking 
measures in Lima to secure his defeat. She urged him to counter- 
march towards Cuzco and capture that capital before the arrival of 
the troops from Lima. Tupac Amaru took this advice and turned back 
towards Cuzco. By December his army was in control of five provinces 
and close to controlling eight others. Only on the coast had he 
failed to win large amounts of followers^ due to the large concen- 
trations of Royalist troops in that region. 

On November 2^ the runner from Cuzco arrived In Lima with 
the news of the execution of the corregidor Arriaga. That same 

day Viceroy Jauregul assembled his military advisors into a junta 

25 

de guerra. The junta ordered the inspector general to raise 

200 militia from the Regiment of pardos libres which were to be 
placed under the command of Colonel Gabriel de Aviles^ a future 
viceroy of Peru. Due to the shortage of fijo troops, it was 
decided that only a veteran command and staff group should ac- 
company this militia, although Aviles was empowered to enlist ad- 
ditional troops along the vyay. The expedition was outfitted 
with kQQ new rifles, 500 sabers, and 12,000 cartridges. On 
November 28 the expedition left Lima, arriving in Cuzco on January 
I, 1781.2^ 

The arrival of Aviles in Cuzco gave heart to the defenders 
of that city and also pointed up the weaknesses v;hich the Indians 
had as yet not exploited. In a subsequent report to the Ministry 
of the Indies, Aviles stated that of the 12,000 soldiers defending 



15^ 



Cuzco, the vast majority were Indian irregulars and conscripts 
from the surrounding areas. Few of them, he noted, had any 
rudiments of military discipline. Avil^s cited the example of 
the militia of Paruro which defied his order to divide in half 
with one group defending a certain position, stating that unless 
all could go, none of them would. He also referred to the conduct 
of the Regiment of Cavalry of Chumbivilcas v.'hich refused to march 

unless he named another commandant. Only the Company of Merchants 

27 

was singled out as possessing the slightest bit of obedience. 

The inability of the Indian army to capitalize on this state 
of affairs was to prove its most serious mistake of the v;ar. On 
December 19 Tupac Amaru had assembled his army in Tinta pursuant 
to marching on Cuzco. Apparently he was not aware of the fact 
that only 1,784 of the defenders of the city v;ere nicmbers of the 
militia, the rest being irregulars. By December 28, after having 
devastated the countryside outside of Cuzco and encircling the 
city, Tupac Amaru waited in the inca fortress of Sacsahuayman which 
overlooks it from the north. Yet he failed to attack and instead 
preferred to cut the city off from communication with the outside, 
perhaps hoping to starve it into submission. In the meantime, 
small detachments of troops left Cuzco to confront the enemy and 
frequently won victories. In an effort to stem the tide of 
defectors, the corregidors ordered anyone leaving the city without 

nO 

permission to be put to death. 



155 



The arrival of Aviles in Cuzco on January 1 probably ended 
any chance v/hich the Indians might have had to capture the city. 
His appearance marked a rapid buildup in the militia of Cuzco and 
improved the morale of the defenders of the city. Increasingly 

after that time the Royalist forces went onto the offensive and 

29 
began to v/i n victories in the lowlands. Finally^ after a bloody 

battle on January 8 in which the residents of Cuzco showed great 

bravery in defending their city^ the Indians v/ere forced to lift 

30 
the siege and withdraw. Aviles^ hov/ever,, due to a lack of fire- 
arms and the fear that the withdrawal was a trap^ chose not to 
pursue the Indians. Had the Spaniards taken the offensive at that 

point, the rebellion might have never reached the proportions that 

31 
it did.^' 

When nev/s of the Sangarara massacre reached Lima the viceroy 

dispatched an additional two hundred troops to Cuzco. The junta 

also agreed that a formal expedition should be sent to that city 

as rapidly as possible. Visitor General Areche offered himself 

as commander of this expedition but was overruled by Inspector 

General del Valle who claimed that as the ranking military officer 

in the kingdom the command belonged to him. The viceroy, who was 

unable to leave Lima due to the war against Great Britain, 

conferred all his powers upon the visitor. On December 20 del 

Valle left with another 200 militia, and shortly thereafter 

Areche, accompanied by a judge of the audiencia, Benito de la 

Mata Linares as his assessor, left at the head of another 400 troops, 



156 



These included fifty soldiers from the fijo battalion at Callaoj 
twenty six members of the Viceroy's Cavalry Guard^ forty two 
dragoon militia from the Regiment of Lima_, 200 militia of infantry 
from the Regiment of pardos libres^ and fifty men from the Regiment 

of morenos. The expedition also carried 3^000 rifles and six 

32 

cannon. 

The first reports submitted by the visitor and the inspector 
general of the military campaign offer considerable information 
about the situation^ especially the motives of the rebels as inferred 
by the Spaniards, and the success of the military preparations taken 
to combat these rebels. In describing the execution of the corre- 
gidor of Tinta, Areche expressed his contempt for the militia of 
that area wiio quietly accepted the fact that an Indian cacique 
was executing the corregidor under orders allegedly given him by 
the king. He described these soldiers as persons in a trance, 
oblivious to the fact that it was their ov/n territorial judge 
being hanged. The fact that the militia were in sympathy with 
the actions of the rebel leader, only hardened his opinion that the 
militia could not be counted upon in any situation where a conflict 
of interest presented itself. Areche went on to cite the example 
of Cabrera and Landa disobeying the orders of the junta de guerra 
as an example of the lack of discipline among these forces, and 
concluded that the Sangarara massacre had therefore been avoidable. 
He stated that the militia which had come to defend Cuzco were 
soldiers in name only and expressed hope that the reinforcements 
sent from Lima could reach the city before long since the present 



157 



troops could not be relied upon if an attack should occur. In ex- 
plaining his failure to obtain the command of the expedition, Areche 
analogized it to a similar situation faced by G^lvez in New Spain. 
He also belittled the militia of Lima as coviards, noting that only 
the commandant of the Regiment of Dragoons of Carabaillo had 
volunteered to accompany Inspector General del Valle to Cuzco. 

in his report. Inspector del Valle spoke of the lack of co- 
operation v/hich he had received from the corregidors of the provinces 
through v/hich he passed on his way to Cuzco, v/ho refused to supply 
him v/ith Indian bearers to carry the arms and munitions. As a 
result, his own troops had to carry them, v/hich delayed the expedi- 
tion considerably. He attributed the success of the Indian leader 
in gaining recruits to his promise that all v/ho died in his arm.y 
v/ould be reborn. He detailed the Indian tactic of keeping to the 
high ground v/here the Royalist troops v/ere at a disadvantage, and 
went on to complain that his defenses in Cuzco consisted of only 
three or four cannon and some catapults. He im.pl ied that the 
rebellion v/ould be over shortly, hov/ever, an opinion the visitor 
general also shared. 

Viceroy Jauregui v/as less optimistic than v/ere his battle- 
field comm.anders over the prospects of quickly defeating the 
rebels. In his initial report to the Ministry of the Indies 
Jauregui estimated the size of the Indian army at 20,000, and 
noted that not only Indians, but mestizos and even Spaniards had 
gathered under the rebel standard. He stated that the situation 



158 



in Cuzco %«as uT>certaln since the militia of that city did not 
inspire confidence and becajse their supply of ams t«as scarce. 
He told the crown that he had first sought to deal noderately with 
the rebels in the hope that such a response would bring theai to 
their senses and convince then, to capitulate. But since then, the 
growing s-pport for the rebellion had caused him to reject this 
tactic. He cited the exarple of the Indians' cutting the rope 
bridges which connected Cjzco with other parts of the viceroyalty 
as one ti^ich hardened his decision to put down the revolt by 
stronger neans if necessary. Mevertheless, the viceroy %<as an 
advocate of the noderate approach throughout the caofvaign, and in 
an effort to cut off popular support for the rebel, he ordered the 
abolition of the repart iniiento without first waiting for royal ap- 
proval for such a reasure. Such actions, conbined with his later 
pardon of certain Indian leaders, were to later lead to his ouster. 
It Was this moderate approach, conibined with the question of 
the role the militia was to play in the conflict, »<hich set the 
visitor and the viceroy on a collision course sinilar to the one 
ttfhich had existed between Areche and Guirior. The issue of whether 
the militia should be called onto active duty to conbat the Indian 
rebels brought up the question of the usefulness of this coaponent 
of the army. The solution which emerged pointed up the fact that 
although an order might be made by the viceroy, it could not be 
inpleniented without the consent of the visitor. Such a humiliating 



159 



defeat on the issue v/as to diminish the prestige of the viceroy 
which was already on the decline. Since later events called into 
question the loyalty of the militia still further, the position 
of the visitor in the affair seemed to have been vindicated. 

Viceroy Jauregui received numerous petitions from the various 
corregidors fearful of their provinces being invaded by the Indian 
rebels seeking permission to pay the militia and place them in 
barracks for the defense of the province. After conferring with 
the junta de guerra, the viceroy passed a circular order author- 
izing the corregidors to place up to tv;o companies on active duty 
for a two-month period, during which time they were to receive 
instruction and training in the handling of arms. In this way he 

hoped the provincial militia companies would be ready to serve if 

u ,j • 38 

an emergency should arise. 

The idea for such a plan had originally been proposed by the 
visitor general himself in a series of letters sent to the vice- 
roy from lea on January 3, 1781. In the letters Areche commented 
upon the weak state in which he observed the militia during his 
journey to Cuzco the previous year. He therefore proposed that 
two companies of militia be barracked in each provincial capital 
for its protection. After a company had served on active duty, 
Areche felt that it would be qualified to serve as a training cadre 
for the other untrained companies in the province. He also felt 
that by deferring militiamen from the payment of tribute and sales 
taxes, and making them eligible for military pensions would Inspire 



160 



loyalty to the crown and offset the appeal of the rebel cause. He 
cited Cuzco, where the entire three militia regiments did not total 
over 300 men, and where officers commanded imaginary companies, as 
a prime example of the need for reform in this component of the 
army. As a concrete proposal, he recommended that the regiments of 
Canete and Chincha be joined to those of Cuzco to bring the latter 
to strength. The cost of raising these militia in the provincial 
capitals could be controlled, Areche asserted, by adjusting their 
pay schedules according to the location of the province. Areas 
such as Cuzco, Arequipa, and Guamanga, he maintained, v/ere 
strategically more important than other parts of the viceroyalty. 
Here, Areche felt, it v;ould be wise not only to increase the size 
of their garrisons, but to increase them with "troops of a dif- 
ferent kind" v/hich he did not identify other than to say that 
they should be sent on field maneuvers with the fijo troops each 
year in order to sharpen their skills in the art of tactical war- 
fare. Finally, the visitor voiced his criticism of the militia 
officers whom he observed in Peru. He recommended that the crown 
cease enlisting landowners, who sought only to use and profane 
the uniform for their own purposes, and instead seek out "the 

useful man" without regard to his social class or rank in 

39 
society. In this appeal the visitor was supported by Colonel 

^0 
Aviles v/ho was a partisan of his. 

The viceroy responded to the visitor on January 12, disclaim- 
ing Areche's contention that he had first had the idea to call the 



161 



militia onto active dtity in the provincial capitals. Actually, 
the viceroy stated, he had first expressed the idea in a letter 
dated January h which he had sent to the visitor. Leaving this 
aside, Jauregui asked the visitor to review the militia of Cuzco, 
and authorized him to bring to strength any unit which was deficient, 
utilizing the best men he could find, regardless of social position. 
He also stated that any vacant ranks in the officer corps, or ones 

held by inappropriate persons, were to be reclaimed by the inspector 

'tl 
general and conferred upon subjects of known ability. 

When the visitor became aware of the fact that the viceroy had 

appropriated his plan to raise the provincial militia and had ordered 

it implemented without conferring with him beforehand, he was 

determined to abort the order by utilizing his power as super- 

intendent of the royal treasury. On January 23 he wrote to the 

corregidor of Guamanga, stating that he considered the order to 

raise two companies of militia in that province inappropriate since 

there was no immediate danger of an Indian attack. In a similar 

vein, he v/rote to the corregidor of Huanta and ordered the plan 

suspended there since there were no sufficient training cadres 

available to train the militia which had been the vyhole purpose 

^3 

of calling them onto active duty. In a letter to Inspector 

General del Valle Areche stated that he felt that raising these 
companies would serve only to increase the powers of the corregidors 
who would employ them to further their ov;n corrupt ends. Since 
del Valle held a similarly low opinion of the corregidors, he was 



162 



reluctant to take any action that would enhance their powers, 

and supported the visitor's bid to abort the order. -^ 

Having done this, the visitor general attempted to explain 

his position on the matter to the viceroy. He asserted that 

Jauregui had misunderstood his earlier letter proposing that the 

militia be called onto active duty in the provinces. This 

proposal, he asserted, was not intended to be applied throughout 

the viceroyalty, but only in those areas which v/ere facing the 

immediate threat of an attack. Secondly, he held that he had 

only offered the idea for the viceroy's consideration, and had 

never advocated that it be put into effect. He then set out a 

series of reasons why such a plan was unv/ise. In the first place, 

he noted that since the corregidors were nothing more than merchants, 

or perhaps judges, it stood to reason that they would not permit 

anyone not of their own choosing into the companies, and v/ould 

probably restrict membership to their supporters and employees, 

whose loyalty they trusted. As a result, he held that 

. , . these tv^o companies placed under arms in a situation 
In v/hich they had jurisdiction would be as useless as are all 
the Militia of the Kingdom, and they v.'ould serve only to 
strengthen the interests of their respective Commandants, v/ho 
doubtlessly would be their own justices. The officer and 
[enlisted ranks] . . . would be sold to persons of the same 
persuasion, doubtlessly with little more military experience 
than the soldier. 

The visitor general also felt that since the order left pay 

scales to the discretion of the senior officer in the province, 

an excessive number of persons would be enlisted and that this 



163 



would be difficult to verify in the more distant regions. He 
estimated that the minimum expense of raising two companies in 
each province v/ould cost the royal treasury 2^206,600 pesos per 
year^ and one the viceroyalty could ill afford. As an alternative, 
Areche advocated that "flying squads" of mounted militia be raised 
like those in Nev; Spain, since they were more useful than infantry 
troops, were less costly to maintain, and could defend the provinces 
more competently. 

Areche v/arned Jauregui that as a result of this circular 
order, corregidors v;ere fabricating mythical invasions in their 
letters in order to be allov-jed to raise militia. He concluded 
that they did so because "they wish to have an armed force in 
their territory in order to better enforce their advantages over 
those of the King, and the public." To combat such a situation, 
the visitor concluded, it was necessary to distribute the fijo 
troops of Lima throughout the kingdom rather than situating them 
solely on the coast. He stated that the militiaman in the 
provinces who was not provided with any degree of training or 
made to live in a barracks, "always v/i 1 1 be a man of little 
utility." Although Areche conceded that it was impossible for 
the crown to afford to maintain a large standing army in Peru, 
he felt that a medium-sized force, distributed in strategic parts 
of the viceroyalty, would be the best assurance of security for 
the kingdom. 



]ek 



In his reply to the visitor. Viceroy Jauregui maintained that, 
notwithstanding his opposition to the scheme, Areche should sup- 
port its implementation, since fatal consequences could stem from 
failing to take the necessary precautions in these areas. He 
went on to assert his belief that the corregidors would remain 
loyal to the crown, and that even if their ends were "toxic" and 
their intentions "far from the motives they profess" that this 
conscience would not allow him to refuse their pleas for help or 
let them suffer the same fate that befell the corregidor of Tinta. 
Jauregui then chided the visitor for having suggested the plan 
initially and later rejecting it. He stated that he had sent 
copies of Areche 's letter to the king as proof of his support for 
the plan lest he should try to deny it at some future date. With 
this bit of blackmail concluded, Jauregui informed Areche that he 
had warned tfie corregidors that the order was to be executed and 
that full reports of its compliance were to be forwarded to him. 
He also claimed that he had arranged v;ith the inspector general to 
have veteran training cadres sent out from Lima to the provinces. 
In a biting conclusion, Jauregui left no doubt that he, and not 
Areche, v;as the true ruler of Peru, nothing that "although in the 
future it may be decided to improve [the order] according to the 
reflections of Your Servant which are equal to mine, 1 consider 
it necessary that it be executed , . ." 

The follov/Ing month Areche replied to Jauregui 's letter, 
stating that he would support the scheme "at least as long as 



165 



the disturbances last," although he held that he did so against 
his better judgment. He cited the examples of Cuzco and Parina- 
cochas where the militia had already exhausted the revenues 
from the tobacco monopoly and other funds traditionally used to 
pay them, and predicted that the order would cause an even 
greater strain upon thf Royal Treasury. In a curious bit of 
insight, the visitor stated that the essential difference between 
him and the viceroy lay in their differing conceptions of the 
nature of a man before he v/as transformed into a soldier. Areche 
implied that Jauregui was an idealist, but held that the inhabitants 
of Cuzco fell far short of this ideal. He said that if only the 
viceroy could see these "fantastic ones" who straggled into Cuzco 
with their corregidors he v;ould have a better idea of the material 
which the militia officers had to work with. 

Areche maintained that all the militia, from the senior of- 
ficers on down, viere inexpert in all aspects of service at arms. 
He explained that v/hen he had spoken of raising soldiers in the 
provinces he had been referring to fijo troops and not to the 
militia. He cited the example of the militia of Parinacochas as 
illustrative of the lack of fidelity on the part of these soldiers. 
There the corregidor had convened the tributaries in order to 
establish new tax rolls and had reportedly found a general eager- 
ness on the part of these groups to also mobilize the militia. 
The corregidor inferred, since no invasion v/as imminent, that these 



166 



tributaries sought only to turn their arms against the king to 
avoid payment of these taxes, and as a result he ordered the 
suspension of the formation of these companies. Areche concluded 
that this example demonstrated to him that it was risky to mobilize 
the militia in certain regions unless the majority of the inhabitants 
were mestizos v;ho were excluded from the payment of tribute. An 
area such as Cuzco_, Areche concluded, was particularly inappropriate 
for forming additional militia companies, since most of its citizens 
were either laborers or muleteers and did not possess a sufficient 
number of horses to form "flying companies." Those who were not 
members of these occupations, Areche said, were all employees or 
dependents of the corregidors, and their becoming soldiers, Areche 
maintained, would cause more extorsions in the provinces than the 
Indian rebels themselves. He also neatly refuted the viceroy's 
claim to have conferred with the inspector about sending veteran 
troops out from Cuzco as training cadres. Areche stated that he 

had spoken with the inspector about this point and the latter had 

k8 
informed him that he could spare no soldiers for this task. 

At the same time the visitor wrote to the crown to try and 

overturn the order. As an alternative, Areche proposed that the 

crown send out fijo troops to the provincial capitals to 

periodically train and review the militia of these areas. In 

order to stem the abuse which arose from the corregidors being 

able to grant commissions in the militia, Areche proposed that the 

royal officials In these capitals be given the pov.-er to annually 



167 



review militia appointments to determine their suitability. Since 
the viceroyalty was short of fijo troops to perform training functions, 
Areche suggested that landowners, especially those on the coast, be 
granted regular commissions. This would, he calculated, double or 
triple the number of fijo troops In the viceroyalty, and provide 
sufficient officers to be dispersed throughout the kingdom to train 
the militia. In this way the visitor felt the crown could remove 
from the corregidors and governors the power of granting commissions 
which they abused, and grant It Instead to a mature group of men 
whose fidelity to the king was unquestionable. 

The visitor probably did not expect the king to take any 
action to remand the viceroy's order to raise the militia In the 
provinces, nor did he need for him to do so. instead, he notified 
his subordinate Jose Ramos to inform the corregidors not to obey 
such an order. Ramos wrote specifically to the corregidors of 
Chancay, Arequipa^ and Moquequa, notifying them not to raise any 
militia unless the province was under a direct threat of invasion 
by the Indians. Areche also left the decision on payment of these 
militia up to the royal officials of the province as was his pre- 
rogative as Superintendent of the Royal Treasury. Thus he bypassed 
the corregidor and made enforcement of the order an Impossibility, 
because the officials would not authorize payment, and the militia 
would not serve v/Ithout it. Since It now v;as practically impossible 
to implement the order, Jauregui chose to wlthdra\-j it. Undoubtedly 
this action caused the viceroy no small loss of prestige and 
demonstrated to him that he could only rule the viceroyalty with 



168 



the advice and consent of the visitor. By this time the viceroy 
had also fallen into disfavor at court for his refusal to use 

the full weight of the army to put down the rebellions, and the 

51 

crown v/as beginning to consider replacing him, in the margin 

of a letter sent by Jauregui to the Ministry of the Indies the 
king's representative noted that the king was so dissatisfied with 
the conduct of the viceroy that he refused to dignify his constant 

CO 

petitions v/ith an an5V>/er.-' 

The central issue which divided the viceroy and the visitor 
concerning the utility of the militia was that of their loyalty. 
This was not such an issue on the coast, because there was a higher 
proportion of wliltes serving In the companies to counterbalance 
the large numbers of Negroes, and because garrisons of fijo troops 
were available to avert disorder. It was of some gravity in the 
interior regions, however, where at times the militia could be 
utilized by either the corregidors or other influential citizens 
to pursue their own ends which frequently were In opposition to 
the interests of the crown. The case of Oruro pointed up this 
danger and lent further credence to the growing belief that the 
militia in the interior of Peru was a positive threat to internal 

security. 

In Oruro, a mining town south of La Paz, the position of 
alcalde mayor, or municipal justice, had been the personal possession 
of the Rodriguez family for eighteen years. The Rodriguez were 
a v/ealthy creole mining family of considerable Importance in the 



169 



town and felt the office to be their personal possession. The 
annoyance of the Peninsular Spaniards at being excluded from 
holding this position was well known^ and frequently they had 
accused the Rodriguez of seeking to make the post hereditary. 
Thus, when the incumbent died in office and an election was 
scheduled in I78I, no less than three Peninsulars filed for the 
position, vyhich was to be filled by a vote of the cabildo. Feel- 
ings ran high in the tov/n preceding the election, and members of 
the cabildo reported receiving death threats if they should dare 
to elect one of the hated Peninsulars to the position. 

The militia in Oruro had been raised somev;hat earlier by the 
corregidor, a Spaniard by the name of Ram&n de Urrutia, in response 
to the violence which had taken place in the province of Tinta. 
While these 3OO militia had ostensibly been raised and quartered 
to defend the town In the event of an Indian attack, actually they 
were on duty as much to Insure that the Creoles and other towns- 
people remained loyal to the crov/n as to protect the city against 
raids. These militia companies were wracked with internal dis- 
sent Ion, hov;ever, due to the fact that the Creoles In them received 
three reales pay per day, v/hile the mixed bloods received none. 
Most serious of all was the rumor which spread among the companies 
that the Spaniards Intended to kill the creoles when the opportunity 
arose. As the rumor went, these executions were to take place on 
February 9. As tension rose in the companies the night of February 
8, a Creole militiaman panicked, and in the company of his friends. 



170 



fled the .barracks . With this outburst, the militia officers saw 
the chance to utilize this dissention to influence the upcoming 
election. Lieutenant Nicholas de Herrera, a former convicted 
thief, assembled his men with those employed by Jacinto Rodriguez, 
a member of the mineowning family and the creole candidate for 
alcalde mayor. Rodriguez, with Herrera's assent, told the militia 
that since the corregidor Urrutia intended to kill them that they 
should no longer obey him. 

The following day corregidor Urrutia assembled the militia 
in the plaza mayor in an effort to demonstrate the falsity of the 
rumor. He spoke at some length on the subject and then asked the 
soldiers to return quietly to their barracks. When this appeal 
failed, he threatened to discipline them unless they obeyed him. 
Nevertheless, the militiamen refused to leave the plaza. Instead 
they remained in groups discussing the successes of Tupac Amaru 
and the evils of Spanish government in Oruro. As night began to 
fall, an estimated 200 creole militiamen climbed a hill outside 
of town and began to sound horns and other instruments in an 
effort to bring the Indians from tfie mines into town. The corre- 
gidor dispatched a force of forty Peninsulars and loyal castes to 
stop this activity, but they were unable to do so, and in fact 
several defected to the side of the Creoles. 

Somev;hat later a rock-throwing crowd gathered in front of 
the house of Jos6 Endeiza, a Spanish nierchant from Buenos Aires, 
where it was rumored tliat the Spanish residents of Oruro had hidden 



171 



350,000 pesos. Soon the creole militiamen stormed and ransacked 
the house in search of the money. During the struggle Endeiza 
and the other inhabitants of the house fired some 200 shots in 
its defense before being overv;he1med and killed. The invaders 
got away v/ith an estimated 200_, 000 pesos. With this anarchy 
spreading, corregidor Urrutia and many Spaniards fled to Cocha- 
bamba for help. In his absence the cabildo proclaimed Jacinto 
Rodriguez as alcalde mayor. 

With the arrival in Oruro of the Indians from the mines, the 
complexion of the struggle changed. Many of them became drunk and 
surly, turning against their Creole sympathizers and insulting them. 
The city turned into a battleground. Each day the Indians killed 
more Spaniards and robberies reached the estimated sum of tv;o 
million pesos. The Creoles recognized the fact that the situation 
v/as getting out of hand, and tried to induce the Indians to return 
to the mines by paying them the sum of one peso apiece out of the 
royal treasury. This was not entirely successful, however, and 
the Creoles laid aside their struggle with the remaining Spaniards 
in Oruro against this common threat to their hegemony. On March 
19 alcalde Rodriguez pardoned all the Europeans in Oruro and 
exhorted them to unite with the Creoles to prevent the Indians 
from destroying the city. He was able to take control of the 
militia and with their help gradually the Indians 'were forced out 
of Oruro. Similar situations in both Potos' and Cochabamba were 
averted by the strong leadership of the local governors. 



172 



Revolts of the militia in areas such as Oruro were illustra- 
tive of the discontent vj'ith Peninsular rule which had manifested 
itself in the revolt of Tupac Amaru. What distinguished the Oruro 
rebellion from the Indian revolts was the fact that it was led by 
the Creoles and mixed bloods, who actively appealed to the Indians 
to help sustain their position. As such it clearly demonstrated 
the assertion of the visitor general that militia under arms, 
especially in the more remote regions where mixed bloods and Indians 
predominated, could pose a distinct threat to Spanish government in 
Amer I ca. 

The Oruro incident was not a singular case of this discontent. 
On April 30, I78I, JosI de VertTz, the Viceroy of the La Plata wrote 
to the Ministry of the Indies to inform It that the militia under 
his control v/ere also dissatisfied vvith European control and were 
ready to emulate the example of the Indians of Peru if the op- 
portunity should present itself. He stated that he feared they 
would not remain faithful if the British staged an invasion of 
Buenos Aires. The rumor of an English invasion of the La Plata 
region in support of the Indian rebels had been gaining credence 
in Spain early in the year. On February 17 the crown had warned 
the Viceroy of Peru that Great Britain was preparing an expedition 
of 2,000 soldiers to invade Buenos Aires intended to supply the 
Indians with 15,000 v/eapons. 

The combination of the Indian rebellions and the threat of 
an English invasion added to the factor of militia disloyalty 
prompted the viceroy to seek additions to the fijo battalion. 



173 



In February of I78I Jauregul wrote to the Ministry of the Indies 
seeking to bring the fijo battalion to strength, citing the 
depletions in its ranks due to the necessity of sending troops 
to Cuzco and Arequipa to combat rebellions in those cities. As 
a temporary measure, Jauregui had accepted the offer made earlier 
by the consulado to Viceroy Guirior to raise and pay for 1,000 
soldiers for the duration of the v;ar. He therefore ordered two 
companies of militia from the Regiment of Spanish Infantry, a 
company of pardos libres, and one of morenos libres to be called 
onto active duty and to be quartered in the former Colegio San 
Felipe, a Jesuit school located in the Plaza Santa Catalina, These 
120 troops remained on active duty until the war ended in April of 
1782. Since the threat of an English invasion did not materialize 
the remainder of the soldiers promised by the consulado v;ere 
never act 1 vated. 

Viceroy Jauregui also sought to improve the status of the 
militia in Lima during the war. Although the del Valle plan had 
never been implemented due to a lack of funding, Jauregui main- 
tained that he had done everything within his means to better this 
component of the army. The Regiment of Spanish Infantry had been 
reduced from its former size of 1,3^7 men to a battalion numbering 
98^, slightly over half the size recommended by the inspector 
general. The two mestizo companies "En Memoria del Rey" had 
increased in size from a recommended 1 80 men to 238. The Regiment 
of pardos libres had been placed at a strength in accordance with 



17^ 



the Cuban militia regulation of 1,600 men, although its strength 
was reduced to 1,133 due to the absence of several companies in 
Cuzco. The Battalion of morenos llbres, which del Valle had recom- 
mended raised in strength to 800 men was similarly understrengtti 
at ^02 due to the demands of the Indian rebellions. The total 
number of provincial infantry militia was 1,151, each having its 
own training cadre and a regular program of instruction. The 
Regiment of Dragoons had been elevated in size to 620 men in ac- 
cordance with the Cuban Regulation. in addition, a second dragoon 
regiment with an equal number of men had been raised in the 
provinces surrounding Lima as the inspector general had recommended. 
A squadron of pardos libres with 2^+0 soldiers, and one of morenos 
with sixty vjere also trained and placed on the footing of provincials 
The total number of provincial militia of cavalry stood at l,5'+0 
troops by I78U. The reduction in size was in line with the 
overall emphasis placed upon economy during the period of the 
visitation, and reflects the financial strain imposed by the Indian 
revolts. Reorganization of the militia v;as apparently carried on 
in the provinces as well. Jauregui singled out the provinces of 
Piura, lea, Arica, Chincha, Pisco and Trujillo as areas where he 
had disbanded several regiments, noting that he had abolished 
certain of these and had reduced the size of others "which served 

no other purpose than to increase the number of officeis, creating 

58 
an abuse of notable prejudice." 

In July of 1782 the petition of the viceroy to increase the 
size of the fijo infantry battalion at Callao was approved. The 



175 



battalion, which by that year v/as depleted to 612 men, was increased 
to a strength of 891, exclusive of the 100 soldiers which were 
detached in Arequipa, and reorganized into tv;o battalions. By 
October the Regiment of Royal Infantry had been completely reformed. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the increase in size of this 
unit was the fact that the additional soldiers were drav;n from 
members of "the principal families of Lima," who, the viceroy felt, 
deserved to be recognized not only for their own merits but those 
of their forefathers. Jauregui also appointed Captain Jacinto 
Iriarte to head the school of mathematics which had been begun 
earlier by Viceroy Amat and v/hich now was composed of a class of 
twenty-six cadets. It v;as at this point that the fijo battalion 
became a creole stronghold, giving these young men an alternative 
source of employment to the militia v;hich had fallen into a 
certain disrepute due to the Indian rebellions. 

Jauregui also related the fact that fijo training cadres had 
been dispatched to Arica, Chiloe, and Chile and that progress in 
training the militia of these regions had been made. However the 
crown's unwillingness to pay these instructors led the viceroy to 
express his doubt that the training program would ever be fully 

implemented and the reports of these instructors who deserted 

60 
while en route to their destinations seemed to bear this out. The 

emphasis on reducing defense expenditures also led the viceroy to 

abolish the post of commandant of cavalry and close the artillery 

factory at Bellavista. Although the viceroy did increase the size 



176 



of the ffjo artillery battalion by two companies to replace the 
training cadres which had been dispatched throughout the vice- 
royalty, and undertook some additional fortifications, a sug- 
gestion that Lima be fortified was abandoned on the basis of 
expense, 

Jauregui's failure to energetically prosecute the war against 
the Indians had brought him into some disrepute with the senior 
military men in the vlceroyalty v/ho tended to side v/Ith the visitor 
on matters concerning this branch of government. One of them, 
Colonel Demetrio Egan, who had remained in Lima to oversee the 
defense of that city during the v/ar, reported to the Minister of 
the Indies that the declaration of war against Great Britain 
constituted the most serious threat the vlceroyalty had ever faced, 
since he felt the lower classes In Peru v;ould support a general 
uprising in favor of the invaders should an attack ever be made. 
Viceroy Jauregul, he confided, was not an aggressive enough leader 
for Peru in such troubled times. Egan, a veteran officer, chal- 
lenged the viceroy's reliance upon the militia to put down such 
a disorder if it should occur. He stated that 

The militia of this kingdom cannot be counted upon for 
Defense. Their stability is fraudulently stated to the King 
[and] has been nothing more than a means by which past Govern- 
ment emptied abundant wealth In the sending of officers, with 
counterfeit papers and without one soldier In many of the 
register ships, to deceive the Sovereign and Ministers and to 
further their pretensions. 

Egan laid the blame for the Tupac Amaru revolt not on the 

alleged abuses of the visitation, which, he noted, "some would 



177 



like to believe." Instead, he asserted that it v/as the work of 
the Creoles of Lima and Cuzco, whom, he felt, sought to emulate 
the example of the English colonists of North America, but who 
lacked the proper spirit to themselves carry out such a scheme. 
In this Egan inferred that the Creoles had persuaded the Indians 
to fight their rebellion for them. He went on to also place the 
blame for the rebellion upon the Jauregui admi nistratbn, whose 
indifference allowed these Creoles to speak out freely against 
the policies of the king, even to the point of boldly venturing 
that Peru should have a "crowned head." For the above reasons, 
Egan v;as contemptuous of the creole militia of Lima, and asserted 
that the only brave and manly militiamen in the viceroyalty were 
the Negroes and mulattos of that city. Yet even these had limited 
value to the crown, he v/ent on, since all of them were "godchildren, 
dependents, and employees of the major part of the most Renowned 
people . . . [Who] make an esteemed point of protecting them . . . 
and as a result it will be easy to seduce them." The solution to 
such a problem, according to Egan, v^as for the crown to send 5^000 
veteran troops to Peru to offset the strength of the militia. 
These veteran troops he felt should be situated throughout the 
kingdom to hold down any demonstrations which might occur in 
support of the English. He warned that unless such measures were 
taken, Spain's enemies v;ould make use of this dissatisfaction 
among the people and capture the kingdom, 

Egon asserted that the arrival of Areche In 1777 gave the 
Creole leaders of the rebellion a pretense to act, whic'i they 



178 



did through the rebel Tupac Amaru. He cited the fact that the 

Indians did not immediately attack Cuzco or seek to control the 

bridge over the Apurimac River which allowed communications to 

continue betv/een Lima and Cuzco, as proof that the Creoles had 

masterminded the plot, since failure to do this indicated that 

the Indians desired to allow the Creoles of Lima and Cuzco to 

remain in contact with each other in order to plan future strategy. 

Egan reiterated that Viceroy Jauregui was not the man to cope with 

such a situation since he was as much a captive of these Creoles as 

his predecessor had been. 

His v/ill is equal to his courage, and v/ithout it being my 
nature to disparage it, it is not sufficiently energetic for 
the demands of the present circumstances. Today an active, 
efficient, military Leader, more feared than loved, is required, 
since the character of these people is more influenced by fear, 
which to them constitutes respect, than by temerity, in order 
to provoke in them veneration, love and blind obedience towards 
the King. The clientele of the present Viceroy are all managed 
and dominated by those v;ho were the Directors of the past Govern- 
ment, and consequently they are opposed to the ideas of His 
Majesty and to his Service. If the King does not send a 
Military Leader here . . . who is equal in zeal, sagacity, 
justice, and civility to the Visitor, and if they are not 
closely united, nothing will ever improve, neither will the 
disorders and evils of the Kingdom ever be remedied. For 
security the [veteran] troops have to be first, and v;ith them 
everything will succeed, and the King will be able to depend 
on these dominions. Today this is problematical if enemies 
appear because I suspect we are betrayed. 

Egan v^ent on to criticize the ineffective measures v/hich the 

viceroy had taken since the declaration of vyar. He criticized the 

sending of training cadres to the provinces and the order calling 

up the militia, citing the soldiers of Lima as an example. There, 

he noted, the men had been placed in the barracks for fifteen days 

and they had not yet been given instruction in the handling and 



179 



firing of weapons. Thus^ Egan asserted 

. . . it will follow that they will not know how to fire, nor 
to discharge a second round, and they will shoot without good 
aim and consequently we will be forcibly defeated with a 
lesser number [of soldiers]. Add to this. Your Excellency, 
the effeminate character of the Creoles that we can hope to 
have ... to the suspicion that we have of their lack of 
loyalty. 

He closed this diatribe by stating that the Creoles were driven by 
the twin desires to further their own interests and to obtain liberty 
of conscience for themselves. These ambitions, Egan stated, could 
only be destroyed by sending veteran troops to Peru and by appoint- 
ing "a Governor of circumstance." Egan boldly proposed that the 
crown appoint Visitor General Jos^ Antonio de Areche to the position. 

The issue of leadership in the campaign against Tupac Amaru 
had been initially tested in the order of the viceroy to raise a 
provincial militia v.'hich had been defeated by the visitor general. 
It continued over the advisability of granting a general pardon to 
the rebels, which the inspector general and the viceroy favored, but 
which Visitor General Areche staunchly opposed. Although such a 
general pardon was issued by Jauregui on December 12, it had little 
effect due to the actions taken subsequently by the visitor to 
defeat it. On March 12 Areche had written to Tupac Amaru, refusing 
to discuss any of the issues which the Indian leader had sought to 
resolve in an earlier correspondence. Instead, Areche threatened 
Tupac Amaru in the most brutal terms that if he refused to surrender 
himself to the royal authorities, he and his followers v;ould be 
destroyed to the last man. This action sickened Inspector General 
del Valle, who later wrote tfiat it was this rejoinder which ended 



180 



any chance of reconciliation, and changed the struggle into a war 
to the death. 

in a letter to G^lvez, Areche attempted to justify his actions 
He noted that in Peru the Indian had always been treated too leni- 
ently. In an interesting dictum he noted 

New Spain and Peru are poles apart: There everything is 
easy, here extremely difficult: There the vassal does not 
know to oppose that which he is ordered to do, here he knows 
nothing but disobedience. There everything or almost every- 
thing, as Your Excellency knows, has a method-simple, clear, 
and natural: Here there Is no matter that is not full of 
inconsistencies; in short, there nothing is mistaken, here 
all is diverse. There inappropriate legislation is never- 
theless observed and for the most part corrected; here it is 
disregarded to an extreme. 

Such a statement reflected the frustrations v/hich Areche v^as ex- 
periencing in attempting to fulfill the visitation and to end the 
rebellions which threatened Its success. It was the opinion of 
the visitor that in order to defeat the rebels it would first be 
necessary to reduce the powers of the caciques who had been so 
influential in securing recruits for the Indian army. To do this, 
Areche suggested that the corregidors take over the collection of 
the Indian tributes themselves as had been done earlier in New 
Spain. Such an action, Areche maintained, v;ould reduce the cacique 

to the status of an Indian with an entailed inheritance but without 

68 
political power. Such a response was indicative of the visitor's 

mentality. Never did he consider that it might be necessary to 

modify these tributes to end the disorders. This inability to see 

the true causes of the Indian rebellions and to cure them was the 

reason for the persistence of the rebellions long after the death 

of Tupac Amaru himself. 



181 



What eventually led to the defeat of Tupac Amaru v;as his 
failure to take the offensive which was taken away from him by the 
Royalist forces of Areche and del Valle which had arrived in Cuzco 
in the early part of I78I. Following the arrival of Avil^s^ Tupac 
Amaru had withdrawn with his army of 60^000 men to Tinta to prepare 
for an assault on Cuzco later that spring. On February 23 del Valle 

arrived in the city and began to prepare for a spring offensive of 

69 
his own, designed to capture the Indian leader. 

The strategy of the Royalist forces was to attack the Indians 
from all sides. In February, Viceroy Vert'z of Buenos Aires had 
commissioned a force of veteran troops under the command of Jos^ 
Resegufn to march v;est of Cuzco and to prevent the rebellion from 
penetrating further into the La Plata region. Orders were also 
sent out from Lima to the military commanders in Arequipa, Moquequa, 
and Tarma to raise expeditions and begin a march overland to Tinta 
where the rebels v;ere taking refuge. At the same time Inspector 
del Valle planned the formation of an expedition composed of five 
separate columns v/hich would march from Cuzco in an effort to sur- 
round Tinta and prevent the escape of the rebels. 

The decision to take the offensive and pursue the Indian army 
represented a significant stage in the war between the races. In a 
report to the Ministry of the Indies del Valle noted that the rebel 
leader would never consent to fight a major encounter in open 
territory since his army vvas badly organized and lacked firepov/er 
in comparison v;ith the Royalist forces. Instead, Tupac Amaru sought 



182 



to keep his army in control of the mountain regions where his troops, 
because of their familiarity with the terrain, held a decided ad- 
vantage. Del Valle felt that his forces could not pursue the 
Indians into these regions because they were not equipped to fight 
in this type of terrain, and that only faithful Indians could dis- 
lodge them from these mountains, "which the rebels traversed as if 
they were plains." The fact that Tupac Amaru controlled all but 
sixteen of the caciques in PerU;, and held all of the provinces which 
bordered on the Andean passes into the La Plata region, meant that 
he must be captured in Tinta before he could be allov-/ed to escape 
into the highlands and regroup. 

Del Valle's expressed strategy to prevent this occurrence 
was to divide his 15,000 man army into five columns, each of which 
v;ould follov; a different route towards Tupac Amaru's headquarters 
in Tinta, with a rear guard following behind to aid any column 
which encountered unexpected resistance on the march. He described 

the maneuver as "forming a type of noose which would tighten as it 

72 

approached the rebel refuge." On March 9 del Valle set out at 

the head of the expedition which totalled 15,210 troops (see Table 
5). An additional detachment of 1,8^6 men was dispatched to Galea, 
Q,uispicanchi, and Urubamba to seal off the passes in the mountains 
to prevent the escape of the rebel. A rearguard of 1,000 soldiers, 

composed of the militia of Cuzco plus some fijo troops from Lima 

73 
remained in Cuzco to protect the city from attack.''^ 



183 



TABLE 5 

EXPEDITION SENT FROM CUZCO AGAINST 
TUPAC AMARU, MARCH I78I 



Commander rn Chief: Field Marshal Jos^ del Valle 
Major General: Captain Francisco Cuellar 

First Column 

Commandant: Sergeant Major of Cavalry Joaquin de ValcSrcel 
Second: Colonel of Militia Marquis de Rocafuerte 

Dragoons of Cotabambas 100 

Dragoons of Calca 60 

Dragoons of Urubamba 100 

Dragoons of Abancay 25 

Dragoons of Andahuaylas 25 

Indians of Tambo and Calca 2000 

2310 

Second Column 

Commandant: Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Campero 
Second: Lieutenant of Infantry Jos^ Varela 

Light Caval ry 

Cavalry of Cuzco 

Cavalry of Quispicanchi 

Cavalry of Andahuaylas 

Infantry of Lima 

Indians of Maras, Chincheros 



Third Column 

Commandant: Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Villalta 
Second: Colonel of Militia Matias Baulen 

Infantry of Lima 100 

Infantry of Andahuaylas 300 

Infantry of Abancay 200 

Company of Cacique Rosas 200 

Company of Lebu 100 

Indians of Tinta, Altos 2000 

2900' 



]8k 



TABLE 5 (cont.) 



Fourth Column 

Commandant: Corregldor of Paruro Manuel Rutz de Cast ilia 
Second: Colonel of Militia Isidro Guisasola 

Infantry of Cuzco 100 

Spaniards and Indians 2900 

3000 

Fifth Column 

Commandant: Colonel of Infantry Domingo Marnara 

Second: Corregidor of Cotabambas Jose Acuna 

Third: Corregidor of Chumbivilcas Francisco Laysequilla 

Veteran Infantry 100 

Spaniards and Indians 2900 

3000 

Sixth Column 

Commandant: Colonel Jos^ Cavero 

Second: the Justicia Mayor of Paurcartambo Francisco Zeleira 

Spaniards and Indians 550 

Reserves 

Commandant: Colonel of Dragoons Gabriel de Avills 
Second: Captain of the Army Jos^ Le&n 
Third: Colonel of Militia Gabriel de Ugarte 

Veteran Infantry of Lima 300 

Infantry of Guamanga 200 

500 

Grand Total 15,210 



Source: AGI :Audiencia de Lima 10^^. Report from del Valle to 
Galvez^ Cuzco, March 1, 1781, pp. 9-12, While author- 
ities differ as to the size of this army, they agree 
that at least 14,000 of the troops were loyal Indians. 
(Fisher, p. 212.) 



185 



Nevertheless, the march from Cuzco to Tinta demonstrated the 
inability of the Spanish government to provision an army in the 
field. Such a handicap was to cause widespread desertion within 
the ranks v/hich was ultimately to weaken the endeavor. The march 
was made in the middle of winter, and often the soldiers travelled 
in a blinding snowstorm which piled snow up to their knees. After 
a month of travel, del Valle stated that "our troops handle them- 
selves with the greatest bravery, and the Pardos and Negroes of 
Lima have made a joke of the snow . . ." The lack of provisions 
was to become a more serious matter. In his report to the vice- 
roy, del Valle noted that he had been forced at one point to turn 
his own supply of meat and biscuit over to his troops, whose 
provisions were exhausted. He v/ent on to say that since the rebels 
had occupied the territory earlier that attempts to purchase cattle 
from the neighboring farms was most difficult, and that by March 12 
Colonel Avil^s had only been able to secure seven head of cattle 
for his 2,760 soldiers. This was not the only limitation, del Valle 
related. In one instance, he noted that only fifteen tents and 
6,000 pesos had been provided for a detachment of 3,000 men. 
Medicines and doctors were practically nonexistent. He mentioned 
that there were only two surgeons for the entire army and that 
they had only brandy and iron oxide with v^hich to treat the soldiers, 
Del Valle explained the lack of discipline in the ranks by the fact 
that army recruiters had told the militiamen that they would only 
have to serve twenty days, v^hen in fact the campaign lasted four 



186 



months, and that as a result many of them deserted. He noted that 
no review of the soldiers had been held prior to their leaving 
Cuzco to determine these deficiencies. He mentioned that only a 
small part of the expedition v;ere men of "honor and circumstance" 
and that most of the troops were "rustics incapable of subjection 
and good order." He also stated that the extreme shortage of 
disciplined militia and fijo troops in his force left him with in- 
sufficient men to act as a training cadre. Finally del Valle 
complained that the soldiers had not received pay on any sort of 
a schedule. He noted that during the entire campaign he had only 
received one full salary. 

Notwithstanding these limitations the Royalist army converged 
upon Sangarara by April, and encamped outside the rebel compound, 
where Tupac Am.aru waited with an army estimated at 10,000 foot- 
soldiers and ^+,000 cavalry. An attempt by the Indians to launch 
a surprise attack upon the Spaniards was defeated, which dis- 
heartened the Indian leader and convinced him to flee to Tinta. 
Before leaving he wrote his wife a plaintive letter, stating that 
"Many, and very brave soldiers are coming against us. There is 
left to us no other remedy than to die." He then left his fortress 
with several trusted lieutenants. Once this decision to flee had 
been made, the Royalist troops moved quickly to capture the rebel 
leaders. Tupac Amaru's wife and two of his sons v;ere captured on 
the road to La Paz. Tupac Amaru himself fled to the town of 
Lanqui where he hoped an ally would assist him in making his way 



187 



to Buenos Aires, from where he hoped to rebuild his army, instead 
his confederate informed the Spanish soldiers of his whereabouts 
and the rebel leader was captured not long thereafter with thirty- 
two of his captains. Tupac Amaru was subsequently taken to 
Cu2co and later charged with treason. On May 15 he was sentenced 
to death by Visitor General Areche who ordered him to witness the 
execution of the members of his family prior to having his tongue 

cut out and his body dismembered by tying his limbs to four horses 

76 
which v;ere driven simultaneously in different directions. In 

such a fashion did the visitor seek to intimidate any others who 

might seek to question the authority of the crown. 

Nevertheless J the death of Tupac Amaru failed to stem the 

tide of Indian rebellions in Peru. Led by his brother Diego 

Tupac Amaru and many of his generals who had escaped, the Indians 

continued to wage a war of attrition vyhich claimed an estimated 

80,000 lives and continued until 1783 before it was extinguished. 

After the death of Tupac Amaru, General del Valle was forced to 

raise another army to pursue these other rebels since once the 

campaign ended his troops had practically all deserted. The 

focus of the second campaign was to be on Puno, a small town 

located on the northwest bank of Lake Titicaca, Described as "a 

little island of loyalty in a sea of rebellion," Puno was strategic 

to both sides since it was situated on the route between Cuzco 

and La Paz, and from it an army could control the approach to the 

latter. ''5 



The defense of Puno prior to this time had been valiantly 
directed by its corregidor Joaqu'n Antonio de Orellana^ who had 
organized and deployed an urban militia against the Indian armies 
trying to capture it. General del Valle had hoped to lead an 
expedition to Puno to repopulate that city and prevent its falling 
into the hands of the rebels. In May^ the general left at the 
head of an army of 15,000 men^ but due to the same limitations 
which had hindered the Tinta expedition, the rate of desertion 
was phenomenal and forced the expedition to return to Cuzco. So 

high was the desertion rate that only 1,100 soldiers and ^50 

80 
Indians reached Puno out of the original number. This fact 

combined with the freezing weather and lack of food led del Valle 
to return to Cuzco and abandon Puno to the Indians. 

The failure of the Puno expedition was consequential to the 
war for several reasons. In the first place^ it allowed the rebel 
forces to gather in the entire Titicaca basin pursuant to an at- 
tack on La Paz which they considered their prime objective. In 
this sense it prolonged the rebellion considerably. Secondly^ the 
abandonment of Puno thoroughly discredited General del Valle as a 
battlefield commander. Areche sought to force the general to 

return to Lima in order that the viceroy might appoint the visitor 

81 
general in his place^ but Jauregui refused to do this. Finally, 

the expedition had proven the limitations of a Spanish army to 

wage war at these altitudes and weather conditions. The inability 

of the coastal militia to fight at these heights was one more 

limitation on this component whose utility had already been seriously 

placed in doubt. "^ 



189 



The report filed by General del Valle in defense of his 
actions was a stinging indictment of the support which a battle- 
field commander received from the royal officials in Peru and a 
statement of the limitations of the military reform program to 
that date. He stated that while Charles Mi had recognized the 
needs of his royal armies throughout the century^ his subordinates 
had failed to implement his policies. Del Valle cited the financial 
limitations which he had suffered, and held that "to make war and 
to successfully conduct the difficult measures which it requires, 
one needs money, money, and money." He stated that although there 
had been sufficient funds in the royal treasury to outfit and 
provision his army, that due to the corruption and inattention of 
the Paymaster General Jose de Lagos this v;as not done. Del Valle 
also blamed the recruiters v;ho enlisted many soldiers under false 
pretenses. These inexpert soldiers, he held 

the major part of whom had never had a rifle in their hands 
. . . believe that V/ar was a pure diversion: that in it 
one v/ould experience no hunger, cold, rains, anxieties, nor 
any type of labors: that they would acquire riches from 
plundering the enemy, having persuaded themselves that they 
could keep all that they seized. 

As a result of these misconceptions, del Valle noted that 1,950 

soldiers had deserted in one day, and that he returned to Cuzco 

with only 1,^^9 soldiers out of the entire number which had left 

earlier. Part of the problem, according to the general, lay with 

the exorbitant taxes levied by the visitor, and the failure of the 

royal officials to exclude the soldiers from the payment of tribute. 

This, along with the failure to pay them for the use of their animals. 



190 



he maintained, accounted for the "incredible aversion of the mes- 
tizos and Indians" to military service. He closed by asking that 
the crown judge his actions in terms of the military situation which 

he faced, and with the knowledge that rarely in the century had a 

83 
field commander been so badly equipped to do battle. 

The turning point in the Indian wars came with the siege of 

La Paz. The Indian rebels, led by Tupac Catari, who claimed a 

relationship to the deceased Tupac Amaru, laid siege to the city 

with a force of 1^,000 soldiers. Twice the rebels besieged the 

city for periods of 109 and seventy-five days. Although the sieges 

resulted in the death of 20,000 Spaniards and ^tO, 000 Indians, 

including one-third of the population of the city, it did not fall 

to the Indians. Finally a force sent from Buenos Aires arrived to 

8^ 
break the siege and provision the city. The success of the 

Spanish inhabitants of La Paz to hold the city against overwhelm- 
ing numbers of Indians proved to them the superiority of their 
arms and gave them increased courage in their ability to defeat 
the natives. Conversely, the inability of the rebel forces to 
capture La Paz was a shattering blow to their aspirations v;hich 
marked the beginning of the end of the Indian rebellions. 

In January, 1782, Diego Tupac Amaru had met v/ith General del 
Valle in the town of Siquani, following the promise of a general 
pardon, and had surrendered his sword on behalf of 30,000 of his 

Or 

supporters. The death of del Valle on September k of that year 
removed one of Diego's stounchest allies from the scene, and helps 



191 



86 
to explain the execution of the latter not long thereafter. On 

August 23 Viceroy Jauregui had written to G^lvez to report that 

the Indian revolts had been crushed and that the viceroyalty was 

. 87 
quiet once again. 

The cost of the Indian wars were staggering. The public debt 

of the viceregal treasury^ which prior to I78O had stood at five 

and one-half million pesos^ had risen to eight and one-third million 

00 
by 178'+. In human terms the losses were equally significant. 

One anonymous account of Peru following the wars states that 

In the two years following the war a very considerable 
scarcity of livestock and other edibles was noticeable^ of 
baize, of all sorts of clothing and merchandise of the country, 
as a result of the damage and ruin which Peru suffered . . . 
The houses were ruined, funds consumed, some families destroyed 
. . . The Royal Treasuries were empty, and in debt throughout 
Peru, taking the Treasure of the King to defray the expenses of 
the war, and although the amount it cost is not known with 
certainty, it is public knowledge that Millions of pesos were 
taken from them. 

Later Visitor Escobedo was to verify that the Indian rebellions had 

89 
cost Peru 2,582,979 pesos. 

The results which stemmed from the Tupac Amaru rebellion are 

several. Three of the most significant of them, all of which form 

part of the Bourbon program, include the abolition of the hated 

repart imiento system, the replacement of the corregidor as an 

administrator by the intendant system in 1784, and the creation of 

an audiencia in Cuzco by I787. The need for such reforms was 

clearly spelled out by Gabriel de Aviles, who had succeeded Jose 

del Valle as commandant of the Spanish Army in Cuzco in 1782, and 



192 



90 
who was charged with the problem of pacification. Gllvez assured 

him confidentially that the entire system of Spanish administration 

91 
in Peru was to be changed as a result. To oversee the implanta- 
tion of this nev; program of reform the crown named Jorge Escobedo, 

the subdelegate of Areche in Potost, as visitor general, and 

92 

ordered Areche to return to Spain. Much of the success of the 

Bourbon program in Peru can be attributed to the efforts of this 

93 
capable administrator. 

The revolts also provided the first test of the wisdom of the 
military reform program. One of the first conclusions to come out 
of the rebellion was the futility and danger of creating a militia 
in the interior provinces. Consequent ly_, all plans to do so v;ere 
dropped. In his Memor ia. Viceroy Jauregui noted that "the interior 
provinces find themselves defenseless, because it is neither con- 
venient nor feasible in them to give the proper organization to 
militias, because almost all the inhabitants are Indians and 
mestizos." Nevertheless, it is incorrect to assume that all of 
the militia which fought in the campaigns against Tupac Amaru 
were cowardly. Most of the desertions experienced by battlefield 
commanders occurred among untrained recruits from the provinces. 
The provincial militia of Lima, v/hlch served in the campaigns in 

Cuzco, gave a generally good account of themselves and v/ere rewarded 

95 
for their bravery. Pvegardless of this fact the militia emerged 

from the wars with a generally tarnished reputation, due in part 

to such occurrences such as the Oruro uprising, where their presence 



193 



constituted a real threat to Spanish government, and the belief 

that the Creoles of Lima, many of whom were prominent in the 

96 
militia of that city, had masterminded the revolts. Even Tupac 

Amaru had disparaged the fighting ability of these militia, stating 

that they were useful only "to kill sparrows and eat cornmeal 

97 
mush." One observer held that all the militia really cared about 

were their military privileges, since the lack of lawyers and 

judicial inexperience common in the provinces allowed them to use 

these privileges to rob the public at will.^^ Another commentator 

stated that the soldiers were libertines whose depredations had to 

be endured during wartime but not in time of peace."" Observers 

also felt that the victory over the Indians was due to luck and 

not mi 1 I tary skill. 

The best blueprint for reform within the Army of Peru came 

from the pen of Visitor Areche, who, for all his shortcomings as 

an administrator, held a generally clearer conception of what was 

required to perfect the defenses of the viceroyalty than his 

contemporaries. In a report to the crown on this subject, Areche 

proposed that the crown send at least three veteran regiments to 

Peru, whose officers he hoped would be "Swiss or German Catholics" 

who presumably would possess Prussian military virtues which they 

would Impart to the soldiers of the viceroyalty. The mission of 

these troops, Areche stated, would be to protect the coast of Peru 

"from the Cape Horn to the south of New Spain" from the incursions 

of the enemies of the Spanish crown. To finance the sending of 



19^ 



these troops, and to further weaken the powers of his enemy the 
viceroy, Areche proposed that the companies of halberdiers and 
cavalry of the Viceroy's Guard be abolished and their salaries 
applied to pay the salaries of these incoming troops. He cited 
as precedent the example of Lieutenant General Villalba v;ho had 
extinguished a similar mounted company in New Spain on the basis 
of expense. As for the fijo battalion, Areche proposed that part 
of it be utilized to fill vacancies in the veteran regiments and 
that the rest of the soldiers be sent to garrisons distant from 
their homes where temptations to desert were less, and where the 
loyalty of these soldiers would be more assured. 

Areche also suggested that the veteran training cadres both 
in Lima and the provinces be abolished since they do not "put forth 
one useful thing" and were too expensive to maintain. In their 
place he suggested that three companies of mounted fusi leers be 
created and that detachments from them be sent to Cuzco, Guamanga, 
Arequipa^ Trujillo, La Paz, Charcas, Chile, Buenos Aires, and Potosf 
to insure the security of these regions. He estimated that the 
total increase in cost of developing such a program v^ould be 19^,160 
pesos, a small sum in view of the improved defense it ivould provide. 

Although the visitor general did not recommend the wholesale 
abolition of the militia component, he did urge that it be reclas- 
sified on an urban basis as it had been previously. The reason for 
this, he declared, was that presently regiments were raised in remote 
regions where, due to the distance from the provincial capitals and 



195 



between the companies themselves^ they were useless as tactical units 
in time of war. The result of such a policy^ the visitor declared, 
was to create companies which consisted of nothing more than of- 
ficers, who frequently utilized their military privileges for their 
own ends. Areche felt that an urban militia should be retained in 
the towns and cities of the viceroyalty to supplement the ranks of 
the veteran regiments in time of war, and noted that the reduction 
of military privileges granted to urban militia would act to limit 
the aforementioned abuses. Areche concluded that by extending royal 
authority in the form of veteran troops throughout the viceroyalty, 
the crown would reap the numerous benefits of increased respect and 
veneration for the king, although it might increase expenses slightly. 
Should military expenditures need to be cut even further, Areche 
proposed that the position of inspector general, which had been 
vacant since the death of del Valle, be abolished and the duties 
assumed by the senior officer of the veteran regiments. 

In February of I783 the crown secretly notified the Viceroy 
of New Spain that it was relieving Jauregul of his duties as Vice- 
roy of Peru and was appointing in his place the commanding general 

of the interior provinces of New Spain, Teodoro de Croix, who was 

102 
ordered to embark for Lima immediately. The replacement of 

Jauregul by Croix signalled not only displeasure on the part of 

the crown of the conduct of the former, but a new philosophy concerning 

royal administration in Peru. Whereas the viceroyalty had previously 

been ruled by men of iron will such as Amat and Areche, in the future. 



196 



the crown noted, Peru would be governed "on the base of a policy of 
regeneration and appeasement, of construction and reform." ^ More- 
over, it would continue to be governed by two persons rather than 
one, since Escobedo as visitor general, inherited all of the powers 
granted to Areche. But whereas before this had been a coequal 
partnership, the balance of power seemed to be shifting in favor 
of the visitor as the king's representative. In a secret report 
to Escobedo, Croix was described by the Minister of the Indies as 
a man of "laudable docility," and one whom he could work easily 
with. The implication seemed clear: from now on Peru was to 
remain more closely under royal supervision, in an effort to prevent 
the factions of the past from recurring. 

Secondly, the king notified the incoming viceroy that he was 
forthwith dispatching two complete veteran regiments to Peru in 
order to dispel the illusion "that our arms and power are not what 
they were presumed to be and that they be respected and feared." -^ 
That the crown should follov; such a course v/hich had been recommended 
to him by Egan and Areche, the two foremost opponents of the militia 
reform, was a tacit admission that the king regarded the militia 
of Peru, especially in the interior, as useless. Such a measure 
was also a drastic departure from the recommendations made earlier 
by the Secret Committee on Imperial Defense, which had specifically 
sought to develop the militia as an alternative to the prior tradi- 
tion of using garrison troops as the basis of colonial defense. 
That the crown recognized the limitations of militia in regions of 



197 



large Indian and mixed blood populations such as Peru was reflected 
by the guidelines drawn up in July, 178?^ by the Consejo de Estado 
or Council of State, headed by the Conde de Flor idablanca, to co- 
ordinate Spanish imperial policy, which held that 

The militias and fijo units of America are useful against 
enemy invasions but are not so to maintain internal order; 
since as natives born and educated with maxims of opposition 
and jealousy towards Europeans, they can have alliances and 
relations with the persons of the country and castes who disturb 
or disrupt the public peace which ought to be kept in mind, 
and much more so when the leaders of these corps also are 
natives, and even castes, Indians, mestizos, and others who 
comprise that population ... It is important to alv;ays have 
veteran troops in the principal areas of America , , . with 
the purpose that they contain and support the fijo corps and 
militia in any cases which occur. '0° 

The significance of the statement is clear: from now on veteran 

troops were to be employed not only to support the militia, but 

to protect the interests of the crown v;hen these diverged from those 

of the militia. The original program of military reform had been 

undertaken to defend the colonies against external aggression. The 

new problem of internal subversion, symbolized best by the figure 

of Tupac Amaru, called for new forms of defense, which in Peru 

were to constitute a virtual repudiation of the reform which had 

earlier been instituted. 



198 



Notes 



Ulendiburu, VI, 3^2-3^3. 

^ Ibid.. II, 351; Pike, pp. 33-35. Baquijano, the Conde de 
Vistaf lor ida, was a creole born in Lima and educated in Spain. 
One of the most enlightened men of the viceroyalty, he was in- 
fluential in founding the Mercurio Peruano and was active in the 
Sociedad de amantes del pats . 

^Lillian Estelle Fisher, Th e Last Inca Revolt. 1780-1783 
(Norman, Oklahoma, 19^6), p. 19. 

4, 



Cangas, "Descripci&n en diSlogo 
'Lill ian Fisher, p. 19. 



p. 3^+. 



Jos^ Fernando Abascal y Sousa, Memoria de aobierno del virrey 
Abascal , Edici6n preparada por Vicente Rodriguez Casado y Jos^ Anto- 
nio Calder6n Quijano (Seville, 19^^), PP. 19^-196, 217-219, 321. 

''bL: "Copia de carta escrita a un Sr. ministro de Madrid por 
un vecino del Cuzco," Cuzco, September 1, 1782, in "Relaci&n de los 
hechos mlis notables acaecidos en la Sublevacion general fraguada en 
los Reynos del Peru, por el Yndio Jos^ Gabriel Tupac Amaru . . .," 
pp. 15-17. 

^AGI:AL 1085, Circular order to all corregidors from Viceroy 
August in de Jauregui, Lima, January 15, 1781. 

^AG!:AL 1039, Letter from Juan Jos^ Abelfuertes, corregidor 
of Pasco, to Areche, Pasco, March 22, I78O, pp. "i-k. 

BL: "Defensa de su conducta escrita por don Joseph Antonio 
de Areche . . . presentada a1 Consejo de Indias en 1 7 de Marzo de 
1787," in "Relaci&n de los hechos mSs notables," pp. 8U-92. 

^^"Proyecto del Coronel Demetrio Egan . . . para la seguridad 
interior de las provincias del reyno del Peru," Lima, October, 
1779, pp. 211 ff.; AGI:AC 716, Letter from the Marques de la Plata 
to GSlvez, La Plata, February h, I78I, both cited in C^spedes del 
Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires, pp. 91 "92. 

^^Lillian Fisher, pp. 35-36, 228-229. 

^^Leona Ruth Auld, "Discontent with the Spanish System of 
Control in Upper Peru, 1730-1809," Doctoral dissertation. University 
of California at Los Angeles, 1963, P. 8U. 



1^ 



Lillian Fisher, p. 41 



199 



Ibid ., pp. ^^+-^5; Lewin, La Rebel ion de Tupac Amaru, pp. 
kk3-khk. 

16 

BL: "Oficio que diriglo la Junta de Guerra de la ciudad 

del Cuzco al Excmo, Sr. Virrey Dn. August in de Jauregui con pro- 
pio destinado a informarle del estado en que se halla la dha 
Cfudad con el lebant imiento [ sic ] de Josef Gabriel Tupac Amaru," 
Cuzco, November 13, 1780, in "Dialogo sobre los sucesos varios 
acaecidos en este Reyno del Peru . . . Ano I786," pp. 145-1^6. 
This document is reprinted in Lewin, La Rebel ion de Tupac Amaru. 
pp. 896-898. 

Letters from Bishop Manuel de Moscoso to Antonio de Areche, 
Cuzco, November 21, I78O and November 23, I78O, in Rafael Jose 
Sahuaraura, Es tado del Peru; codice escrito en 1780 v que contiene 
datos importantes sobre la revolucion de Jos^ Gabriel Tupac Amaru 
(Lima, 19^+^)^ PP. 1^9-138, Sahuaraura was an Indian priest of 
Cuzco accused by Bishop Moscoso of being in favor of the rebels, 
and this book formed his defense against that charge. 

'^AGI:AL 108i+, Areche to G^lvez, Lima, December 22, I78O, p. 
k; Lillian Fisher, pp. 102-10^; Lewin, L a Rebel i6n de Tupac Amaru. 
pp. i+^9-A50. 

10 

^AGIrAL lOS'l, Areche to G^lvez, Lima, December 22, I78O, p, 

^; Lill ian Fisher, p. 105, 

Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Tupac Amaru, la revolucion pre - 
cursora de la emancipacion continental (Cuzco, 19^9), PP. 168-1 69. 
Almost half of the money raised to defend Cuzco v^as donated by the 
Church. AGI:AC 37, "Sumario general de las datas de esta cuenta 
. . .," Cuzco, December 31^ 1780. In Lima also the clergy donated 
heavily to end the rebellions. AGI:AL 66^, Jauregui to G^vez, 
Lima, March 16, I783, pp. 1-3. 

21 

Lillian Fisher, p. 111. Lewin states that these figures 

are more impressive v;hen one remembers that San Martfn liberated 

Peru with a force of ^,^1^ soldiers. Lewin, La Rebel ion de Tupac 

Amaru, p. h^] . 

22 

Cornejo Bouroncle, p. 172; Lillian Fisher, pp. 115-116. 

For the discussion in Parliament to invade South America at this 
time, see The Parliamentary and Consti t utional History of Englan d 
from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803 (London, 181^), XX, 932. 

23 

Lewin explains (pp. 436-^+33 that the Indians in Peru v;ere 

never allowed to possess firearms and were not given them when 

conscripted for military expeditions. As a result, Tupac Amaru's 

army lacked organization and tactical planning in addition to 
weapons and provisions. 



200 



2k 

Lillian Fisher, pp. 109-112. 



P. 1. 



^^AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to GSlvez, Lima, February 15, 1781, 
26. 



Relaciones de los virreyes, I I i ^ R e lac ion que hace el Excmo . 
Sr. D. Augustfn de Jauregui . . . a su Sucesor Excmo. Sr. D. T eodo- 
rode Croix desde 20 de Julio de I78O hasta 3 de Abril de 178^, pp. 

^''agIiAL 1^83, Report from Gabriel de Aviles to JosI de G5l- 
vez, Cuzco, January 28, I783, pp. 1-2. 

Li 1 1 ian Fisher, p. 121 . 

29 

Informe relacionado que e1 cabildo, justicia, y reqimiento 

de la ciudad del Cuzco hace a V.M. con documentos, de los princi - 

pales sucesos acaecidos en aquella ciudad desde princi p io s del Ano 

de 1780 hasta ultimos de 783 . i n Relaciones de los virreyea v au- 

diencias que han qobernado el Peru , Ml, pp. 337-3^5; AGirAL 660, 

Jauregui to G^lvez, Lima, February 15, 1781, pp. 1-2. 

^°Lill ian Fisher, pp. 123-125. 

31 

"Copia de carta escrita a un Sr. ministro de Madrid . . .," 

p. 23; Relacion de Jauregui , p. 1^7. 

32 

Lewin, La Rebel ion de Tupac Amaru, pp. ^5^-^55; Relacion 

de Jauregui, pp. 1^8-1^9; Carlos Daniel ValcSrcel, La Rebel ion de 

Tupac Amaru, 2nd ed. (Mexico City, 1 965) , p. 129. 

33 

■^ AGI:AL 108i+, Areche to G^lvez, Lima, December 22, I78O, 

pp. ^"7. While G^lvez V7as visitor-general in New Spain, he had 
requested command of a detachment of soldiers being sent to San 
Luis Potosf to put dov;n an Indian uprising in favor of the Jesuits, 
but had been denied this by Viceroy Croix. 

3^ 

BL: Letter from Antonio de Areche to Fernando Marques de 

La Plata, Viceroy of La Plata, Lima, February 1, I783, p. 31. 

35 

AGI:AL 104^ Report from del Valle to the King, Cuzco, 

March 1, I78I, pp. 1-^; BNL: Documentos sobre la rebel i&n de 

Tupac Amaru. Areche to G^lvez, Cuzco, April 30, I78I, p. 7. 

AGI:AL 659, Jauregui to GSlvez, no date, pp. 1-2; AGI :AL 660, 
Jauregui to G^lvez, Lima, February 15, I78I, p. 8. 

^^Lill ian Fisher, pp. II7-II8. 



201 



■} Q 

AGIrAL 1085, Circular order to all corregidors from Augus- 
tin de Jauregui^ Lima^ January 15^ 1781, p. 1. 

AGIrAL 660, Areche to Jauregui, lea, January 3, 1781, p. 3; 
AGIrAL 10^1, Areche to Jauregui, lea, January 3, I78I, p, 3; AGIrAL 
1085, Areche to Jauregui, January 3, 1781, pp. 1-3. 

ho 

AGIrAL 660, Gabriel de Aviles to Jauregui, lea, January 3, 

1781, p. 1; AGIrAL 660, Aviles to Jauregui, Cuzco, January 13, 1781, 
p. 3. In this letter the general stated his feelings that it was 
a particular disposition of God that the Visitor has come, in 
order that with his authority and perspicacity he can inter 
this cancer which consumes this body politic; where everyone 
wants to rule, and all differ in their mode of thought, and 
all complain reciprocally ... 

AGIrAL 1085, Jauregui to Areche, Lima, January 12, I78I, 
pp. 1-^. 

^Barros Arana, VI, 39^, note 55. 

•^AGIrAL 1085, Areche to the corregidor of Guamanga, Guamanga, 
January 23, 1781, p. 1; AGIrAL IO85, Areche to the corregidor of 
Huanta, Guamanga, January 25, 1781, pp. 1-2. 

AGIrAL 1085, Areche to del Valle, Guamanga, January 23, 1781, 
P. 1. 

Letter from del Valle to two friends in Lima, dated October 
3, 1781, cited in Sir Clements R. Markham, Travels in Peru and 
India (London, 1862), p. 128. Del Valle stated that 

if they were informed that the rebels were approaching their 
town, they would rather see the defeat of the King's soldiers 
than send away a single Indian who might owe them a yard of 
cloth. 

AGIrAL 108^ Areche to Jauregui, Guamanga, January 28, I78I, 
pp. 1-^. 

^7 

AGIrAL 1085, Jauregui to Areche, lima, February 28, I78I, 

PP. 1-3. 



U8, 
-6. 
^3, 



3 

AGIrAL 1085, Areche to Jauregui, Cuzco, March 16, I78I, 
PP. 1-6. 



^AGIrAL 1085^ Areche to G^lvez, Cuzco, March 20, I78I, pp. 
6-9. 



202 



Re1aci6n de Jaurequi, pp. 151"152, 

AGI :AL 6^0, "Infonne del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix, instru- 
iendole de los principales acaecimientos en el Reyno del Peru con 
el fin de que le sirvan de govierno estas noticias," El Pardo, 
March 28, 1783, PP. 1-15. 

AGI:AL ]0k], Jauregui toG^lvez, Lima, January 16, 1783, p.3, 

^^Auld, PP. 109-129; Fisher, pp. 1^0-171. 

^ Lill ian Fisher, p. 172. 

^^ Ibid . , pp. 116-117; AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to G^lvez, Lima, 
May 5, 1781, p. 1. 

^^AGI:AL 660, Jauregui to GSlvez, Lima, April 25, 1781, p. 1; 
AGI:AL 149^+, Jauregui to GSlvez, Lima, June 16, 1783, P. 1; AGI:AL 
663, Jauregui to G^lvez, Lima, June 1 6, I783, p. 1; ANL: Real 
Tribunal del Consulado, legajo 10, cuaderno 150 (I78O), pp. 1-17; 
Relaci6n de Jauregui, p. I89. 

^^ Relacion de Jauregui. pp. 192-193. 

^^Ibid. 

AGI:AL 66^4, Jauregui toGdlvez, April 16, I783, p. 1. 

^^ Relacion de Jauregui , pp. 190-191. For specific examples 
of these desertions, see various letters in ANL:RH, 
legajo 2 (I78I). These pay records give a good overview of the 
actions and attitudes of these training cadres, 

AGI:AL 1496, Areche to G5lvez, Lima, November 22, I78I, 
p, 1; El Moralista F i 1 at het i co Amer icano (Lima, I8I9), p. 376. 
This vjork contains numerous royal orders and cedulas, listed in 
chronological order. The order abolishing the cavalry commandant 
is dated June 2, I78I . 

^^ Relaci6n de Jaurequi. pp. 191-192. 

^AGIrAL 662, Jauregui to G^lvez, Lima, July 5, 1782, pp. 
8-91 Rclacion de Jaurequi , p. 19^. 

The king had ordered Jauregui to read a plan of defense 
titled Lima Inexpugnable, written in 17^+0 by Pedro de Peralta y 
Barnuevo, a leading intellectual of Lima. The plan, which entailed 
massive fortification of the city, was vetoed by the junta de 
guerra. See Luis Antonio Eguiguren Escudero (Lima, I966). AGIrAL 
662, Jauregui to Galvez, Lima, May 31, 1782, p. 1; Re lac ion de 
Jaurequi . p. 204. 



203 



AGI:AL lif93, "Relacion del Coronel Dn. Demetrio Egan de los 
alborotos del Peru al Sr. Jose de Galvez/' Lima^ February 20, I78I, 
PP. 1-11. 

For an example of Areche's thinking on the "soft line" 
adopted towards the Indians, see BNL: Legajo Ck]6, Documentos sobre 
la Rebel ion de Tupac Amaru, Areche to Jauregui, Lima, September 7, 
1781, pp. 10-13. 

'BL: "El marlscal de campo D. Jos^ del Valle escribio y 
firm6 en el Cuzco en 30 de Sete. de I78I un manifesto . . .," p. 8. 
Del Valle stated that if he had made such a brutal reply, v;hich made 
a surrender and peace impossible, Areche would have denounced him 
and declared that he sought to continue the war for his soldiers' 
personal gain. "But as he was the visitor, I kept quiet; and on 
my part^ to make me hated, he said I was ungovernable. If he had 
heard Tupac Amaru in terms of humility, misfortunes like those of 
La Paz and others and their revolts would have been avoided." 

68 

AGI:AL 1040, Areche to G^lvez, Cuzco, March 20, I78I, pp. 
1-10. 

69 

Lillian Fisher, pp. 129-130. It took del Valle and Areche 

almost three months to make the trip from Lima to Cuzco, whereas 

Avil^s made it in one month. Had Tupac Amaru attacked the city 

before February, he might well have been able to capture it. 

70 

Lill ian Fisher, p. 172. 

BL: "Relacion de los hechos mas notables acaecldos en la 
Sublevaclon general , . .," p. 297. 

72 

AGIrAL ]Ohk, del Valle to G^lvez, Cuzco, March 1, I78I, 

PP. 5-7. 

''^AGIrAL 10^0, Areche to GSlvez, Cuzco, March 20, I78I, p. 5. 

7/1 

' AGhAL 1040, del Valle to Jauregui, Campo de Tinta, April 
8, I78I, pp. 1-2; BL: "El Mariscal de Campo D. Jose del Valle 
escr i bio . . .," pp. 1 -3 . 

''^AGIiAC 63, del Valle to G^lvez, Campo de Tinta, April 8, 
1781, p. 3; Lillian Fisher, pp. 214-220. 



^^Lillian Fisher, pp. 222-223. 



77 a 

BL: "Decada 4 de la escena en la revel ion de Jose Gabriel 

Tupac Amaru," Cuzco, May 22, I78I, pp. 1-15. 

78 

AGI:AC 63, del Valle to GSlvez, Siquani, June 25, 1781, pp. 
1-10. 



20^ 



79 f 

Lillian Fisher, p. 258, Lewin, La Rebel ion de Tupac Amaru. 

P. ^31. 

Lillian Fisher, p. llh. 

81 

BL: "Carta que el Sr. Visitador Dn. Josef Antonio de Areche 

escribio al Sr. Inspector General sobre el abandon© de Puno," in 

"Dialogo sobre los sucesos varies acaecidos en este Reyno del Peru 

. . .," pp. 322-323. 

^AGI:AL lOi+1, Areche to G^lvez, Lima, October 16, I78I, pp. 
^-8; AGi:AL lOUl, Jauregui to GSlvez, Lima, August h, I78I, pp. 2-3; 
AGI:AL 1086, Areche to G^lvez, Lima, October 17, 1781, pp. 3-8. 

go 

AG1:AC 63, del Valle to G^lvez, Cuzco, September 28, I78I, 
pp. 1-26. In another defense of his conduct, written two days 
later (BL: "El Mariscal de campo D. Jose del Valle escribi& . . .," 
p. 7), the Inspector general noted that it had been the viceroy and 
not the visitor who had finally freed the militia and Indian 
auxiliaries from paying tribute, while serving in the army. This 
was one more evidence of Areche 's unwillingness to sacrifice revenue 
during the war. Del Valle related the story of a meeting between 
Areche and Tupac Amaru after the capture of the former. When 
Areche asked him to declare the names of his accomplices, Tupac 
Amaru replied, "There are only two. You and I. You for having 
oppressed the Kingdom with excessive contributions, and I for 
wanting to free it from such vexations." 

8i+ 

Lillian Fisher, pp. 281-312. 

^^ Ibid .. pp. 3^8, 365-368. 

or 

An anonymous observer of Cuzco reported that Diego Tupac 
Amaru rode Into town beside del Valle dressed in the uniform of 
a Colonel in the Spanish Army. BL: "Copia de carta escrita a un 
Sr. ministro de Madrid . . ,," p. 28. Colonel Gabriel de Avilds, 
a future Viceroy of Peru, v/as named as commandant in Cuzco in his 
place. 

87 

AG! :AL 662, Jauregui to Gllvez, Lima, August 23;, 1782, p. 1. 

00 

C^spedes del Castillo, Reorqanizaci6n, p. ^2. 

°BL: "Relacion de los hechos m5s notables . . .," p. 330; 
"Informe del visitador . . .," in R elaciones de los virreyes. Ill, 
kkl. 

90 

AGI:AL 618, Gabriel de Avll^s to G^lvez, Cuzco, September 

30, 1782, pp. 1-2; ibid .. Cuzco, January 28, I783, pp. 1-3. 



91 



AGI:AL 618, G^lvez to Avil^s, September 22, I783, PP. 1-2. 



205 



92 

Palacio Atard^ p. 55, 

93 

See the report from Escobedo to GSlvez^ Lima, October 20, 

1785, in Relaciones de los vFrreyes v audiencias que ban gobernado 
el Peru. Ill, 369-'+^^. 

Relacion de Jauregui. p. I7I. This assertion was sup- 
ported by the audiencias in these areas also. The Audiencia of 
Charcas, for example, stated that, since the officers and men of 
the militia were of the same race, discipline of one by the 
other was impossible. AGI : IG, Audiencia of Charcas to the Ministry 
of the Indies, Plata, June 15, 1781, pp. 1 -3 . 

95 

An observer in Cuzco, an avov/ed partisan of Areche, reported 

that the pardos libres of Lima were unspeakably cowardly during the 
campaign, and that only the Battalion of Merchants of Cuzco acted 
with any bravery among the militia there. He also felt that the 
corregldors as a group demonstrated more bravery than the regular 
officers, vyhom he accused of leaving their bravery in Spain and 
retaining only their uniforms, BL: "Carta que un sugeto vecino 
del Cuzco y apasionado del Sr. Visitador escribio a otro confidante 
suyo vecino de Lima . . ." Cuzco, July J,, I78I, in "Dialogo sobre 
los sucesos varies acaecidos en este Reyno del Peru . . .," p. 29. 

Nevertheless, when Jauregui asked AvI16s to draw up a list 
of the soldiers v/ho had particularly distinguished themselves in 
the fighting, the list included thirty-three militia officers, 
seventeen regular officers, eleven adventurers, and nine corregidors. 
He also cited the militia of Arequipa, Paruro, Paucartambo, Guamanga, 
and Abancay for special recognition. AGI:AL 66^, "Relacion que 
explica los meritos que han adqulrido, y las acciones en que se han 
hallado los Oficiales del Exercito, Caballeros Aventurosos y ofl- 
ciales de milicias que han servido en esta Ciudad . . .," Cuzco, 
September 16, I782, pp. 1-23. For other examples of particular 
bravery see the Informe relacionado que el cabildo. iusticia y 
regimiento de la ciudad de Cuzco hace . . . in Relaciones de los 
virreveBv audiencias que han gobernado el Perd. Ill, 3^+5 ff. 

^ AGIrAL 6^0, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . ,," 
El Pardo, March 28, I783, pp. 1-15; BNL: Documentos sobre la 
rebel i&n de Tupac Amaru, Areche to G^lvez, Cuzco, Paril 30, I78I, 
PP. 8-9. 

97 

Tupac Amaru to Joseph Paredes, Canon of the Church of La 

Paz, Chuquibamba, January 26, I781, cited in Carlos Daniel Val- 
cSrcel, "Sentido social de la rebel ion de Tupac Amaru," Letras 
No. 50-53 (Lima, 195^);, p. 173. The Indians later changed their 
opinion of these troops as their losses began to mount. See AGI: 
AL \Qk\ "Carta de los Naturales del Pais al Rey," December k, 
1781, pp. 16-18. 



206 



AGI: Estado Jk "Informe de las causas de Rebel ion de 
Tupac Amaru del Dn. Francisco Martinez y La Costa al Virrey del 
Peru/' San Felipe, August 30;, I78I, pp. 1-2. 

99 a 

BL: "Dicada h de la escena en la revel ion de Jose 

Gabriel Tupac Amaru," pp. 14-15. 

BL: "Copia de carta escrita a un Sr. ministro de Madrid," 
pp. 27-28. 

AGItAL 1086, "El Visitador y Super intendente general de 
la Real Hazienda del Peru informa a S.M. con varies Planes y do- 
cumentos el numero y clase de tropas que juzga necesarias para 
cubrir las atenciones de aquella America y poner en una justa 
subordinaz ion a sus vasallos , . .," Lima, November \h, 1782, pp. 
1-15. 

AGI;AL 6^+0, "Expediente reservado sobre que se restituya 
a Espana el Virrey del Peru Dn. Augustfn de Jauregui," El Pardo, 
February 10, I783, p. 1. Secrecy v/as held necessary to insure 
that the Creoles suspected of fomenting the rebellions did not 
hear of the ouster and provoke more trouble. 

1 0^ 

"^AGIiAL GkO , G^lvez to Jorge Escobedo, El Pardo, February 

15, 1783, P. 1. 

Emilio del Solar, Insurreccion de Tupac Amaru, sus Ante - 



'°^AGI:AL 640, "informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . .," 



cedentes y Efectos (Lima, 1926), p. 165 

p. \h 

Gobierno del Senor Rey Don Carlos III, o instruccion reser; 
vada para direccion de la junta del estado que creo este monarca; 
dada a 1 uz por don Andres Muriel (Madrid. 1839), PP. 261-262. 



V. THE CULMINATION OF THE MILITARY REFORM 

As a direct result of the financial drain of the Indian 
rebellions and the inadequacy of the interior militia during 
these viars, the size of the Army of Peru was reduced after 178^. 
Perhaps more significant was the fact that two complete veteran 
regiments were sent from Spain to assume their task of garrison- 
ing the major provincial capital In order to prevent further 
Insurrections. Such a development meant essentially that the 
plan of military reform proposed by the Committee for Imperial 
Defense in 17^3 had not succeeded in Peru. The shift back to 
increased dependence upon regular troops was Instead a reversion 
to the defense system vyhich had been employed prior to the Seven 
Years War. However^ the difficulty of maintaining regular troops 
in America v/as to provoke further changes in the structure of the 
army after I787 which would bring it more into line with the 
historical and geographic realities of the kingdom. By 179^ the 
Army of Peru had achieved a structure which was to remain essentially 
unchanged throughout the balance of the colonial period. 

The keynote of the period following the end of the Indian 
rebellions in Peru was reconciliation between the viceroy and the 
visitor general^ in the hope that the viceroyalty could be restored 
to a stable econonuc and social footing. Jorge de Escobedo^ who 
replaced Antonio de Areche in 17^2^ has been described by one 

207 



208 



historian as "the prototype of . . . the ideal American administra- 

2 

tor." His counterparty Teodoro de Croix^ was chosen primarily for 

3 

his flexibility rather than his administrative genius. 

The end of the rebellions did not mean that the problems 
which had caused them no longer remained. The departing judge 
Benito de la Mata Linares informed G^lvez that Peru was still 
financially in desperate straits, and that the deep rift betv;een 
Creoles and Spaniards still existed. He also detailed the cor- 
ruption of the church v;h i ch he held was extraordinarily powerful, 
and noted that certain corregidors were still clandestinely col - 
lecting the repart imiento contrary to the law. During the vice- 
regency of Teodoro de Croix the Bourbons took several steps to 
alleviate these social and economic problems. Mining was given 
renewed attention in an effort to repair the damage done during the 
rebellions. in an effort to improve the administration of this 
important resource, the Mining Ordinances of New Spain were 
introduced, the mining guild v^as reorganized, and a school of metal- 
lurgy v;as established. During the viceregency of Croix's successor. 
Viceroy Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, the Nordenflicht mining 
mission v;as sent from Germany to Peru to implant new technological 
advances, but its overall impact was slight. Several important 
scientific expeditions sent to Peru had a higher degree of success. 

Perhaps the most important of the Bourbon administrative 
reforms introduced into Peru following the Indian rebellions v;as 



209 



the Intendancy system, which had been implanted earlier in 1782 in 
the La Plata Viceroyalty and had been judged suitable for use in 
Peru also by Escobedo. The system ousted the corrupt corregidors 
and replaced them with a group of professional administrators v;ho 
were given higher salaries and special instructions upon their ar- 
rival in 178^. In addition, the administrative boundaries of Peru 
were redrawn, replacing the numerous provinces with seven inten- 

dancies in an effort to increase efficiency through decentral- 

o 
Ization. They v;ere not, hov;ever, granted increased military 

q 
powers. Escobedo retained the intendance of Lima for himself, 

sharply circumscribing the pov^ers of Viceroy Croix, who, in 1790 
spoke out strongly against the system and urged that it be dis- 
continued. This advice was not followed by the crown, however. 

Concurrently with the above reforms it was decided to reduce 
the size of the Army of Peru, to reinforce the size of its regular 
component, v;hile decreasing the size of the fijo and militia 
sectors. There vyere two reasons for such a change. The first 
stemmed from a deep-seated distrust of the Creoles who controlled 
these fijo and militia sectors, and the other was based upon the 
financial limitations imposed by the Indian rebellions. The 
crown had first spelled out its doubt about the Creoles' loyalty 
in a secret report to Viceroy Croix. In it the king expressed 
his opinion that the Tupac Amaru rebellion had been planned as 
early as 1776 by the Creoles of Lima, v/ho had been aided in their 
endeavors because of the hatred existing throughout Peru of the 



210 



"military contribution" and other taxes imposed later by the Visitor 
Areche, and by the Inaction of Viceroy Guirior, v^ho refused to take 
any action against these subversives. The king went on to note that 
the situation did not improve under Viceroy Jauregui since he^ like 
his predecessor^ fell also under the control of the Creoles vyho 
dominated the audiencia. He explained that the "shameful peace" 
resulting from the pardon of Diego Tupac Amaru convinced him that 
Jauregui was proceeding upon a course v;hich vyould lose the kingdom 
through concessions to the Indians and which required his dismissal. 
To stem this trendy the king told Croix that he v/as sending two 
regiments of the army to Peru. He ordered the viceroy to station 
them throughout the kingdom to Insure that the will of the 

sovereign was obeyed. To Implement this order he named Brigadier 

12 

General Manuel de Pineda as Inspectoi Gen^^ral and Governor of Callao. 

By the first of Hay^ 178^, the f r Iqates Aqu 1 1 a and Santa An na 
had anchored in Callao harbor with the first contingents of these 
troops. By August the Regiment of Soria v/ith 1^276 soldiers^ and 
the Regiment of Extremadura numbering 1,285 had disembarked In Peru. 
These 2,561 troops, v/hen added to the fijo soldiers in the vice- 
royalty, brought the size of the regular component in Peru to 
6,089 troops. ^^ 

The financial strains of the Indian rebellions also provoked 
a decrease In the size of the army after 1783. The superintendent 
of the Royal Treasury informed Croix in 178^ that in the previous 

year military expenditures had exceeded revenues set aside for 

1^ 

this purpose by ^88,205 pesos. To decrease this expense and help 



211 



support the cost of the veteran contingent, the crown ordered that 
the Viceroy's Cavalry Guard be reduced in size from 150 to thirty- 
five men, and that the Company of Halberdiers be decreased from 
fifty-two to tv/enty-f i ve. Visitor General Escobedo had urged 
the previous viceroy to abolish the veteran training cadres in 
the provinces as well. He argued that the regular component of 
the army had consumed 730,5^6 pesos out of the 771,^08 pesos spent 
on military salaries the previous year, and that the veteran troops 

from Spain could train the militia in these areas as well as these 

1 <; 

training cadres at a great savings in cost. 

These urglngs for a reduction in the size of the army viere 
supported by a report which Viceroy Croix had requested Inspector 
General Pineda to make on the status of forces in Peru. Pineda had 
sent out subi nspectors to report on the condition of the provincial 
militia, and they had returned the information that the coastal 
militia v/as badly understrength, with only Canete and Chancey 
possessing complete regiments. He also reported that the training 
cadres in these regions v;ere below strength and as a result they 
served no useful purpose, since there v/as an insufficient number 
to train the militia of their districts. He cited as an example 
the southern coastal region embracing the towns of Arequipa, Mo- 
quequa, and Arica, v/hich contained three battalions of infantry 
militia and thirteen squadrons of cavalry and dragoons, and whose 
entire training group consisted of only a sergeant major, an 
adjutant, and four lieutenants. He noted that the northern region 



212 



of Trujillo, Lambayeque^ and Piura had about the same ratio of 
militia to instructors,, and that the entire Indian frontier had 
only three sergeants and three adjutants. Pineda blamed the 
situation on Visitor Areche, who^ he stated^ cut back the train- 
ing cadres to the point where^ due to their small size, he 
"caused the expenditures to be useless," 

According to Pineda, the fallacy in creating a militia in 
these provinces lay in the fact that administrators assumed that 
these companies were made up of residents from the provincial 
capitals, whereas in fact most of them were individuals who lived 
either on large ranches or in small villages situated some distance 
from each other. Because they could not be away from their fields 
or due to the distance involved it v;as practically impossible to 
gather them together for any period of time to give them suitable 
instruction. in the frontier regions, he felt the situation was 
even vrarse due to the terrain and because many of the soldiers 
were either muleteers or transient laborers who never maintained 
a fixed residence for training purposes. He stated that the 
militia regulations v/ere exceedingly difficult to carry out in 
Peru since the region was geographically so different from Spain 
end Havana. 

Pineda remarked that some of the same problems of transiency 
existed among the militia of Lima also. He therefore recommended 
that the Regiment of Spanish Infantry and the Pxegiment of pardos 
be retained at their present strength and In a disciplined classi- 
fication, but that the Battalion of morenos be reduced in size to 



213 



three companies and Its membership be restricted to freemen. He 
felt that for the same reasons the Company of morenos of cavalry 
could be abolished^ but that the companies of pardos should be 
retained since their members all owned their own mounts. He 
considered the mestizo companies "En Memoria del Rey" to be the 
most useful of all the companies in Lima^ and urged that they be 
retained on a disciplined basis. Finally^ Pineda recommended that 
due to the dispersion of its members who lived on haciendas and 
large estates the Regiment of Carabaillo be disbanded and its 
members be incorporated into the Regiment of Dragoons of Lima. 

As for the other areas in Peru^ Pineda recommended that 
training cadres be retained in the cities of Chancay^ Huarura^ 
Arequipa^ Moquequa^ Arica^ Caman^j Trujillo, Lambayeque^ and Piura^ 
and that their size be increased in order to better their ef- 
ficiency. The only exception to this rule was Cuzco^ v;here Pineda 
felt a detachment of veteran troops should be stationed to prevent 
the outbreak of hostilities. Aside from these regions^ the 
inspector recommended that the militia companies should be re- 
classified as urban, and that an end be put to the practice of 
awarding commissions to men who sought them only for reasons of 
vanity. 

Pineda remarked that "a great hatred for the military career" 
was evident among the young men of Peru, which he attributed to the 
low pay in the fijo companies and the practice of granting titles 



2\k 



in the military orders to those v/ealthy enough to buy them rather 
than to those who deserved them on the basis of experience or 
merit. He warned that if the situation were not changed^ veteran 
regiments would refuse to come to Peru and the career at arms 
would fall to men of undistinguished birth and reduced competence. 
He argued that Peru required an expanded number of training cadres 
along its lengthy and undefended coastline to mount an adequate 
defense in case of an invasion. He warned the junta de guerra 
not to make the mistake of placing too much reliance on the 
veteran regiments to provide the kingdom with a defense. These 
regiments, he noted, v/ere scheduled to remain only for a period 
of four years, and that during this period death, desertion, and 
retirement would reduce the strength of these bodies until they 
were practically nonexistent. Europeans coming to America, he 
said, all hoped to enrich themselves by one means or another, and 
for this reason the soldiers vrould desert in order to make their 
fortunes. He predicted that in two years the two regiments would 
number no more than a battalion, and cited the example of the 
second battalion of the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima as an example 
that levies were generally unsuccessful as an alternative means 
of keeping a regiment at strength. He also warned that the 
promise of the crown to send another pair of regiments in four 
years v;as also illusory since the cost of such a shipment v/ould be 
too high to justify. For the above reasons, Pineda recommended 
that the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima be increased in size as a 



215 



hedge against this attrition. 

Viceroy Croix had convened a junta de guerra on August 6 to 
consider these various proposals regarding the army. Escobedo 
spoke of the "deplorable situation" of the royal treasury and all 
of the assembled members agreed that it could not bear the expense 
of training cadres for the provincial militia, although all agreed 
that by abolishing them, the defense of the viceroyalty was 
weakened considerably. In a series of economy measures, the junta 
passed a resolution deactivating the militia in Cuzco, Tarma, and 
Jauja, and ordering that these troops be replaced by detachments 
from the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima. A measure was also passed 
permitting veteran sergeants and corporals to transfer into the 
fijo regiment when their tour of duty was completed. The officer 
corps of the militia regiments of pardos and morenos was also 
ordered removed from pay status and the size of the fijo artillery 
detachment was ordered reduced from 138 to ninety-three men. in 
addition, the junta agreed to retain the fijo troops on Chiloe 
and in Valdivia due to their strategic importance and approved 
a petition of the viceroy to utilize the command and staff group 
of the dragoon Regiment of Caraballlo as a fijo dragoon company 
for his own use. 

On August 16 the junta was again convened by the viceroy 
to discuss a I78I order of the king that a disciplined militia 
be created in Peru capable of defending the kingdom against ex- 
ternal aggression as well as providing internal security. Croix 
stated that Viceroy Jauregui had not put his order into effect 



216 



during this viceregency, either because he was too preoccupied 

with the Indian rebellions or because he was awaiting the arrival 

19 

of Inspector General Pineda. The members of the junta agreed 

that the reform should therefore be carried out vi'ith a minimum 
of delay^ and a vote to replace the training cadres in certain 
of the provincial capitals with veteran detachments v/as passed. 
It was then decided to send the balance of the veteran troops, 
including the second battalion of the Extremadura Regiment to La 
Pazj six companies of the second battalion of the Soria Regiment 

to Cuzco, and the remaining three companies to Arequipa. The fijo 

20 

troops on duty in those areas v/ere ordered to return to Lima.'^ 

Veteran troops were also ordered out to the eight garrisons In 

21 

the provinces of Tarma and Jauja. 

The junta then took up the issue of the fijo Royal Regiment 
of Lima. Visitor Escobedo recommended that the second battalion 
of this unit be disbanded on the grounds that it was below 
strength and not necessary to the defense of the kingdom, but 
this proposal v;as opposed by Inspector Pineda and the regimental 
commander v/ho both felt it should be retained and brought to 
strength. A v^rltten vote on the proposal to disband it v/as taken, 
however, and it passed, due to the support of the viceroy for the 

measure. A second proposal to allow all officers and cadets from 

, 22 

the second battalion to be Incorporated into the first also passed. 

The visitor v;as unsatisfied with this victory though, and proposed 
that in addition to these measures that the regiments of pardos 



217 



and niorenos be reclassified as urban militia and deprived of their 
veteran training cadres on the grounds that this training would 
eventually cause them to be superior in skill to the companies 
of whites, but this proposal was voted down. At the same time 
he recommended that the companies "En Memoria del Rey" be also 
reduced to urban status, but this too was tabled. When Escobedo 
later took this proposal to the crown, he was informed that a 
disciplined militia was essential to the security of Peru and 
not to interfere further in the matter. ^ As a result of this 
deemphasis of this component, Croix only formed a few additional 
urban militia companies during the balance of his viceregency. 
Although he was aware of their limitations, in certain areas they 
were the only forces which the crown possessed to meet an enemy 
attack. ^5 

The effect of the decision to limit the size of the fijo and 
militia components of the Army of Peru in favor of the veteran 
troops coming from Spain tended to breed animosity between these 
tvjo groups. Such hostility was common between regular and militia 
troops, since the former demanded respect and obedience from the 
latter on the grounds that they were Peninsulars and soldiers of 
the king and the militia were not always v/illing to grant them 
this veneration. Often quarrels broke out in a town betv/een the 
senior veteran officer and his militia counterpart over the question 
of who should take command in the absence of the civil authority. 
In Arequipa, for example, the commandant of the veteran detachment 



218 



asserted in a letter to the viceroy that the claim of the ranking 

militia officer to such a command was comparable to a child who 

26 

had never attended school seeking to be a teacher. 

Such hostility was exhibited in the so-called "Revolt of the 
Muchachos" which occurred in the town of Chuquisaca (Sucre)^ where 
a detachment of Spanish troops had been stationed in 1785. During 
the Tupac Amaru rebellion the inhabitants of the city had been 

formed into a militia unit v;ith the name of the Cuerpo de Patr i - 

27 
cios or the Corps of Nobles. This unit was disbanded in 1785 

with the arrival of the veteran troops^ much to the dismay of the 

members of the unit v;ho had attached great pride to membership. 

Not long thereafter violence broke out betv;een the soldiers and 

the townspeople. On the evening of July 21^ a soldier named 

Alonso P^rez, v;ho had been provoked by taunts from a crowd of boys, 

fired into the crov.'d, killing a mestizo by the name of JosI Oro- 

pesa and wounding several other persons. The death of Oropesa 

provided rallying point for the people against the hated Spanish 

troops, and the next day large groups gathered in the town square, 

shouting insults and throwing rocks at the barracks. At the same 

time another group went to the house of Ignacio Flores, the 

president of the Audiencia of Charcas, to demand that P6rez be 

tried for murder for the death of Oropesa. Flores accompanied 

the party to the square in an attempt to get the crowd to disperse 

but by the time he arrived, the soldiers had begun to fire in an 

attempt to drive off the mob. This resulted in the killing of 



219 



low- 



several more persons and the dispersal of the group^ but the foll^ 
Ing day the people again assembled outside of the barracks calling 
for justice. Only the appearance of Flores^ who promised the 
people that the Cuerpo de Patricios would be reestablished^ succeeded 
in ending the demonstration. 

Flores^ a creole^ v;as supported in his attempt to reinstate 
the militia unit by another Creole^ Juan Jos^ de Segovia^ the 
recently appointed rector of the University of San Francisco Xavier 
in the city. The pair v;on the approval of the audiencia to reform 
the unlt^ and in August the petition was sent to the Marques de 
Loreto^ the Viceroy of the La Plata. The viceroy^ a Peninsular^ 
opposed the measure^ v/ith the active support of Arnais^ another 
Peninsular who was an attorney of the audiencia. Loreto therefore 
notified Flores that the defense of Chuquisaca would remain with 
the veteran troops and not with the militia. Perez and some of 
the other soldiers v^ere ordered reassigned to other areas to calm 
the situation. 

The issue did not end there^ however. Because of their sup- 
port of the militia^ v;hich the Spaniards considered a threat to 
the public safety^ Flores and Segovia were harassed and driven from 
public office. Arnais succeeded In getting the archdeacon of the 
cathedral chapter to revoke Segovia's rectorship^ and an investi- 
gation of Flores was begun in Buenos Aires^ although he died before 
It could be completed. The reason for the denial of the peti- 
tion indicated that the crown was aware of the hostility existing 
betv/een veteran and militia soldiers In Peru and did not want to 



220 



elevate a body which might turn against the crown at some future 
time. Moreover, it demonstrated that Creoles v/ho supported such 
a militia v/ere considered to be disloyal and would be treated 
accordi ngly. 

This deemphasis of the creole militia came during a period 
of intense creole nationalism which was fed by the ideas of the 
Enlightenment v/hich had entered the Viceroyalty of Peru. The 
spirit of scientific enquiry in Europe v/hich was transferred to Peru 
in the form of scientific expeditions, manifested itself in the 
Sociedad de amantes del pafs (Society of lovers of the country) 
whose membership included most of the literary and intellectual 
talent in Lima. The society also published the H ercurio Peruano, 
a literary, scientific and historical journal, which one author 

has referred to as "the mouthpiece of a nascent Peruvian national- 

29 
ity." In addition, Lima produced the first daily newspaper in 

America, as well as several other important publications, all 

written and published by the creole elite of that city. This 

Creole aristocracy also used their control of the cabildo to make 

30 
limited gains in the control of municipal government as well. 

Such Creole nationalism also manifested itself in the v/iden- 

ing gulf between Creoles and Peninsulars, and Peru v;as rife v/ith 

31 

rumors of revolt, most of which had no basis in fact. This 

conflict was most clearly shown in the writings of the time, which 
often provide a lucid commentary on these social conditions. The 
militia which had been created by Amat v/ere a source of pride to 



221 



these Creoles. Esteban de Terralla y Landa, a social critic whose 
patron vias the Viceroy Crolx^ noted in his v;ork Lima Por Dentro y 
Fuera (1792) that by becoming a soldier a man of lower-class origin 

could improve his status^ and that otherwise he was treated no better 

32 

than a Negro, It was therefore understandable that the militia did 

not v/elcome the arrival of the veteran regiments from Spain whose 
power and authority they viewed as a detriment to their own ambi- 
tions. Such contempt is described by Terralla y Landa in his ac- 
count of a celebration held in Lima on October 10^ 1789, honoring 
the coronation of Charles IV in v^hich the members of the Soria and 
Extremadura regiments participated. 

Twelve Soldiers follow the Procession 

with rich dazzling Uniforms: 

brilliantly braided suits 

demonstrating in their splendor and arrogance 

although they are not equals of 

[the soldiers of] France, 

they come to Peru, because they receive 

as much applause as a grandson of Phillip. 

In this manner then. Uniformed, 

and in very well harnessed Liveries, 

they bravely authorize the parade 

in order to give more lustre to that Trophy. 

The split between Creoles and Peninsulars v;as widened after 
1789 by the reaction v;hich took place in Peru to the French Revolu- 
tion, whicti led to repressive actions on the part of the authorities 
that the Creoles resented. These had begun as early as I783 with 
the confiscation of Baqufjano's welcoming speech for Viceroy 
Jauregui, and were continued by Viceroy Croix who ordered the burn- 
ing of books suspected of containing subversive ideas and opposed 
reforms in the curriculum at San Marcos. This repression of 



222 



liberal ideas was continued by Viceroy Francisco Gil y l.emos, tine 
former Viceroy of Nev/ Granada^ who replaced Croix on March 25^ 

1790. Gil felt that his period of rule had been during the "most 

35 

calamitous epoch of the world." The presence of British and 

American whalers offshore v;ere not only smugglers and potential 
aggressors^ he felt, but also visible symbols of successful revolu- 
tion. In his Memor ia Gi 1 noted that by the end of his term the 
threat of Indian rebellion had passed into history. What he 
considered to be the most serious challenge to Peru was the French 
Revolution and its dangerous ideas of liberty, fraternity, and 
equality. To meet this challenge he banned numerous books and 
established a secret police to ferret out those suspected of sedi- 
tion. ' He was especially contemptuous of higher education for 
the Creoles whom he suspected of disloyalty. V/hen he was harangued 
on his views by some Creole students at San Marcos one day, Gil 
asked the rector if it was true they were being taught science. 
When the rector replied that they were, Gil replied "Tu, tu, tu, 
let them learn to read, write, and say their prayers, for this is 

•5 o 

as much as any American ought to knovy."-' 

When the news that the junta de guerra had voted to reduce 
the size of the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima to one battalion 
reached the Creoles who held officerships in the second battalion, 
they petitioned the viceroy for its retention and demonstrated their 
anger with the policy of denying Creoles adequate opportunities for 
advancement in the military. Four creole officers. Captains Antonio 
Su^rez, Stanislao de Cabrejas, Jacinto Iriarte, and Joseph de 



223 



Mannilla wrote Croix "in the name of all" of their number who were 
similarly affected by the measure to emphasize the dedication and 
valor which had characterized their service and to argue that 
abolition of the second battalion would leave Lima undefended at 
a most dangerous period. The four signatories held that the second 
battalion constituted only a small additional cost to the Royal 
Treasury^ and that the small savings obtained from disbanding it 
hardly justified the ruin of such a commendable unit. They also 
warned that it was dangerous to place too much reliance upon 
veteran troops, since the climatic and geographic conditions in 
Peru would serve to raise the rates of death and desertion^ espe- 
cially if these soldiers were detached in the interior provinces. 
The authors stated that royal preference for these veterans v/as 
"most prejudicial to the service of the Sovereign" since it gave 
the Creole nobility no chance to serve tiie king at arms. The 
four warned that such a policy might well mean that these loyal 

servants would refuse to ansv/er the call if the battalion should 

39 
later be reformed in an emergency. 

The representation did little good. By December the inspector 

general reported to the crov;n that the Battalion of Infantry at 

Callao had been disbanded along with the second battalion of the 

Royal Regiment of Lima and the competent members of the second 

battalion integrated into the first battalion. This meant a 

reduction in the size of the fijo component of the Army of Peru 

from 6^ 1^0 to 3^678 soldiers, constituting an annual savings of 



224 



579^570 pesos (see Table 6). At the same time, the visitor warned 
G^lvez that due to death and desertion the Soria and Extremadura 
regiments were both below strength, and that the soldiers were 
"broadly disliked" by the people of Peru. He noted that if the 
regiments were brought to strength it would erase the savings 

created by the reduction in the number of training cadres and 

... ., 41 
T I JO un I ts. 

By the following year the predictions regarding the attrition 
of the veteran regiments made by Inspector General Pineda v;ere 
being fulfilled. In an indignant report to the viceroy, Pineda 
stated that the second battalion of the Soria regiment which had been 
detached to Cuzco and Arequipa vjas diminishing at an alarming rate. 
He noted that at the present rate of decline, the battalion v;ould 
decrease from a present strength of 1,191 soldiers to an estimated 
675 by the end of 1785^ and to no more than 559 by the end of the 
following year. Similarly, Pineda predicted that the first bat- 
talion of the Regiment of Extremadura could be expected to lose 
251 out of its total strength of 625 soldiers and an additional 
forty-one by the end of I786, reducing its strength to 333 men by 
that time. In addition, he held that the Royal Regiment of Lima, 
which had been reduced in size to one battalion vjith a strength 
of 610 men, would lose 164 of these by I786, leaving it at a strength 
of 446 men. The cause of this v;as not merely death and desertion, 
Pineda emphasized, but the royal order of the crown wliich, due to 
the drastic underpopulat ion of the Peninsula, permitted those 



225 



TABLE 6 



THE REFORM OF THE FiJO COMPONENT OF THE 
ARMY OF PERU, 1784 



Strength and Expense Strength and Expense 

Prior to the Reform Units After the Reform 



Expense 


Strength 


137,000 pesos 
95,988 
9,931 
28,920 


510 

369 

3 

103 


14,652 
14,352 


36 
43 


1,128 


4 


24,607 


53 


19,391 


49 


2,089 


5 


3,242 


8 


3,362 


8 


3,362 


8 


660 
6,424 


2 

15 


8,520 

5,400 

65,400 

15,600 


82 

7 

151 

51 


13,488 

36,024 

4,402 


66 

144 
9 



Strength Expense 



3 

93 
26 


9,931 

29,448 
9,000 


43 


14,352 


4 


1,128 


50 


20,707 



1st Btn.Rl. Regt. Lima 724 194,748 

2nd Btn.Rl. Regt. Lima 

Command Group, Lima 

Artillery Garrison, Callao 

Artillery Garrison, Cuzco 

Artillery Command Group 

Command Group, Battalion 

of Spaniards 
Command Group, Companies 

of Tailors (Mestizos) 
Command Group, Regiment 

of Dragoons of Lima 
Command Group, Regiment 

of Dragoons of 

Carabai 1 lo 
Command Group, Militia 

of Cariete 
Command Group, Militia 

of Huarura 
Command Group, Militia 

of I ca 
Command Group, Militia 

of Chancay 
Officers, Indians of Lima 
Command Group, mulattos 

of Lima 
Mulatto Officers 
Unattached Officers 
Viceroy's Cavalry Guard 
Halberdiers of the 

Viceroy's Guard 
Garrison in Jauja 
Garrison in Tar ma 
Command Group, Militia of 

Piura 



2 


660 


15 


6,424 


50 


4,284 


15 


11,100 


34 


13,680 


25 


7,800 



226 



TABLE 6 (cont.) 



Strength and Expense • Strength and Expense 

Prior to the Reform Units After the Reform 

Expense Strength Strength Expense 



2,289 


5 


Command Group, Militia 
of Truj i 1 lo 


~ 




^,272 


13 


Command Group, Militia 
of Arica 


" — 




1,704 


k 


Command Group, pardos 
of Lima 


k 


1,704 


2,106 


23 


Pardo Off icers 


13 


1,290 


216,665 


1,177 


Militia of Cuzco 


— 




51,532 


373 


Garrison in Valdivia 


373 


51,532 


39,710 


207 


Garrison on Chi loe 


207 


39,710 


328,908 


1,276 


Regiment of Soria 


1,276 


328,908 


337., 728 


1.285 


Regiment of Extremadura 


642 


168,864 


1,^98,958 


6,089 




3,600 


915,270 


2,866 




Pr izes to each corps 




2,866 


6,922 


51 


Ret i red and Inval id 


78 


1 1 , 040 


1,508,7^6 


6,140 


Totals 


3,678 


929,176 



Summary 

Strength Annual Expens e 

Strength and expense before the Reform 6, 140 1,508,746 pesos 

Strength and expense after the Reform 3,678 929,176 

Reform and savings that result 2,462 579,570 



Source: AGlrAL 1494 "Cotexto del Gasto anual, pie y fuerza del Exercito 
que antes de la ultima Reforma hecha por Junta de Grra en Dec^° 
de 9 de Sept'^^ de 1784, havia en la conprencion de este Virrei- 
nato y el cstado actual que oy se reconoce con demon°'^ de la 
dif^ del antor yd pres^^." 



227 



soldiers who had completed their tours of duty in the veteran regi- 
ments to return to Spain. The combination of these factors would, 
he estimated, reduce the size of the veteran and fijo components to 
around 1,338 men by the end of I786, or a 5O per cent reduction in 
strength. He noted that the reform of the army v;hich he had sup- 
ported had been made with the expectation that the veteran component 
would be retained at full strength. Since this was obviously not 

the case, he warned that the defense of the viceroyalty would be- 

^2 
come perilously v/eak in the coming years. 

By 1787 the situation which Inspector Pineda had warned of 
earlier had presented itself and Viceroy Croix requested permis- 
sion from the crown to disband the Soria and Extremadura regiments. 
He also asked that he be allowed to increase the size of the Royal 
Regiment of Lima by tv7o additional battalions to 1,358 men (see 
Table 7). He stated that while Peru presently contained four 
regular battalions that three could effectively defend the vice- 
royalty if six companies were detached in Cuzco, three in Arequipa, 
two in Tarma, one in Jauja, and the remaining fifteen in the Lima- 
Callao area. He noted that if the Soria and Extremadura regiments 
were disbanded and their members transferred into the fijo Regi- 
ment of Lima additional money could be saved due to the pay dif- 

^3 
ferential between fijo and regular troops. 

Such a request v^as not at the same time an invitation to the 

Creoles to assume the defense of the viceroyalty. Croix expressed 

certainty that the members of the regiments vyould seek positions in 



228 



TABLE 7 
ORGANIZATION OF A VETERAN INFANTRY REGIMENT 



Companies 



Grenadiers 1 1 


1 1 1 


3 


3 


1 


5^ 


63 


Fus i leers 1 1 


1 1 2 


h 


k 


2 


6it 


77 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


6^ 


77 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


6^ 


77 


^ Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Gk 


77 


.1: Fus i leers 1 1 


1 1 2 


h 


k 


2 


Sk 


77 


•^ Fus i leers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Gh 


77 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Sh 


77 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


h 


2 


eh 


77 


Grenadiers 1 1 


1 1 1 


3 


3 


1 


5h 


63 


Fus i leers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Gk 


77 


Fus i leers 1 1 


1 1 2 


h 


k 


2 


Gh 


77 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Gk 


77 


^ Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Sk 


77 


g Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Sk 


77 


^ Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Sk 


77 


^ Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Sh 


77 


Fusileers 1 1 


1 1 2 


k 


k 


2 


Sk 


77 



Totals 



18 18 18 18 3^ 



70 



70 



3^ 1132 1358 



229 



TABLE 7 (cont.) 



Command and Staff Group 



First Battalion 



Second Battal ion 



1 Colonel 

1 Sargento Mayor 

1 Ayudante Mayor 

2 Standard Bearers 
1 Chaplain 

1 Surgeon 

1 Corporal^ Gastador 

6 Gastadores 

1 Master Armorer 

1 Drum Major 

2 Fifers 



1 Lieutenant Colonel 

1 Ayudante Mayor 

2 Flag Bearers 
1 Chaplain 

1 Surgeon 

1 Corporal^ Gastadores 

6 Gastadores 

1 Master Armorer 

2 Fifers 



Source: Adapted from Ordenanzas de S.M. para el regimen, disciplina . 

subordi nacion, y servicio de sus exercitos . . .. 2 voTs . (Madrid, 
1768). 



230 



the fijo regiment once their terms of service were ended If allowed 
to do so. He was also aware that the Creoles^ whom he characterized 
as "weak,, unaccustomed to work, and Incapable of v/i thstandi ng the 
hardships of war/' v;ould also try to pack the battalions with their 
own kind in an effort to create a vehicle to serve their own ambi- 
tions. To prevent this from happening^ Croix proposed that the 
command and staff groups^ officer corps^ and enlisted ranks in the 
new battalions be limited to 50 per cent Creole membership, reserv- 
ing the other half for Peninsular Spaniards. In addition, as a 
security measure, he sought to limit the number of Creole officers 
who served in any one company. Nevertheless, Croix admitted that 
the lack of interest in military service among the Spaniards In 
Peru v;ould make this difficult to achieve, and he urged that the 
crown send annual shipments of recruits from Spain to preserve the 
balance between the two groups. In order to facilitate the 
retention of regular soldiers, Croix made an exception to a rule of 
the church forbidding the marriage of these troops, and Issued an 
order allowing commanders to Issue marriage licenses to soldiers 
under their command. "^ 

Croix convened a junta de guerra to work out the mechanics of 
the transfer. The junta decided to allow all officers and men 
from the two regiments to join the new fijo battalions if they would 
sign up for a six-year period. Although this also entailed a re- 
duction in pay, Croix noted that it did not deter "large numbers" 
of soldiers from making the sv/Itch. However it v;as still necessary 
to make a "rigorous levy" In the various provincial capitals In an 



231 



effort to bring the new battalions to strength. By I788 the 
fijo Regiment of Lima v;as at a total strength of 1^^02 men, 663 
below its prescribed strength of 2,065. 

The crown approved Croix's petition to disband the veteran 
regiments and to expand the size of the fijo battalion, but it 
attached two stipulations to such approval .^"-^ First, it held 
that each regular officer passing into the new regiment must pay 
the crown a benefice, a practice follov/ed earlier in New Spain, 
to help cover the cost of maintaining the nev; unit. Secondly, the 
crown held that during peacetime the size of each of the fijo bat- 
talions should be reduced from nine to seven companies, and that 
during wartime its strength could be increased by attaching 
twenty-five militiamen to each company to bring it to strength. 

At first Croix refused to enforce this provision, since he 
feared that it would cause "untold hardship" to the officers of the 
six companies which v;ould be abolished. He told the superintendent 
of the Royal Treasury that he would not dare to order such a measure 
because of the anger which it would provoke among those affected. 
The commandant of the detachment of the Royal Regiment of Lima in 
Cuzco v;rote to the crov;n and expressed the opinion that such an order 
would increase the workload of a regiment which was understrength 
and overloaded with duties. He noted that these two extra companies 
in each battalion were often used as manpower pools to replace 
soldiers that had been detached throughout the viceroyalty whose 
number had declined due to desertion, sickness, or death. Their 



232 



loss, he warned, would place the loyalty of the entire regiment In 
question. Nevertheless, the reform proceeded as requested, and 

by the end of the year 1790 Croix notified the king that the 

52 

companies had been disbanded in each battalion. 

Although the arrival in Peru of the news of the French Revolu- 
tion provoked an increased attention to defense after 1789, it also 
marked a period of decadence within the Spanish empire, during 
v;hich the reduction of the size of the Army of Peru continued. The 
death of the capable G^lvez and later of Charles 111 on December 1^, 
1788, left the leadership of the empire in the hands of the latter's 
incompetent son Ctiarles IV, and placed the success of the Bourbon 
Reforms in jeopardy. In Peru Viceroy Croix was granted a commission 
in the Spanish Royal Waloon Guards in honor of his services and 
relieved of his duties as viceroy. Mis successor. Lieutenant General 
of the Royal Navy Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, arrived, accord- 
ing to one Informed source, to guide Peru through the golden age of 

53 
the colonial period. 

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the military reform program, 
the period was less idyllic, in that the militia was Increasingly dis- 
credited and, contrary to Croix's hopes, the Creoles captured numer- 
ical control of the fijo regiment. Yet at the same time, the Army 
of Peru remained the largest Spanish force In America, In the Vice- 
royalty of New Granada, for example, the army had a total strength 
of 9^990 fijo and disciplined militia troops ouL of a population of 
approximately a million and a half persons, giving it a soldier to 



233 



citizen ratio of about 1:150. Nev; Spain at this time had an army 
of 35^^00 soldiers out of a population of five million^ giving it 
about the same soldier-citizen ratio as New Granada, The Army of 
Peru^ on the other hand^ numbered about 25,000 fijo and disciplined 
militia troops, out of a population estimated at just over a million, 
giving it a ratio of about 1:40.5^ Conditions, however, dictated 
that this number must be reduced to achieve the savings necessitated 
by the financial condition of the viceroyalty. 

Accordingly, by 1790 the Royal Regiment of Lima had been de- 

55 
creased by 597 men to a strength of 1,^68. On the basis of an 

order from the king the following year that all militia units be 
reclassified as either urban or disciplined in order that the 
crown could better assess New World defenses, the Peruvian author- 
ities estimated the size of the militia at 57^787 men, including 
3'+,71^ infantry mi 1 it ia, 18,811 caval ry mi 1 i t ia, and 11,262 
dragoons. Of the total, only 19^000 v/ere classified as dis- 
ciplined, possessing a regular training cadre, standard table of 
organization, and regular training. The rest of the militia were 
classified as urban whose status and privileges had been substan- 
cially curtailed in I786 in an effort to stem the abuses result- 
ing from these fueros. 

During the viceregency of Viceroy Gil y Lemos the reduction 
in the scope and function of the militia which he had carried out 
in New Granada earlier was continued in Peru. Gil had objected 
to a militia for the reasons that it was expensive and ineffective, 



23^ 



but also because he felt it posed a positive threat to internal 

security because of its impact on the Indian. 

... to have [the Indians] live among the professionals, to 
fortify the capital and maintain it in a constant state of 
war^ is to teach them what they do not know; it is to make 
them think about that which otherwise would not occur to them; 
it is to force upon them an appreciation for their own power, 
and on the occasion in which they employ it, they may perceive 
their advantage. Therefore, if in addition to the indispen- 
sable appropriations which the King must make for the security 
of these domains against the exterior enemy, the interior 
defense is placed on a comparable footing, its maintenance 
will not only become useless but dangerous. 

There v;ere two reasons for such an attitude on the part of the 

58 
viceroy. The first was their lack of loyalty, and the second 

was the belief that the militia officers frequently used their 

commissions for personal gain. Such an assumption v;as supported 

by travellers such as the German naturalist Alexander von Humboldt 

who noted that all the principal residents of the interior towns 

in Peru were officers in the local militia and that they made 

59 

"extraordinary sacrifices of moriey" to obtain these commissions. 

These and other accounts implied that gain as well as prestige 
was a factor in seeking these positions. 

In a report to his successor, Viceroy Gil stated that the 
coastal provinces of Peru constituted the real bulwark of loyalty 
to the crown, and that this fidelity weakened progressively as 
one passed eastwards into the mountains. The militia of the interior, 
he felt, v/ere useless, and served only to provide a subterfuge for 
rich men of Lima to hold commissions in nonexistent companies for 
their own ends. Gil felt that the garrisons on the Indian frontier. 



235 



however, should be maintained to prevent attacks by the savages of 
the Mattogroso region on the frontier settlements of Tarma and 
Jauja, and that large numbers of troops, both regular and militia, 
should be maintained along the coastal valleys and especially in 
Lima, which was, he felt, "the real source of respect for and 
conservation of our possessions." He cited the disciplined mili- 
tia units of the capital as a prime reason for this situation, and 
urged that the thirty-eight companies of Spaniards on Chlloe, as 
v/ell as the militia regiments in Cuzco and Arequipa also be given 
a disciplined classification since, although they did not have 

permanent training cadres, they received regular training from the 

... . . ^, 61 

fijo garrisons in those areas. 

In September, 1792, Viceroy Gil sent to the crown a report of 
subinspector general Gabriel de Avills, the former military com- 
mandant of Cuzco, v;hom Gil had asked to assume the duties of 
Inspector General Pineda who had returned to Spain. in his report 
Aviles stated that he had carried out an inspection tour of the 
militia in the viceroyalty which convinced him that the units located 
on the coast and in certain interior towns ought to be retained due 
to their utility in combatting seaborne expeditions and Indian 
rebellions respectively. In the other regions of the viceroyalty, 
Aviles recommended that the companies of militia no longer be 
permitted to remain in an urban classification, but that they be 
abolished altogether. He stated that their presence was prejudicial 
to the best interests of the crown since there was an insufficient 
number of reputable persons, meaning whites, in these areas v/ho 



236 



could be granted commissions with any degree of confidence in their 
loyalty. On the other hand, the practice of awarding commissions 
in these companies to residents of Lima had resulted, Avil65 felt, 
in a complete lack of training and discipline, since these persons 
never ventured out to the provinces. As a result, all the crov;n 
had succeeded in producing vias a large group of men who wore the 
uniform only to serve their own interests and who often sailed to 
Spain to trade on its value there. 

As an alternative to this inadequate system, Aviles recom- 
mended that these companies be abolished and that the subdelegates 
instead raise ad hoc companies to serve as auxiliaries in the event 
of an emergency. If and vihen these companies were raised to combat 
a coastal invasion, Aviles urged that they be placed under the com- 
mand of local landowners rather than regular officers. He cited 
the experience of the Tupac Amaru rebellion as an example of the 
desertion which occurred when these militia v;ere placed under of- 
ficers other than their employers or local officials. 

As for the coastal militia, Aviles held that it was practically 
impossible to unite the various militia regiments into a tactical 
unit for combat purposes, since the coast v;as 500 leagues in length 
and because the existing troops could cover only one-third of this 
at most. Since the terrain, distance, and lack of a settled popula- 
tion precluded traditional offensive maneuvers in what Aviles 
referred to as "the European manner," he reasoned that it would be 
better to restrict the function of this coastal militia to the 



237 



protection of the towns and villages along the coast. Avil^s urged 
the viceroy to request that the crown pass an order forbidding the 
creation of any further militia in these interior regions in an ef- 
fort to prevent "persons interested in disorder" from using the com- 

62 

mission as a means to promote their schemes. He attached a table 

in which he recommended that fity-eight militia regiments^ totalling 

18,8^1 men^ be abolished^ retaining a total of ^0,088 militia which 

63 
he deemed both useful and necessary to the defense of the kingdom. 

The subsequent history of the militia in Peru reflects the 
recommendations of Inspector Avil6s. Betv/een 1793 and 1799 the 
cutbacks in the urban militia in the interior caused a drop in 
that component from '49;010 to 29^725 soldiers, while the new emphasis 
placed upon the disciplined militia of the coast led to an increase 
in that sector of the army from 10,881 soldiers to 29,725 by the 
end of the century. While the size of the Army of Peru fluctuated 
somev/hat prior to independence, the relative strength of the urban 
and disciplined militia remained the same, reflecting the fact 
that agreement had been reached by the authorities as to their organ- 
ization and mission. Subsequent increases in the size of the urban 
militia just prior to independence do not reflect a change in this 
thinking as will be explained subsequently. By the turn of the 
century, therefore, the military reform had been essentially 
culminated. (See Table 8.) 

The declaration of war against France, published in Peru on 
August 12, 1793, gave Avil^s the opportunity to set up a plan of 



238 

TABLE 8 
THE MILITIA OF PERU, I787-I8I6 



1281 

Total Infantry Militia 31,9^5 

Total Cavalry Ml 1 it ia 9,^3& 

Total Dragoon Mi 1 it ia IO.O86 

Total Disciplined 17,000 

Total Urban 3^,^67 

Grand Total 51,^67 

U31 

Total Infantry Militia 3^,71^ 

Total Cavalry Mi I itia 18,811 

Total Dragoon Militia 1 1 . 262 

Total Disciplined 19,000 

Total Urban 38,787 

Grand Total 57,787 

1221 

Total Infantry Mi 1 it la 27,230 

Total Cavalry Mi 1 itia 10,955 

Total Dragoon Militia 10,825 

Total Disciplined 10,881 

Total Urban 38,229 

Grand Total ^9,010 

Total Infantry Militia 23,0^5 

Total Cavalry Mi 1 itia 11,217 

Total Dragoon Militia 9,032 

Total Disciplined 

Total Urban 

Grand Total ^3,29^+ 



239 



TABLE 8 (cont.) 



1232. 

Total Infantry Militia 
Total Caval ry Militia 
Total Dragoon Militia 

Total Disci pi i ned 
Total Urban 
Grand Total 

1802 



23,718 
^9,725 



26,412 
13,223 

13,808 



53,4^3 



Total Infantry Militia 
T6tal Cavalry Mi 1 it ia 
Total Dragoon Militia 

Total Di scipl i ned 
Total Urban 
Grand Total 

1816 



23,114 

29,299 



26,737 
12,936 



52,413 



Total I nfantry Militia 
Total Cavalry Mi 1 itia 
Total Dragoon Militia 

Total Disci pi I ned 
Total Urban 
Grand Total 



29,026 
41,544 



41,077 
13,925 
15,568 



70,570 



Sources: AGI:AL 673 Croix to Sonora, Lima, March 31, I787, pp. 1-2; 
AGJrAL 703 Gil to the Campo de Alange, Lima, February 26, 
1792, p. 1; Hipolito Unanue, Guia Polftica , Eclesi ^s tlca 
^L-MJJ-i tar del Virreinato del Peru (Lima, 1793, 1799); 
Estado Militar de Espana, Ano de 1799 (Madrid, 1799); 
BNL:Mss. D4717 "Estado que manifiesta el pie y fuerza de 
los cuerpos de Milicias Provinciales Disci pi i nadas y Ur- 
banas . . . que hay en el Virreynato del Peru . . .," 
Lima, July 19, 1802; ado que manifiesta el numero de 
Cuerpos de Ynfanteria que tiene el Virreinato del Peru 
. . . Ario de I8I6," Menioria de Abascal , plate 8, follow- 
ing p. 336. "Estado que manifiesta el numero de Cuerpos 
de Caballerfa y Dragones de Milicias Provinciales Disci- 
plinadas y Urbanas que tiene en el Virreinato del Peru 
. . . Ano de 1816." Ibid ., plate 10, following p. 352. 



2^0 



defense v/hich would be consistent v/ith the above reorganization, 
whereby responsibility for defense would be decentralized and 
Increased attention would be given to the coastal militia. Vice- 
roy Gil stated that although a seaborne invasion remained a 
dangerous possibility in an area with as extensive a coastline as 
Peru, he had not mounted a single cannon in any part of the king- 
dom during the war against France, since he did not feel that the 
coastal presidios themselves could turn back an enemy. More- 
over, he did not feel that they vyould have to. Instead, he relied 
upon the arid coastal deserts and the disciplined militia of the 
littoral to discourage any enemy penetration. 

On August 19 Viceroy Gil convened a junta de guerra to discuss 
preparations for the v/ar against France. Ideally, Gil noted, Peru 
should have a large navy to cover the coast and encounter an at- 
tacking force before it could stage a landing, but he recognized 
that the extension of this coast made this impossible. Nevertheless, 
he reiterated that even v;ith a small army, the geographic barriers 
of Peru posed a formidable obstacle to an enemy expedition which 
had been forced to travel 15,000 leagues to launch an attack. 

Viceroy Gil then went on to relate the plan of defense vjhich 
had been devised by Inspector Avil^s, proposing that this extensive 
coast be divided into three separate commandancies general, each of 
v/hich was to be placed under the command of a veteran commandant 
v/ho would have the overall military responsibility for the area. 
Each of these three commandancies v.'ould in turn be subdivided into 



2^1 



military districts which v/ould be presided over by a veteran com- 
mand and staff group consisting of a senior officer, a subaltern, 
a sergeant major, three corporals, and a drummer, who v;ould be 
charged with the task of disciplining the militia of that region. 

The plan proposed that the northern command extend from 
Tumb^s to the Santa River, v/ith Trujillo as the capital of the 
commandancy, and that training cadres be placed in the tov/ns of 
Trujillo, Huarura, Lambayeque, and Palta, The central commandancy 
was to run south from the Santa River to lea, v;ith Lima as its 
capital. Besides Lima and lea, training cadres were to be placed 
in Santa and Chancay. The southern commandancy was to extend 
south from lea to the border with Chile, with Its headquarters 
In Tacna, and training cadres located in the towns of Nasca, 
CamanS, Tacna, and Moquequa. Funds were to be appropriated to 
pay the expense of thirty mounted militia who v;ere to serve each 
commandancy as couriers to relay the nev;s of an invasion from 
dist r I ct to dl st r let . 

The plan concentrated upon the defense of the major coastal 
towns and cities on the theory that an enemy could not sustain it- 
self on the arid desert unless It could take possession of these 
areas. The training groups located in eacy city would be respon- 
sible for putting the militia of that region under arms, commanding 
these forces in battle, and handling other matters related to 
defense. Each of them would be directly responsible to the district 
commandant v;ho would be empowered to act as a judge in cases concerning 
the militia^ and who would coordinate all military activities In his 



2^2 



commandancy. Should an enemy land, Avil^s planned to use small 
mounted militia units ("flying squads") to keep them pinned down 
along the coast and to deprive them of the facilities of the 
cities. He hoped to thereby force a retreat through a loss of 
morale rather than by military superiority. 

Avil^s reasoned that if an attack was launched against Lima 
it would be done by a large invading force. He conceded that the 
artillery at the fortress "Real Felipe" was insufficient to deter 
such an invasion, but reasoned that it would at least force a land- 
ing to be made at a point farther removed from the city. For this 
reason he ordered a "flying squad" composed of sixty mounted dragoons 
to be placed in a barracks situated on the coast which would patrol 
it from dusk to dawn in order to prevent a nightime attack bent on 
firing and sacking the city. As a second line of defense, Avil^s 
divided the city of Lima into several sections, each of which 
became the responsibility of a particular militia regiment. At 
a given signal, the regiment was to assemble at a designated 
location to defend the city walls. In an effort to equalize the 
firepower of these regiments and provide them leadership, companies 
of the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima were to be dispersed among the 
various militia companies when they were so positioned. The over- 
all command of the militia during an attack v/as to be placed in 
a major general of the army. In addition, Aviles recommended that 
the fortress at Callao be reinforced by i+00 fijo troops and 1,100 
militiamen in the event of a siege. He also exempted from militia 



2^3 



service a small army of mechanics and tradesmen whose job it was 
to supply and feed the soldiers. 

On August 2k, 179^^ the Aviles plan vjas approved by the 
crown^ and Gil named as commandants of the northern and southern 
districts the veteran officers Colonel Joaqu'n Valc^rcel and 
Salvador Cabrito^ vyhile keeping command of the central district 
for himself. At the same time he ordered four of the six fijo 
com.panies which had been detached to Cuzco in 178^ to return to 
Lima, along with the two detached in Arequipa, in order to increase 
the strength of the garrison. Training cadres were dispatched to 
the various cities outlined by Aviles and the viceroy noted that local 
citizens had raised money to arm and outfit the militia in many of 
these areas. The viceroy himself presided over a mock invasion of 
the coast outside of Lima in which 3^000 militia participated, and 
at its conclusion announced his satisfaction with their ability to 
defend the capital. 

In 1796 Viceroy Gil was replaced as viceroy by the energetic 
former Captain General of Chile, Ambrosio O'Higgins. During his 
viceregency and that of Gabriel de Avills, who replaced him in 
1801, the military institution in Peru remained essentially un- 
changed from the status which it achieved under Viceroy Gil. Both 
held similar views on defense strategy, and both recognized the 
utility of maintaining a disciplined militia on the coast to defend 
against an enemiy invasion by sea."' The optim,ism voiced by Gil in 
the capacities of this coastal militia seems to have disappeared 



2ii4 



under O'Higglns^ however. Whereas in 1797^ after taking office and 
being informed of the outbreak of war against Great Britain^ O'Hig- 
gins boasted that he could raise 8,000 militia in Lima at any given 

time, two years later he had changed his opinion of this component 

r u 68 
of the army. 

In a report on the condition of the viceroyalty in 1799^ 

O'Higgins informed the crown that the 20,000 militia which v/ere 

supposed to exist in the provinces were imaginary, lacked arms, 

discipline, and the slightest semblance of soldiers. He stated that 

he could not depend upon them for defense and that the fijo Royal 

Regiment of Lima was "the only hope and confidence of this Kingdom." 

The viceroy had hoped to place the squadron of dragoons "Harfa Luisa" 

of Caraballlo In a fijo category to act as a "flying squad" to cover 

the coast north and south of Callao harbor, but this proposal v;as 



by 
rejected by the crown on financial grounds. He warned the king 

that the coastal militia could be expected to flee Into the 

interior In the event of an invasion, and that an enemy v/ould proceed 

tov/ards Lima without opposition. He retained his faith in the militia 

of Lima to defend it though, stating that they were professional 

enough to v/Ithstand the rigors of war. A proposal by O'Higgins 

to convert the fijo troops In the viceroyalty to militia in an 

effort to save on expenses v/as also made, but apparently was not 

, J 70 
accepted. 

For the above reasons, O'Higgins took no extraordinary measures 

to defend the coast from attack during the war. In a letter to the 

crown he cynically stated that these vyars v;ere always terminated 



2^5 



before such measures as casting cannon and erecting fortifications 
v/ere completed. He did, hovyever, appoint Lieutenant Colonel 
Gavino Gainsa and a detachment of thirty dragoons to take control 
of the northern commandancy, and ordered Bartolom6 Maria de Sala- 
manca, a career naval officer and the Intendant of Arequipa, to 
assume command of the southern district. Salamanca subsequently 

placed that region in the best state of defense v;hich it had ever 

72 
experienced.' In addition, O'Higgins assumed control of the 

defense of Chile, which brought him into conflict with Gabriel 

de Avil^s, the captain general of that region, who succeeded in 

having the Captaincy General of Chile declared independent of the 

Viceroyalty of Peru in 1798.''^ 

By the year 1801 when the aged Marques de Avil^s succeeded 

O'Higgins as Viceroy of Peru, the apparent decline in the morale 

of the army was widespread. Avil^s conceded that he had been 

generally unsuccessful in the raising of additional militia due to 

the widespread aversion to this service and the ease v/ith v/hich 

enlistment could be avoided in the less populated regions of the 

viceroyalty. He also noted the presence of deep dissatisfaction 

in the fijo component of the army because of low wages and slow 

promotion. As a result, he disclosed that many of the Spaniards 

in the regiment had either deserted or resigned to make their 

fortune elsev^here. He disclosed that of the 1,000 replacements 

which had been enlisted following the peace with Great Britain, 

practically all v/ere Americans, whom he considered to be inferior 

soldiers. He frankly admitted that not over 10,000 Spaniards 



2ke 



could be found in all America to fill the fijo battalions. TPie 
Creoles in this regiment^ he noted, v/ere reluctant to perform 
garrison duty on Chiloe and in Tarma and Cuzco, and that as a 
result he had been forced to utilize militia soldiers to perform 
these duties. 

Such frank admissions demonstrate not only Aviles' lack of 
aptitude for government but also the fact that by the turn of the 
century the defense of Peru vias largely in the hands of the fijo 
regiment in Lima^ which by this time was essentially a creole unit. 
The balance between Spaniards and Americans encouraged by Gil and 
Aviles had not been maintained. This characteristic also manifested 
Itself in the fijo Regiment of Artillery which was increased in 
size in 1802, and commanded by Colonel Joaqufn de la Pezuela, the 
subinspector of that branch of the army, who himself became vice- 
roy in 1816.^5 

The history of the militia in Peru after 1800 demonstrates 
a continuing lack of confidence in their abilities on the part of 
the Spanish authorities. Viceroy Abascal, who assumed the vice- 
regency in 1805 held that they were better in Lima than elsewhere 
simply because in the provinces whim and influence counted more 
towards promotion than did merit and seniority, and that the small 
likelihood of an enemy striking in these distant regions meant that 
discipline was relaxed and that disorder prevailed. In his Memo - 
ria Abascai detailed the failures of the military reforms, stating 
that since their inception the provincial militia had been under- 



247 



strength and officered by men v;ho sought only to enrich and glorify 
themselves through the use of the uniform. He noted that the 
various economy measures had prevented training cadres from being 
assigned to them and that as a result discipline could not be 
maintained. He blamed the authorities for appointing subinspectors 
v;ho were either too old or who lacked an interest in the militia, 
and who consequently failed to travel to the provinces to oversee 
the formation and training of these companies. For this reason he 
felt that neither their number or quality could be counted upon. 

Abascal admitted that while the coastal militia had been 
given training cadres and were theoretically in a disciplined clas- 
sification, that certain areas still lacked this instruction. He 
noted that to rectify this situation he had resorted to the device 
of calling up 10 per cent of the coastal militia and assembling 
them for field maneuvers outside of Lima, in the hope that this 
would familiarize them with tactics and the rigors of warfare. In 
general he admitted that his efforts to use the militia to put 
down disturbances in Quito and La Paz had been a failure and that 
he had been forced to detach large bodies of fijo troops to 
garrison both of those areas. 

Nevertheless, the increasing number of rebellions in favor 
of independence which occurred in Upper Peru after 1810 forced 
Viceroy Abascal to order the reformation of the militia of this 
region which had been deactivated by Avil^s after 1784. This 
was done, however, not to provide this chaotic area v\/ith an efficient 



2A8 



means of defense, but rather to retain its loyalty through the grant' 
ing of commissions and fueros which had been taken away from the 
inhabitants years earlier and which the Spaniards and Creoles 
demanded be reinstated. Not only were the militia given their 
old privileges back but Viceroy Abascal decreed that to reduce 

desertion they should be granted pieces of land in fee simple at 

78 
the end of a campaign. Such concessions attest to the strong 

desire to retain the loyalty of these militiamen whose fidelity 

to the crown had always been suspect since the conclusion of the 

Indian v/ars. Nevertheless, the surge for independence v;as too 

strong to be deterred by such measures. In I8l8 Viceroy Pezuela 

recommended in a letter to the crown that the interior militia of 

Peru be disbanded altogether on the grounds that as mixed bloods 

v>fho had received training in the handling and firing of weapons, 

their defection to the insurgents could be "extremely fatal to 

the State." He proposed instead that detachments from the fijo 

regiment in Lima be sent to garrison these interior towns and 

79 
cities to preserve them for the crown of Spain. Nevertheless 

the militia remained intact throughout the pre independence period 

simply because Spain could not afford the expense of maintaining a 

larger standing army. 

Under the capable Viceroy Jos^ Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, 

the most capable military man to govern Peru since Manuel de Amat, 

the viceroyalty offset the absence of an interior defense by 

80 
strengthening its coastal defenses. During the turbulent period 



2^9 



following the Napoleonic invasion of Spain^ the loyalist Abascal 

worked hard to ingratiate himself with the influential sectors of 

81 
Lima society and won their support. Much of this effort was 

devoted to healing the widening breach between Spaniards and 

Creoles in Peru. Within the army this enmity had been accentuated 

by the policy practiced by the viceroys following the Indian 

rebellions^ which attempted to restrict the number and rank of 

the Creoles within the fijo regiments in Peru. Although this 

measure had failed to keep the Creoles from dominating the regiment 

by 1800^ the senior grades within the officer corps of the army 

were generally restricted to Peninsulars except in certain areas 

where Creoles dominated the militia companies due to a lack of 

Op 

Spaniards to fill such positions. Accordingly^ the army lacked 
internal unity. 

With the appointment of the Creole Jos6 Manuel de Goyeneche 
as the head of the Royalist armies sent to subdue the rebellions 
in Chuquisaca and La Paz in 1 809^ Abascal showed himself to be 
willing to appoint Creoles to positions of responsibility in the 
Spanish colonial administration without regard to their place of 
birth. The creole officers whom Abascal appointed in turn 
willingly took orders from a creole general and his presence did not 

provoke the animosity between these two factions which Peninsular 

8^ 
generals had been prone to do. In addition^ Abascal recreated 

the urban militia Regiment of the Nobility and renamed it the 

Regiment "de la Concordia Espanola/' in the hope of providing a 



250 



vehicle for the Spaniards of Lima to express their loyalty to the 
king and to serve as a counterweight to the creole-dorni nated fijo 
Royal Regiment of Lima. Abascal's stated purpose in so doing was 
to end the "hateful rivalry between the Spaniards of both Hemi- 
spheres/' although the creation of the regiment only provoked a 
massive criticism from the Creoles who ridiculed the unit and tried 
to destroy it once it had been established.^^ Accordingly, the 
regiment failed in its purpose of reconciling the two groups and 
instead served only to drive them further apart. ^^ By I8l6 Vice- 
roy Abascal noted that the rivalry between Creoles and Peninsulars 
seemed to be on the increase, and had manifested itself especially 
betvyeen the members of the fijo and militia troops. 

Nevertheless, by the end of the first decade of the nineteenth 
century the Army of Peru was as strong as any within the Spanish 
empire in the New V/orld. This was due largely to the efforts of 
Abascal, who had finally created the first proper army within the 

viceroyalty in response to the threat of independence which had 

oo 
begun to sweep the continent. (See Table 9.) By I8IO the king- 
dom of Peru was described by one contemporary historian as "an 

89 
arsenal." Even enemies of the crown attested to the strength of 

90 
the Peruvian army. By the end of the century it had become the 

single largest item in the budget, consistently consuming over half 

of the total revenues of the viceroyalty.^^ Moreover, it had been 

changed substantially in structure since midcentury. Whereas prior 

to this time a proper militia did not exist In Peru, by the end of 



251 

TABLE 9 
THE ARMY OF PERU, 181 6 



1 . Regular Troops 

Regiment of Royal Infantry of Lima 
Battalion of Infantry of Chiloe 
Company of Infantry of Mainas 
Company of Dragoons of Cuzco 

Training cadres detached for the instruction of 
the disciplined militia 

Total 



1,278 

380 

51 

35 

2k] 
1,985 



2. Infantry Hi 1 itia 
a, Discipl i ned 
Lima 



Battalion of Spaniards 
Battal ion of pardos 
Companies of morenos 

I ca 

Battal ion of lea 

Cuzco 

Regiment of Cuzco 
Regiment of Noble Indians 

Trui i 1 lo 

Companies of Trujillo 
Battal ion of Piura 
Regiment of Lambayeque 

Arequ i p a 

Regiment of Arequipa 
Tar ma 

Regiment of Tarma 



1,359 

1,299 

kh7 



361 



926 
1,156 



'f95 

731 

1,005 



1,786 



970 



252 

TABLE 9 (cont.) 



Chi loe 

Regiment of Castro 1^599 

Companies of Chi loe 633 

Guayaqu i 1 

Regiment of Guayaquil 880 

Battalion of pardos hkO 

Total 1^,087 

b. Urban 

Tar ma 

Cuzco 

Guamanga 

Huanuco 

Mainas 

Arequipa 

Puno 

Total 26,990 

Note: Veteran training cadres were situated in Lima, Piura, Lamba- 
yeque, Trujillo, Santa, Chancay, CaFfete, lea, Nasca, Caman^, 
and Tacna. In Cuzco and Arequipa the veteran garrisons per- 
formed this training function. 

3. Cavalry Mi 1 it ia 

a. Discipl ined 

Lima 

Squadron of pardos 214 

Companies of morenos 89 

Chancay 

Regiment of Chancay 432 

Regiment of Huarura 445 

Companies of Santa 565 



253 



TABLE 9 (cont.) 



Canete 



Regiment of Canete 37/4 

Regiment of Chincha 599 

I ca 

Regiment of lea 67O 

Regiment of Nazca 5$$ 

Cuzco 

Regiment of Cuzco 1^950 

Tru i i Ho 

Regiment of Trujillo 622 

Regiment of Ferrinafe in SafTa 839 

Piura 



Regiment of Q.uerrecor i 1 1 a 231 

Companies of Tambogrande 92 



Areq uipa 



Regiment of Arequipa 77O 

Regiment of Caman^ 582 

Chi Toe 

Regiment of Castro 226 

Free companies I36 

Total 9,^02 

b. Urban Militia 

Tarma 

Huancavel ica 
Trujillo 
Arequ ipa 
Puno 
Guayaqui 1 

Total Zj^523 



25^ 



TABLE 9 (cont.) 



k. Dragoons 

a. Disclpl ined 

Lima 

Regiment of Lima 

Chancay 

Company of Huarura 
Company of pardos 

Sana 

Squadron of Pacsamayo 

Piura 

Squadron of Amenotape 
Companies of Tambogrande 

Ar i ca 

Regiment of Arica 

Camana 

Regiment of Mages 
Regiment of Anas i y Chales 
Regiment of Carabelli 

Guayaqui 1 

Squadron of Guayaquil 

Total 

b. Urban 

Lima 
Tarma 
Cuzco 
Guamanga 



801 



57 
60 



766 



570 
218 



1,150 



53^ 
kk] 
5^2 



398 
5,537 



255 



TABLE 9 (cont.) 



Truj i llo 
Arequl pa 
Puno 
Guayaqu 1 1 

Total 10,031 

Grand Total 

Regular Troops 1,985 

Militia 

Infantry ^1,077 

Cavalry 13,925 

Dragoons 1 5,568 

Total 72,555 

Note: The Regiment "de la Concordia Espanola" created by Abascal 
in Lima v/as duplicated in Tarma, where four companies "de 
Concordia" were formed in the mining town of Lauricocha to 
keep the peace. Companies were also formed in Huancavel ica. 
La Paz, and Potosf for the same purpose. 



Source: "Estado que manlfiesta el numero de Cuerpos de Ynfanterfa 
de Milicias Provinciales Discipl i nadas y Urbanas que tiene 
el Virreinato del Peru . . . Ano de I8l6," Memoria de 
Abascal , plate 8, following p. 33^; "Estado que manifiesta 
el numero de Cuerpos de Cabal lerfa y Dragones de Milicias 
Provinciales y Urbanas que tiene el Virreinato del Peru 
... Ano de 1816," ibid ., plate 10 following p. 352; "Es- 
tado de las Tropas Veteranas qual tiene el Virreinato del 
Peru, con distincion de Cuerpos, y fuerza de que constan 
... Ano de I8l6," ibid., plate 11 following p. 368; BHl: 
"Noticia de los cuerpos de milicias del Virreynato del 
Peru y provincias adyacentes que tienen tropa veterana, 
incorporada en ellos para su instruccion ..." Lima, 
May 12, I8l4. 



256 



the century a large disciplined militia v;as deployed along the coast 

and in the larger interior cities. 

Yet beneath this veneer of invincibility, Spanish authorities 

continued to question the true extent of the military reform and 

the commensurate ability of the army to withstand an enemy attacl<. 

Even in Lima, where the reform enjoyed its most substantial success, 

the schism between Creoles and Peninsulars threatened to tear it 

asunder. One observer noted that 

Whenever a city is garrisoned by a military force, the in- 
habitants as well as the soldiers must submit to the V7i 1 1 of 
the commanders. Such was the state of Lima: many of its 
soldiers, it is true, were residents of Lima, but many were 
from different parts of Peru, and nearly the whole of the 
officers were Spaniards. Those who were not vjere under the 
suspicious eye of jealous masters." 

Such an explanation, however, fails to take into consideration the 

loyalty of these Creoles to the crown of Spain which prevented an 

internal revolt from breaking out within the ranks which might 

have resulted in Peru gaining independence prior to 1821. As the 

beneficiaries of the Spanish imperial system, deeply fearful of 

the lov/er classes v;hich the army served to subjugate, these 

Creoles possessed a colonial mentality, preferring to work vjithin 

the framework of the empire to achieve gains rather than to run 

the risk of social upheaval which might overturn their privileged 

93 

position altogether. 

In New Spain, divisions between Creoles and Spaniards mani- 
fested themselves in the increased number of conflicts of juris- 
diction v;hich stemmed froin the grant of expanded military privileges 



257 



that accompanied the reform of the army. Moreover, these privi- 
leges, or fueros, were successfully employed by the army as an 
institution against the civil, mercantile, and ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions, attesting to the success of the military reform 
there. In Peru the army was less able to utilize its privileged 
jurisdictim, a fact v;hich bespoke the v/eakness of the reform 
itself. In certain areas such as Lima, the military jurisdiction 
was strong, but in the provinces traditional jurisdictions were 
frequently able to withstand this institutional challenge to their 
authority. 



258 



Notes 



AGI:AL 6i+q, "Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . ./' 
PP. 1"15. The public debt of the viceregal treasury had reached 
the sum of ten and one-half million pesos by I786. C^spedes del 
Castillo^ Reorqanizacion. p. h2. 

2 

Viel lard-Baron, cited in Moor^ p. I38. 

3 

For a laudatory view of Croix, see L. E. Fisher, "Teodoro 
de Croix," Hispanic American Historical Revievj, IX, No. k (November, 
1929), ^88-50^. My ovjn opinion is somewhat less favorable. Croix 
mistook the exhaustion of the Viceroyalty of Peru for tranquility 
and told his brother that a fifteen-year-old boy could have ruled 
the country. Jose Antonio de Laval le, Estudios Historicos (Lima, 
1935), P. 3^9. 

AG I :AC 29, Benito de la Mata Linares to G^lvez, Cuzco, June 
30, 1783, pp. 1-3. 

The failure of the Nordenflicht mission sent to Perd in I788 
to raise production levels seems due to the fact that the Born 
process which it was sent to apply could not be adapted to the 
low grade ores of the Peruvian mines, and also to the failure of 
Peruvian officials to cooperate. Carlos Deustua Pimentel, "La 
expedicion de Nordenflicht en el Peru," Hercu'rio Peruano, No. 
366-367 (Lima, October-November, 1957), pp. 510-519; Diffie, pp. 
381 -382. 

Notably the La Condamine and Malaspina expeditions, the 
latter a botanical mission vjhich catalogued much of the flora 
of western South America. See Arthur Robert Steele, F 1 owe r 5 
for the King; the expedition of Ruiz and Pavon and the Flora 
of Peru (Durham, N.C., 196^). 

AGI:AL 1 1 18, "Ext racto de los Informes dados por varies gefes 
del Peru y Buenos Aires sobre la ordenanza expedida por S.M. en 
28 de enero de I782 para el establecimiento, e instruccion de In- 
tendencias en dhos virreynatos y sus provincias." 
o 
Carlos Deustua Pimentel, Las Intendencias en el Peru, 1790- 
1796 (Seville, I965). 

9 

-^Mendiburu, IV, 2^7-2^8; Moore, pp. 1^42, 146-1^7, 153. 

10, 

"El Virrey Caballero de Croix al bailio Frey Antonio Valdes, 
sobre i nconvcniencias de aplicaci&n de las Ordenanzas de Intenden- 
tes, Ano 1790, Lima, May 16, 1790," Revist a de la Bibl ioteca 



259 



Nacional. VI i I, No. 25 (Buenos Aires, 19^3), 128-129; Moore, pp. 
189"190. Escobedo had kept for himself the intendancy of Lima 
which irritated the viceroy. 

' AGI:AL 6U0/'lnforme del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix . . ./' 
PP. 1-15. 

'^AGIiAL 666, Croix to G^lvez, Lima, May 22, 178^+, p. 1. 

'^AGItAL 666, Croix to Gllvez, Lima, May 1, I78U, p, 1; 
AGI:AL 667 "Estado de las Fuerzas que componen el actual Pie 
de Exercito de este virreynato del Peru . . .," Lima, August 1^, 
178^. 

\k 
AGI :AL 667, Diego Saenz de Alaya to Croix, Lima, July 29, 

VSk, p. 1. 

^AGI:AL 667, Croix to G^lvez, October 5, 178^, p. 2; Memorias 
de los virreyes que han qobernado el Peru, V, Memoria de Teodoro 
de Croix, 220-221. 

1 6 

AGI:AL 667^ Escobedo to Jauregui, Lima, June 2, 178^, pp. 

1-2. 

AGI :AL 667^ Report of Inspector General Manuel de Pineda 
to Croix, Lima, August 12, 178^, pp. 1-11. 

'^AGI:AL 666, Croix to G^lvez, Lima, July 16, 178^, p. 1; 
AGI:AL 667, Croix to G^lvez, Lima, October 5, 178^, pp. 2-5; 
Memoria de Croix, pp. 223-22^f. 

19 

AGI:AL 667, Croix to G^lvez, Lima, December 5, I78A, pp. 

1-2; MefTPria de Croix, p. 235. 

20 

AGItAL 667, Croix to G^lvez, Lima, October 5, 1784, p. 1; 

AGI:AL 1^183 Pineda to G^lvez, Lima, May 1, I785, p. 1. 

21 

AGI:AL 667, "Estado que manifiesta los Oficiales, Sargen- 

tos, Cavos, y Soldados que se hallaran destinados al resguardo 
de los cinco Fuertes de la Frontera de esta Capital de Tarma 
como en los tres del Partido de Jauja . . .," Tarma, November 18, 
\7Bk. 

^^AG1:AL 667, Croix to G^lvez, October 5, 1784, p. 5. 

23 

AGI:AL 667^ "Copia de los Dictamenes que produxeron los 

Senores Vocales de la Junta de Guerra acerca de la permanencia 
o extincion del 2° Batallon de Regimiento Real de Lima, y de- 
creto de se mandado llevar a efecto la Supresion . . .," Lima, 
August 24, 1784, p. 21; AGI:AL 1494, Escobedo to Galvez, Lima, 
April 5, 1785, P. 3. 



p. 1 



260 

2^ 

Memoria de Croix, pp. 232-234. 

^^AGIrAL 681, Croix to Antonio Vald^s, Lima, July 16, I788, 

?6 

BNL: Document 0^383 "Expediente obrado a representaci on de 

varios oficiales del ej^rcito de la ciudad de Arequipa, sobre que 
se declare a quien corresponde el mando militar en ausencia u otro 
motivo del Sr. Intendente de aquella ciudad." Arequipa, May 10, 
1790, pp. 1-6. 

^^Lynch, p. 2^2. 

^^Auld, pp. 131-137. 

29 

Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New 

York, 1963), pp. 229-231. For other descriptions of this growing 

Creole nationalism in Peru, see Moore, pp. I73-I96; Pike, op. 38- 

40; Reuben Vargas Ugarte, Historiadel Peru: Virreinato (Siqio 

XV I I I y. 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires, 19S7), pp. 36-42. 

30 

Recent research has shown that, rather than trying to weaken 
the cabildos in Peru, Visitor Escobedo tried to strengthen them in 
order to increase their efficiency so that the intendants could 
work through them. John Fisher, "The Intendant System and the 
Cabildos of Peru, 1784-1810," Hisp anic American Historical Review. 
XLIX, No. 3 (August, I969), 430-453. 

31 

AGI:AL 149^ "jnfornie Rescrvada del Sargento Maior de Mi 1 i - 
cias de Guaylas Dn. Francisco Castaneda . . . al Virrey de Buenos 
Aires el Marques de Loreto, " Buenos Aires, September 3, I786, pp. 
1-19; AGI:AL 1496, Escobedo to Loreto, Lima, November 16, I785, p[ 
1; AGI:AL 1496, King Charles I I I to the Viceroy of Buenos Aires, 
El Pardo, January 17, I787, p. 1. 

32 f 

Simon Ayanque (Esteban de Terralla y Landa) , Lima por Dentro 

V Fuera. 5th ed. (Paris, 1924), p. I74. 

33 

Simon Ayanque, E1 Sol en el Mediodia (Lima, 1790), p, I3. 

34 

^^Pike, p. 35, 

35 

Memorias de los vireves cue han gobernado el Peru, VI, 

Memoria de Frev Don Francisco de Taboada y Lemos. 3 03 . 
36. 




261 



38 

W. B. Stevenson, HistoricaT and Descriptive Narrative of 

a Twenty Years' Residence in South America. 3 vols. (London, 1829), 

I, 288. 

39 

AGI:AL 667> "Representacion hecha a nombre de la oficialidad 

del Regimiento el Real de Lima, rhanifestando los Servicios que han 

contraydo, y perjuicias que exper imentaran si llega a verificarse 

la supresion de su Segundo Batallon." Lima, August 31^ 178^, pp. 1-3. 

AGIrAL 1^95, Pineda to Gllvez, Lima, December 1, 178^, pp. 1-2. 

^^AGI:AL 1^9^, Escobedo to G^lvez, April 5, 1785, pp. 1-3. 

42 

AGI:AL 671, Pineda to Croix, Lima, November 18, I785, pp. 1-2. 

43 

Memoria de Croix, p. 228. The cost of the Soria and Extre- 

madura regiments had been 1,167,351 pesos according to Escobedo, 
greatly in excess of the estimate. This helps to explain the 
decision to increase the fijo component instead. "informe que hace 
el Visitador . , .," in Relaciones de los Vireyes del Peru . . ., 
Ill, hkZ. 

AGI:AL 673^ Croix to the Marquis de Sonora, Lima, March 16, 
1787, PP. 1-3. 

^5 

Memoria de Croix, pp. ^3-^5. 

AGIrAL 675;. Croix to Sonora_, Lima, November 28, I787, p. 1. 

AGIrAL 671, "Estado que manifiesta ... La Batallon de 
Infanteria Real de Lima . . .," Callao, January 1, 1786; AGIrAL 
679 "Estado que manifiesta en que se halla el Regimiento de In- 
fanteria Real de Lima . . ." Lima, April 1, I788. 

k8 

AGIrAL, Croix to Sonora, Lima, August 16, 1787^ p. 1. 

Memoria de Croix, pp. 250-252. 

^°AGIrAL 681, Croix to Valdes, Lima, June 16, I788, pp. \-h. 

51 

BNLr Document C1550 "Representacion del Dn. Augustin Vicente 

de Torres y Valle, Comandante accidental del Regimiento Real de 
Lima al Rey," Cuzco, October 15, 1789^ pp. 1 "'+. 

^^AGIrAL 641, Croix to Valdes, Lima, September 20, 1790, p. 1. 

■^Richard Konetzke, "Ideas polfticas del Virrey Francisco Gil 
de Taboada." Mar del Sur, VII (Lima, March-April, 1952), 53. This 
term is used to describe the period in which Peru produced several 
periodicals, newspapers, literary societies and other examples of 
intellectual accomplishment. 



262 



5^ 

Thomas Martin Gale, "Antonio Cabal lero y Gongora, Archbishop 
and Viceroy of New Granada, 1779-1789," M.A. thesis. University of 
California (Berkeley, I950), p. -Jh; AGIrAL 667, "Estado de las 
fuerzas que componen el actual Pie de Exercito de este Virreynato 
del Peru . , .," Lima, August l^f, 1784, 



55/ 
ia 

56, 



^AGIiAL 6UI, Croix to Sonora Lima, September 20, 1790. p 1- 
Memoria de Gil, p. l]h. '^ > y- > 



AGIrAL 703;, Gil to Conde Campo de Alange. Lima, February 26 
1792, p. 1; McAlister, Fucro Militar. p. 66. 

The militia buildup in Peru in response to the war against 
France was not inconsiderable. In I787, there had been, accord- 
ing to Croix, a total of 51,^67 militia, of which 31,9^5 were 
infantrymen, 9,^36 were cavalry, and 10,086 were dragoons. The 
increase by I792 shows the desire to increase the mounted'caval ry 
and dragoon units along the coast. Of this number, Croix estimated 
that only 17,000 could be considered to be disciplined. AGI:AL 
673 Croix to Sonora. Lima, March 31, I787, pp. 1-2. This ratio 
of disciplined to urban militia ran about the same in other vice- 
royalties also. Alexander von Humboldt, for example, estimated 
that only 8,000-10,000 men out of the 32,000 which composed the 
Army of New Spain were disciplined militia. Alexander von Humboldt, 
£n5aY.p_po1 lUco sobre el Rpinn de la Nueva Ef^pana. 6th Spanish ed 
(Mexico, 19^1), IV, 189, 193. 

'^"Resumen que hace el Virrey Gil y Lemos de las disposi- 

ciones dadas durante su gobierno," Santa Fe de Bogot^, July 31, 

1789, in Konetzke, "Ideas politicas del Virrey Francisco Gil," 
P. 53. 

58 

There are several examples. One cited by Croix will serve 
as an illustration. Memoria de Croix, pp. 206-209. 

59 

-^ -^Humboldt, pp. 194-195. 

60 

Memoria de Gil, pp. 308-309. 

61 

AGIrAL 703, Gil to Campo de Alange, Lima, February 5, 1792, 

A? 

AGIrAL 704, Report of Avills to Gil, Lima, May 16, 1792 in 
Gil to Campo de Alange, Lima, February 5, 1792, pp. 1-2. 

63 

AGIrAL 704, "Relacion de I05 Partidos interiores del Virrey- 
nato de Lima en donde son inutiles los cuerpos de Milicias Pro- 
vinciales Urbanas que hay en ellos y conviene reformarlos con 
expresion de su fuerza"; "Relacion . . . donde pueden permanecer 
los cuerpos de Milicias provinciales Discipl inadas y Urbanas que 
hay en ellos con noticia de su fuerza . . .," Lima, August 7, 1792. 



263 



6^ 

AGI:AL 70^ Gil to Campo de Alange, Lima, September 21, 

1793, PP. 1-3. 

^^ Memoria de Gil, pp. 320-330. 

^^ibid.. pp. 313-317. 

"informe sobre el Virreinato, 1799" reproduced in Ricardo 
Donoso, El Marques de Osorno? Don Ambrosio Higqins, 1720-1^21 
(Santiago, 19^1), P. ^67. 

68 

AGI:E 73, Marques de Osorno to Manuel Godoy, Prfncipe de la 

Paz, Lima, November 8, 1792, pp. 1-2; "Informe sobre el Virreinato," 

in Donoso, p. 466. 

69 

"Informe sobre el Virreinato," in Donoso, p. 466. In 1797 

O'Higgins had raised a fijo company of dragoons "Reina Luisa" 

with a strength of I50 men. It was disapproved in 1799 on the 

basis of the royal order of August ]5, 1793^ forbidding any more 

companies of soldiers to be created in excess of those existing 

in 1784; Memoria del Virrey del Peru Marques de Avil^s, publicada 

Carlos Alberto Romero (Lima, 1901), p. 59. 

70 

"Informe sobre el Virreinato," in Donoso, pp. 464-467. It 

is questionable whether the fijo troops would have accepted such 
a reduction in pay and prestige. Another idea of O'Higgins was 
to create corps of Indians for duty in the highland areas and to 
restrict coastal militia service primarily to the Negroes since 
each was more suited to the climate of these regions. 

' AGI;AL 641, Marques de Osorno to Diego de Gardoqui, Lima, 
March 8, 1797, pp. 6-7. 

72 

Ibid., pp. 1-5; AGi:AL 647, "Relacion de las di spos iciones 

principales que ha tomado para poner en estado de defensa aquel 

Reino. Carta del Marques de Osorno al Exmo. Sr. Ministro de 

Hacienda," Lima, January 26, 1798, pp. 1-2. For a detailed 

description of the military reform in the southern command, see 

BNL: Document DII6I9, "Relacion de govierno que forma D. Barto- 

lome Maria de Salamanca . . .," Arequipa, January 31, 1812, pp. 

85-96. This document covers the period 1796-1811 and is a most 

valuable look at the army which later successfully put down the 

La Paz rebel 1 ion in I809. 

^^Donoso, p. 375. 

Memoria de Ayi l^s . pp. 55-59. 

Fernando D'az Veneto, La s Campaiias Militares del Virrey 
Abascal (Seville, 1948), pp. 38-39. 



264 

76 , 

Jose Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, Hemoria de Gobierno. 

p. 1 vi . 

77 

Ibid ., pp. 361-366. 

78 

Ibid ., pp. 369-371. This had been proposed to him earlier 

by Goyeneche. AG I : E ']k Jos^ Manuel de Gcyeneche to the Marquis 
de las Horinagas^ Cuzco^ September 8, 1810^ p. 7. 

79 / 

Viceroy Joaquin de la Pezuela to the Minister of War^ 

Lima, November S, I8I8, in Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna, La Revolu - 

cion de la Ind e pendencia del Peru, 1809-1819 (Lima, 1924), pp. 

177-179. 

80 

Dfaz Veneto, pp. I7-I8, states that Abascal v/as 

. . . one of the most sagacious Viceroys that the Spanish 
monarch sent to the American dominions , . . having been 
the only source of support for the royal authority in all 
South America when it seemed on the point of collapsing. 

81 

Sebastian Lorente, Historia del Peru bajo los Borb ones, 

1700-1821 (Lima, I87I), p. 302, states that Abascal vron this sup- 
port by various means: he reorganized the constitution and by- 
laws of the lawyers' guild, founded a school of medicine, established 
a public library, and opened a public cemetery, thereby winning 
over the law^'ers, doctors. Intellectuals, and general public. 

82 

The Cuban Militia Regulation specified that militia officers 

should be of the same caste as the companies they commanded but 
this was not practiced in Peru. As Viceroy Croix noted, the lower 
castes were often too poor to outfit themselves and to comimand 
the respect of their troops, and through necessity these positions 
were given to "residents of honor and distinction," most of whom 
were white. AGI:AL 1496> Croix to King Charles III, Lima, September 
5, 1786, pp. 1-2. 

•^ Memoria de Abascal, pp. Ixxxvlxxxvi ; Reuben Vargas 
Ugarte, Historia del Peru, p. 122. 

84 

Ibid., pp. 124-127. 

Or 

Memoria de Abasca l. pp. 366-368. 

86 

Historian Benjamin Vicuna Maci<enna, for example, states that 

even In the shadow of the royal palace of the viceroy in Lima, the 
general public watched quietly as the standard of the Regiment "de 
la Concordia Espanola" passed, but that they applauded wildly and 
set off rockets as the Royal Regiment of Lima passed, often ac- 
companying it to the doors of its barracks. To them, he feels. 



265 



the regiment most nearly represented the emerging nation of 
Peru (p. 60) . 

87 

Memoria de Abascal . pp. if89-490. 

go 

Vargas Ugarte^ Historia de] Peru, p, 303, 

89 

Basadre, La Multitud, La Ciudad, y el Campo en la Historia 

del Peru , p. 1^+3. 

90 

Vidaurre^ pp. 18-23. For Abascal 's estimate of his 

capability to defend Lima from attack^ see the Memoria de 

Abascal. pp. 336-352. 

91 

■^ Unanue^ pp. 16-17. In 1790, for example, the total 

expenses of the viceroyalty were 2,970,599 pesos. Out of this 
amount, the military expended 1,176,710 pesos, over half of the 
total. During the immediate pre i ndependence period this per- 
centage increased. 

^^Stevenson, III, 48-it9. 

^^North, p. 6; Pike, pp. ^2-'+^; Stein, pp. 110, 11^. 



VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED 
MILITARY PRIVILEGE 

By the end of the eighteenth century the Bourbon military 
reform in Peru hod largely run its course. Begun during the Seven 
Years War in an effort to prepare the Viceroyalty of Peru against 
English aggression^ the subsequent decade of Indian rebellion 
demonstrated that the enemy within was a more formidable threat 
to Spanish sovereignty than were the possible Invasions which 
might arise out of the crown's involvement in a long series of 
European wars. It v^as these i nter ior upr Is I ngs which forced the 
Spanish authorities in Peru to drop their plans of creating a 
strong provincial militia elsewhere than on the coast^ because of 
the lack of whites and the questionable loyalty of the mixed blood? 
who predominated in the highland militia regiments. In lieu of 
this, training cadres were provided to the pardo-domi nated militia 
units v;hich v/ere located along the coast, where a sufficient 
number of whites could be counted upon to maintain order. Yet 
the breach between Creoles and Spaniards in Peru was widening 
by century's end, making mere vjhiteness a false indication of 
f idel i ty. 

At the turn of the century, the Bourbom military reforms in 
New Spain and Peru bore both great similarities and distinct dif- 
ferences. While the Army of Peru was approximately twice as large 

266 



267 



as that of New Spaln^ Its veteran component was considerably smaller, 
reflecting the fact that the crown still considered Peru to be geo- 
graphically isolated and less likely to be Invaded than its Carib- 
bean possessions, which v;ere rapidly becoming seedbeds of revolu- 
tion. Moreover, the relative weakness of the fijo component in 
Peru was an indication that the military as a career had not captured 
the Creoles' fancy as it had in New Spain, perhaps due to the fact 
that the Creoles in Peru, due to their loyalty to the crov/n, were 
not excluded from positions of responsibility v;ithin the civil 
administration as they were in certain other viceroyal t ies . 

The differences to be found in the military reform of the 
Armies of New Spain and Peru seems to lie, however, less in their 
actual configurations than in the results which arose out of the 
reforms themselves. Historian L. N. McAlister, for example, has 
concluded that the Army of New Spain successfully utilized its 
fueros and military privileges v>/hich accompanied the reform to 
undermine the authority and prestige of the king's representatives, 
becoming "a military class exempt from civil responsibility and 
liability." He feels that this "autonomous and irresponsible" army 
helped to destroy the Spanish government there, especially after 
the abdication of the Spanish crown to the forces of Napoleon in 

1808. McAlister offers this as one explanation for the develop- 

3 

ment of a praetorian tradition in republican Mexico. This chapter 

will attempt to determine if the army in Peru had a similar impact 
upon civil institutions and to v/hat extent it was successful in 



268 



becoming an interest group similar to that which developed in New 
Spai n. 

The grant of fueros or privileges was an expression of the 
Spanish concept of liberty which had its roots in the Roman city- 
state. These privileges were specific and limited, and were granted 
to cities, guilds, institutions, and corporations rather than to 
individuals. These grants reflected a social structure of well- 
defined classes and corporate bodies with separate and distinct 
functions. individuals derived their rights from membership in one 
of these bodies rather than from any privileges accruing to royal 

vassals as a whole. Such a system v;as reproduced in the Spanish 

k 

American colonies as v;ell. 

Fueros and other privileges ( preeminencias) were granted to 
the army in an effort to secure its loyalty and to enhance the 
prestige and attractiveness of military service. Among these pre- 
eminencias v/ere the freedom of payment of certain municipal taxes, 
such as the media anata, or half of the first year's salary, from 
the duty of quartering soldiers in their homes, from the payment 
of carcelage or jail cell fees, and from the payment of tribute 
in certain instances. The judicial corollary of this was the 
prized fuero de querra, v;hich freed the soldier from the juris- 
diction of the royal, or ordinary system of courts and allowed him 
to be judged instead by his military superiors. In certain 
instances the soldier vias also permitted to exercise his fuero 
in the capacity of a plaintiff to prosecute civil defendants. 



269 



The military composed one of an estimated total of thirty- 
four privileged jurisdictions in Spain, and was governed by a 
legal code vyhich dated from the sixteenth century. By the 
eighteenth century the corpus of laws governing tlie military 
jurisdiction was large and exceedingly complex and covered troops 
not only in Spain but in the outposts of empire as well. Veteran 
troops in Peru, for example, were governed by the Ordenanzas de 
S.H. para el regimen, disciplina. subordinaci on, v servicio de 
SU5 ex^rcitos of I768, which specified that the officers and men 
of the regular army, as well as their v;ives, dependents, and servants, 
enjoyed the military jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. 
Although the ordinance did not so specify, this applied only in a 
passive sense, that is, in a case v/here one of the above were 
defendants. ' 

The militia was covered by the 173^ Ordenanza de milicias pro- 
vincial es de Espana. which was later modified by the 176? Real de - 
claracion sobre puntos esenciales de la Ordenanza de milicias pro - 
vinciales de Espajia. The latter ordinance stated that officers in 
the provincial, or disciplined militia regiments and their v^ives 
v/ere to enjoy this fuero in both civil and criminal cases even if 
their unit was not currently serving on active duty. Enlisted men 

were to be granted the fuero in criminal cases, but obtained the 


right to exercise it in civil cases only v/hen on active duty. 

The privileges of the urban militia were somewhat less 

extensive. As a general rule urban units were only granted the 



270 



use of the fuero militar when serving on active duty, but the fact 
that a firm designation of urban and provincial militia was not 
achieved until 1791 in Peru confused the issue there. In 1786 the 
crown denied the urban militia of America the use of the fuero mi- 
litar al together. 

In the interest of public policy certain cases were regarded 
as desafuero and excluded from the military jurisdiction. These 
included, among others, the disposition of entailed estates, actions 

in mercantile law, offenses committed prior to entry into the mili" 

9 
tary, the division of estates, and fraud against the royal treasury. 

The boundaries between these jurisdictions were not alv;ays clear, 

however, and competenc i as , or conflicts of jurisdiction frequently 

f 1 ared up as a resul t . 

Cases involving members of the regular and fijo components 
were usually tried before the auditor of war, a legal aide of the 
captain general, with appeals going to the Consejo Supremo de 
Guer ra in Spain, Cases involving the provincial militia were 
generally heard by the regimental commanders or the subi nspectors 
general, with appellate jurisdiction being exercised by the auditor 
of war in Lima, In practice, however, the auditor of war frequently 
sat as a court of first instance and hear the cases of the militia 
located in the Lima area. This v;as a significant departure from 
the system followed in New Spain, 

The Spanish imperial administration attempted to solve the 
problem of these jurisdictional conflicts by setting up a pro- 
cedural mechanism to be followed after a member of one jurisdiction 



271 



had been taken into custody by the authorities of another. For 
example, if a soldier vias apprehended by an officer of the ordinary 
or other jurisdiction, he was to declare his possession of the 
fuero militar. If the authority considered that probable cause 
existed, but that the defendant's fuero was controlling, he was 

bound to deliver him to the rightful authorities within a reason- 

12 

able amount of time. If, however, the official considered the 

fuero of the defendant to be invalid or inapplicable to the case, 
he was obligated to notify the defendant's commanding officer in 
order that the latter might lodge an appeal for a change of juris- 
diction. The defendant v/as to respect and cooperate with the 

13 
civil authorities until these procedural issues were settled. 

Such assumptions disregarded the realities of the New World, 

v/here laws were made only to serve the classes in power. As 

historian Stanley J, Stein has observed "to the elite, law became 

a norm honored in the breach. To the unprivileged, law was 

arbitrary and alien, therefore without moral force." The fuero 

militar v^as considered an affront by the civil authorities for 

several reasons. In the first place, exclusion of the militia 

from the ordinary jur isdict ioti meant that local officials were 

deprived of the fines and fees which they collected from 

defendants and which they used to support themselves. Moreover, 

by reducing the size of the group within his control, a civil 

magistrate was similarly reduced in prestige, which was one of 

the attractions of holding public office. As a result, a 



272 



sensitivity over points of honor developed betv;een civil and 
military officials. The military were especially jealous on the 
subject of honor which they equated with the preservation of dis- 
cipline and morale. For these reasons cases frequently hinged 
on factors other than a valid point of law^ which meant that 
decisions could be and often were based on subjective grounds. 

As early as 17^0 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa had observed 
these realities^ and stated that men were enlisting in the militia 
less out of devotion for the king than to escape the persecution 
of the local justices or to avoid debts owing before other tribunals. 
Viceroy Amat said later that "the militiamen view this prerogative 

as one of the most efficacious means of freeing themselves from 

16 

the molestations of the Tribunals ..." Yet the civil 

authorities were unwilling to give up the rights v/hich they had 
possessed for so long, and the military, which had been subject 
to this often capricious group of royal officials In the past, 
was equally unwilling to forefit the privileges which they had 
gained. As a result, tempers frequently flared on both sides. 
The alcalde (municipal magistrate) of Piura, Miguel Serafin del 
Castillo wrote the Audi end a of Lima and complained that v;hereas 
he had always arrested members of the military In cases involving 
homicide as a matter of right, he had been forced to stop this 
practice in order to avoid conflicts with the military justices, 
whom, he stated, "are exceedingly passionate" in the defense of 
their rights," He noted that they had eroded his authority in 



15 



273 



Plura to such a degree that hfs prestige v;as reduced and he was 
subject to great embarrassment. He also maintained that these 
military judges often failed to prosecute the defendants they 
held.'^ 

Class factors also entered into the numerous conflicts of 
jurisdiction between the civil and military jurisdictions. In 
Canete, for example^ Antonio Pumarada^ a creole who served as 
administrator of the sales tax in the tovm of Pisco^ spied a 
boatlcad of Spanish soldiers rov/ing inland from the frigate 
Primavera which v;as anchored offshore. Pumarada gathered a 
detachment of cavalry militia in Cariete and marched them to the 
beach where he demanded that the sailors^ who had come ashore 
to v/ash their clothes^ return to their ship. Such an action 
could only have its roots in the hatred of Creoles for the 
Peninsulars, A subsequent investigation^ headed by Colonel Ignacio 

As i n^ the military commandant of Canete, ruled that the ouster was 

1 8 

without cause and secured the deposition of Pumarada, 

Because the number of veteran and fijo troops in Peru was 
small prior to the Seven Years War^ cases involving this compo- 
nent of the army are fev/ and relatively insignificant. It was 
the subsequent increase in the size of the militia component 
with its expanded system of fueros after 17^6 which caused the 
increase in litigation betv;een the civil and military jurisdictions 
in Peru. In 1777^ Gcispar de Urquizu Ibanez, the current auditor 
of war and a judge of the Audiencia of Lima replied to Areche 



llh 



that he "had not had a free hour," due to the "great multitude 
of Cases and petitions, both Civil and Criminal, as well as plead- 
ings and wills, since with the formation of the militias just 
before my entrance the fuero has been greatly expanded, "^^ In 
relation to the total number of cases involving a civi 1 -mi I i tary 
conflict of jurisdiction, Lima and the smaller coastal cities such 
as Arequipa, jca^ and Lambayeque predominated, due to the fact 
that the disciplined militia were located in these regions. The 
reduced scope of privileges accruing to members of the urban 

militia in the interior explains the relative lack of litigation 

20 
in these areas. 

The fierce insistence with which the military defended their 
fuero presupposes that they hoped for, and even expected that they 
v/ould receive preferencial treatment in their own courts of law. 
Such had been the case in New Spain, and one might have reason- 
ably expected the same situation to have occurred in Peru also. 
The fact that it did not in part is a reflection of the abortive 
attempts to reform the army in the latter area. In Cliiloe, for 
example, the Cuban militia ordinance v/as never applied until 
1793. All cases involving the militia were left to the ordinary 
jurisdiction by authorization of the subi nspectors general who in- 
frequently visited there, although this was contrary to the regula- 
tions. In 1793 this practice was finally called into question 
when a militiaman, Xavier Camacho, who had been appointed a 
lieutenant of justice by the governor of the island Pedro de Cafia- 
veral, arrested one of the militia guards in the plaza mayor on an 



275 



unspecified charge and put him in the civil jail. V/hen the news 
of the arrest reached the commandant of the militia Colonel 
Cesar Balviani, he instructed Lieutenant Joaqufn SSnchez to go 
to the jail and inquire about the charges lodged against the 
defendant. Camacho^ however, refused to divulge them and San- 
chez returned to the colonel empty handed. Accordingly, Balviani 
petitioned the governor for the release of the prisoner, citing 
the pertinent sections of the Cuban Militia Regulation. The 
reply from Canaveral stated only that the defendant had broken the 
law, but beyond this gave no information. 

The case was then referred to Inspector General Gabriel de 
Avil^s on appeal. in his opinion Avil^s admitted the governor's 
right to name a lieutenant of justice in areas v;here no provin- 
cial judge existed, but disregarded the claim of Canaveral that 
civil officials had the right to arrest militiamen. He asserted 
that the arrest itself vjas permissible as long as the defendant's 
commanding officer was promptly informed. Aviles distinguished 
the case at hand from previous rulings on the issue. He cited 
one of September lb, 1785^ in which Viceroy Croix had ruled that 
a subdelegate could hear a civil case brought against a militia, 
and a later royal order of September 1'^, 1791^ in which it was 
ruled that if a subdelegate himself was unable to hear the case, 
it should revert to the senior military officer in the parish in 
which the incident occurred. Neither of these applied, Aviles 
maintained, since the case occurred in San Carlos where the 



276 



governor himself was resident^ so it could not be delegated to 
a subordinate. Moreover^ Avil^s held^ a recent case adjudicated 
in Lima had established that officers and sergeants major enjoyed 
the active fuero militar and that enlisted men in disciplined 
companies enjoyed the passive fuero. Since the defendant's unit 
v;as in a disciplined category, the governor did not have juris- 
diction over the case and therefore could not assign it to Ca- 
macho, since "one cannot give av;ay v;hat one does not possess to 
begin with." Aviles gave Canaveral the option of ansv;ering the 

request of Colonel Balviani to show cause why the defendant should 

21 
be held, or to defend his actions before the king. 

It is difficult and dangerous to speculate about the value 

of the fuero in the interior provinces of Peru. In an early 

pronouncement on the subject. Viceroy Guirior held that the 

judges and lav/yers simply refused to enforce those provisions of 

the military ordinances which were repugnant to them, and asked 

the crown to publish an order that they be obeyed in the 

22 
future. The frequency with which the crov/n issued these orders 

subsequently is good evidence that such abuses continued through- 

out the period. On the other hand, there are records of civil 

officials bemoaning the fact that the militia took advantage of 

the lack of trained law^'ers in the provinces to use their fueros 

2k 
for their ov-yn benefit. The fact that in certain areas whole 

families dominated the militia also enhanced the probability of 

25 

conflicts of interest occurring. 



277 



The few cases which concern the interior militia demon- 
strate that the civil jurisdiction was quite capable of hold- 
ing its own against the incursions of the military courts. In 
one case the civil authorities were able to oust Lieutenant 
Nicholas Moreno^ an officer of the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima 
who had been detached to the militia Regiment of Tarma^ for 
jailing militiamen v/hom he had failed to pay for their periods 
of service^ and to replace him with the alcalde and the collector 
of tributes. A more positive explanation for the ability of 
the civil jurisdiction to retain control of the militia in these 
areas was the fact that military commandants often lived in the 
provincial capitals or in areas far removed from military 
defendants and v;ere unavailable to come to their defense. Not 
always were civil magistrates successful in this maneuver though. 

One instance in v/hich the military successfully retained 
jurisdiction over one of its members occurred in the village of 
Acobamba outside of Cuzco^ where the subdelegate arrested a shoe- 
maker named Pablo Munoz on an unspecified charge. Since Hunoz 
was a member of the militia of Cuzco^ he claimed his fuero mi 1 i - 
tar and asked that he be tried by his commandant. The sub- 
delegate denied his plea on the grounds that no company roster 
could be found to support his claim of militia membership. The 
subdelegate did^ hov/ever, write a letter to the deputy militia 
commandant in the district^ Captain Francisco Miranda and informed 
him of the arrest. in the letter the subdelegate held thai since 



278 



the senior military officer lived far outside of Acobamba on 
a hacienda, it would be more proper for him, as the represen- 
tative of the king in Acobamba where the offense occurred, to 
take the case. Miranda refused to accept this line of reasoning, 

however, and appealed to the auditor of war who granted him juris- 

27 

diction over the case. 

A more definite trend can be observed in the coastal prov- 
inces, where the presence of a larger disciplined militia produced 

a greater number of cases involving conflicts of jurisdiction. 

Although the militia in these coastal provinces v;as disciplined 
in the sense that it received regular training, apparently true 

military subordination was never achieved. The subinspector 

general Francisco de la Hata Linares admitted this and stated that 

In Peru, it seems to me [military discipline] has never 
existed, and therefore there is no subordinate, there is no 
soldier . , . they feel that any humiliation is an offense, 
and that they can insult their superiors in any way at all 
. . . [and] flaunt subordination, which is the soul of the 
Profess ion. ^" 

One consequence of this lack of a military ethic was to excuse 
men of high birth from their offenses. In Lambayeque, for example, 
a Creole militia lieutenant Narciso Rioja hit his superior, veteran 
Sergeant Major Jos^ Rosales, who had tried to arrest him for miss- 
ing a review. Since Rioja was a member of the local creole 
nobility, he was able to enlist the support of the alcalde Juan 
Alexo Munoz de Pinillos. Although Pinillos was a notorious enemy 

of the militia, he supported Rioja against the hated Spaniard 

29 
Resales. " In addition, Rioja obtained the support of the clergy 

of Lambayeque, and that of his father, himself a captain in the 



279 



militia. The case v;as tried before the auditor of war in Lima who 
handed down a decision in favor of Rioja and sentenced Rosales to 
two months in jail as well as the payment of all court costs, 
prompting Inspector General Gabriel Avil^s to wryly conclude 
that "military laws are made to serve the nobility which compose 

it. -30 

The fev/ cases which are preserved indicate that the militia 
was more successful in circumventing the mercantile jurisdiction 
in the coastal provinces rather than in Lima where the power of 
the consulado or merchant's guild was strong. In the provinces, 
the German naturalist von Humboldt observed that the militia of- 
ficers used their fuero to further their ends as businessmen. 
One such example of this occurred in Piura where a man v/ho had 
contracted a debt in I785 and had successfully avoided repayment 
ever- since, joined the militia in I809 when he was seventy years 
of age in order to take advantage of the fuero militar. Although 
the plaintiff argued that the defendant's age precluded him from 
performing the functions of a militiaman, the viceroy refused to 
rule on this obvious bit of fraud and remanded the case to the 
defendant's military commander for decision. Although the out- 
come of the case is not known, the fact that the commandant had 
earlier shielded the defendant from arrest, raises the presumption 
that a favorable decision was granted the defendant by his ally. 
If this is true, it would bear out the assertion of the plaintiff 
in the case, v;ho held that the military were expert in securing 



280 



the advantage of prejudice and delay in order to assure that cases 

concerning their members would not be decided on the basis of 

32 

reason. 

In Lima the militia were less successful In circumventing 
the mercantile jurisdiction, represented by the powerful Tribu- 
nal del Consulado de Lima, whose membership included the most 

■>■> 

influential Spaniards in the kingdom. In one recorded case, 

the authorities of this tribunal arrested Antonio Martinez, a 
merchant of Lima, for the nonpayment of 51,000 pesos, the value 
of some goods which the consulado had allegedly delivered to him. 
Since Martinez had been a lieutenant in the artillery militia 
since I766 he claimed the arrest v;as Illegal since he possessed 
the fuero mllitar and had the right to be tried by the military 
jurisdiction. The issue was heard by Isidro de Adana, the at- 
torney for the Audlencia of Lima, who solicited briefs from both 
parties. In reply, Tomas Martin Luengo, the prior and consular 
of the consulado asserted that the case Involved a business 
contract which was classified as desafuero under the provisions 
of the Laws of Cast I lie. He reasoned that since practically all 
the militia of Lima were engaged In one form of business or an- 
other, it would be inequitable to allow them to circumvent their 
contractual obi igat lors through the use of the fuero militar, 
which he asserted was primarily a privilege reserved for v;artlme, 

Luengo cited several cases in which the courts tiad held 
that the clerical fuero was not absolute, and reasoned that If 



281 



this was the case, the more recent military fuero could not be 
considered absolute either. He held that the exercise of this 
fuero during peacetime only created a situation in which the 
militia ridiculed their creditors and the mercantile jurisdiction. 
Since Martine?. had contracted in the capacity of a businessman, 
Luengo held that he should be tried as one also. This line of 
reasoning obviously impressed the court, which held that the 
case properly belonged to the Tribunal del Consulado and vjarned 
the militia that legal loopholes involving military debtors were 
henceforth closed. 

By 1786 the relative advantage which the consulado had en- 
joyed over the military seemed to be disappearing. The consulado 
had fallen on hard times as the free trade regulations had 
reduced its economic strength considerably, while the militia of 
Lima v;as enjoying considerable prestige as the defenders of the 
kingdom during the period of frequent v;ar in Europe. The case 
involved a militia lieutenant of the prestigious Battalion of 
Spaniards v/ho had been arrested by the authorities of the consu- 
lado on charges stemming from the nonpayment of a debt of twenty- 
five pesos. That the seeds of the dispute lay deeper than this is 
demonstrated not only by the small sum involved, but by the fact 
that the lieutenant v/as marched through the streets of Lima in 
full public view and placed in the public jail. When the arrest 
v/as made known to the commandant of the battalion, he appealed 
to the subinspector to request that Viceroy Croix hand down a 



282 



decision on the jurisdictional issue. 

Immediately Croix requested that the contending parties file 
briefs setting out their arguments. in reply, the officers of the 
consulado made no attempt to justify their actions, but instead 
haughtily declared that they " would do the same to a Colonel or 
a Sergeant Major in equal circumstance s [emphasis theirs]." Such a 
bold assertion, Croix felt, could not be allowed to go unansv/ered, 
since if it were, it could threaten the morale and entire fabric 
of the army, whose support was vitally needed by the authorities 
in the critical period follovjing the Indian rebellions. 

in his verdict, the viceroy recognized that the outburst made 
against the officers of the Battalion of Spaniards made by the 
consulado was in fact a protest against the practice of granting 
commissions to men of low birth, something the nobility could not 
abide. To his credit, Croix did not apologize for the practice. 
Instead, he noted that the effect of such slurs upon their birth 
had been catastrophic to the officers of the Battalion of Spaniards, 
and by imputation to these of the Royal Regim.ent of Lima. He 
stated that as a result of the jailing of their fellow officer, 
these soldiers had been mortified to such a degree that they 
remained behind closed doors to avoid further humiliation. 
Therefore, to avenge this insLilt and thereby preserve the honor 
and morale of the army, Croix ordered the defendant freed im- 
mediately and threatened to levy a fine of 6,000 pesos against 
the consulado if it dared to abridge the rights of the militia in 
the future. 



283 



Such a decision ignored the legal issues of the case and 
demonstrated the extent to which honor and public policy formed 
the basis of decisions involving the fuero militar. in a report 
to the crovm, Croix admitted that, although the militia was hated 
and scorned by many people, it V7as necessary to guard their fueros 
and privileges with the utmost vigor in order to prevent mass 
resignations. Written during the chaotic period fol1o\jing the 
Indian rebellions, v;hen the militia and fijo troops of Lima 
seemed to be the only source of support which the crovyn possessed, 
Croix was obviously concerned about the consequences v/hich such 
resignations v/ould produce. As he stated to the crown, if the 
king found himself without these troops in a situation which 

required them, the results would be extremely fatal for royal 

35 
authority In Peru. 

Subsequent cases demonstrated the concern which the govern- 
ment had for the rights of the militia of Lima. In 1793 3 case 
arose in which Juan Benaque, a Spanish soldier in the Regiment 
of Dragoons of Lima, who had contracted a debt with Andres Mora- 
les, a scribe of the cabildo of Lima, was accosted in his store 
by Morales for refusal to repay the money. In the confusion which 
surrounded the struggle Benaque struck and seriously injured Mora- 
les. Not long thereafter, Benaque was arrested by Mat las de 
Torre y Tagle, an alcalde of Lima and & member of a distinguished 
Creole family of that city. When the news of the arrest reached 
Colonel Joaquin Valc^rcel, the commandant of the regiment, he 



28i* 



petitioned Torre y Tagle to turn Benaque over to the military 
jurisdiction but was refused. Valc^rcel then asked the Inspector 
General^ Gabriel de Avil^s^ to decide on the jurisdictional issue. 

In his brief Torre y Tagle asserted that the jurisdiction of 
the king was reduced to insignificance by the fact that practically 
every citizen in Lima assumed positions in the militia in order to 
avoid it. Although he did not say so, his choice of words implied 
that Benaque v-zould escape punishment if the military assumed control 
of the case. He added that the jurisdictional issue should be 
regarded as secondary to the assault and battery on Morales. Never- 
theless, Aviles chose not to rule on the merits of the case but 
instead ordered the defendant bound over to a military court for 
trial. ^^ 

The military was similarly successful in defending its fuero 
in cases of testamentary dispositions, often to the detriment of 
the legal heirs. in Lambayeque, for example, the commandant of 
a militiaman who died intestate claimed jurisdiction over his 
estate, contrary to the plea of the deceased's v;ife, v/ho asserted 
that her husband had not been a member of the militia at the time 
of his death. The v;idow asserted that no service record of her 
husband could be produced, and introduced the testimony of an army 
surgeon that he had been totally unfit for military service for 
fifteen years. The auditor of v/ar, nonetheless, awarded juris- 
diction of the estate to the commandant. In her brief the v/idow 
stated that this was not the first time this officer had sought to 



285 



37 

prejudice the rights of legal heirs in Lambayeque, 

The military also tried to retain jurisdiction over cases 
involving the partition of estates in separation proceedings between 
husband and wife. Although the king had stated in 1796 that cases 
where both parties claimed the fuero militar should be desafuero 
on the grounds that they soiled the honor of families^ and set 
one member against another, the military fought diligently to 
bring them within their own jurisdiction since ecclesiastical 
tribunals could be counted upon to favor the female. And, in 
certain instances, they v;ere successful. In 1813 Viceroy Abas- 
cal handed down a decision involving a militiaman and his wife 
in which he declared that the ecclesiastical court must limit 
itself to the issue of the separation alone, leaving the parti- 

•3 o 

tion of the estate to the military tribunal. Such a decision 
was an indication that the military could hold its ov/n against 
the prestigious ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 

Other cases sustain the assertion that the military tribunal 
v/as gaining power equal to that of the ecclesiastical court by the 
end of the century. In Trujillo, for example, Cornelius Antonio 
Paredes, a militiaman of the Royal Corps of Artillery, rented a 
house from Manuel Espinosa, the collector of tithes in the tov;n 
of Uzquil, In 1810 Espinosa died, apparently in debt to the 
church for the nonpayment of these tithes. Therefore Fernando 
Caballero, the lay chaplain of Trujillo, levied a tax of 3 per 
cent of the value of the deceased's house against Paredes, claiming 



286 



that he, as tenant, assumed the debts of Espinosa. When Paredes 
refused to pay, he was taken before the executive board of tithes 
in Trujillo. He claimed immunity from prosecution on the basis 
of his fuero militar and asked that tFie board notify his com- 
mandant, Antonio de Q.uevedo, in order that he might secure a 
change of jurisdiction. 

Quevedo replied that he held jurisdiction over the case as 
the commandant of the Royal Corps of Artillery of v;hich the 
defendant v;as a member, but the ecclesiastical court denied this 
on the basis that Paredes as the deceased's tenant was a debtor 
of the church and therefore within its jurisdiction. The court 
also ignored Quevedo's assertion that it ought to more properly 
proceed against Maria Ignacio Navarro, who had inherited the 
house from Espinosa rather than against Paredes. in March of 
1812 the case v;ent before the viceroy to decide the jurisdictional 
issue. The brief, v/ritten by Joseph Irigoyen, the assessor of the 
tribunal of artillery, complained that the church refused to 
recognize the tribunal as a separate and independent jurisdiction, 
and that it exhibited "a certain air of superiority" in its deal- 
ings with the military, regardless of the fact that the corps of 
artillery had been established in 1776. In its brief, the board 
of tithes noted that this money was part of the Royal Treasury 
and that payment of it could not be avoided by the defendant 
claiming the military fuero, since cases involving the Royal 
Treasury vjere excluded from the military jurisdiction. The 



287 



board also stated that it has contracted with various persons to 
collect these revenues, and that if they could not collect them 
directly from members of the militia it would constitute a great 
hardship, since scarcely anyone vias not a member of these units. 
This argument failed to sway the viceroy, however, and on 
December 15 he ruled that all cases involving artillerymen were 
restricted to their own tribunal. He also held that the ec- 
clesiastical jurisdiction would do well to bring their conduct 

into harmony v/ith this ruling to avoid future conflicts of juris- 

39 
diction with the military. 

One of the most delicate areas involving a conflict between 

jurisdictions v;as that of marriage. The problem was always present 

when veteran troops from Spain arrived in Peru for there were few 

safeguards to prevent a married man from marrying -again under 

false pretenses. Royal orders held that regular officers who 

defaulted on a promise of marriage were to be forcibly married 

by the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and discharged from the service, 

Li] 

but in fact this rule does not seem to have been applied. Regu- 
lations regarding military marriages were actually relaxed in Peru 
after 178^ in the hopes that the soldiers of the Soria and Extre- 
madura Regiments would remain in the country following their 
d is charges . 

The most frequent source of disputes involves breach of promise 
and misrepresentation. Since the military life was not particularly 
stable, frequent liaisons between soldiers and local women were almost 



288 



impossible to restrict. Parents whose daughters had allegedly 
been wronged by a militiaman were generally unsuccessful in 
their appeals for justice before military courts which refused 
to treat many of these cases seriously. The fact that these 
liaisons were often between soldiers and women of the lov-yer classes^ 
or even slaves, increased the likelihood of acquittal for a military 
defendant, since the court v/as loath to require a soldier to marry 
a woman of low station. in cases involving a slave v;oman, the 
owner oftentimes testified on behalf of the soldier, perhaps in 
the hope that the child born of such a union would become his 
slave. In one case of seduction involving a rrii 1 i t i aman, the 
subinspector of pardos Antonio Bello fined a soldier eight pesos 
child support per month wryly noting that this was the minimum 
penalty which could be levied against "a teacher of his caliber." 
Frequently a welter of conflicting testimony concerning the 
chastity of the female threw the court into confusion and in- 
creased the bitterness surrounding the decision. In one such 
case, the military judge became exasperated at a mother's pious 
pronouncements of her daughter's chastity, and ordered her to 
"remain perpetually silent" on the matter in the future since her 
daughter's scandalous conduct v/as a miatter of record. 

The most divisive social issue within the coastal soldiery 
concerned pardo militia privileges. In these areas, where the 
pardos formed a large part of the population, and were considered 
to be shiftless and troublesome by the higher classes, a conflict 



289 



of interests occurred. On the one hand, the ability of the pardos 
to v;ork in the humid coastal climate and their skill as fighting 
men made them invaluable to the whites as members of the local 
militia units. On the other, as a volatile and passionate group 
whose rights had always been suppressed by their v;hite superiors, 
possession of the fuero was utilized as a weapon by the pardos to 
secure a measure of equality. Therefore white officials, both 
civil and military, sought to restrict their exercise of their 
milnary privileges. Sub i nspectors general often punished them 
heavily for insignificant offenses and possessed great discretionary 
pov-yers to control them. 

Civil officials were strongly united in opposition to pardo 
military privileges, probably due to their chagrin over the exemp- 
tion of this group from the payment of tribute and the loss of 
prestige which resulted from their inability to collect this 
revenue. In Lambayeque the hostility was deeper than elsev/here. 
This stemmed in part from the pardos' successful refusal to pay 
the "military contribution" in 1779. Such hostility can be 
demonstrated by the fact that as late as 1791 the subdelegate of 
that city was seeking to charge pardo militia the fee of carcelage 
which they had been excused from paying by the 1767 ordinance. 
A further illustration of this is to be seen in the case arising 
the following year in v;hich the commandant of the regiment of 
pardos cf Lambayeque, Lieutenant Colonel Benito Chirinos, was 
arrested by the alcalde of that city, Alexo Munoz de Pinillos, 
for the alleged nonpayment of a debt owing to Pinillos' brother. 



290 



Chirinos lodged an appeal for a change of jurisdiction with Inspector 
General Gabriel de Avil^s^ v/ho_, in a brief filed with Viceroy Gil 
stated that 

The more years of residence that I pass in these countries, 
the less 1 understand the authority and faculties of different 
employments; I observe that Subdelegates and Alcaldes possess- 
ing little more authority than the power of confusion, put 
militia officers in improper and demeaning prisons, and if the 
rightful Militia Chiefs put a pardo militiaman in the prison 
cell in the Barracks for desertion or other serious crime, 
[these subdelegates] write slanderous and personally injurious 
appeals. Even the Sub-Inspector General is not excused from 
having to apologize for his conduct. 

In a legal concept the Militia are equal, whether they are 
to be found in the capital [Lima] or outside of it, without 
distinction other than that of their rank and classification; 
but I observe that those who have the misfortune to be residents 
of Lambayeque, suffer the vexation of having their rights 
trampled by these judges, whereas the fact that they are the 
noble servants of the King and the first ones to help these 
same judges when they require it, ought to gain for them 
preferential treatment. ^9 

Although Aviles was successful in securing a change of jurisdiction 
for Colonel Chirinos, who was not a pardo, subsequent cases involv- 
ing this race tended to confirm the problems of which the Inspector 
spoke. 

In 1792 a case arose in Lambayeque involving the alcalde Pi- 
nillos and an officer of the pardo militia Captain Francisco Banda 
which illustrates the methods by which the civil jurisdiction 
denied pardo militiamen the privilege of their own jurisdiction. 
It seems that on the evening of June 8, Pinillos, accompanied by 
veteran Sergeant Major Juan de Carmen Cazos and Lieutenant Francisco 
Preciado, was making his nightly rounds of the city. Although the 



291 



subsequent events are far from clear^ it seems that the party 
decided to enter the house of Captain Banda by force^ where the 
defendant was allegedly found in bed with a woman by the name of 
Juana Vasquez. Pinillos thereupon accused Banda of living in 
sin with a woman not his wife and took him to the public jail. 
Although Banda claimed his fuero militar as an officer in a 
disciplined militia company^ according to his testimony Pinillos 
paid no attention^ and became furious when Banda tried to dispute 
his authority. 

The following day Lieutenant Felix Ru'z^ Banda 's immediate 
subordinate^ got news of the arrest and notified Colonel Domingo 
Figuerolaj the commandant of the regiment^ who was also a req i dor 
(magistrate) of the city. After hearing the story of the arrest, 
Figuerola sent a letter to Pinillos in which he prudently avoided 
the jurisdictional issue, but asserted that Banda had testified 
to Rufz that he had been asleep alone and the woman had been in 
an adjoining room in the house. He went on to say that Sergeant 
Cazos had throvyn Banda into jail without ceremony and had 
threatened to beat him unless he kept still. He noted that this 
circumstantial evidence was insufficient to hold Banda prisoner, 
and that even if he were guilty of the offense charged, as first 
offender he should receive only a reprimand. 

Figuerola also asserted that Pinillos v/as not the proper of- 
ficial to assume jurisdiction over the defendant, and that civil 
jurisdiction properly lay with the subdelegate of the district in 



292 



which the crime occurred. Figueroia stated that he had spoken 
with the subdelegate before the latter left Lambayeque to make 
a tour of the province and that he had assured him that the al- 
caldes would be careful not to infringe upon the rights of the 
militia if he would also comply with the law and restrain the 
troops under his command^ which Figuerola held he had done. He 
noted that Banda had acted correctly in declaring his possession 
of the fuero militar but that he had been insulted for so doing, 
and that subsequently Lieutenant Ru1z had been denied any informa- 
tion about the case. The colonel therefore personally demanded 
that Pinillos turn the prisoner over to him in accord v;ith the 
regul at ion. 

Pinillos answered by saying that he had been elected alcalde 
to deal with situations such as this, and that Colonel Figuerola 
should not try to instruct him about these duties. He replied 
that if Banda had acted with moderation that he v;ould not have 
been arrested in the first place, but that his violent defense 
of his fuero and his attempts to resist arrest made it necessary 
to jail him. Pinillos vjent on to say that no fuero was in itself 
absolute, since the king presumed that these privileges would be 
bestov/ed on men of high birth and good conduct. This argument 
implied that the fuero should not be applied in the case of 
pardos vho were deficient on both counts. Moreover, the alcalde 
asserted that the fuero militar v/as not permitted to be used to 
revile the ordinary jurisdiction. He claimed that Banda had 



293 



insulted him, and in so doing, had insulted the king of whom he 
was the representative in Lambayeque. Pinillos also brazenly 
asserted that in cases in which commissions were held by "scandal- 
ous pardos," he would decide the proper limits of the ordinary 
jurisdiction in order that the sacred authority of the crov-vn not 
be transgressed. He noted he was authorized to do this in the 
absence of Viceroy Gil, who was his only superior, and warned 
Figuerola to respect these limits in the future. 

Colonel Figuerola responded by sending copies of Pinillos' 
letter to the subdelegate and to the viceroy, and on June 19 
wrote to the inspector general to enlist his assistance in the 
matter. In his letter Figuerola explained that Pinillos was 
"powerful in money and favors in Trujillo where he is resident, 
because he is married to a niece of the Count of the Royal Prize," 
and that Banda was at a disadvantage as a result of the great 
influence v/hich this official possessed. Moreover, Figuerola 
maintained that Pinillos had boasted that he vjas going to humble 
all of the militia officers in Lambayeque which his predecessors 
as alcalde had been unable to do. He went on to cite the fact 
that Pinillos had hit Banda v/ith the flat of his sword, and claimed 
that he intended to use Danda as an example to demonstrate to the 
other civil officials that it was possible to prosecute members of 
the militia in defiance of the inspector general if it was done 
with dispatch. Figuerola stated that Pinillos had averted the 
Inquiry of the subdelegate with "a million lies" and, refusing 



29^ 



his petition to transfer Banda to the military jail, had instead 
appeared before a notary with his ov/n subordinates in the capacity 
of witnesses and had drawn up charges against Banda v^hich v;ere 
false. The colonel noted that Pinillos had then sv^orn never to 
free Banda or any other militia officer. He also informed the 
inspector that Banda was a master hatmaker and that he had no 
income to hire a lawyer or to support his family. 

This letter was carried to Lima by a group of pardo militia 
officers who felt similarly threatened and who hoped to testify 
on behalf of their friend. In the meantime, Pinillos had done 
what the colonel had claimed in his letter. When the subdelegate 
had written from the town of Guadalupe inquiring about the details 
of the case, Pinillos replied that he had already drawn up an 
indictment against Banda which had been sent to Lima for disposi- 
tion, in this v;ay he prevented the subdelegate from claiming 
jurisdiction over the case or from ordering Banda freed. In 
addition, Pinillos had filed suit against Colonel Figuerola and 
Captain Joseph Clavijo at the same time on the grounds that they 
had interfered with the royal jurisdiction. In his brief, Pi- 
nillos testified that Colonel Figuerola appeared at the public 
jail on June 15 and ordered Timothy Guinea, one of the jailers, 
to free the prisoner, which Guinea refused to do on the grounds 
that he lacked the proper authority. Pinillos then alleged that 
Figuerola demanded the keys in order that he might free Banda 
himself. V/hen Guinea again refused, the colonel reportedly tried 



295 



to bribe him with an offer of six quJntales of ham in exchange 
for the keys, but this was prevented by the arrival of another 
jailer v/ho ordered Guinea to leave the room. The alcalde also 
held that Captain Clavijo accompanied Figuerola and shouted to 
Banda not to worry, that they would return with four Negroes to 
get him out. The following day, Pinillos said, a servant of 
Figuerola returned to the jail with a message for Banda to decline 
any offer of freedom from the civil authorities, and later Clavijo 
appeared to inform him that the colonel had apprehended Pinillos 
for his actions and v;as preparing to give him a whipping. 

On July 2 Aviles had heard the testimony of the pardo of- 
ficers of Lambayeque who had come to Lima to plead Banda 's case 
for a change of jurisdiction. On July 13 Avills v^rote to Vice- 
roy Gil and urged that he intervene to stop this flagrant abuse 
of the military jurisdiction. In his letter he related a dif- 
ferent version of the story than that given by Pinillos. He 
stated that Captain Clavijo had appeared at the jail, not to help 
Banda escape but rather to free two militiamen v;ho had been jailed 
by Pinillos for nonpayment of a debt, and noted that they v/ere 
being forced to pay a carcelage fee of twenty one reales apiece 
in violation of the militia ordinances. Aviles asserted that 
Clavijo had refused to pay the fee, and that Pinillos had drawn 
up a complaint against him since he feared that he and Figuerola 
would try to free the prisoners by force. 



296 



The issue at stake, Avil^s held, was not Bands 's morality 
or lack of it, but the rights of militia possessing the fuero 
militar in Lambayeque. He conceded that the militia was unpopular 
there, judging by the number of competencias concerning them which 
had passed across his desk. Avil^s judged that although the 
number of judges who hated the pardo militia v/as small, their 
ties of blcod and marriage, end connections in Lima, gave them 
a strength disproportionate to their size in a small town like 
Lambayeque. He therefore asked that Banda be freed and awarded 
damages for the income lost during the time he was unable to 
practice his trade, and that Pinillos be severely punished for 
his attempts to interfere with the military jurisdiction which 
had been granted to the members of the militia by the king himself. 
Unless this were done, Avil6s warned that the streets of Lamba- 
yeque v/ere not safe for any member of the militia v;no might be 
summarily jailed by the ordinary authorities on the pretext of 
having insulted the royal jurisdiction. 

This appeal v;ent unanswered and the following month Banda 
again wrote to Colonel Figuerola asking him to inform Aviles of 
the situation. In it he reiterated Pinillos' tremendous power, 
which was not restricted only to the civil sector. He observed 
that Pinillos also had great influence with the officers of 
militia, v;ho;Ti, in exchange for his friendship and protection, he 
utilized to exert pressure on other authorities who refused to 
do his bidd i ng. 

V/hether Figuerola dispatched this note to Aviles is not 
knov'^n. Aviles did, hov.'ever, continue to press the viceroy to 



297 



decide the Banda case. In another letter he detailed to the vice- 
roy the v;ay in which Pinillos was able to utilize the law to 
supress the rights of the militia. He noted that Pinillos would 
arrest a militiaman regardless of the jurisdictional limitations, 
and would form a case against him which he would immediately send 
to Lima before the subdelegate could step in and claim the case 
as his own. In this way he could utilize the lengthy appeals 
process to keep the defendant in the public jail until a decision 
on the jurisdictional issue was handed dov/n. In this fashion, 
Avil6s asserted, Pinillos had the satisfaction of humiliating the 
militia regardless of the outcome of the case. He stated that 
Banda had no funds to hire a lawyer, and that It was feared that 
his oldest daughter might be forced to part with her virtue to 
support the other members of the family. Unless the viceroy acted, 
Avil^s asserted, Banda would remain in jail indefinitely. He 
pleaded vjith the viceroy not to repute the militia which he had 
placed on such a disciplined footing, and who served him so well 
in time of need. Instead, he maintained, men like Pinillos, who 
sought to bring the two jurisdictions into conflict rather than 
jailing true criminals who v;ere a threat to society, should 
receive the wrath of the viceroy. 

On August 20 these appeals bore fruit. Through his minister, 
the Marquis de Salinas, Gil ruled that Captain Banda v/as to be freed 
immediately and paid 200 pesos as compensation for the three months 
unjust inipr isonment which he suffered. No penalty was levied 



298 



against Pinillos for his actions, but the viceroy ordered that 
Sergeant Major Carmen Cazos be sentenced to two months in jail 
for his part in ttie affair. Such a decision, although ultimately 
vindicating the rights of the militia, demonstrated how civil 
authorities dominated the military in areas far removed from the 
capital. Not only was the ordinary jurisdiction older and better 
entrenched, but also It was vested In men of substance and prestige 
such as Pinillos, who were more than a match for pardo officers, 
who bereft of family and finances to defend their rights, could 
only appeal to the authorities In Lima. 

An equally interesting feature of the Banda case v/as the In- 
ability of Colonel Figuerola to free the defendant. Since Figuerola 
was a regldor of the city. It might be presumed that he could have 
used his influence to retain jurisdiction over his soldier. More- 
over, Figuerola stopped short of his threat to free the defendant 
when Pinillos had refused his ultimatum. Banda hints at the 
reason for such a situation in his appeal v^;hen he says that 
Pinillos enjoyed great popularity among the militia officers in 
Lambayeque, v/ho apparently curried favor v/ith him in an effort 
to secure better treatment. Such a comment indicates that 
Figuerola could not secure support even among the other members 
of the officer corps in his fight to free Banda. Considering 
that the defendant v/as a pardo, this support v;ould be even more 
difficult to obtain. Not only does this point up the superiority 
of the ordinary jurisdiction In Lambayeque, but also the conflict 



299 



of allegiance among the militia, especially in areas of heavy 
Negro concentration where whites struggled to keep people of col- 
or in their place, and where loyalties followed racial rather 
than institutional lines. The pardo social issue seems to have 
divided the militia in Peru internally, preventing it from acting 
as a unified interest group as it did in more racially homogeneous 
areas such as New Spain. 

The Banda case v^as not unique in Peru. In the tov;n of 
Huanta, the subdelegate Bernardino Estevanes de Cevallos vias 
in the practice of hiring militiamen from the disciplined Regiment 
of Huanta to work for him in violation of the military ordinances. 
V/itnesses held that Cevallos bore a deep hostility towards the 
officers of this regiment and would use these employees to 
harrass them at every opportunity. Should an officer seek to 
discipline one of these men, they would decline their fuero in 
order to remain under Cevallos' paternal jurisdiction. As a 
result, the officer corps was demoralized and constantly terror- 
ized by Cevallos. In one instance his men entered the home of 
Ayudante Mayor Domingo Garcia Quintas and arrested his whole 
family on an unspecified charge. Quintas was severely beaten 
when he tried to resist arrest, his daughter's head was shaven 
and she was forced to suffer other indignities. The Intendant 
of Guamanga, Demetrio O'Higgins, the nephev; of the previous vice- 
roy, at first refused to intervene in the case until Q.uintas ap- 
peared in Guamsnga "half dead" from the beating v/hich he had 



300 



received. Although Quintas was to sue Cevallos for attempted murder 
subsequently, the outcome of the decision is not knov;n. 

In a separate incident, Cevallos and the subinspector of 
militia Fernando Rufz were discovered by Adjutant Major Manuel 
Cardona listing mestizos in the register as Indians in order that 
their membership in the militia would not excuse them from the 
payment of tribute. This forced the individual to either produce 
a birth certificate or to pay the duty in violation of the military 
ordinances. When Cardona discovered this practice, he demanded 
that Cevallos cease falsifying these records, but was jailed for 
daring to protest. By pressing false charges against Cardona, 
Cevallos was able to have him removed from his position by O'Higgins 
Although Cardona had the pleasure of inducting Ruiz's brother into 
the militia prior to losing his job, he noted that this tactic 
backfired because the man refused to obey orders and, due to his 
relative's position, v/as never punished. The case mentions 
several other incidents of Cevallos physically mistreating members 

^ u .,• • 51 

of the mi li 1 1 a. 

Faced with such an unequal situation, the militia in Peru vyas 
often forced to collaborate with the civil authorities in an effort 
to preserve itself. In one recorded instance in lea, the military 
commandant. Colonel Antonio Uria, in league with the titled 
nobility, set up a Consejo Preparatorio (preparatory council), 
which, by rotating the elections of its officers among the group, 
retained control of the town. The consejo bypassed the normal 



301 



avenues of jurisdiction and assumed control over both civil and 
military cases occurring in the city. In 1813 the officer corps 
of the cavalry militia oF i ca filed a suit with the auditor of 
war against Urta and the consejo on the grounds that he charged 
"horrible extorsions" In order to avert unjust sentences. Never- 
theless^ the authority of the consejo was upheld on the grounds 

that it was necessary in order to allov; a military commander to 

52 
retain order and discipline among his troops. Such a case 

demonstrated that often the military chose to rule in conjunction 

with the powerful civil authorities in an effort to retain their 

rights which they could not sustain in opposition to them. 

If the fuero militar was not a disruptive influence in the 

provinces where the militia remained weak and internally divided, 

one might expect a different result in Lima where the militia was 

prestigious and powerful. Nonetheless, such does not seem to be 

the case. In his Memor i a, Viceroy Abascal mentions that the 

grant of the fuero to the militia had made the administration of 

justice "extremely laborious," but also he lauded the high 

standards maintained by the auditor of war in his efforts to 

53 
control fraud and crime among military defendants. It is 

notable that the auditor and the viceroy heard the majority of 

cases involving the militia of Lima, contrary to the practice in 

other areas where local commanders acted as a court of first 

instance. Moreover, an examination of the decisions handed dov;n 

by these officials indicates that abuses of the military juris- 



302 



diction, vhile not being absent, are sufficiently infrequent to 
conclude that no undue favoritism v;as shown the military of that 
region, and that consequently it did not override civil justice 
in an authoritarian and irresponsible manner by the end of the 
colonial period in Peru. 

This hypothesis is supported by a most interesting document 
entitled Reforma del Peru, written by a Spaniard by the name of 
Alonso Carrio de la Vandera, whose various observations about 
the viceroyalty have been described as "a good testimony of the 
attitude that predominated among the colonial elites in the 
second half of the eighteenth century." This work, written in 
1782 during the turbulent Indian rebellions, proposed a new plan 
of government for Peru, designed to grant minimal concessions to 
the lower groups to preserve the viceroyalty but not to alter the 
social or economic situation to the extent that the favored posi- 
tion of these elites vrauld be endangered, Carrio began v/ith a 
discussion of the military in Peru, acknowledging that men 
entered the service for a variety of reasons, not all of them 
noble. Simply because a small minority of them v;ere corrupt, he 
went on, many persons argued that members of the army were not 
honorable or deserving of confidence, but such was not the case. 
Instead, Carrio termed the militia "men of honor . , . very astute 
politicians, urbane and loyal servants of those persons who have 
confidence in their persons." 



303 



Carrio asserted that by viewing the public punishments which 

take place in the regiments each day, one might also conclude that 

the militia vjas filled with criminals and those who evade the law, 

but actually he concluded 

Not one tenth part of them are to be regarded as Idlers 
and Artisans. The reason is that in the militia it is a 
grave matter not to punish any infraction of the [military] 
ordinance outside of a grave scandal, and because all of the 
soldiers are students of the law they know the penalty for 
each crime. Neither do the [military] judges have any 
compassion [for these defendants] because they would be re- 
garded as fainthearted by the troops, and more worthy of the 
distaff than of the sword . . . Outside of the militia many 
murderous bandits are at liberty . . . The military are not 
absolutely exempt from these crimes, because they are men, 
but through subordination, control, and severe punishment, 
the wolf is converted into a lamb and they are restrained. 
Desertion, regarded innocently by the people, many times 
costs the soldier his life. Who intercedes on behalf of 
these miserable persons? No one, because they all know the 
judges are correct. These are the men who I want for the 
execution of my Plan. Men of these circumstances, who hate 
avarice, will be prudent. V/ithout these prerequisites it is 
impossible to govern a Republic honestly. 56 

Such testimony bears out the assertion that the militia of 
Lima were both disciplined and honest due to a strong system of 
military justice. Carrio hoped to raise 200 fijo troops in each 
of forty provinces and to utilize the militia of Lima to provide 
them with training cadres in an effort to spread these virtues 
throughout the viceroyalty, but the plan was never implemented, 
due, among other things to expense. 

In conclusion, the exercise of the fuero militar in Lima seems 
to have been far less disruptive than in New Spain for the reason 
that a strict code of military justice, often administered by the 
viceroy himself, prevailed, Elsev/here throughout the viceroyalty. 



30k 



militia ambitions were checked through several devices. The govern- 
ment in Lima fully backed the power of the intendants and supported 
them v/henever the local military commandants challenged their 
authority. In one such case, the auditor of war warned a local 
commander that 

. . , such command could never exempt him from the jurisdiction 
of that Government v/hich is both political and military, and it 
would scarcely be proper in the provinces, especially In the 
interior areas of the Kingdom, that command be divided among 
various persons, and that the Governors Intendant not be the 
only Leaders who are responsible for the complete peace and 
security of these areas, ^ 

Since the militia in the interior was of an urban classification, 
whose privileges were substantially reduced after 1 786, the problem 
did not present itself there. 

On the coast, however, where there was a substantial dis- 
ciplined militia^ ambition was restrained by the issue of pardo 
military privileges which internally divided the fledgling insti- 
tution and hampered its action as an interest group. Frequently, 
members of the civil authority were men of considerable power and 
prestige, backed by years of experience. In another context, 
Magal i Sarfatti has noted that in the more remote regions of 
the viceroyalty "it is reasonable to suppose that the minor 
Spanish officials worked in collusion with the local oligarchies 

in a manner similar to that described by Bourricaud in today's 

59 
Peru." As an analogy to ci vl 1 -mi 1 Itary relations in colonial 

Peru, the quote is apt. Confronted by a povverful civil jurisdiction 

far removed from the authorities In Lima, allegiances, as in the 



305 



Banda case^ might reasonably follow racial rather than institu- 
tional linesj and accommodation between v;hites of both juris- 
dictions replace conflict. A combination of these factors 
prevented the Peruvian military from becoming a disruptive element 
in society during the last part of the eighteenth century. 



306 

Notes 

McAlister, Fuero Mil itar, pp. 98-99, sets the Army of New 
Spain in I8OO at 29,9^2 men, of which 6,150 were regulars, 11^330 
were disciplined militia^ and 12,^82 were urban or other militia. 
In Peru, on the other hand, there were approximately 1,985 regular 
troops, 23,11^ disciplined militia, and 29,299 urban militia, with 
a total strength of 5^,398 men. (See Tables 8 and 9, supra, 
Chapter V) . 

o . . • 

For a list of Creoles v;ho served the crown of Spam in posi- 
tions of responsibility, see Mendiburu, VI, i+39-'*51 . Their pre- 
dominance in the Audiencia of Lima caused Vi s i tor -General Areche to 
undertake a special visitation of that body which uncovered their 
spiritual and family relationships. Through these they held enormous 
pov-jer in Lima and throughout Peru. See AGi:AL 1082 Report of Areche 
to King Charles III. Lima, February 20, 1778, pp. 1-55. These, 
coupled with the continuous downgrading of the army in Peru, helps 
account for the relative lack of enthusiasm for a military career 
among the Creoles there. 



pp. 



McAlister, "Reorganization," p. 32; McAlister, Fuero Mil itar, 
-89. 
h 



'McAlister, Fuero Mi 1 itar . p. 5. For a discussion of the 
social structure of New Spain, which paralleled Peru in many 
respects, see L. N. McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change 
in New Spain," Hispanic American Historical Review. XLIil, No. 3 
(August, 1963); 3^+9-370. 

^For an excellent discussion of the background of the fuero 
mil itar, see McAlister, Fuero Mi 1 itar. pp. 6-10. 



Ibid., 


P. 6. 


^Ibid., 


pp. 6-7. 


Ibid., 


P. 9. 


^Ibid.. 


pp. 7, 66 


ibid.. 


pp. 9-10. 



^ Mbid . In Peru, archival research indicates that often the 
viceroy and auditor of war formed the court of first instance in 
these competencias. Since many of the disciplined militia vjere 
located in the Lima area, many of the cases arose there also. The 
strict decisions which this court handed down against military 
defendants implies that, being above the local passions which often 



307 



prejudiced cases in which local commanders presided^ military 
justice was more severe in Lima than elsewhere. 

1 2 

Reqlamento para las milicias de infanterfa y caballerfa 

de la Is la de Cuba . Chapter II, article 2k; Chapter XI, article 
17. The number of times the crown was forced to legislate on 
this point is an indication that the procedural instructions 
were not always followed. See McAl ister, Fuero Mil i tar . pp. 
76-77. 

13 

Reqlamento para las milicias de infanterfa y caballerfa 

de la Isla de Cuba. Chapter IV, article 1; Chapter XI, article 20. 

Stei n, p. 81 . 

'' Noticias secretas, p. 1^1. 

AGlrAL 653^ Amat to Arriaga, Lima, November 3, 177^, P. 1. 

ANL:SG, legajo 2k, cuaderno 69^ Expediente de una compe - 
tencia de jur i sdi ccion, Lima, 179^. 

1 fi 

ANL:TM, legajo 5^ Expediente de una competencia de juris - 

di ccion. Lima, I8O8. 

^AGlrAL 1082, Letter from Caspar de Urquizu IbSnez to 
Areche. Lima, November 13, 1777^ P. 6. A search of the legajos 
of the T r i bunal Mil i tar in the Archive Nacional, Lima, produced 
only seven significant cases involving a conflict of jurisdiction 
between the military and ordinary jurisdictions during the years 
1752-1780. During the period I78O-I789 thirteen such cases exist, 
v/hile the number increases to forty-four during the period 1790- 
1800. During the two decades 1800-1821, 126 litigations of this 
sort were adjudicated. I arbitrarily regarded as "significant" 
any case in v/hich the fuero militar was an issue, and disregarded 
the num.erous cases involving minor debts or other issues in which 
the jurisdictional question was not being debated. 

20 

A sample of 190 cases examined in the Archi vo Nacion al , 

Lima , v/hich concerned a conflict between the civil and military 

jurisdiction, shows forty-eight being tried in the larger interior 

cities, with two being of uncertain location, another forty-eight 

being tried in the coastal provinces such as lea, Arequipa, or 

Lambayeque, and the remaining 125 being adjudicated in Lima, 

21 

ANL:TM, legajo 2, Expediente de u n a competencia de luris " 

d ice ion. Lima, 1793. 

^^AGI:AL 65^, Guirior to G^lvez, Lima, October 20, 1776, p. 1 



308 



Reales Cldulas, Reales Ordenes. Decretos, Autos y Bandos 
q ue se Guarden en el Archivo Histor ico-Mi nister io de Hacienda 
(Lima, 19^7), passim. 

^^AGI:E Jk, "Informe de las causas de la Rebel i&n de Tupac 
Amaru de Dn. Francisco Martinez y Acosta al Virey," San Felipe, 
August 30, 1781, p. 1 . 

AGI:AL 1^93;, Colonel Demetrio Egan to G^lvez, Lima, 
February 20, I78I, p. 1. 

ANL:TM, legajo k, Expediente de una competencia de juris - 
dicci6n , Tarma, I8OI. 

27 

ANL:TM, legajo 6, Ex pediente de una competencia de juris - 

d i cc ion. Acobamba, I809. 

28 .... 

ANL:TM, legajo 3, E xpediente de una competencia de juris - 

d ice ion. Lambayeque, 1798. 

29 

Aside from the racial issue, the tov/ns people disliked the 

training cadres sent to their provinces because they had to share 

the expense of maintaining these soldiers. This obligation was 

frequently challenged. See ANL:TM, legajo 3, E xpediente de una 

competencia de j ur i sd i cc i6n, lea, 1795. Pinillos v;as involved in 

several other cases set out in this chapter. 

30 

ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de iuris - 

d i cc ion, Lima, 1791. 

^^Humboldt, IV, 195. 

32 

ANL:TM, legajo 5; Expediente de una competencia de juris - 

d ice ion. Piura, I807. 

33 

Magal i Sarfatti, Spanish Bureaucrat ic-Patrimonial ism in 

America (Berkeley, 19o6), pp. 62, 95. 

^ ANLtSG, legajo ]k, cuad. 318, Expediente de una compe - 
tencia de jur isdi ccion, Lima, 1770. 

^^AGI:AL 673, Croix to the Marques de Sonora, Lima, March 
30, 1787, pp. 1-8; Memoria de Croix, pp. 86-88. 

^ ANL:TM, legajo 3, Expediente de una competencia de juris - 
d ice ion. Lima, 1793. 



309 



37 

■"A royal cedula of January H, Mil, stated that "Any 

individual holding the fuero militar with a will or without one 
shall have his estate divided by the Governor of the District." 
The royal order of February 3, 1 793» limited this right of governors 
to decide these cases to militiamen dying intestate only. Where a 
soldier left a will, they were executed by his commandant. ANLiTM^ 
legajo S, Expediente de una competencia de iur isdi ccion, Lambayeque_, 
1808. 

•J g 

BNL: Bandos Virreynales (l68^-l805) "Bando del Virrey don 
Ambrosio O'Higgins, Marques de Osorno^ espedido en Lima el 10 de 
Noviembre de 179^, por el que se ordena i ndist i ntamente a los mi- 
ll tares, que deben quedar comprehend idos en la Real PragmStica de 
matrimonios de 23 de Marzo de 1776"; ANL:TM, legajo 1, Expediente 
de una competencia de jur isdicci6n, Lima, 1813. 

39 

ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de una competencia de juris " 

dicci&n. Trujillo, 1810, 

40 

For example, Viceroy Croix noted in his Memor ia that military 

commandants and chaplains refused to verify the marital status of 

their soldiers, who frequently posed as civilians and gave false 

surnames when courting the local girls, and often contracted 

marriage under these pretenses, Hemoria de Croix, p. ^5. 

AGI.AL 653, Amat toArriaga, Lima, November \h, MIS, p. 1. 

hi 

Memor i a de Croix , p , k"^ , 

^3 

ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de u na competencia de juris " 

dicci&n. Chancay, l8ll, 

kh 

ANL:TM, legajo }, , Expediente de una competencia de juris - 

dicci6n , Lima, 1798. 

ANL:TM, legajo 6, Expediente de una competencia de juris - 
dicci6n. Lima, 1809. 

46 

One of the differences between this issue in Peru and Nev; 

Spain stems from the fact that Peru had an estimated 82,000 Negroes 

living primarily on the coast in a few cities, while New Spain had 

only 20,000. Haring, p. 203. For an example of this discretionary 

pov;er, see ANL:TM, legajo 2, Expediente de una competencia de juris " 

di cci6n. Lima, 1792. 

hi 

McAlister, Fuero Mi 1 itar , pp. 44-45, For a detailed analysis 

of the pardo militia in New Spain, see pp, 43-51, 

48 

ANL:SG, legajo 31; cuaderno 983 Expediente de una compe - 
tencia de iur isdicci6n . Lambayeque, 1791. 



310 



^9aNL:TMj legajo 2, Expediente de una competenc ia de iuris - 
dicci6n. Lambayeque, 1792. 

ANL:TM;, legajo i, Expediente de una competencia de iuris - 
di cci6n. LambayequC; 1792. 

^ ANL:TM, legajo S, Expediente de una competencia de juris - 
diccion, Huanta, 1810, For some interesting observations about the 
militia in Guamanga, see the Informe del Intendente de Guamanga . 
P. Deinetrio O'Hiqgins a] Ministro de Indias Dn . Mig uel Cayetano 
Sole r, in Juan and Ulloa, Noticias secretas, pp. 297-373, in which 
he describes the disorganization and loss of morale v;hich led to 
civil domination of the companies, 

^ ANL:TM, legajo 7, Expediente de una competencia de iuris - 
dicci6n, lea, 1813. 

Memoria de Abascal , pp. 11^+, 372. 

^ McAlister, Fuero Mi 1 itar, pp. 9-10. McAl ister states that 
after the Seven Years War the military magistracy began to consti- 
tute a significant part of the legal structure in Nev/ Spain. In 
Peru, because the role of the militia was less we i 1 developed, the 
viceroy retained both primary and appellate jurisdiction over both 
regulars and militia as had been the case during the seventeenth 
century. Since the viceroy was less likely to be swayed by passion 
or prejudice, than local commanders, this served as a check on 
mi 1 i tary amb i t ion. 

Alonso Carrio de la Vandera, Reforma del Peru, transcrip- 
cion y prologo de Pablo Macera (Lima, 1966), p. 8, The author 
also wrote the book El Lazarillo de cieqos caminantes in 1773 , 
which has been translated as Concolorcorvo, E l Lazar i 1 lo: A Guide 
for Inexperienced Travellers between Buenos Aires and Lima, 1773. 
translated by Walter D. Kline (Bl oomi ngton, Indiana, 1965), Con- 
colorcorvo v/as the pseudonym of Carrio, who came to Peru in 17^6 
from Spain, and served as a corregidor and visitador de correos. 
Married to a wealthy woman, who gave him financial independence, 
Carrio offers some insight into the elite mentality in Peru during 
the late eighteenth century. Pablo Macera is Professor of History 
at San Marcos and Peru's leading scholar of this period. 

56 

Carrio de la Vandera, pp, 29-30. 

^^ Ibid ., p, 101. 

ANL:TM, legajo 5, Expediente de una competencia de juris - 
d ice ion . Puno, 1808. Conflicts between intendants and military 



311 



commanders were repetitive^ especially in Cuzco^ according to Vice- 
roy Croix. AGI:AL 67O, Croix to the Marques de Sonora, Lima, 
August 5, 1786, p. 1; Memoria de Croix, pp. 215-217. In an order 
disallowing an auditor of war in that city, which was a ploy of 
the commandant Gabriel de Avil^s, to usurp the jurisdiction of the 
intendant, the king held that military commanders were subordinate 
to both the audiencia and the intendant in all except purely 
military matters, in which case the commander was required to confer 
with them. AGIrAL 1^+96, Royal Order to the Viceroy of Peru, El 
Pardo, March 5, 1787, p. 1 . 

59 

Sarfatti, p. 78, The reference is to Francois Bourricaud, 
a noted sociologist who has written extensively on the Peruvian 
ol igarchy. 



CONCLUSION 

The central conclusion reached in this study is that the 
reform of the Army of Peru begun during the Seven Years V/ar v/as 
abortive and that therefore a professional military did not 
evolve there by the end of the eighteenth century. The purpose 
of the reform had been to replace the veteran garrisons located 
along the coast with a disciplined provincial militia in an ef- 
fort to not only produce financial savings but also to extend 
the autfioi-;ty of the crown more widely throughout the viceroyalty. 
Yet by the end of the century the army still remained largely 
restricted to the littoral as it had been in the past. More- 
over^ it still relied primarily on presidial troops. A disci- 
plined militia had been created on the coast, but it was relatively 
small in relation to the size of the viceroyalty. The Army of 
Peru existed as such only in Lima and a few major coastal cities. 

Several factors had produced these results. The first of 
them vias the enormous size of the viceroyalty. An earlier Vice- 
roy of Peru_, the Harqu6s de Montesclaros, referred to the vice- 
regency as "a bronze giant with feet of clay/' in the sense that, 
while Spanish administration was theoretically supreme throughout 
the kingdom, in fact this authority was restricted to the larger 
cities and towns, and that the vast part of Peru was virtually 
autonomous of its jurisdiction. The great size of Peru had a 



312 



313 



definite effect on the success of the military reform. In the 
first placCj it caused both the Spanish and Cuban militia regula- 
tions to be unsuitable for the viceroyalty. Since the tov;ns and 
cities in Peru vjere widely separated, their militia were similarly 
dispersed and were consequently unable to operate as tactical 
units or to aid other provinces in time of war. The great distance 
also made communications difficult. Frequently royal orders or 
regulations were not forv;arded to the provinces or the local of- 
ficials chose not to enforce them. For these reasons, the size 
and training of the provincial militia never had a uniform basis 
in Peru. The size of Peru also caused provincial autonomy which 
v/as a worry to Spanish authorities in Lima. In an effort to train 
and discipline the provincial militia these authorities dispatched 
veteran training officers to the provinces, but due to their abhor- 
rence of these areas and the authorities' inability to pay their 
salaries, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Moreover, 
the scarcity of whites in the interior limited the number of loyal 
men to whom the crown dared to grant commissions in the militia. 
Consequently, commissions in these interior regiments were granted 
or sold to v/ealthy residents of Lima, who rarely, if ever, travelled 
to these regions to inspect or train the soldiers under their 
command. 

The leadership gap which this produced and the potential for 
violence v;hich the interior held became evident during the period 
1777"1782 which coincided with the visitation of Jos6 Antonio de 
Areche to Peru. Although the visitation had been executed earlier 



31^ 



by Jos^ de G^lvez with great success in New Spain^ it failed in 
Peru due largely to the power struggle v/hich developed between 
Areche and Viceroy Manuel de Guirior, This weakened the vice- 
regal administration during a critical period which v/ould have 
severely tested any reform program in Peru, since it further 
divided the Spaniards and Creoles whose cooperation vyas an essential 
prerequisite to the success of the Bourbon innovations. 

This disruptive situation was aggravated by Spain's constant 
involvement in a series of European v;ars. These came at a time 
when the free trade regulations had decreased the volume of Peru- 
vian commerce and the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Rfo de 
La Plata had removed from Peru the silver mines of Charcas which 
constituted the richest sources of its vyealth. Each declaration 
of v;ar required Peru to send heavy military subsidies to other 
regions within the empire, and consequently placed severe finan- 
cial limitations upon future military reform itself. In order 
to pay the salaries of veteran training cadres for the provincial 
militia, as required in the Cuban Militia Regulation, Areche had 
attempted to tax the mixed bloods who comprised the enlisted 
strength of the coastal militia. Their refusal to pay this tax, 
and their successful resistance of efforts designed to force 
this payment further v;eakened the military reform and demonstrated 
the inability of the authorities in Lima to rule in the provinces. 
The combination of the above factors raises the hypothesis that 
often the Bourbon reforms worked at cross -purposes with one an- 
other, rather than as a unified v^/ho1e, a factor which might serve 



315 



to explain their lack of overall success in Peru. 

With the advent of the Indian rebellions in 1780^ the fail- 
ure of the Spanish authorities in Peru to organize and discipline 
an interior militia became quite evident. Not only were these 
militia considered by the Spanish military commanders to be use- 
lessj but also because both the officers and men in these units 
were mixed bloods^ and frequently sympathetic with the objectives 
of the Indian rebels, the government began to regard them as a 
positive threat to internal security. As a direct result, the 
majority of the militia regiments in the interior v^ere disbanded 
after 178'+ and the defense of this region was transferred to two 
veteran regiments sent from Spain. Such a decision was a tacit 
admission that the reform of the militia in the interior had 
failed in its objective of providing a measure of internal security 
to the area. 

Thereafter, the reform of the militia was restricted to 
the coast v/here the loyalty of the Negroes was more certain, and 
where large numbers of regular troops were stationed. Yet by 
the end of the century Spanish military officials felt only the 
militia of Lima vjould be able to defend the kingdom successfully 
in the event of a seaborne invasion. The conclusion can only be 
reached that, with the possible exception of Lima, no professional 
military ethic had developed in Peru by the end of the colonial 
period. Visitor General Escobedo referred to the militia as "a 
useless fantasy," and as late as 1803 Viceroy Gabriel de Avil^s 



316 



concluded that the persons who joined the militia did so only to 
be able to wear the uniform and exercise the fuero militar, but 

that they had no intention of meeting the obligations of an of- 

2 
ficer v;hich accompanied these privileges. Why this ethic 

failed to develop is difficult to determine^ but certainly the 

Isolation of Peru^ which served as its best defense against foreign 

attack, made it extremely difficult to keep the army on a v^artime 

footing. Secondly_, the fact that Creoles in Peru were not excluded 

from holding positions of civil responsibility meant that the army 

v;a5 only one of several avenues of advancement open to them, a 

factor which might have diminished military prestige somev^hat. 

After 1786 the militia was reduced in size and the Spanish 

authorities in Peru reverted to the use of veteran troops as the 

basis of defense as had been the practice during the seventeenth 

century. This effort also failed, hov;ever, since Peninsular 

Spaniards either resigned or deserted from the service in order to 

make their fortunes in nonmilitary pursuits. By I787 the veteran 

Soria and Extremadura Regiments v;ere disbanded. In their place, 

the fijo Royal Regiment of Lima, which the government had reduced 

in size as an economy measure following the Indian rebellions, 

was tripled in size and called upon to form the basis of the 

Peruvian army. Viceroy Teodoro de Croix, however, hoped to limit 

to half the number of Creoles in this regiment in order to preserve 

it as a Spanish unit. But the Spaniards for one reason or another 

refused to join and by 1800 the regiment had become a creole body. 



317 



Contrary to the situation in Chile, where Spanish soldiers were 
constantly deployed against the Araucanian Indians and thereby 
won considerable prestige, the factionalism between Creoles and 

Spaniards in the Army of Peru did not cease and the latter never 

3 

became an integral element of society. Instead, by the end of 

the century the defense of Peru vjas largely in the hands of 
Creoles v;hom the Spanish regarded as inferior soldiers and whom 
the crov/n had suspected of disloyalty during the Indian wars. In 
this sense the reform of the veteran component of the Army of 
Peru was also less than successful, 

A second conclusion reached in this dissertation is that 
because the Army of Peru failed to achieve the povyer and prestige 
which a successful reform might have brought about, it was less 
able to assert its fuero at the expense of the civil jurisdiction 
than in other areas v;here the reform was more widespread. in 
Peru, the interior militia v^ere first placed in an urban clas- 
sification and later abolished altogether. Since the king 
restricted the fuero of the urban militia sharply after I786, the 
opportunity for this component to utilize it was circumscribed. 

In the coastal provinces, the disciplined militia also 
failed to become a disruptive element in society for several 
reasons. To begin v;ith, the Cuban Regulation was not uniformly 
applied in Peru, v;ith the result that, as on Chiloe, militiamen 
were not infrequently tried by civil authorities for their crimes. 
Secondly, in the provinces where the regulation v^as applied, 
military justice tended to favor the nobility v;hich comprised the 



318 



officer corps, but this favoritism did not alv/ays extend down to 
the mixed bloods who served as junior officers and noncommissioned 
officers. The question of pardo militia privileges bore a special 
significance to the whites of Peru since the percentage of these 
blacks to the total population was much higher than in some other 
areas such as New Spain. The result was that civil authorities 
often tried to suppress the rights of any black militia v;ho dared 
to assert the rights of his fuero. 

The Creoles of Peru, viho comprised a large part of the of- 
ficer corps, were, according to several authorities, a conservative 
group for the most part. Moreover, they v;eie not a homogeneous 
body, but v/ere divided among themselves on many issues. Only 
their common hatred of Spaniards and castes could unite them to 
any degree.-' In Peru, as a result of the violent eighteenth 
century Indian revolts, the Creoles' hatred of the Spaniards 
was exceeded by their fear of the castes. For this reason, Spanish 
and Creole officers frequently refused to exert great efforts to 
defend pardo militia whose rights had been violated by the civil 
jurisdiction. The fact that the civil jurisdiction in Peru v;as 
older than the military and was enforced by men of power and 
prestige in the community no doubt reinforced this tendency. There- 
fore, if a conflict of jurisdiction between the civil and military 
authorities arose, loyalties often followed racial rather than 
institutional lines, and frequently the military cooperated with 
civil authorities in an effort to secure fair treatment both forther 



319 



9el\es and their subordinates in the future. This lack of internal 
unity prevented the military in Peru from acting as a pov/erful 
corporate interest group. 

In Lima the situation was somewhat different. There military 
ambition seems to have been checked by a strict code of military 
justice v/fiich v;as often administered by the viceroy himself. Also^ 
because the militia were generally not considered to be the de- 
fenders of the kingdoai^ courts were therefore less willing to 
forgive their crimes and to grant them special privileges. 

The significance of the conclusions reached above is two- 
fold. First^ the fact that several of the Bourbon reforms in 
Peru, including the visitation, the mining measures, and the 
military reform all failed to produce the results which they 
had achieved in Hevj Spain, indicated that the effect of these 
measures was not uniform throughout the empire. Historian Carlos 
Daniel ValcSrcel has stated that an understanding of Bourbon Peru 
is a point of departure for an understanding of the problems of 
contemporary Peru. If this is so, a detailed study of the 
Bourbon Reforms and their effect upon that area would seem to 
be a highly desirable undertaking. Unless this is done, the 
erroneous assumption that their effect was the same on all 
regions tends to be honored in the breach. 

Secondly, the failure to achieve a true military reform in 
Peru may help to explain the absence of a praetorian tradition 
there at the end of the colonial period. The fact that the 



320 



reform did not extend uniformly throughout the viceroyalty, and 
that racial friction plagued it^ meant that the military could 
not function effectively as a corporate interest group. Since 
it could not^ it did not disrupt traditional institutions in 
Peru as it did in New Spain. Historian Carlos Pereyra feels 
that these traditional institutions were preserved longer in 
Peru than elsev/here in Spanish America, and that they counter- 
acted and effectively suppressed tendencies towards rebellion. 

With the disappearance of the authority and prestige of the 
Spanish crown after I8O8 the restraints imposed by the civil 
authority upon the military slov/ly began to erode. But as R. A. 

Humphreys asserts, it was the wars of independence that fastened 

o 
militarism on many of the nevj republics. During and after this 

chaotic period, the soldier in Peru, as elsewhere, began to 

consider himself to be the indispensable man. Moreover, tfie 

militia and clergy were the only two organized classes to emerge 

9 
in Peru during the postv;ar period. if the roots of a praetorian 

tradition in Peru are to be found^ i,t_-,lS-.£!uj.in3_thIs time that one_ 

must begin the search. 



321 



Notes 



Memoria de Abascal. p, Ixi. 

2 

Konetzke, Sud und Mi ttel -Amer ika, 1^ I63. 

^ Ibid .. p. 160. 

Donald Marquand Dozer, Latin America; an Inte r pretive 
History (New York, I962), p. 203; Pike, pp. hz-hk; Stein, pp. 
110-111, 



■^Sarfatti, pp. 62, 92. 

Carlos Daniel Valc^rcel, "Peru borbonico y emancipacion, " 
Revista de Historia de America, L (December, I96O), i+33. 

'Carlos Pereyra, Historia de America Espanola (Madrid, 1925), 

VI I, 330. 

o 
Humphreys, p. 222. 

9 
Jorge Basadre, "Bosquejo sobre la clase militar en los 

primeros arios de la Republica," Mercurio Peruano. No. 117 (Lima, 

March, 1928), pp. I8I-I83, 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Manuscript Materials 
This dissertation is in large part based upon manuscript 
material from the Archivo Nacional, Lima and the Archivo General 
de Indias in Seville^, Spain. For a listing of the different sub- 
sections consulted, see the Note on Citations in the preliminary 
pages. Because of the great number of documents involved, the 
author has not listed the titles of these individually. 

Printed Materials 

Official DocLiments and 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 

Leon George Campbell^ Jr. was born May 8^ 1938^ in Los Angeles^ 
California^ the son of Dr. and Mrs. Leon Campbell of Pasadena. He 
graduated from the Woodberry Forest School in Woodberry Forest, 
Virginia, before entering Stanford University where he vyas a member 
of Zeta Ps i fraternity and on the varsity track team, graduating 
in i960 with a Bachelor of Arts in History. He subsequently served 
in the United States Army at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, 
before enrolling in the Graduate School of Stanford University where 
he earned a Master of Arts in Hispanic-American Studies in 1965. In 
September of that year he entered the University of Florida where he 
has remained enrolled until the present time. His studies were 
supported by several departmental ass istantshi ps and a research 
associatesliip in the Center for Latin American Studies. In I968 
he v/as av;arded a Ful br ight -Hays Research Fellowship to Peru and 
Spain for viork in Peruvian colonial history. Mr. Campbell is 
married to the former Abigail Blake Adams of Piedmont, California. 
They are the parents of George Blake, Sal lie Adams, and Margarita 
Campbell. He is currently Assistant Professor of History at the 
University of California, Riverside. 



This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the 
chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been 
approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to 
the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate 
Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the require- 
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 



June^ 1970 



2lA 



Dean, College of Arts 'and tdiences 




Dean, Graduate School 



Supeuvisory Committee 



li rman '